Relations between Townspeople and Rural Nobles in late medieval Germany: A Study of Nuremberg in the 1440s by POPE, BENJAMIN, JOHN
Durham E-Theses
Relations between Townspeople and Rural Nobles in late
medieval Germany: A Study of Nuremberg in the 1440s
POPE, BENJAMIN, JOHN
How to cite:
POPE, BENJAMIN, JOHN (2016) Relations between Townspeople and Rural Nobles in late medieval
Germany: A Study of Nuremberg in the 1440s, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham
E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11492/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
1Relations between 
Townspeople and Rural 
Nobles in late medieval 
Germany
A Study of Nuremberg in the 1440s
Benjamin John Pope
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in the Department of History, Durham 
University
2015
2CONTENTS
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
 The Medieval Debate .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  9
 ‘Not exactly established’: Historians, Towns and Nobility.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 18
  Liberals and Romantics .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 20
  The ‘Crisis’ of the Nobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
  Erasing the Divide .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 29
  The Widening Divide?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
 Questions and Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
  Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	 	 Defining	Townspeople	and	Rural	Nobles .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 40
  Approaches and Objectives.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 45
2. The Town.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 47
 Residence and Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
 The Status of Nobles in Nuremberg  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
 Imperial, Princely and Noble Events in Nuremberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
  Imperial and Princely Occasions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 64
  Noble Occasions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 66
 Nobles and Nuremberg’s Churches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
 The Urban Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
 Hosts and Agents .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 78
 Conclusion: the distant centre? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3. The Countryside: Lordship and Land.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 83
 Who’s Whose? Contested Peasants and Burghers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
 Burghers as Rural Landowners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
 Townspeople under Noble Lordship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
 Nobles and Townspeople as Rural Neighbours .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  111
 Land and Territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
 Conclusion: holding the balance? .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 127
4. The Countryside: Security and Control .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 129
 Nobles as Protectors: Roads, Tolls and Markets .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 131
 Nobles as the Threat: Robbery and Insecurity .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 141
 Robbery on the Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
 Responses to Insecurity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
  Patrols, Arrests and Punishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
  Nobles’ Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
 Conclusion: insecurity and ideological control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
35. Communities and Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
 Contact and Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
  Means and Places of Communication .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 199
  Information and Suspicion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
  Messages and Meanings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
 Political Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
  Imperial and Regional Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
  Peacemaking and Patronage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
  Princes vs. Towns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
 Conclusion: growing apart together?.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 250
 
6. Alliance and Service.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 253
 Allies and Servitors .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 254
 Duties and Lordship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
 Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
 Conclusion: turning outwards, facing inwards?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
7.	Feud	and	Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
 Background and Origins .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 287
 The Conduct of Feuds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
  Diplomacy and Propaganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
  The Spiral of Violence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
 Settlements and Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
 Conclusion: feuders together and apart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
8. Conclusion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 319
9. Bibliography .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 325
 Primary Sources.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 325
 Secondary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
Maps
1. Nuremberg in Upper Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Nuremberg in Franconia and Surrounding Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Nuremberg’s Noble Allies in the 1440s.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 275
4. Nuremberg’s Feud Opponents in the 1440s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Illustrations
1. Mural depicting the legend of Eppelein von Gailingen  . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2. Tüchersfeld, 42 km north east of Nuremberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3. Parsberg castle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
4. Funerary hatchment for Werner von Parsberg, St Laurence’s church,
 Nuremberg  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
4Abbreviations
BB Briefbuch (StAN Rep. 61a Briefbücher des inneren Rats)
ChrdtSt Karl von Hegel et al. (eds.), Chroniken der deutschen Städte, 37 
vols. (Leipzig, 1862–1968; reprinted Göttingen, 1961–1969)
fl.	 florins
Regesta Boica Carl Heinrich von Lang, Josef Widemann, Maximilian von 
Freyberg, Georg Thomas Rudhart (eds.), Regesta sive rerum 
boicarum autographa, 13 vols. (Munich, 1822–1854)
Regesta Imperii Regesta Imperii, accessed at www.regesta-imperii.de
RB Ratsbuch (StAN Rep. 60b Ratsbücher)
RTA  Deutsche Reichstagsakten, Ältere Reihe, 21 vols. (1867–2001)
StAAm Staatsarchiv Amberg
StadtAAm Stadtarchiv Amberg
StAN  Staatsarchiv Nürnberg
Names
Names of people and places are given in their German form, unless – for places – 
there is a widely recognized English equivalent (e.g. ‘Munich’ for ‘München’), 
or – for people – the English form is likely to be more familiar to the reader as an 
appelation	for	that	particular	individual	(this	applies	chiefly	to	kings	and	emperors,	
e.g. ‘Frederick’ for ‘Friedrich’). The names of places outside of the Federal Republic 
of	Germany	which	had	large	German-speaking	populations	during	the	fifteenth	
century	are	given	in	German,	with	their	modern	names	in	brackets	after	the	first	
mention	(e.g.	‘Eger	(Cheb)’),	unless	this	modern	name	is	likely	to	be	significantly	
more familiar to the English reader (e.g. ‘Bratislava’ for ‘Pressburg’). The names of 
places in the modern-day Czech Republic which clearly derive from German (and 
their associated toponyms) are given in their German form only (e.g. ‘Sternberg’ 
for	’Šternberk’).	Of	the	two	most	common	fifteenth-century	forms	for	the	names	of	
German-speaking nobles – ‘Friedrich von Murach’ or ‘Friedrich Muracher’ – the 
‘von’-form is used, unless only the latter is found in the sources. 
The German term Land is	 difficult	 to	 translate.	 In	 different	 contexts	 it	 can	 be	
rendered as ‘land’, ‘countryside’, ‘territory’, ‘region’, ‘province’ and more besides. 
To avoid confusion, Land and its compounds are therefore given in German 
without translation throughout the thesis. The compounds used are: Landgericht – a 
court with jurisdiction over a Land; Landrichter – a presiding judge in a Landgericht; 
Landfriede – a peace association of individuals and corporations within a Land; 
Landvogt –	an	administrative	official	with	responsibility	within	a	Land, particularly 
(in	the	fifteenth	century)	in	the	Habsburg	dynastic	territories.
Abbreviations have been silently expanded in transcriptions from manuscript sources.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should 
be published without the author’s prior written consent and information 
derived from it should be acknowledged.
Map terrain layers courtesy of maps-for-free.com, used with permission. All 
other images created by the author.
5Acknowledgements
The research for this thesis was made possible by funding from the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council, the Institute for Historical Research, the German 
Historical Institute in London, the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher 
Akademischer Austauschdienst), the German History Society, the Royal Historical 
Society, and Durham University.
I am very much indebted to my supervisor, Len Scales, who has supported my 
work with tremendous patience and good judgement. Many other historians 
have taken the time to discuss my work with me, including Martial Staub, Andy 
Wood and Justin Willis. I especially thank Joseph Morsel for meeting me at Rouen 
in May 2011. I am grateful to Gabriel Zeilinger, Bridget Heal, Lyndal Roper and 
Hannah Murphy for invitations to speak at events which helped me to develop 
my	ideas,	and	to	Peter	and	Elke	Jezler	for	their	hospitality	at	Schaffhausen	in	May	
2014. Andy Burn helped to set my database on the right track; Suzana Miljan, 
Katherine Kent and Angela Huang provided useful research leads. In addition, it 
has been a pleasure to discuss Nuremberg, Germany, and late medieval history 
with Amy Newhouse, Duncan Hardy and Mark Whelan.
The	 staff	 of	 the	 Hauptstaatsarchiv	 München,	 the	 Staatsarchiv	 Amberg,	 the	
Stadtarchiv Amberg, and especially the Staatsarchiv Nürnberg have been 
extremely	helpful	and	welcoming,	as	have	the	staff	of	the	Germanisches	National	
Museum. The museum’s accommodation for visiting researchers was a perfect 
lodging	during	extended	periods	of	archival	work.	The	staff	of	the	Parsberg	castle	
museum were also very generous in allowing me to use their collection. My father 
and sister, Ian and Emma, proofread the entire thesis, though any mistakes which 
remain are of course entirely my responsibility.
My family, friends and fellow PhD students who have supported me in so many 
ways	over	 the	past	five	years	 cannot	all	be	named	here,	but	 I	 am	nonetheless	
grateful	to	all	of	them	individually.	The	final	word	belongs	to	my	mother,	Clare,	
with	whom	I	first	explored	the	world	around	me.
6
71.
INTRODUCTION
Historians have in recent years formulated a number of dualities to express the 
essential ambiguity which they see in relations between townspeople and the 
rural nobility in late medieval Germany: ‘contact and conflict’ (Katrin Keller); 
‘cooperation and confrontation’ (Rolf Kießling); ‘enemies and exemplars’ (Klaus 
Graf); ‘attraction and exclusion’ (Steffen Krieb).1 This ambivalence serves a very 
definite purpose: it aims to rescue our conception of the relationship between 
these two social groups from a long-standing belief that their interaction in the 
late Middle Ages was dominated by differentiation, misunderstanding and 
mutual antagonism arising from a fundamental clash of cultures which was 
playing itself out in Germany over many centuries. From the Enlightenment 
to the early years of the Cold War, a consensus of opinion held that inveterate 
hostility between townspeople and rural nobles in late medieval Germany was 
the first serious engagement in a trans-epochal battle for the German people’s 
identity and destiny, an ongoing war between reason and feeling, between 
freedom and autocracy, between conservative and liberal, between aristocracy 
and bourgeoisie.
When it is set down in such distinctly modern terms we see the glaring anachronism 
of this clash-of-cultures worldview in relation to the late Middle Ages. With the 
advantage of a certain distance from some of the bitter struggles which gave 
rise to this way of seeing the world, historians since the Second World War have 
quietly consigned it to its own chapter of history. This has been a project for some, 
1. Katrin Keller, ’Kontakte und Konflikte. Kleinstadt und Adel am Beginn der Frühen Neuzeit’, 
in Helmut Bräuer and Elke Schlenkrich (eds.), Die Stadt als Kommunikationsraum. Beiträge 
zur Stadtgeschichte vom Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Karl Czok zum 75. 
Geburtstag (Leipzig, 2001); Rolf Kießling, Die Stadt und ihr Land. Umlandpolitik, Bürgerbesitz 
und Wirtschaftsgefüge in Ostschwaben vom 14. bis 16. Jahrhundert (Cologne & Vienna, 1989), 
p. 84: ‘Kooperation und Konfrontation’; Klaus Graf, ’Feindbild und Vorbild. Bemerkungen 
zur städtischen Wahrnehmung des Adels’, Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins, 141, 
NF 102 (1993); Steffen Krieb, ’Anziehung und Abgrenzung. Zum ambivalenten Verhältnis 
von Stadt und Adel im späten Mittelalter’, unpublished paper presented at the conference 
‘Turnier, Tanz und Totengedenken. Stadt und Adel im Mittelalter’ (Schaffhausen, 2014).
8and certainly not all, historians in Germany and beyond, and it has found little 
public resonance, even if (and perhaps because) the old dichotomy of town and 
nobility no longer has its former hold on the collective imagination. Nonetheless, 
the rewriting of the history of the relationship between townspeople and nobles 
in medieval Germany has the potential not only to reveal late medieval society 
and its social identities on their own terms, but also to uncover the myth-
making processes by which these identities were transfigured to address later 
preoccupations. Currently historians are exploring both the otherness of the 
Middle Ages in this respect – rejecting the ‘clash of cultures’ in favour of the 
integration of rural nobilities and urban elites – and models of the late Middle 
Ages as a period which witnessed a growing opposition between ‘town’ and 
‘noble’ identities, a dichotomy which was bequeathed to later centuries and on 
which was hung so many other ideas about German society.
This therefore presents an exciting challenge: not only to test the different 
hypotheses and their consequences for German history more generally, but also 
to break down generalizations and to resolve supposed paradoxes. The dualities 
with which we began present juxtaposed, contradictory models of the relationship 
between the generalities of ‘townspeople’ and ‘rural nobles’. The generalities 
are difficult to prise apart without atomizing them into a myriad of individuals 
whose experience can only be understood as unique to themselves, and the 
juxtapositions are unintelligible as real, individually experienced structures 
of thought – not because people are not capable of holding two contradictory 
beliefs at once, as clearly we all are, but because even contradictory ideas (such 
as ‘cooperation and conflict’) cannot simply coexist; they must interact and shape 
one another. We must define intellectually and locate socially the contours of 
different late medieval models for understanding these relationships, and map 
their movement in relation to one another over time. We might reasonably expect 
to find that different models of understanding will be more or less associated with 
particular places and times, and that this will help us to develop more helpful 
generalizations than broad categories such as ‘town’ and ‘nobility’.
9This is ultimately a study of social identity within a fascinating relationship 
which was defined by the symbiosis of town and country yet marked by deeply 
antagonistic discourses about town and nobility. The specific German context is 
partly a terrain to be explored for its own sake, and partly an environment which 
provides unique conditions for one iteration of a universal enquiry into how we 
understand and misunderstand other people. Factors such as the extreme political 
decentralization of the late medieval Holy Roman Empire and the economic and 
political position of the towns within German society will continually recur, and 
these particular German issues will be in constant dialogue with general human 
issues of identity and its associated patterns of thought: xenophobia, instinctive 
solidarities, categorization, prejudice, stereotyping and so on. These bigger 
questions will necessarily remain in the background as we focus on the details of 
one particular case, but they remain at the heart of the undertaking.
The Medieval Debate
There was a lively debate throughout the German Middle Ages on the 
relationship between the urban, commercial world and various ideals and social 
groups which were taken to represent ‘nobility’. Just how far ‘nobility’ in general 
(as opposed to ‘rural nobility’ in particular) can be separated from urbanity in 
medieval Germany is a question which we will have to address. But first it is 
vital to consider how this basic dichotomy between ‘urban and commercial’ and 
‘noble’ evolved between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries.
The courtly-chivalric literary culture which emerged in the German-speaking 
lands in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries made extensive use of the 
‘noble’ and the ‘merchant’ as a pair of stock figures with didactic content. The 
merchant figure was typically avaricious, deceitful and cowardly, in contrast to the 
nobleman’s generosity, moderation, honesty and physical bravery. These were the 
positive noble virtues which the merchant figure reinforced and re-emphasized 
within a literary work by embodying their negative. Even apparently sympathetic 
10
literary depictions of the ‘good merchant’ rested on this characterization and 
served a didactic role. For instance, the charitable merchant Gerhard in Rudolf 
von Ems’ Der guote Gêrhart (c.1220) exposes the failings of nobles in the same tale 
precisely because the merchant is not expected to be generous,2 and in Wolfram 
von Eschenbach’s Willehalm (before 1217) the character of Wimar, a merchant of 
noble birth, shames the nobles at the court of Louis the Pious by offering the 
high-born Willehalm exemplary hospitality when he is shunned by his peers.3 
Although both Gerhard and Wimar are presented as residents of towns, the town 
per se does not feature as the antithesis of the nobility; indeed, both merchants 
are simultaneously townspeople and at least semi-noble (of noble origin, or 
participating in chivalric culture).4
During the fourteenth century some of the characteristics of the anti-chivalric 
’merchant’ become associated with the ‘burgher’, who typically has wealth 
without any sense of generosity.5 In the first half of the fifteenth century, a song by 
Oswald von Wolkenstein (c.1377–1455) expressly thematized a dispute between a 
burgher and a courtier (hofman), who compete to please an old lady. The courtier’s 
foolish jumping and jousting have no appeal for her compared to the burgher’s 
sack of money, but he turns out to be a liar and a miser.6 Wolkenstein’s burgher 
2. Rudolf von Ems, Der guote Gêrhart, ed. John A. Asher, 3rd ed. (Tübingen, 1989). For this 
interpretation of the guote Gêrhart see Kurt Ruh, ’Versuch einer Begriffsbestimmung 
von ‘städtischer Literatur’ im deutschen Spätmittelalter’, in Josef Fleckenstein and Karl 
Stackmann (eds.), Über Bürger, Stadt und städtische Literatur im Spätmittelalter. Bericht 
über Kolloquien der Kommission zur Erforschung der Kultur des Spätmittelalters 1975-1977 
(Göttingen, 1980), pp. 324-325.
3. Wolfram von Eschenbach, Willehalm, eds. Werner Schröder and Dieter Kartschoke, 3rd ed. 
(Berlin, 2003), vv. 130-139. For Wimar’s noble birth see v. 131,1: ‘Der was von ritters art 
erborn’.
4. On the topos of noble and merchant see also Ulrich Andermann, Ritterliche Gewalt und 
bürgerliche Selbstbehauptung. Untersuchungen zur Kriminalisierung und Bekämpfung des 
spätmittelalterlichen Raubrittertums am Beispiel norddeutscher Hansestädte (Frankfurt am Main, 
1991), p. 82; Ursula Peters, Literatur in der Stadt. Studien zu den sozialen Voraussetzungen und 
kulturellen Organisationsformen städtischer Literatur im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 
1983), p. 58.
5. For instance in the poems of Heinrich der Teichner (c.1310–1372/78), discussed in 
Thomas Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt des deutschen Spätmittelalters. Erscheinungsformen und 
Verhaltensweisen’, Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins, 141, NF 102 (1993), pp. 42-43 
and Peters, Literatur in der Stadt, pp. 53-54.
6. Oswald von Wolkenstein, Die Lieder Oswalds von Wolkenstein, eds. Hans Moser, Norbert 
Richard Wolf, and Notburga Wolf (Tübingen, 1987), no. 25.
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has become part of a more differentiated discourse than the straightforward 
opposition of ‘merchant’ and ‘noble’, but he is clearly part of the traditional 
presentation of urbanity and commerce as equivalent to dishonest cupidity. These 
stereotypes are not accurate depictions of medieval merchants and burghers, 
and the discourses about social morality which they populate need not have any 
relation to a particular social divide or conflict between townspeople and nobles. 
Nonetheless, they were very powerful and long-lasting images.
A discussion about ‘town’ and ‘nobility’ only really becomes visible in the fifteenth 
century, and initially in the form of polemics which presented townspeople as 
upstart peasants foolishly posing as nobles. For instance, the citizens of Würzburg 
in rebellion against their bishop in 1400 were caricatured along the lines of an old 
tradition of peasant parody (associated with the poet Neidhart) by Bernhard von 
Uissigheim, who fought against them, and in 1449 Margrave Albrecht ‘Achilles’ 
of Brandenburg-Ansbach sponsored a number of lyrics which praised him as 
a defender of the nobility against the arrogance of the ‘peasants behind walls’ 
during his conflict with the city of Nuremberg.7 Around 1440 a group of nobles 
in south-western Upper Germany were also propagating the idea that the towns 
were ‘oppressing’ the nobility in the context of a series of feuds between these 
nobles and the Swabian League of imperial towns (see below, pp. 248-249). All of 
these discourses were explicitly partial, and it is not certain that they found any 
particular resonance amongst the nobility at large.
But one anonymous text does give the impression that a wider debate was taking 
place about town and nobility and their proper relationship to one another. We 
know next to nothing about the origins of this brief work, except that it appears 
alongside other social and political commentaries in a manuscript which was 
probably created in northern Bavaria in the third quarter of the fifteenth century.8 
7. Sonja Kerth, ’Bernhard von Uissigheim: Vom Würzburger Städtekrieg’, Historisches Lexikon 
Bayerns, (2013), accessed 17.11.2015: http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/artikel/
artikel_45645. For Achilles’ propaganda see below pp. 241-250.
8. Karin Schneider (ed.), Die deutschen Handschriften der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek München. 
Die mittelalterlichen Handschriften aus Cgm 4001-5247 (Wiesbaden, 1996), pp. 419-422.
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The prose text is headed: ‘Here pleads the natural lordship of the nobility before 
the highest judges – pope, cardinals, emperor and the seven electors – against 
the haughty burghers’, and takes the form of a fictional court case with both 
the nobles’ ‘complaint’ and the burghers’ reply, followed by verses in which the 
judges named at the outset discuss justice in general but reach no decision on this 
particular case (henceforth referred to as The Complaint of the Natural Lordship of 
the Nobility).9 The nobles allege that the burghers ‘are appropriating, seizing and 
buying up princely lordship – towns, castles, lands, people and property – all of 
which is illegal according to their statutes, and they are building thereon fortresses 
and castles and wish themselves to be rulers, judges and noblemen, all without 
reason; by this means they scorn their own fellow citizens and inhabitants within 
the city walls and depart from the laws of the unity of the citizenship’.10 Burghers 
should cease their attempts to rule on their own account (mit freyem willen) and 
through violence, as by this means they take from the nobility its natural lordship, 
‘just as in Lombardy where there is continuous war and unrest’.11 They should 
live within the walls, pursue trade and commerce, and pay tolls and taxes to the 
nobles so that these can protect their subjects according to ‘divine and natural 
law’.12
The burghers reply that they have purchased various lordships from princes 
and nobles according to imperial law, which they hope no ‘nobility which comes 
from virtue’ would deny them.13 They go on to complain that the nobles are 
oppressing burghers with new tolls and taxes and with charges for safe conduct 
on the imperial roads, which by right ought to be free; this is contrary to the 
9. Bayerische Staatsbibliothek ms. Cgm 4930 f. 20r-23v: ‘hie clagt die naturlich herschafft des 
adels den obersten richtern Babst Cardinal Keyser und den siben kurfursten vber die hohen 
burger’.
10. ibid f. 20r: ‘wie daz sie sich vntercziehen tringen vnd abkawffen der fursten herschafft stet 
sloß lant leut vnd gut, Das als mit rechts recht nicht sein sol nach Innwonung ir statut vnd 
pawen darein festen vnd sloz vnd wellen selbs herschen richter vnd edel sein vnberuffter 
sach damit sie versmehen ir eigen eytgenossen vnd Innwoner der statmawr vnd tretten ab 
von den gepoten ir einigkeit der burgerschafft’.
11. ibid f. 20v: ‘damit sie nemen dem adel sein naturlich herrschafft iren gewalt und suchen 
den zuvertreiben als zu lamparten da albeg krig und unfrid ist’.
12. ibid f. 20v: ‘die gotlichen und natürlichen gegesetz’ [sic].
13. ibid f. 21r: ‘adel der auß tugent kumen’.
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‘divine and natural law’ which the nobility themselves invoked. Out of ‘envy, 
hatred and arrogance’ the nobility wish to oppress imperial subjects with war 
and robbery and make them their slaves, as the heathens do, and break apart the 
Holy Roman Empire.14 Therefore the towns say to the ‘nobility that comes from 
virtue’, which was originally rooted in the towns: as members of the Empire the 
burghers are permitted to make peace (frid czu machen) for those who desire it – 
peasants, artisans and merchants (who are the ‘crown’ of the nobility: for what 
would the nobility be without subjects?) – and with these three ‘races’ (geslechten) 
the burghers wish to take up the imperial banner against all those who oppose 
divine and natural law. Thus the townspeople are not only given the last word, 
but also a longer and more detailed speech than the nobility, and one which ends 
with a rousing battle cry. This might suggest that the author sympathizes with 
the towns, though he (or she) can see both points of view.15 We do not know 
that either of these perspectives ever existed outside of the author’s imagination, 
though we will see that many of the individual ideas from this text appear in 
others as well.
Whatever the origins and influence of the Complaint, it must be read alongside a 
debate about the relative social standing of certain members of the rural nobility 
and the wealthy, elite burghers of important towns, centred on the rights of 
these elite burghers to take a full part in the nobility’s premier social occasions. 
Participants had long been required to prove their nobility, and this procedure 
was becoming increasingly exacting. A tournament at Schaffhausen in 1436 is the 
first known occasion on which all those taking part were required to demonstrate 
14. ibid f. 21r: ‘Vnd durch solichs neyd haß vnd hohmutz willen, den sie tragen, wollen sie die 
undertan des reichs verdrucken vnd verderben mit krig mort prant und raub, abnemen 
den leib und gut unverschulter sach und wöllen in dy zu aygen machen als dy haÿden 
thun, und daz heilig Römisch reich zetrennen’.
15. See Klaus Schreiner, ’Religiöse, historische und rechtliche Legitimation spätmittelalterlicher 
Adelsherrschaft’, in Otto Gerhard Oexle and Werner Paravicini (eds.), Nobilitas. Funktion 
und Repräsentation des Adels in Alteuropa (Göttingen, 1997), p. 391, who focuses on the nobles’ 
complaint, and Klaus Graf, ’”Der adel dem purger tregt haß”: Feindbilder und Konflikte 
zwischen städtischem Bürgertum und landsässigem Adel im späten Mittelalter’, in Werner 
Rösener (ed.), Adelige und bürgerliche Erinnerungskulturen des Spätmittelalters und der Frühen 
Neuzeit (Göttingen, 2000), pp. 195-196, who sees the author in an ‘intermediary position’.
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that they had four noble ancestors.16 When the helmets and heraldic headgear of 
the prospective participants were inspected prior to the tournament, the wealthy 
burgher of Basel Henman Sevogel found his cast into the street and dragged 
through the mud. He had not passed the test, despite being married to the 
noblewoman Gredanna von Eptingen.17 Two years earlier in 1434 some burghers 
of Nuremberg who had been knighted by Emperor Sigismund on the Tiber 
bridge in Rome had been refused admission to a tournament in their own city.18 
But there is no evidence from this period that townspeople were automatically 
excluded from tournaments.
This began to change in January 1479, when nobles gathered in Würzburg for what 
became the first in a series of ‘Four Land’ tournaments staged across southern 
Germany between 1479 and 1485 (the four lands being Franconia, Bavaria, Swabia 
and the Rhineland). The ordinances of this tournament, which was organized by 
the Franconian Society of the Clasp, prescribed punishments for any nobles who 
married outside of the nobility and who ‘pursued trade in the manner of merchants 
who are not noble’.19 This was almost a revival of the old dichotomy of knight and 
merchant, and was clearly a threat to the social standing of the urban commercial 
milieu; it did, however, leave open the possibility that some nobles might also 
be merchants. But when the Society of the Donkey organized its tournament at 
Heidelberg in 1481 all nobles who were also burghers were excluded.20 This was a 
radical step, and it clearly met with some opposition. In the negotiations ahead of 
a tournament at Heilbronn in 1482, it was agreed that those who had of their own 
16. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 44.
17. Karl Stehlin, ’Ein spanischer Bericht über ein Turnier in Schaffhausen im Jahr 1436’, Basler 
Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde, 14 (1915), p. 163.
18. Rudolf Endres, ’Turniere und Gesellenstechen in Nürnberg’, in Helmut Bräuer and Elke 
Schlenkrich (eds.), Die Stadt als Kommunikationsraum. Beiträge zur Stadtgeschichte vom 
Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Karl Czok zum 75. Geburtstag (Leipzig, 2001), 
p. 273; Thomas Zotz, ’Adel, Bürgertum und Turnier in deutschen Städten vom 13. bis 15. 
Jahrhundert’, in Josef Fleckenstein (ed.), Das ritterliche Turnier im Mittelalter. Beiträge zu einer 
vergleichenden Formen- und Verhaltensgeschichte des Rittertums (Göttingen, 1985), p. 485.
19. Cord Ulrichs, Vom Lehnhof zur Reichsritterschaft. Strukturen des fränkischen Niederadels am 
Übergang vom späten Mittelalter zur frühen Neuzeit (Stuttgart, 1997), p. 138: ‘alle die von Adl 
Kauffmanschafft treiben als ander Kauffleuth, die nit von dem Adl seindt’.
20. Ulrichs, Lehnhof, p. 142.
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volition become burghers or officials in towns could not take part, but those who 
were obliged to seek ‘protection’ from towns, or were simply employed by towns 
without further obligations, were to be admitted.21 This rule remained in place for 
tournaments at Bamberg and Heilbronn in 1485.22 The Bamberg ordinance of this 
year also added the stipulation that any noble from an old ‘tournament’ family 
who had married the daughter of a burgher for the sake of the prosperity of his 
family, and who had received at least 4,000 Gulden as a dowry, should be admitted 
to the tournament, but still punished with ritual blows for this marriage.23
There had to be a response from the towns, but it did not come directly from any 
patrician or merchant. It was the Dominican friar Felix Fabri who included in his 
treatise on the city of Ulm (1488/89), where he lived and worked, a somewhat 
contorted defence of the ‘nobility’ of the civic elite.24 Fabri granted second place 
in the civic hierarchy (after the clergy) to the rural nobles who defend the city as 
servitors of the council, as they share outstanding honour with the clergy but also 
nobility with the third rank, that of the leading burghers. These elite citizens are 
simultaneously more than citizens (quasi per excellentiam civium cives),25 and they 
originate in a ‘younger’ nobility than the old ‘Trojan’ nobility who live in castles 
and frequent tournaments. But amongst six distinct types of noble burghers are 
some of Trojan, Roman or Carthaginian ancestry, and some former rural nobles 
driven from their castles by war, loneliness or old age, or lured to the town by 
its comfort and vices. Yet these men then cease to live like nobles and thus are 
excluded by their rural relatives from tournaments.26 Soon afterwards Fabri implies 
21. Ludwig Albert von Gumppenberg, Die Gumppenberger auf Turnieren (Würzburg, 1862), p. 75.
22. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 37.
23. Horst Wenzel, Höfische Geschichte. Literarische Tradition und Gegenwartsdeutung in den 
volkssprachigen Chroniken des hohen und späten Mittelalters (Bern, 1980), p. 207 n. 128: ‘Welcher 
aber auß altem thurnerß geschlecht eins erbern burgers frume unverleimte dochter von den 
geslechtern oder erbern auß den stetten nem unb seiner narung und auffkomens willen 
seins stammes, doch das im die under viertausend gulden nicht zuprecht, dem sol man es 
nicht verargen, in und seine kinder reitten lassen, doch mag man sie schlagen’.
24. Felix Fabri, Fratris Felicis Fabri Tractatus de civitate Ulmensi de ejus origine, ordine, regimine, 
de civibus ejus et statu, ed. Gustav Veesenmeyer (Tübingen, 1889), pp. 59-76. German 
translation: Felix Fabri, Traktat über die Stadt Ulm, ed. and trans. Folker Reichert (2014), pp. 
60-77.
25. Fabri, Tractatus, p. 59.
26. Fabri, Tractatus, p. 63.
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that all citizens of Ulm have failed to maintain their noble blood, so that the nobles 
no longer wish to be addressed by them with the familiar second person pronoun 
(du).27 But he soon rallies again to the patricians’ cause. He describes at length 
how the leading citizens rigorously exclude artisans from their ranks in order 
to continue their various forms of interaction with the nobility, and Fabri then 
summarizes twelve points which prove that the civic elite are recognized as true 
nobles (veri nobiles esse comprobantur): they practice connubium with the nobility; 
they legally possess ‘noble seats’ (nobilium sedes); they hold fiefs from princes and 
counts; they are asked by nobles to address them with du; they hunt; they attend 
tournaments, which are the ‘sieve of the nobility’ (though they take part only in the 
jousts, not the mêlée); they dance with nobles; they have coats of arms; they have 
old-established wealth; they can be virtuous (indeed, more easily than nobles in 
the countryside who have no regular clerical instruction); they are not involved in 
trade or handicraft; and they hold the highest offices in the urban government.28
Fabri presents an idiosyncratic picture in which opportunities to display his 
erudition sometimes seem to take precedence over any polemical, let alone 
descriptive purpose. He is the mouthpiece of neither town nor nobility, yet he 
reflects something of the wider discourse about town and nobility. Aside from 
Fabri’s scholarly speculations this discourse was becoming ever closer to real and 
contemporary events, and in the early sixteenth century we can hear the nobility 
reacting directly to the supposed threat from the overmighty towns which had 
been outlined in the preceding century by the polemicists of princes and by the 
anonymous author of the Complaint. This new voice of the nobility rises to a 
crescendo in 1523, when an anonymous pamphleteer imagined a meeting in the 
market place in Nuremberg between a visitor from Brandenburg, der Marckhanns, 
and Cuntz Frenckel, a Franconian patriot, who together produce an apology for the 
Schweinfurt League of nobles, recently founded in opposition to castle-breaking 
27. Fabri, Tractatus, p. 66: ‘Quia autem cives Ulmenses antiquam nobilitatis venam non 
servaverunt qua olim iuncti nobilibus erant, ideo nunc nobiles dedignantur eis familiariter 
convivere, nec patiuntur ut ab eis tibizentur, quod olim ab eorum patribus volebant habere’.
28. Fabri, Tractatus, pp. 72-76.
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campaigns mounted by the towns of the Swabian League (Apology for the Nobility 
of Franconia).29 Marckhanns had heard that the Franconian nobles are just robbers, 
but Frenckel informs him that they are being oppressed by the princes and towns, 
though it is the towns that have the real power and that are the real robbers through 
their usury. Just like the Jews, the towns manage to maintain themselves by greasing 
the right palms, although everyone despises them. Certain towns harbour such 
‘hatred through envy’ (haß auß neyd) for the nobility that they have stirred up the 
princes to oppress the nobles, hoping to then defeat the princes and rule the land as 
the towns do in Lombardy, where no nobles have castles in the countryside.
This dramatic image of the towns’ megalomania is a long way from the ‘good’ 
merchant who shows nobles how to behave by overcoming his low nature. But 
there are constants – most obviously the depiction of the urban commercial 
world as in thrall to avarice – and even the extreme language of the Apology has 
much in common with the supposedly non-partisan Complaint. We can follow the 
evolution of a certain body of ideas over many centuries to the final flowerings of 
chivalric culture, in which townspeople and nobles appear utterly sundered and 
implacably opposed, even responsible for each other’s ruin. Count Reinhard of 
Solms’ ‘Tournament Book’ of 1564 included excessive closeness to burghers and 
their commercial activity in his list of symptoms of the decay of the nobility.30 By 
this time townspeople had also developed a vigorous discourse on the menace 
of certain nobles, extending the criticism of nobles as parasites which we saw in 
the response to the Complaint. In 1562 the Nuremberg master-singer Hans Sachs 
wrote satirically of nobles who beg for the life of a highway robber to be spared 
until they learn that he is not in fact a noble, and therefore has no right to be a 
robber.31 Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) said of the German towns: ‘to the lords 
and gentlemen who live in that region they are entirely hostile’.32
29. Karl Schottenloher (ed.), Flugschriften zur Ritterschaftsbewegung des Jahres 1523 (Münster, 
1929), pp. 100-111.
30. Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 84-85.
31. Graf, ’Feindbild und Vorbild,’ p. 121.
32. Thomas Brady, Turning Swiss. Cities and Empire 1450-1550 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 20-21.
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These discourses have had a long post-medieval afterlife – indeed, they may 
never truly have ended. In later centuries historians read these medieval debates 
as direct reflections of antagonistic day-to-day social interaction between town 
and nobility. This approach has been called into question, as we will see, but it 
does seem likely that medieval models of the relationship of townspeople and 
nobles tended increasingly towards mutual hostility and exclusion. More work 
could be done on the intellectual history of these discourses, but I would like to 
focus on their social situation, through their production and influence within late 
medieval German society at particular places and times. One of the reasons that 
I feel this approach to be important is that historians’ interpretations of town-
noble interaction in late medieval Germany have over the last fifty or sixty years 
increasingly diverged from the medieval discourse.
‘Not exactly established’: Historians, Towns and Nobility
In 1992 a conference on the subject of town and nobility was held at Bretten, near 
Karlsruhe. The Freiburg historian Thomas Zotz gave his assessment of the state 
of the field:
this theme refers to a relationship which was not only problematic in the 
late medieval past; research on this question was also problematic for 
many years, and still today ‘nobility and town’ does not exactly count 
amongst the established themes in the social history of the Middle Ages.33
During the 1980s and 90s other leading German historians such as Ernst Schubert, 
Peter Johanek and Werner Paravicini also identified the problem of town and 
nobility as a subject in need of further study.34 This led directly to some of the 
33. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 22: ‘dieses… Thema umschreibt nicht nur ein in der Vergangenheit 
des späten Mittelalters problematisches Verhältnis…; auch der Umgang der historischen 
Forschung mit dieser Frage war lange Zeit problematisch, und noch heute gehört “Adel 
und Stadt” nicht gerade zu den gängigen Themen der mittelalterlichen Sozialgeschichte’.
34. Arend Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt des Spätmittelalters. Göttingen und Stade 1300 bis 1600 
(Bielefeld, 1996), p. ix; Peter Johanek, ’Adel und Stadt im Mittelalter’, in Gunnar Teske 
(ed.), Adel und Stadt. Vorträge auf dem Kolloquium der Vereinigten Westfälischen Adelsarchive 
e.V. vom 28.-29. Oktober 1993 in Münster (Münster, 1998), p. 34; Werner Paravicini, Die 
ritterlich-höfische Kultur des Mittelalters (Munich, 1994), pp. 32-35 (see Rainer Demski, Adel 
und Lübeck. Studien zum Verhältnis zwischen adliger und bürgerlicher Kultur im 13. und 14. 
Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), p. 14).
19
first monographs (and an essay collection) to use ‘town and nobility’ as their 
frame of reference.35 The problems to be overcome were quite substantial: not 
only the absence of ‘town and nobility’ as an explicit historiographical theme, 
but also the total separation of ‘urban’ and ‘noble’ history writing in the German 
historiographical tradition.36 These difficulties were clearly felt to be stimulating, 
however, and the 1990s in particular produced many other innovative contributions 
to the field, with which we will become acquainted. This allowed Heidrun Ochs 
to conclude (in 2012) that we can now gain a ‘relatively good overview’ of the 
relationship between town and nobility, though her judgement seems to me to be 
a little hasty.37 Certainly there is still much to explore, and it also seems that the 
subject has passed through a period of vogue and into a quieter phase.
Why does the relationship between medieval towns and nobles as a historical 
topic tend to slumber in this way? Alongside the lack of scholarly momentum and 
the difficulties of merging two normally very separate historiographies, I would 
suggest that this slumber has – paradoxically – a lot to do with the dramatic 
picture of division and hostility between town and nobility which was painted 
by some of Germany’s first professional historians. This has only encouraged 
equally drastic, broad-brush rebuttals which give the misleading impression that 
big questions have been settled. Furthermore, although town-noble relations 
have not always been a subject for analysis in their own right, they have never 
been far from the minds of historians of medieval Germany as a long-established 
part of the mental furniture in Germans’ sense of their past.
35. Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt (inspired by Schubert); Demski, Adel und Lübeck (inspired by 
Paravicini); Gunnar Teske (ed.), Adel und Stadt. Vorträge auf dem Kolloquium der Vereinigten 
Westfälischen Adelsarchive e.V. vom 28.-29. Oktober 1993 in Münster (Münster, 1998) (with 
Johanek). There was one previous monograph: Kurt Burkhardt, Stadt und Adel in Frauenfeld 
1250-1400 (Bern, 1977).
36. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 24.
37. Heidrun Ochs, ’Ritteradel und Städte. Bemerkungen zu ihrem Verhältnis am Beispiel der 
Kämmerer von Worms und der Vögte von Hunolstein’, in Joachim Schneider and Sabine 
Reichert (eds.), Kommunikationsnetze des Niederadels im Reich um 1500 (Stuttgart, 2012), p. 92.
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Liberals and Romantics
Following the demise of the emperors of the Swabian House the 
turmoil knew neither measure nor bounds. The nobility had admittedly 
aggrandized itself at the emperor’s expense, but on the other hand it had 
also ruined itself through pomp and luxury. With respect for the emperor 
declined respect for the law; the nobility’s continued feudal right to legal 
self-help manifested itself in unending violence, robbery and plunder. 
The impoverished knight looked on in envy at the blossoming prosperity 
of	 the	 towns,	and	turned	ruffian	and	robber.	Culture,	which	had	only	
just begun to bud amongst the upper classes, vanished from their ranks 
again and clung on only in the towns, where it nonetheless set down 
consequently deeper roots, and gradually spread itself across the whole 
of Germany.38
In 1782 Johann Christoph Adelung, in his Towards a History of the Culture of the 
Human Race, sketched with brilliant clarity the view of the German late Middle 
Ages which dominated many minds both in his generation and in generations 
to come. Over seventy-five years later, the vision offered in one of nineteenth-
century Germany’s most popular works of history – Gustav Freytag’s Scenes from 
the German Past – had not changed in its essence, and had only been elaborated 
with the first fruits of a new historical scholarship. Freytag’s chapter on late 
medieval ’War and Feud’ focused almost exclusively on conflicts between town 
and nobility. He recognized that the dividing lines were not always so clear, and 
that some nobles fought for the towns, but he assumed that they must have been 
caught in two minds between their oaths of allegiance and their hearts, which 
longed to be with their cousins beyond the walls.39 ‘Hatred and envy’ amongst 
the nobility and the princes constantly worked against the towns, and for many 
nobles feuding against them was a means of self-assertion, a source of income 
38. Johann Christoph Adelung, Versuch einer Geschichte der Kultur des menschlichen Geschlechts 
(Leipzig, 1782), p. 372: ‘nach dem Abgange der Kaiser aus dem Schwäbischen Hause 
kannten die Verwirrungen weder Maß noch Gränzen. Der Adel hatte sich zwar auf Kosten 
der Kaiser vergrößert, aber sich auf der andern Seite auch durch Pracht und Ueppigkeit 
zu Grunde gerichtet. Mit dem Ansehen der Kaiser fiel das Ansehen der Gesetze; die dem 
Adel bey Lehensverfassung noch immer vorbehaltene Selbsthülfe, artete in unaufhörliche 
Gewaltthätigkeiten, Plackereyen und Raubereyen aus. Die verarmten Ritter sahen den 
blühenden Wohlstand der Städte mit neidischen Augen an, und wurden Raufbolde und 
Räuber. Die Cultur, welche in den oberen Classen kaum aufgeblühet war, verschwand in 
denselben wieder und schränkte sich bloß auf die Städte ein, in welchen sie aber auch 
desto tiefere Wurzel schlug, und sich nach und nach über ganz Deutschland verbreitete’.
39. Gustav Freytag, Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit: Vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit, 6th ed. 
(Leipzig, 1871), p. 293.
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and even the ‘wild poetry’ in their lives.40 The notorious rapacity of nobles was 
justified by all sorts of spurious complaints against the towns, and was fed by 
resentment of burghers who owned rural property, lent money at interest and 
presumed to dress in noble fashions. In general, ‘the power of money seemed 
the greatest tyranny to those schooled to despise working for one’s living’.41 
The towns, meanwhile, were isolated ‘walled republics’ which alone through 
these difficult centuries nurtured ‘civic freedom’ (bürgerliche Freiheit), the only 
basis for a national reinvigoration (nationale Kraftentfaltung).42 But they also took 
a fierce revenge on their noble opponents through summary justice and brutal 
executions.43
This, in outline, is what we can justifiably call the ‘liberal’ history of late medieval 
town-noble relations. It regards towns as bastions of freedom and democracy 
in a hostile world, pointing the way to the bourgeois rationality of the future 
(the German word Bürger can refer to a medieval ‘burgher’, a ‘bourgeois’, and a 
modern ‘citizen’). The nobility on the other hand are parasites who know nothing 
of the moral and economic value of work and recognize only that might makes 
right (the ‘law of the fist’, or Faustrecht). Yet we sense a certain sympathy for 
their rage against the burghers’ usurpation of the leadership of society via the 
grubby accumulation of money. Other authors were more fulsome concerning 
the towns’ ‘more pleasant and edifying tableau of ever-striving diligence… 
and rational love of order which accepts the necessity of wise and fitting laws 
and willingly submits to them’.44 But in Freytag’s ‘wild poetry’ of the feud we 
40. ibid, p. 296.
41. ibid, p. 300.
42. ibid, pp. 293, 296.
43. ibid, p. 309.
44. Peter Johanek, ’Mittelalterliche Stadt und bürgerliches Geschichtsbild im 19. Jahrhundert’, 
in Gerd Althoff (ed.), Die Deutschen und ihr Mittelalter (Darmstadt, 1992), p. 88, quoting 
from Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek (1792): ‘das angenehmere und lehrreichere Gemälde 
des immer emporstrebenden Fleisses… und der vernünftigen Ordnungsliebe, welche die 
Notwendigkeit billiger und weiser Gesetze erkennt und sich ihnen bereitwillig unterwirft’.
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see something of the complementary, ‘Romantic’, view of the same history.45 
Romanticism did not deny the dark picture of the nobility in contrast to the light 
of the towns; indeed, it extolled the Faustrecht as the ‘highest work of art’46 and 
celebrated individual freedom, strength, bravery and loyalty to old ideals in the 
face of certain defeat. The Romantic history of the nobility reached an early high 
point in Goethe’s dramatization of noble feuding, Götz von Berlichingen (1774), 
and gave rise to numerous novels about robber knights (Raubritter) and their 
splendid misdeeds. This was as much an English as a German tradition, and it 
found elegant expression through George Eliot. A German author might only 
have added ‘the industrious burgher’ to her list of colourful contrasts:
If those robber-barons were somewhat grim and drunken ogres, they 
had a certain grandeur of the wild beast in them – they were forest boars 
with tusks, tearing and rending, not the ordinary domestic grunter; they 
represented the demon forces for ever in collision with beauty, virtue, 
and	the	gentle	uses	of	life;	they	made	a	fine	contrast	in	the	picture	with	
the wandering minstrel, the soft-lipped princess, the pious recluse, and 
the timid Israelite. That was a time of colour, when the sunlight fell 
on	glancing	steel	and	floating	banners;	a	 time	of	adventure	and	fierce	
struggle…47
Thus the antagonism between town and nobility in the late Middle Ages was 
never questioned, although it received two entirely different interpretations.48 
Both presented the conflict as a battle between two inherently opposed sets of 
principles,49 and some expanded the individual feuds of the Raubritter into an all-
embracing eternal feud between town and nobility. This was the view of the artist 
45. For characterizations of the ‘liberal’ view see Ernst Schubert, Einführung in die deutsche 
Geschichte im Spätmittelalter (Darmstadt, 1998), p. 112; Johanek, ’Mittelalterliche Stadt,’ pp. 
84-85; Peters, Literatur in der Stadt, pp. 10-11, 35. For the Romantic view: Graf, ’Feindbilder 
und Konflikte,’ pp. 203-204; Regina Görner, Raubritter. Untersuchungen zur Lage des 
spätmittelalterlichen Niederadels, besonders im südlichen Westfalen (Münster, 1987), pp. 3-5, 8-9.
46. Graf, ’Feindbild und Vorbild,’ p. 143, quoting Justus Möser (1720–1794).
47. George Eliot, The Mill on the Floss (Ware, 1993; first published 1860), p. 253.
48. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 18.
49. See Niklas Konzen, Aller Welt Feind. Fehdenetzwerke um Hans von Rechberg (+ 1464) im 
Kontext der südwestdeutschen Territorienbildung (Stuttgart, 2014), p. 52; Gabriel Zeilinger, 
Lebensformen im Krieg. Eine Alltags- und Erfahrungsgeschichte des süddeutschen Städtekriegs 
1449/50 (Stuttgart, 2007), pp. 15-16. A parallel tradition in French historiography presents 
those who go against the ‘principle’ of their class as ‘traitors’ or ‘defectors’. See Fernand 
Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, translated by 
Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (London, 1972; first published 1949), ii, 725.
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Wilhelm von Kügelgen, who in 1826 told his bourgeois fiancée Julie Krummacher 
of his inborn prejudice as a noble against merchants, who laughed at the quality of 
personal bravery which Kügelgen’s fellow nobles considered the ‘highest manly 
virtue’. (Though he did make a exception for Julie’s hometown of Bremen, which 
he claimed had its own brand of defiant ‘noble’ freedom.)50 This ‘feud’ had deep 
roots in the social imagination of the day, when liberals were battling the privileges 
of the aristocracy, which in turn was unsettled by rapid industrialization. Although 
we should not entirely reduce the influences upon the liberal-Romantic history of 
town and nobility to these social divisions, it is clear that many observers either 
saw the origins of such divisions in the late Middle Ages or simply projected their 
dichotomous view of society onto the medieval past.51 One of the best-known 
examples of this tendency is Wagner’s opera Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg (The 
Master-Singers of Nuremberg). Wagner, in Peter Johanek’s reading, dramatizes ‘the 
dissonance and the gulf between the nobility and the town, which are understood 
as fundamental historical categories and dressed in the costume of the close of the 
Middle Ages and the transition to the early modern era’.52
It was in part Wagner’s opera which made Nuremberg so particularly associated 
with this vision of the late Middle Ages. The city which had long been known 
for detailed, skilled craftsmanship and rigorous civic order seemed to perfectly 
symbolize the ‘bourgeois’ values of hard work and social harmony in opposition to 
the individual, spontaneous creativity of Walther, the rural nobleman who breaks 
all the rules of the master-singers’ guild. Other aspects of the liberal-Romantic 
tradition are very strong in Nuremberg today: public art commemorates the semi-
50. Johanek, ’Mittelalterliche Stadt,’ p. 81.
51. See in particular Hartmut Boockmann, ’Lebensgefühl und Repräsentationsstil der 
Oberschicht in den deutschen Städten um 1500’, in Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin 
(ed.), “Kurzweil viel ohn Maß und Ziel”. Alltag und Festtag auf den Augsburger Monatsbildern 
der Renaissance (Munich, 1994), p. 34; Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 22-23; Johanek, 
’Mittelalterliche Stadt,’ pp. 94-97; Görner, Raubritter, pp. 3-4; Peters, Literatur in der Stadt, 
pp. 16, 22; Heinz Lieberich, ’Rittermässigkeit und bürgerliche Gleichheit’, in Sten Gagnér, 
Hans Schlosser, and Wolfgang Wiegand (eds.), Festschrift für Hermann Krause (Cologne & 
Vienna, 1975), pp. 66-67, 93.
52. Johanek, ’Adel und Stadt,’ p. 9: ‘Der Dissens, die Kluft zwischen Adel und Bürgertum, 
die als historische Grundkategorien empfunden und in das Gewand des ausgehenden 
Mittelalters und der beginnenden Neuzeit gekleidet werden’.
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legendary Raubritter Eppelein von Gailingen – who supposedly escaped execution 
in the city with the aid of a supernatural horse – and a modern introduction to the 
city’s fifteenth-century history makes use of a pair of words which often stand for 
the entire late medieval relationship between town and nobility: Placker, meaning 
noble robbers, vs. Pfeffersäcke, literally ‘sacks of pepper’, connoting wealthy but 
boorish merchants.53
53. Peter Fleischmann, Nürnberg im 15. Jahrhundert (Munich, 2012), p. 85.
Fig. 1: Mural depicting the legend of Eppelein 
von Gailingen (Nuremberg, 2013)
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The ‘Crisis’ of the Nobility
The liberal-Romantic tradition implies a kind of crisis afflicting the nobility, even 
if this crisis is seen as a creative force and a heroic call to arms. For many years 
social and economic historians, both ‘liberal’ and Marxist, have also seen the late 
medieval nobility as suffering through a profound political and economic crisis 
which is inextricably linked to the nobles’ relationship with the towns and their 
contrasting power and prosperity. The first cause of this crisis is believed to be 
the fall in population due to famine and plague in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, which reduced demand for foodstuffs and increased the price of 
manufactured goods (the so-called ‘price scissors’), thus hurting all agricultural 
producers but especially rural landlords who also wished to purchase luxury items 
produced by skilled craftsmen.54 Some historians blame the ‘crisis’ chiefly on the 
nobility’s unsustainable addiction to such luxury and conspicuous consumption, 
encouraged by competition amongst themselves and with elite townspeople, 
who could better afford the outlay.55 Another common view is that inflation (part 
of a money economy with which nobles could not come to terms) gradually ate 
away the value of land rents, whilst the tradition of partible inheritance divided 
estates into ever smaller units, increasingly incapable of sustaining a noble 
lifestyle.56 Meanwhile, nobles were being forced out of positions of authority in 
the rising territorial states by learned counsellors trained in the universities (and 
often born in the towns) and were supposedly losing their leading military role to 
infantry with firearms.57 Without the traditional princely service to harness their 
energies, the now ‘functionless’ nobles turned to robbery and feuding, and thus 
54. See summary in Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 70-72.
55. e.g. Andreas Ranft, ’Adel und Stadt im späten Mittelalter. Ihr Verhältnis am Beispiel der 
Adelsgesellschaften’, in Stefan Rhein (ed.), Die Kraichgauer Ritterschaft in der frühen Neuzeit 
(Sigmaringen, 1993), p. 58; Werner Rösener, ’Zur Problematik des spätmittelalterlichen 
Raubrittertums’, in Helmut Maurer and Hans Patze (eds.), Festschrift für Berent Schwineköper 
(Sigmaringen, 1982), p. 484.
56. e.g. Eckard Lullies, Die Fehde der Guttenberg gegen die Vögte und die Adelsfehde gegen Eger 
(Kulmbach, 1999), p. vii.
57. e.g. Hanns Hubert Hofmann, ’Der Adel in Franken’, in Hellmuth Rössler (ed.), Deutscher 
Adel 1430-1555. Büdinger Vorträge 1963 (Darmstadt, 1965), p. 117.
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also forfeited their moral leadership of society as protectors of the weak.58 But 
this was unavoidable, as they were fighting a desperate rearguard action against 
the princes and the towns.59
Given such a fate, it is no surprise that some historians believe they can detect 
the ‘self-doubt, fear and nervousness’ of the nobility as a whole.60 But most have 
increasingly sought to substitute ‘change’ or even ‘prosperity’ for ‘crisis’.61 The 
notion that the nobility were left behind by advances in military technology 
has proved the least substantial of the ‘crisis’ arguments,62 and the idea that the 
nobility as a whole were being driven from power by princes and towns has not 
fared much better.63 Meanwhile, a great deal of effort has been invested in rolling 
back the presumption that late medieval economics and demography must have 
generated severe economic problems for the rural nobility.64 Detailed research 
has shown that nobles even profited from currency fluctuations,65 and that they 
often received rents in kind and thus were immune from inflation.66 It has been 
conclusively shown that nobles were very active creditors, and lent (collectively 
and individually) huge sums to other nobles, to princes, and sometimes also to 
towns.67 Nobles were able to invest heavily in acquiring mortgaged (or ‘pledged’) 
58. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 74. See Josef Fleckenstein, ’Bürgertum und Rittertum in der 
Geschichte des mittelalterlichen Freiburg’, in Wolfgang Müller (ed.), Freiburg im Mittelalter. 
Vorträge zum Stadtjubiläum 1970 (Bühl, 1970), p. 94 for nobles as ‘functionless’ (aufgabenlos).
59. See Andermann, Gewalt, p. 182; Hermann Mau, Die Rittergesellschaften mit St. Jörgenschild in 
Schwaben (Stuttgart, 1941), p. 12. For critical summaries of this complex of ideas see Ulrichs, 
Lehnhof, p. 24; Görner, Raubritter, p. 2.
60. Lullies, Fehde, p. vii.
61. See Görner, Raubritter, p. 13.
62. Recognized by Mau, Rittergesellschaften, p. 175 n. 526.
63. e.g. Görner, Raubritter, pp. 157-158.
64. For doubts about the ‘late medieval crisis’ more generally see Schubert, Einführung, pp. 5-9.
65. Markus Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft und Finanzierungsmethoden. Studien zu den wirtschaftlichen 
Verhältnissen des Adels im westlichen Bodenseeraum 1300-1500 (Stuttgart, 1991), p. 53.
66. Kurt Andermann, ’Zu den Einkommensverhältnissen des Kraichgauer Adels an der Wende 
vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit’, in Stefan Rhein (ed.), Die Kraichgauer Ritterschaft in der frühen 
Neuzeit (Sigmaringen, 1993), pp. 76-86. See also Mark Mersiowsky, ’Das Stadthaus im 
Rahmen der spätmittelalterlichen adligen Wirtschaft’, in Weserrenaissance Museum (ed.), 
Der Adel in der Stadt des Mittelalters und frühen Neuzeit (Marburg, 1996), p. 203 and Hillay 
Zmora, State and nobility in early modern Germany. The knightly feud in Franconia, 1440-1567 
(Cambridge, 1997), pp. 53-55.
67. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 44; Andermann, ’Einkommensverhältnissen,’ pp. 103-108; 
Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, pp. 165, 172, 217.
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properties and titles from princes from which they could draw a further income.68 
Why some nobles seem to have had such enormous capital and others seem to have 
struggled so badly remains unclear, but it seems that those who were able to use 
their resources for political gain entered a virtuous circle, whilst political reverses, 
rather than underlying economic structures, brought about the ruin of others.69
This rejection of the ‘crisis’ theory has been traced back to an article from 1939,70 but 
it only gained any sort of momentum in the 1980s.71 It was entirely commonplace 
before 1990, and still had some currency a decade later,72 though the majority 
opinion had by then turned against it.73 The ‘crisis of the nobility’ has nonetheless 
been immensely significant in the historiography of town-noble relations both in 
itself and because it has sustained the tenets of the liberal-Romantic worldview 
under the mantle of ‘progressive’ social and economic history. Most curiously of all, 
this technocratic historiography has perpetuated many of the moral judgements 
associated with the liberal tradition: in 1974, for instance, Herbert Helbig blamed 
depopulation and the ‘price scissors’ for ‘an almost boundless brutalization of the 
knighthood’, an undoubtedly unconscious echo of Johann Christoph Adelung’s 
‘turmoil [which] knew neither measure nor bounds’ of nearly 200 years earlier.74
This debate has also distracted us from the economic and political comparisons 
which late medieval observers made between townspeople and nobles. Amongst 
the source material which sustained the ‘crisis’ model was the medieval trope of 
the ‘poor’ nobleman, whose fate has exerted a thoroughly Romantic fascination 
68. See Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, pp. 121, 143, 148-149.
69. Andermann, ’Einkommensverhältnissen,’ pp. 109-111; Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, pp. 222, 
268.
70. Andermann, ’Einkommensverhältnissen,’ p. 100 and Görner, Raubritter, p. 13, referring to 
Karl Otto Müller, ’Zur wirtschaftlichen Lage des schwäbischen Adels am Ausgang des 
Mittelalters’, Zeitschrift für Württembergische Landesgeschichte, 3 (1939).
71. Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, p. 14.
72. e.g. Keller, ’Kontakte und Konflikte,’ p. 505.
73. Summarized by Joachim Schneider, Spätmittelalterlicher deutscher Niederadel. Ein 
landschaftlicher Vergleich (Stuttgart, 2003), p. 9.
74. Herbert Helbig, ’Die brandenburgischen Städte des 15. Jahrhunderts zwischen 
Landesherrschaft und adligen Ständen’, in Wilhelm Rausch (ed.), Die Stadt am Ausgang des 
Mittelalters (Linz, 1974), p. 230: ‘sich ins Maßlose steigernde Verwilderung des Rittertums’.
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both then and now. In comparison to elite townspeople, late medieval nobles were 
indeed more likely to appear ‘poor’, precisely because they were relatively more 
economically secure: so long as a nobleman held more of his wealth in land than 
the average patrician (see below, pp. 90-104, for townspeople’s landholdings), 
he was less likely to face total ruin, which would bring a complete inability 
to maintain elite status and effective invisibility from an elite viewpoint. This 
perception of relative wealth was important within town-noble relations. So too 
were preoccupations with the political rise and fall of whole social identities, as 
we saw in the Complaint of the Natural Lordship of the Nobility.
This concern lives on in theories of ‘cultural cycles’ in which the culture of one 
group is destined to be replaced or eclipsed by another.75 A combination of this 
cyclical model and the liberal belief in the natural progress of reason and liberty 
may lie behind persistent theories of the ‘bourgeoisification’ (Verbürgerlichung) 
of the nobility in the late Middle Ages. This was driven, according to Ulrich 
Andermann, by the towns as ‘greenhouses for the idea of the modern state’, 
which imposed their ideas about legitimate and illegitimate violence on society 
at large.76 We will encounter this problem of judging the legitimacy of violence 
later in our study (see pp. 144 and 193), but for the time being it is important 
to note that in the case of Nuremberg at least, burghers’ ideas about legitimate 
violence were not fundamentally different from those of the nobility. In particular, 
although Nuremberg rarely declared feuds itself and branded all feuds against 
itself as illegal, it still admitted the right to feud in certain ways and in certain 
places: ‘where one ought to strike one’s enemies’ (da man veynd besuchen sölt), as 
the council sometimes admonished nobles (see also p. 172 below).77
75. See Peters, Literatur in der Stadt, pp. 8-9.
76. Ulrich Andermann, ’Kriminalisierung und Bekämpfung ritterlicher Gewalt am Beispiel 
norddeutscher Hansestädte’, in Kurt Andermann (ed.), ‘Raubritter’ oder ‘rechtschaffene vom 
Adel’? Aspekte von Politik, Friede und Recht im späten Mittelalter (Sigmaringen, 1997), pp. 
153-154: ‘Treibhäusern des modernen Staatsgedankens’ (quoting Wilhelm Ebel). See also 
Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 41, 62, 317.
77. e.g. BB 9 f. 259r-v (17.6.1432).
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Erasing the Divide
The reaction against the various theories which framed medieval townspeople and 
nobles as natural enemies began after the Second World War, and its first notable 
exponent was Otto Brunner.78 Brunner started with the simple observation that we 
cannot equate the modern Bürger (either as a member of the bourgeoisie or as the 
citizen of a state) with the medieval Bürger (burgher, or citizen of a town). This led 
him to argue that towns were not foreign bodies in a feudal world; like all medieval 
units of political authority, they were ‘special peace districts’ or ‘autonomous 
jurisdictions’ (Sonderfriedensbezirke) and hence only distinct from their surroundings 
through what they had in common with these surroundings.79 Brunner’s argument 
that towns were differentiated from the ‘feudal’ world through exclusively ‘feudal’ 
means has been widely echoed, especially in the context of towns’ and townspeople’s 
extensive rural landholdings, which did not significantly differ in structure from 
the lordships of the rural nobility.80 It followed from this that the liberal dichotomy 
between ‘feudalism’ and ‘freedom’ also had to go; certainly the ‘freedom’ afforded 
by the oligarchic constitutions of the late medieval towns was not the democratic 
‘civic freedom’ for which nineteenth-century liberals campaigned.81
If town and nobility no longer represented diametrically opposed forms of 
society, could they then integrate with one another? Erich Maschke and others 
demonstrated that in the thirteenth century there was very little distinction 
between elite ‘burghers’ and the ministeriales who lived in most major towns. 
These ministeriales were legally unfree but frequently very powerful retainers of 
78. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 24.
79. Otto Brunner, ’“Bürgertum” und “Feudalwelt” in der europäischen Sozialgeschichte’, in 
Carl Haase (ed.), Die Stadt des Mittelalters (Darmstadt, 1973; first published 1956).
80. Brunner, ’Bürgertum,’ p. 486. Wolfgang Leiser, ’Das Landgebiet der Reichsstadt Nürnberg’, 
in Rudolf Endres (ed.), Nürnberg und Bern. Zwei Reichsstädte und ihre Landgebiete (Erlangen, 
1990), p. 247; Bernd Schneidmüller, ’Städtische Territorialpolitik und spätmittelalterliche 
Feudalgesellschaft am Beispiel von Frankfurt am Main’, Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte, 
118 (1982), p. 132. Compare a Marxist interpretation (Brigitte Berthold, Evamaria Engel, 
and Adolf Laube, ’Die Stellung des Bürgertums in der deutschen Feudalgesellschaft bis 
zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts’, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 21 (1973), p. 206) 
which argues that the towns were neither ‘feudal’ nor ‘anti-feudal’.
81. See Wolfgang Leiser, ’Territorien süddeutscher Reichsstädte. Ein Strukturvergleich’, 
Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte, 38 (1975), p. 981.
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lords whose retinues spanned town and country, and were thus connected to 
the rural elite as well. Many ministeriales were mounted warriors attached to the 
courts of powerful lords, and therefore participated in noble-chivalric culture 
despite their unfreedom (which gradually became meaningless, so that the 
ministeriales families evolved to comprise much of the local rural nobility). But 
the ministeriales in towns were also involved in trade and commerce, and often 
joined with the burghers in resisting the authority of their lord.82 In this social 
context, the entire urban elite of the larger towns participated in chivalric culture 
in a way that was (superficially at least) indistinguishable from the practices of 
the rural nobility. It soon became clear, as Ursula Peters summarized in 1983, 
that there was no particular ‘bourgeois’ culture in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, as the urban elite was fully aligned with courtly-chivalric norms.83
Smaller and newer urban elites, such as the patriciate which emerged at Nördlingen 
around 1400, were also found to fit this pattern of integration between town and 
country.84 In the bishopric of Würzburg around 1400 the episcopal administration 
was apparently permanently uncertain as to whether many individuals were 
burghers or nobles.85 Historians also took an increasing interest in the presence in 
the towns of nobles normally resident in the countryside, and the extent of their 
participation in urban life was fully acknowledged.86 Rural nobles did not always 
have properties or residences in towns, but they very frequently organized and 
attended tournaments which were hosted for them by the civic administration, and 
at Heidelberg, Nuremberg and elsewhere they used towns’ churches and official 
82. Erich Maschke, ’Bürgerliche und adlige Welt in den Städten der Stauferzeit’, in Erich Maschke 
and Jürgen Sydow (eds.), Südwestdeutsche Städte im Zeitalter der Staufer (Sigmaringen, 1980), 
pp. 24-25. See also Peters, Literatur in der Stadt, pp. 33-34, 121.
83. Peters, Literatur in der Stadt, p. 13. See also Paravicini, ritterlich-höfische Kultur, pp. 32-35; 
Wenzel, Höfische Geschichte, pp. 191-235.
84. Kießling, Stadt, pp. 28-29.
85. Ulrichs, Lehnhof, p. 64.
86. Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt; Weserrenaissance Museum (ed.), Der Adel in der Stadt des 
Mittelalters und frühen Neuzeit. Beiträge zum VII. Symposion des Weserrenaissance-Museums 
Schloß Brake vom 9. bis zum 11. Oktober 1995, veranstaltet in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Institut 
für vergleichende Städtegeschichte an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster (Marburg, 
1996); Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt’; Ranft, ’Adel und Stadt’; Zotz, ’Adel, Bürgertum und 
Turnier’.
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buildings (including council chambers) for their own events and gatherings. 
This was facilitated by their hosts’ familiarity with chivalric culture, which was a 
constant throughout the late Middle Ages. Tournaments, confraternities, literature 
and material culture all testify to this,87 as do street names: the street which housed 
the urban elite in Osnabrück was called the ‘knights’ street’ (Ritterstraße) and the 
patricians called themselves the ‘knighthood’ (ridderschop).88
In the early 1990s this was quite a revelation. Werner Paravicini described Lübeck 
as an ‘unexpectedly aristocratic city’,89 and Andreas Ranft remarked on the 
‘astonishing normality’ of noble life in the towns.90 Even those (such as Ulrich 
Andermann) who still emphasized conflict between town and nobility recognized 
the importance of these findings.91 But how, therefore, should we explain the 
apparent antagonism between two highly differentiated concepts of ‘town’ and 
‘nobility’ that is so apparent in the medieval discourse? Thomas Zotz and Peter 
Johanek have both suggested that the very closeness of town and nobility was 
the cause of friction between them.92 This could indeed account for the minute 
attention which was paid to questions of rank and equality between urban and 
rural elites towards the end of the fifteenth century, but not necessarily for the 
catalogue of mutual recriminations presented in the Complaint of the Rightful 
Lordship of the Nobility. There were also problems of chronology and change which 
needed to be ironed out: Erich Maschke’s research on the thirteenth century was 
important for Thomas Zotz, who himself ranged into the sixteenth century.93 But 
was the same social integration that Maschke had identified between burghers 
and ministeriales still present in the later centuries, and should we take a different 
87. Tournaments: Zotz, ’Adel, Bürgertum und Turnier’. The Lübeck Zirkelgesellschaft as a 
chivalric confraternity: Demski, Adel und Lübeck, pp. 171-174. For literature see Peters, 
Literatur in der Stadt. For murals in patrician houses at Lübeck see Demski, Adel und Lübeck, 
p. 15.
88. Schubert, Einführung, pp. 113-114.
89. Demski, Adel und Lübeck, p. 13.
90. Ranft, ’Adel und Stadt,’ p. 64.
91. Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 24, 40.
92. Johanek, ’Adel und Stadt,’ pp. 34-35; Zotz, ’Adel, Bürgertum und Turnier,’ p. 42.
93. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 24.
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view of the cultural similarities between late medieval rural and urban elites if 
they turned out not to have been so integrated? This issue is in part a consequence 
of the relationship between this strand of historiography and the liberal-Romantic 
tradition: because the latter was so extremely anachronistic, its rebuttal did not 
(at first) need extreme precision in order to carry the day.
The Widening Divide?
Once Brunner and others had begun to dismantle old certainties about the eternal 
feud between town and nobility, the question of how this dichotomy arose in 
the first place thrust itself forward. Perhaps it had nothing to do with even the 
transition from medieval to early modern eras, as Peter Johanek’s interpretation 
of Wagner’s Meistersinger implies. But perhaps Wagner was not so fundamentally 
wrong about his choice of setting: many historians have associated precisely this 
transition with a change in mutual attitudes between town and nobility. The 
first example of this argument of which I am aware was made by Hanns Hubert 
Hofmann in 1966. He saw the tournaments of 1479–1485 (see pp. 14–15) as the 
culmination of a process of ‘inner renewal’ within the nobility which had begun in 
the mid-fourteenth century, and which in the 1470s caused the previous custom of 
intermarriage between Nuremberg’s patriciate and the rural nobility to suddenly 
break off.94 Shortly afterwards Albrecht Rieber made a similar argument for the 
Swabian towns, though with a different chronology: only after the First Towns’ 
War (1387–89) and even more so after the Second (1449–50) did the knighthood 
develop a ‘hatred’ for the ‘Pfeffersäcke’, partly because the patrician families 
intermarried with others of lower social standing.95
94. Hanns Hubert Hofmann, ’Nobiles Norimbergenses. Beobachtungen zur Struktur der 
reichsstädtischen Oberschicht’, in Untersuchungen zur gesellschaftlichen Struktur der 
mittelalterlichen Städte in Europa (Stuttgart, 1966), pp. 74-76. Similar: Gerhard Pfeiffer (ed.), 
Nürnberg – Geschichte einer europäischen Stadt (Munich, 1971), p. 127.
95. Albrecht Rieber, ’Das Patriziat von Ulm, Augsburg, Ravensburg, Memmingen, Biberach’, 
in Hellmuth Rössler (ed.), Deutsches Patriziat 1430-1740 (Limburg an der Lahn, 1968), p. 
329.
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Heinz Lieberich then suggested that the decisive shift actually took place after 
1500, when feudal divisions of rank within the nobility disappeared, and the new, 
more homogeneous, nobility continued to make the claims to superiority vis-à-vis 
townspeople which had previously been made by the higher ranking nobles. This 
was also connected with a change in economic mentalities, following which all 
commercial activity (not just small-scale trading) was looked down upon by nobles.96 
Subsequent historians have favoured variations on these basic chronologies for 
this ‘late medieval process of differentiation’, with very little detail on how this 
might have taken place.97 Thomas Zotz suggests unspecified economic factors and 
changes in the structure of urban and rural elites following the withdrawal of many 
nobles from towns in the early part of the fourteenth century;98 Johanek credits 
nobles with initiating this process of ‘self-reassurance’ (Selbstvergewisserung) and 
protection of political and material interests.99 Even the more detailed explanations 
on offer are problematic: Hofmann’s idea of ‘inner renewal’ is another expression of 
the ‘crisis’ or ‘decline’ of the late medieval nobility, and Rieber borrows the clichéd 
term ‘Pfeffersack’, which was first used in the sixteenth century,100 to characterize a 
process which he sees as beginning in the fourteenth.
More detail and precision emerged in 1993 (as part of the general upswing in town 
and nobility as a subject) from Klaus Graf. He sees a major confrontation between 
the towns and the combined forces of the princes and nobility crystallizing in the 
1440s. This produced a ‘Cold War’ characterized by division into two ideologically 
polarized and armed camps which developed stereotyped images of the ‘enemy’. 
96. Lieberich, ’Rittermässigkeit,’ pp. 68-70, 86.
97. Johanek, ’Adel und Stadt,’ pp. 25-26. E.g. Karl-Heinz Spieß, ’Aufstieg in den Adel und 
Kriterien der Adelszugehörigkeit im Spätmittelalter’, in Kurt Andermann and Peter 
Johanek (eds.), Zwischen Nicht-Adel und Adel (Stuttgart, 2001), p. 6 (‘fifteenth century’); 
Keller, ’Kontakte und Konflikte,’ p. 505 (‘sixteenth century’); Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 42 
(‘fourteenth century’); Rudolf Endres, ’Adel und Patriziat in Oberdeutschland’, in Winfried 
Schulze and Helmut Gabel (eds.), Ständische Gesellschaft und soziale Mobilität (Munich, 1988), 
pp. 221, 224 (from First Towns’ War, and especially post-1450); Peters, Literatur in der Stadt, 
p. 35 (‘later fourteenth century’). All authors here are referring to town-noble relations in 
general, beyond any particular region.
98. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ pp. 25, 42.
99. Johanek, ’Adel und Stadt,’ pp. 25-26.
100. Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 16 vols. (Leipzig, 1854), xvi, cc. 
1639-1640. Accessed via http://woerterbuchnetz.de (19.11.2015).
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Tensions between these two groups were escalated by poor communication and 
mistrust.101 Graf sketches some of the negative images of townspeople and nobles 
from the fifteenth century which we saw above (pp. 9-18), and also relates this 
antagonism to the power-political conflict between certain towns and princes 
in southern Germany, in particular tensions ahead of the Second Towns’ War 
of 1449–50. This war between the Swabian League of towns (with some allied 
princes) and a coalition of Upper German princes was driven by the aggressive 
policies of one prince in particular, Margrave Albrecht ‘Achilles’ of Brandenburg-
Ansbach, whose chief antagonist was the imperial city of Nuremberg. Graf insists 
on the importance of these prejudices, resentments, fears and miscommunications 
in determining political behaviour, despite the equal weight of evidence for 
‘pragmatic, even friendly’ and ‘mostly peaceful and neighbourly’ relations.102
This is Graf’s only concession to the historiographical rapprochement between 
town and nobility which was dominant when he first published his interpretation. 
But he soon received highly effective backing from the French historian Joseph 
Morsel, even though Morsel’s ideas about town and nobility are just part of a wider 
thesis concerning the ‘invention of the nobility’. He believes that ‘the nobility’ was 
first constituted as a ‘social discourse’ and then as a ‘social reality’, and that it first 
becomes visible in his (Franconian) sources from around 1400, and decisively by 
1440, through developing use of the substantive adel. Changes in princely and noble 
behaviour were simultaneously resulting in a greater homogenization of a group 
which could now call itself (and be called) ‘the nobility’ (der Adel). The heightened 
tension between certain towns (especially Nuremberg) and the developing ‘nobility’ 
in the 1440s reinforced this group-formation through a perceived opposition 
between nobility and town. This was further reinforced by an anti-noble discourse 
amongst townspeople, as the two represented opposing ‘interest groups’, each 
with its own ‘logic’. This logic was expressed in different systems for the exchange 
101. Graf, ’Feindbild und Vorbild,’ pp. 126-127, 132. In a specific Swabian context Markus 
Bittmann had already identified 1440 as moment of rising tensions: Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, 
p. 267.
102. Graf, ’Feindbild und Vorbild,’ p. 132; Graf, ’Feindbilder und Konflikte,’ p. 204.
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of goods (‘giving and taking’ for the nobility, ‘buying and selling’ in the town) 
and in the criminalization of noble feuding by the towns; it heightened tensions 
in conjunction with a range of more concrete and contingent factors, including 
competition for rural lordship and political changes at the imperial level.103
Thus Morsel’s thesis has something in common with the old liberal-Romantic 
assumption of two entirely different cultural spheres, but with the important 
new idea that the awareness and discursive heightening of this difference only 
developed through a process of social identity formation. Graf calls Morsel’s work 
‘inspirational’,104 and the ideas of the two together are clearly echoed in Gabriel 
Zeilinger’s study of the Second Towns’ War.105 Morsel was also an influence on 
Hillay Zmora, who himself transformed the historiography of feuding through a 
case study of Franconia (see pp. 285-286).106 Joachim Schneider agrees that Franconia 
had become an area of particularly ‘abrasive’ relations between town and nobility 
by 1449.107 Yet Morsel’s theory itself – at least in relation to the subject of town and 
nobility – remains little more than an outline, and it stands in an uneasy relationship 
to the ‘rapprochement’ historiography, which still draws considerable strength from 
the continuing popularity beyond academia of the liberal-Romantic model.
Nonetheless, the research of the historians mentioned directly above has clearly 
made the region of Franconia (especially the city of Nuremberg) in the middle 
years of the fifteenth century (and in the 1440s in particular) an enticing prospect 
for further research. Historians working on Franconia have established bold new 
theories which can be tested through more detailed work on this area, but they 
have also identified potentially key places and times in the development of town-
noble relations which can be investigated afresh with a new set of questions.
103. Joseph Morsel, ’Die Erfindung des Adels. Zur Soziogenese des Adels am Ende des 
Mittelalters – das Beispiel Frankens’, in Otto Gerhard Oexle and Werner Paravicini (eds.), 
Nobilitas. Funktion und Repräsentation des Adels in Alteuropa (Göttingen, 1997).
104. Graf, ’Feindbilder und Konflikte,’ p. 193.
105. Zeilinger, Lebensformen im Krieg, p. 152.
106. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 88.
107. Schneider, Niederadel, p. 328.
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Questions and Approaches
Nuremberg suggests itself as a case study through the developing historiography 
of town-noble relations, but also because particularly valuable sources from the 
civic administration have been preserved there and have not so far been exploited 
for the study of this subject. It is also possible to distinguish quite clearly between 
groups of people resident in fifteenth-century Nuremberg and groups of nobles 
resident in the countryside. This is not necessarily typical of German-speaking 
towns in the period, nor is it necessarily more interesting for our questions about 
the mutual understanding of townspeople and rural nobles than the situation in 
towns where the lines between urban and rural elites were less sharply drawn. But 
the relatively extreme separation of townspeople and rural nobles in the case of 
Nuremberg has its value as an object of study. It is impossible to generalize results 
from Nuremberg to other towns even in Upper Germany, but Nuremberg was 
certainly a part of a wider debate within Upper Germany about the relationship 
between townspeople and rural nobles, and the particular separation between 
the two groups at Nuremberg may have played an important role in that debate.
Sources
The most important of the sources available at Nuremberg are the inner council’s 
registers of outgoing correspondence (the Briefbücher).108 The inner council was 
the sole decision-making body in the city, as the much larger ‘great council’ had 
no political power. The constitution of the inner council (henceforth simply ‘the 
council’) was still evolving into the early fifteenth century, but the most significant 
date in its history was 1348.109 In this year an uprising in the city overthrew the 
dominance of a small group of leading families and installed an entirely new set of 
councillors. The ‘revolt’ was soon put down by the previously dominant families 
(with the help of King Charles IV), and from this point onwards all power in the 
108. BB (StAN Rep. 61a).
109. On Nuremberg’s constitution see Peter Fleischmann, Rat und Patriziat in Nürnberg, 3 vols. 
(Neustadt an der Aisch, 2008).
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city was firmly in the hands of this ‘patrician’ group. Its evolution as a ruling caste 
was not completed until the early sixteenth century, when the term ‘patriciate’ 
was first used and its composition was first described in the form of an ordinance 
specifying the families to be admitted to dances in the city hall (the Tanzstatut of 
1521, naming thirty-seven families). In the mid-fifteenth century the membership 
of this group was fixed only by custom, but was still relatively stable. From this 
circle of patrician families, twenty-six men were elected to the council as full 
members, and a further six to eight (from 1445 always eight) as senior members 
of the great council with seats on the inner council. From 1370 onwards there were 
also eight representatives of the craft trades (no formal guilds were permitted at 
Nuremberg), but these had little say in proceedings. Real power lay with the 
various officials appointed from amongst the twenty-six full councillors, whilst 
day-to-day business was handled by the mayors (Bürgermeister). This office was 
always exercised by a senior and a junior Bürgermeister simultaneously, and the 
post rotated around the full members of the council through the year in thirteen 
four-week terms of office each called a Frage, or Bürgermeisterfrage.
This organization, through the work of the city chancery, produced the Briefbücher. 
The letters were registered according to the Bürgermeisterfrage responsible 
for drafting them, and they were recorded as drafts. The many emendations 
and occasional letters crossed out or marked as unsent show this clearly. It is 
impossible to know how complete the Briefbücher are as a record of Nuremberg’s 
correspondence, though we can gain a measure of the incoming letters from a 
surviving index for the years 1449–1457.110 Some very important letters were 
drafted by the council directly, and therefore do not appear in the Briefbücher.111 
In 1538 a ‘young scribe’ was devoted to registering everything which came into 
or out of the chancery, no matter how important it was; this may accord with 
earlier procedure, as many routine and relatively insignificant letters are found 
110. Dieter Rübsamen (ed.), Das Briefeingangregister des Nürnberger Rates für die Jahre 1449-1457 
(Sigmaringen, 1997).
111. Ernst Pitz, Schrift- und Aktenwesen der städtischen Verwaltung im Spätmittelalter. Köln – 
Nürnberg – Lübeck (1959), p. 265.
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in the fifteenth-century Briefbücher.112 There may be many reasons why letters 
were not drafted or recorded in the Briefbücher, but it seems that the majority 
were, although enclosed notes and transcripts of other letters sent with the main 
or covering letter were rarely copied. The letters ‘missing’ from the Briefbücher 
would in any case be a minuscule loss compared to the oral communication 
which Nuremberg maintained by various means with most of its correspondents, 
and which is sometimes mentioned in the letters themselves (see pp. 199-203).
A very high proportion of the letters are addressed to rural nobles or discuss 
Nuremberg’s relationship with rural nobles. This material forms the backbone of 
this study, and it enables us to follow Nuremberg’s written interaction with the 
rural nobility on a virtually day-by-day basis. Further archival sources complement 
this material: the Ratsbücher are the minutes of the inner council, and the council’s 
accounts record details of expenditure, sometimes extending to short narratives 
describing the cause of particular expenses or the progress of an event which 
resulted in the expense. The chancery also kept separate files on particular feuds 
and conflicts, and the city’s archive of charters and other documents is preserved 
along with these administrative sources at the Staatsarchiv Nürnberg. Other, 
more specialized sources from this municipal archive have also been useful for 
parts of this project, and will be introduced at the appropriate points.
Is it possible to write about the relationship between town and nobility based 
on the archival remains of only one of these parties? In the first place it must be 
noted that this is a practical necessity: considerably fewer records have survived 
from noble archives, and this material consists mostly of charters. It is also in 
general much more efficient to focus on one town and the nobles with which it 
interacted than, for instance, to study a body of nobles and the multiple towns 
with which they interacted. But the sources in Nuremberg do give us multiple 
points of direct or indirect access to the rural nobility. Many letters sent by nobles 
to Nuremberg and to third parties are preserved (in original or in transcript) 
112. Pitz, Schrift- und Aktenwesen, pp. 265-266.
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in the various special files kept by the chancery on particular feuds and other 
issues. In addition, every letter which Nuremberg sent began with a summary 
of any preceding correspondence; read alongside the surviving letters by 
nobles, these summaries provide a reasonably good understanding of nobles’ 
correspondence. Naturally the council and chancery often selected the most 
controversial statements in nobles’ letters to summarize and then refute, but the 
noble recipient had to be able to recognize his own original letter in Nuremberg’s 
summary. Its purpose was to persuade the reader of Nuremberg’s openness and 
honesty; other rhetorical purposes could then be served in the main body of the 
letter once this foundation had been established. There is also a large quantity of 
source material relating to nobles available in specialist secondary literature and 
various collections of published sources (especially the Regesta Boica, though this 
series unfortunately ends in 1436), and I was able to make archival visits beyond 
Nuremberg to Amberg, Munich and the castle museum at Parsberg to gather 
material on particular nobles. Much of my research has focused on contextualizing 
the nobles whose relationships with Nuremberg are recorded in the civic sources, 
and thus the overall balance of the investigation ‘favours’ neither side, as far as 
the nature of the surviving sources allows.
The in-depth access to Nuremberg’s interaction with the rural nobility which the 
Briefbücher afford is well worth exploiting in full. This does inevitably limit the 
time period which can be covered, given the density of the Briefbücher material and 
the necessity of drawing on many other sources to contextualize it. In light of the 
historiography outlined above I decided to focus on the 1440s, and in particular the 
years 1440–1448 which are seen by Graf, Morsel and others as the especially tense 
prelude to the war which broke out in the summer of 1449. A comprehensive study 
of the Briefbücher for the period January 1440 to March 1448 (inclusive) provides a 
corpus of around 2,100 letter drafts with relevance to town-noble relations. I have 
also used a nineteenth-century index of names in the Briefbücher to systematically 
find material in pre-1440 volumes relating to noble families of particular importance 
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during the 1440s.113 These letters can be analysed alongside the complete civic 
accounts from Easter 1431 to Easter 1442 (those for the 1430s published by Paul 
Sander);114 Ratsbuch material from 1441; a particular concentration of special feud 
files from the 1440s; and other sources relevant to individual topics. The surviving 
archival material is supplemented by the annals of Johann Müllner, which were 
compiled in the early seventeenth century and made use of some documents 
which are now lost. Wherever Müllner’s sources have survived, we can see that he 
generally followed their form and language very closely.115
Defining Townspeople and Rural Nobles
What exactly do we mean by townspeople and rural nobles, in the context of 
Nuremberg in the 1440s? We also have to be certain that we are justified in making 
a distinction between the two. This study defines the two groups geographically, by 
residence either in the town or the countryside, and thus it is conceivable that nobles 
might be counted amongst the townspeople. In practice, as we will see, this does 
not occur, and this distinction between social groups in particular spaces has more 
analytical value than a distinction between abstract categories of ‘town’ and ‘nobility’.
In this study, the ‘townspeople’ of Nuremberg refers to all those who habitually resided 
within the city walls or were burghers of the city. These two definitions produce 
virtually identical groups, as Nuremberg – unlike many German cities – had hardly 
any non-resident citizens (known as ‘outburghers’ or ‘paleburghers’ – see pp. 87-90). 
The lower and middling classes in the town were naturally highly differentiated from 
the rural nobility, but the ‘patrician’ elite will claim most of our attention. This group 
included a small number of men who had been dubbed knights (see p. 14), and all 
of its members expressed themselves through various forms of chivalric culture. For 
113. These families are: Leuchtenberg, Mangersreuth, Pappenheim (1404–1432), Parsberg, 
Plauen, Rechberg, Rosenberg, Schwanberg, Sternberg, Waldenfels, Wildenstein, Wolfstein.
114. Paul Sander, Die Reichsstädtische Haushaltung Nürnbergs. Dargestellt auf Grund ihres Zustandes 
von 1431 bis 1440 (Leipzig, 1902).
115. Johannes Müllner, Die Annalen der Reichsstadt Nürnberg von 1623, ed. Gerhard Hirschmann, 
2 vols. (Nuremberg, 1972).
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instance, they bore coats of arms and participated in jousts.116 They were also extremely 
powerful figures within the city, effectively by hereditary right, and were owners of 
extensive rural estates. Some at least believed themselves to be descended from noble 
families: for example, Ulman Stromer (1329–1407) understood his distant ancestor 
to be Gerhard von Reichenbach, a knight in possession of a castle 19 km south of 
Nuremberg.117 Many may have seen in themselves a personal quality of ‘nobility’. But 
Nuremberg’s urban elite certainly did not consider themselves to be part of the rural 
nobility as a social group. They referred to the rural nobility by the names which the 
nobility had for itself – ‘lords, knights and squires’, and increasingly ‘the nobility’ – 
and did not apply these names to themselves. Sometimes they expressly contrasted 
themselves with the rural nobility: in 1421 the council denied that members of a certain 
family were under its authority by claiming that they were ‘knights and squires and 
servitors of princes, and not our burghers’;118 and in his report on the war of 1449 the 
councillor Erhard Schürstab wrote that ‘the princes and the whole nobility were so 
vigorously opposed to the town of Nuremberg and to all imperial cities’.119
This sense of differentiation between urban and rural elites was a reflection of 
a straightforward social separation between them. To what extent both social 
separation and mental differentiation were products of other aspects of town-noble 
relations is another question, but we can for now clearly establish the separateness 
of both elites as social groups. The patriciate did not participate in the social and 
political institutions of the rural nobility, such as princely service or noble societies 
and leagues, let alone involve themselves with the rural churches and monasteries 
patronized by the nobility, and the nobility did not generally enter collegiate churches 
or monasteries in the town (with a few exceptions, see pp. 50-51, 71). A small number 
of nobles had a limited role in urban government as servitors of the town (see chapter 
six), but for the most part the only institution within Nuremberg’s walls in which 
116. Endres, ’Turniere und Gesellenstechen’.
117. ChrdtSt, i, 60.
118. BB 5 f. 114v (14.2.1421): ‘Ritter und knecht und der herren diener und unser burger niht sind’.
119. ChrdtSt, ii, 137: ‘die herren und aller adel wurden so seer bewegt wider die stat Nürmberg 
und wider all reichstet’.
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rural nobles participated was the house of the Teutonic Order – in this context we 
have to see nobles as brothers of the Order first and rural nobles second.
Individual families did not very often bridge the divide between town and country. 
There is no evidence of nobles taking up residence in Nuremberg in the fifteenth 
century (see pp. 49-51). Some families from Nuremberg’s elite do seem to have 
left the town to reside on their country estates during the fifteenth century, but the 
lack of references to these families in the sources from the 1440s suggests that in 
doing so they severed most of their connections with the town.120 The question of 
intermarriage between urban and rural elites is also difficult to answer, and there is no 
question that such marriages did take place. We have seen Hanns Hubert Hofmann’s 
opinion that a previously active connubium suddenly broke off in the 1470s (p. 32), 
but there is little evidence for this in the patrician genealogies assembled by Peter 
Fleischmann (though unfortunately these are incomplete, and focus on the members 
of each family who served as councillors).121 These show some significant marriages 
between patricians and women from powerful noble families in the early part of 
the fifteenth century – Sigmund Stromer and Kunigunde von Egloffstein (d. 1435), 
Sebald Groland and Barbara von Egloffstein in 1418, Peter Rieter and Barbara von 
Seckendorff-Nold in 1420, Sebald Rieter and Margarete von Lichtenstein in 1443 – 
and one in the second half of the century: Peter Rieter and Elisabeth Truchseß von 
Pommersfelden (d. 1493). From other sources we have evidence for some marriages 
of Nuremberg women to noblemen: Hans von Wildenstein and Brigitte Haller (1406); 
Ehrenfried von Seckendorff and Agnes Haller (1421); Friedrich von Wolfskeel and an 
unnamed burgheress (before 1445).122 On this evidence it seems that intermarriage 
between town and nobility had ceased well before 1470, and that even in the earlier 
part of the century it was practised by only a few patrician families (especially Haller 
and Rieter).123 This decline in family contacts was not necessarily an expression of 
120. See Ulrichs, Lehnhof, pp. 75-77.
121. Fleischmann, Rat und Patriziat, ii, tables.
122. Gustav Voit, Die Wildensteiner (Nuremberg, 1964), p. 9; Zeilinger, Lebensformen im Krieg, p. 
173; BB 17 f. 203r-v (28.1.1445).
123. Thomas Zotz also finds little intermarriage at Nuremberg: Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 38. 
See also Ulrichs, Lehnhof, pp. 80, 86.
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growing mistrust between townspeople and nobles. Most rural nobles tended to 
marry within their home region, often with immediately neighbouring families.124 In 
this context, Nuremberg could represent just another regional system of endogamy 
(most patricians married with other patrician families), although geographically 
smaller because even its elite population was so much denser.
Thus the nobility was clearly distinguished from the urban elite. But it is always 
hard to distinguish the lower strata of the nobility from all sorts of other non-noble 
groups. The ‘nobility’ or otherwise of some particularly marginal individuals 
and families may have been quite situational, dependent on the opinion of the 
observer. Contemporaries would have had various expectations of nobles: they 
might be trained and equipped to fight on horseback, live in some sort of fortified 
residence, and conform to certain codes of behaviour. But we can rarely determine 
the presence or absence of such characteristics in precisely the most difficult cases. 
For our purposes it seems reasonable to accept Nuremberg’s judgement as to 
whether an individual was noble, and this was expressed through standard forms 
of address in the council’s letters. A man addressed as erber und vester (‘honourable 
and steadfast’) was certainly a nobleman in the council’s eyes. Erber alone was not 
an indication of nobility (except as an appellation for Nuremberg’s noble servitors, 
see p. 258), and the rare vester is difficult to interpret. But unfortunately Nuremberg 
did not correspond with all the nobles with whom it interacted, and it did not 
always address even undoubted nobles with more than a plain lieber (‘dear’). In 
these cases I have used contextual evidence, such as an individual’s known political 
and administrative functions and position in lists of names, to identify certain 
individuals as nobles. I have erred on the side of caution, however, and therefore 
some low-ranking nobles may not have received the consideration they deserve.
The rural nobility also needs to be distinguished from higher ranking nobles, the 
princes. Some princes acquired their rank through an office, in particular prince 
bishops. For Nuremberg, the most important of these were the bishops of Würzburg, 
124. Ulrichs, Lehnhof, p. 134.
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Bamberg and Eichstätt. But the secular princes were members of noble dynasties who 
had risen to particular power, and their titles are of little relevance to their real status. 
For instance, in mid-fifteenth century Swabia the counts of Württemberg were vastly 
more powerful than the dukes of Urslingen, and the political behaviour of the former 
shows that they had undoubtedly attained princely rank whilst the latter moved in 
the circles of the rural nobility. Another dynasty whose high-status title flattered to 
deceive were the landgraves of Leuchtenberg, based to the east of Nuremberg on 
the Bohemian border. In the fifteenth century they can be found in the service of 
genuine princes, such as the Wittelsbach dukes of Bavaria. This same measure of 
political behaviour allows us to assign some particularly powerful comital families 
to the ‘rural nobility’ as well: the counts of Oettingen and Henneberg, for instance, 
had large independent lordships, but also took positions in the service of princes, 
albeit in particularly exalted posts (Ludwig von Oettingen as imperial master of the 
court, and Georg von Henneberg as administrator of the bishopric of Bamberg). By 
comparison, the counts of Württemberg entered into alliances with powerful princes 
such as the Hohenzollern margraves of Brandenburg, Nuremberg’s closest princely 
neighbours. The Hohenzollern family had been burgraves of Nuremberg since the 
early thirteenth century, and throughout the 1300s the town battled to reduce their 
authority with the walls. A partial conclusion to this process was reached in 1427, 
when the council purchased most of the burgraviate’s remaining rights in the city 
and the surrounding imperial forests, including the burgraves’ fortress adjacent to 
the imperial castle in Nuremberg.125
The ‘rural nobility’ for our purposes must also be distinguished from members of 
noble families who had entered monasteries, the church and the military orders. 
These men and women had significant interactions with Nuremberg, and no doubt 
the ways in which they perceived and understood the city and its citizens had much 
in common with the attitudes of their lay relatives. But we cannot separate their 
actions as clerics and religious from their behaviour as nobles, and so including 
them in the ranks of the rural nobility could confuse and distort our picture.
125. See Pfeiffer, Nürnberg, p. 88.
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Both our groups, therefore, embrace a broad socio-economic spectrum. Further, finer 
distinctions would be difficult to make with any consistency, but would also ignore late 
medieval social constructs. The densely populated city was inevitably a community 
in which rich and poor lived side by side, and any interaction between a nobleman 
and an artisan was closely monitored by the council, whilst the council’s policy 
towards neighbouring nobles was a matter for discussion amongst the citizenry (see, 
for example, p. 17 for Hans Sachs’ critique of noble robbers, though as a cobbler rather 
than a long-distance trader he was not in the front line of this particular confrontation). 
Nobles knew that their engagement with the patriciate was also an engagement with 
the wider commune, hence Felix Fabri’s pedantic concern with the separation of 
patriciate and guilds in Ulm (pp. 15-16). Rural nobles, meanwhile, had a great deal in 
common despite the considerable economic differences between richest and poorest: 
the overwhelming majority were professional military men and administrators who 
sought to enter the service of princes and towns. Historians including Joseph Morsel 
and Heinz Lieberich have also argued that a single ‘noble’ identity was increasingly 
associated with a wide range of political and economic positions within this group, 
and in order to take into account the possible effects of this on town-noble relations 
this range must be reflected in the parameters of this study.
Approaches and Objectives
The fundamental objective of this project is to investigate the reciprocal relationship 
between the ideas which townspeople and rural nobles had about each another 
(and themselves) and the ways in which these same townspeople and rural nobles 
interacted with one another. Some of the late medieval models of town-noble 
relations have already been outlined, though we might expect to come across others 
as we proceed. What role did these patterns of thought play in the lives of different 
nobles and townspeople, and how did their lived experiences shape their ideas 
about each another? Where and when do we find particular ideas about town-noble 
relations, and how do different understandings of this relationship interact with 
one another? The social situation and social production of ideas about town and 
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nobility will be at the forefront of this investigation, and I will therefore examine 
in detail the social, political and economic interaction of townspeople and nobles 
in different spaces and contexts: in the town, in the countryside, through political 
communities, through alliances and service relationships, and during feuds.
Throughout the study I will concentrate on breaking down the generalizations of 
‘town’ and ‘nobility’ themselves: we need to prise individual townspeople and 
nobles out of their imagined ‘class’ environment and re-contextualize them in 
their individual circumstances so as to understand their behaviour as a product 
of and an influence upon their ideas about themselves and others. This is a greater 
a task for the nobility than for the town, not least because we are dealing with one 
town and a multitude of nobles.126
With this contextual approach I negate the twin temptations to read individuals’ 
actions as either a direct expression of their supposed ideology or as unprincipled 
‘pragmatism’, or to simply oppose concepts such as ‘cooperation’ and ‘conflict’ with 
no sense of the relationship between them. These are risks inherent within both the 
liberal-Romantic dichotomy and the historiography which rejects it but lacks an 
alternative explanation for the medieval discourses of antagonism. A focus on the 
‘similarity’ or ‘closeness’ of urban and rural elites has produced many gains, but it 
is unable to fully address the actual relationships between the two. Those historians 
who postulate change over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries at 
least challenge us to investigate these relationships in more detail in order to detect 
possible shifts within them. The issue of change naturally presents a challenge to this 
project in particular, with its tight chronological focus. But I hope to use the density 
of the sources in Nuremberg to investigate relationships in the detailed, contextual 
manner which is essential to ultimately understanding change and causation over 
the long run.
126. In this I follow Hillay Zmora’s attempt to study the ‘individual noble feuder, rather than 
his class’ (Zmora, State and nobility, p. 11). See also Peter-Michael Hahn, ’Landadel und 
Stadt im 15. Jahrhundert’, in Matthias Puhle (ed.), Hanse – Städte – Bünde. Die sächsischen 
Städte zwischen Elbe und Weser um 1500 (Magdeburg, 1996), p. 288.
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2.
THE TOWN
The presence of the nobility in Nuremberg is at once inescapable and elusive in 
the surviving sources. The mere fact that nobles were active in towns does not 
seem to have been cause for contemporary reflection and comment as were the 
activities of burghers in the countryside. Seemingly it was taken for granted that 
rural nobles would be present in urban spaces in economic, political and social 
contexts, and this was certainly the case to  a considerable extent, irrespective of 
the size and type of town under consideration. Nor does this surprise the modern 
observer, who is accustomed to a society structured around the economic and 
social centrality of towns. We might question how far the pre-industrial town 
was the ‘ordering centre of life’ that the modern town has arguably become,127 
but the rural nobility’s world still revolved around urban spaces when it came 
to the purchase of certain goods and services, and for the majority of their most 
significant social and political occasions.
This is certainly the picture of noble life in the town with the broadest support 
amongst historians at present. Andreas Ranft describes the ‘astonishing normality’ 
of noble life in the town.128 The theme of the nobility in the town has also been 
taken up by Thomas Zotz, Arend Mindermann and others, and is the subject 
of a volume of essays.129 Ranft expresses his ‘astonishment’ in reaction to the 
older view of town and nobility as inherently antagonistic, but he also draws our 
attention to ways in which aspects of the nobility were incompatible with the 
town in a more practical sense: municipal authorities did not want armed forces 
within their walls, for example.130 In weighing this balance of ‘normality’ and 
127. Edith Ennen quoted by Wolfgang Leiser, ‘Städtische Zentralität im agrarisch-feudalen 
Umfeld’, in Hans Schulze (ed.), Städtisches Um- und Hinterland in vorindustrieller Zeit 
(Cologne, 1985), pp. 1-20. Here p. 3: ‘ordnende Mitte des Lebens’.
128. Ranft, ’Adel und Stadt,’ p. 64.
129. Weserrenaissance Museum, Adel in der Stadt.
130. Ranft, ’Adel und Stadt,’ pp. 49-50.
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incompatibility we have to deal with the fact that tensions tend to produce more 
sources than harmony, coupled with the lack of systematic sources recording 
aspects of the nobility’s interaction with the town. This problem is to an extent 
more acute in Nuremberg than elsewhere, as the city’s system of taxation based 
on ‘self-assessment’ by the sworn testimony of each taxpayer has not left the kind 
of records which have allowed, for instance, the very detailed reconstruction of 
noble property in the Upper Rhenish town of Schaffhausen.131 The ‘chanciness’ of 
the evidence for much of the nobility’s urban activity reveals one of the limitations 
of the tight chronological focus of this study: by casting a wider net, we might 
be able to join the many scattered dots into a meaningful shape. Nonetheless, we 
can discern some remarkably distinct forms, especially through comparison with 
results from studies of other towns.
Two sets of sources do offer a more comprehensive picture of the nobility in 
Nuremberg, though only for those nobles who were singled out for special honour 
by the city council. Some nobles received gifts of wine (Weinschenk), which were 
recorded in a register (the Schenkbuch) according to the administrative rhythm 
of the Bürgermeisterfrage (see above, p. 37). The Schenkbuch survives for the 
period 1422 to 1445.132 Other nobles were accorded military escorts to and from 
the city, references to which are scattered throughout the municipal accounts.133 
Technically both wine and escorts could have been provided to nobles outside of 
the town without leaving a trace in the records, but in practice this is not likely 
to have been the case on any significant scale; exactly how certain nobles were 
selected for these honours will be considered below (see pp. 58-59). We are thus 
relatively well informed on the presence of particularly distinguished nobles in 
Nuremberg. But aside from these formalities, what relationships were formed by 
nobles’ interaction with the urban space and urban economy? For the most part 
131. Kurt Bänteli, ’Schauplatz des Turniers von 1436. Die Stadt Schaffhausen in den 1430er-
Jahren’, in Peter Jezler, Peter Niederhäuser, and Elke Jezler (eds.), Ritterturnier. Geschichte 
einer Festkultur (Lucerne, 2014), p. 74.
132. StAN Rep. 52b 315.
133. See Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 485-490 and the original accounts by year in StAN Rep. 54.
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we only encounter nobles in Nuremberg momentarily, sometimes with contextual 
information on their status in the city or the purpose of their stay. Rarely can we 
see them face to face with townspeople outside of official diplomatic situations. 
Is this apparent distance despite so much physical proximity solely a trick of the 
sources, or does it also have some origins in the ways in which the nobility found 
themselves interacting with the town?
Residence and Property
Rural nobles could become temporary residents of towns in many ways, whether 
on a seasonal basis or for a fixed period of time. Nobles might take up residence 
in a town to meet their obligations to the town council, for medical, business or 
security reasons, or for pleasure and sociability. Unless their residence required 
or resulted from a particular arrangement with the civic authorities, we cannot 
expect it to have been recorded in most circumstances. Urban property owned 
by nobles is, however, far more likely to have left traces of some sort. Residency 
and property-owning are not necessarily connected – the one does not imply 
the other – and their relationship has to be deduced on a case-by-case basis. But 
precisely this need to look for a relationship between residency and property-
holding suggests that we should consider the two in tandem.
I have found no direct evidence for rural nobles as residents of Nuremberg in 
the 1440s. Various nobles may well have stayed in the city for several months 
at a time, but none are known to have taken up long-term or repeated, habitual 
residence within the walls whilst retaining noble status. This is in many ways 
surprising, given the draw which the town exerted on the rural nobility. This 
attraction was thematized by some writers in the later fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries: Felix Fabri (c.1440–1502) lists amongst his six types of noble burghers 
those nobles who have left their castles because of feuds, vexation and loneliness, 
or lack of necessities, and emigrated to the town for the solatium societatis and 
other voluptates. Other nobles move to the city due to weakness or poverty to live 
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as nobiles senes, to serve God and be near medical treatment.134 For the Alsatian 
humanist Jakob Wimpfeling (1450–1528), the glory of the towns was reflected in 
the fact that even nobles assembled in them: particularly elderly nobles, afraid of 
loneliness and no longer attracted to the hunt, repelled by robbery and finding 
princely service burdensome, who wished to go to church and hear God’s 
word.135 Historians working on other towns have found some evidence for the 
sorts of noble residence envisioned by Fabri and Wimpfeling: at Nördlingen, 
noble widows were admitted to the town, even though few other nobles resided 
there in the later fifteenth century.136 Moving to a town was a retirement option 
for princes as well as rural nobles throughout late medieval Germany: in 1316 
Count Gerhard IV of Holstein retired to Lübeck on the proceeds of sale of his 
lordship, and lived there for two years.137 Consequently, modern historians often 
assume that life in the town was preferable for nobles, at least on the grounds of 
comfort, convenience and sociability.138
These factors were not entirely absent from the picture at Nuremberg. In 1466 
Martin von Wildenstein spent the final months of his life in the Carthusian 
monastery there, having previously made donations to various monasteries in 
his Upper Palatinate homeland.139 He is not known to have had any previous 
relationship with the Carthusians at Nuremberg, and so his decision to end his 
days there – rather than in one of the Upper Palatine houses – may well have 
been influenced primarily by the town’s amenities. There is also some evidence 
of nobles coming to Nuremberg for medical treatment. In January 1440 Count 
Michael of Wertheim requested three or four weeks’ safe conduct in Nuremberg 
as a physical indisposition meant that he was in need of help and care (hillf 
und guter pflege), and he felt that he could obtain this in Nuremberg better than 
134. Fabri, Tractatus, p. 61.
135. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 26.
136. Kießling, Stadt, p. 83.
137. Demski, Adel und Lübeck, pp. 104-106.
138. For example Paravicini, ritterlich-höfische Kultur, p. 51.
139. Voit, Wildensteiner, p. 11.
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elsewhere.140 He was granted safe conduct for four weeks, or longer if he needed, 
but it is not known whether he took up this option. He died on 25 July in the same 
year.141 So it seems likely that Nuremberg could fulfil the functions of towns for 
the nobiles senes as sketched by Felix Fabri, but we do not yet have any evidence for 
extended periods of residence by aged nobles outside of the town’s monasteries, 
let alone any evidence for residence by nobles other than on the grounds of age 
and ill-health. This would make Nuremberg an extreme case, but fundamentally 
in line with the general pattern elsewhere, certainly in Swabia and Franconia. Jos 
Humpiß (from a former patrician family of Ravensburg) made this clear enough 
in 1516: ‘To be noble and to reside in the towns as a burgher is not the custom of 
the nobility in Swabia’.142
Some nobles did own houses in Nuremberg, without there being any indication 
that they personally resided in these houses at any point. The burgher Ulrich 
Neunhauser lived in a house which belonged to Anthony von Seckendorff’s 
wife, but whether he was a tenant in all or part of the property is not clear.143 Two 
other noble properties can be located to the northern part of Nuremberg, in the 
area of the castle: one was connected to the imperial part of the castle, the other to 
the burgravial fortress. The former seems to have been in or adjacent to the castle 
itself and took the form of a tower. The Bohemian noble Ulrich of Hasenburg was 
possibly negotiating its sale to the Waldstromer family in 1410,144 and this was 
confirmed by King Sigismund in 1428.145 More is known about a house on the 
‘Paniersberg’, within the walls just to the east of the castle, which was held for 
many years by the Wildenstein family as a fief of the Hohenzollern burgraves. 
When Heinrich von Wildenstein bought the house from his fellow noble Ludwig 
Rindsmaul before 1362, the city council was able to stipulate that it could only be 
140. BB 14 f. 104v (8.1.1440).
141. Detlev Schwennicke, Europäische Stammtafeln. Neue Folge: Stammtafeln zur Geschichte der 
europäischen Staaten. Vol. 16: Bayern und Franken (Marburg, 1995), table 153.
142. Quoted in Endres, ’Adel und Patriziat,’ p. 231. Residence by nobles was not common in 
Lübeck either: Demski, Adel und Lübeck, p. 267.
143. BB 17 ff. 166v-167r (2.12.1444).
144. BB 3 f. 45v (14.3.1410).
145. Regesta Boica 13, p. 127 (8.9.1428).
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sold in future to a citizen of Nuremberg, perhaps because Heinrich was himself a 
burgher.146 Subsequently the house changed hands within the Wildenstein family, 
but remained very much in the city council’s field of vision: in 1369 Heinrich von 
Wildenstein complained to the Franconian Landfriede that Nuremberg had caused 
2,000 Marks’ worth of damage to the house (perhaps in the course of the long-
running dispute between the town and the Hohenzollern), and in 1429 Hans III 
von Wildenstein purchased the house from Hans II and his son Martin,147 with 
the help of a 400 Gulden loan from the council.148
By May 1436 Andreas Volckamer and Berthold Nützel had agreed to purchase 
the house from Hans von Wildenstein.149 This transaction appears to have 
fallen through however, as in July Nuremberg advanced 200 Gulden to Hans 
von Wildenstein against the promise that he would ensure that Michael Beheim 
was enfeoffed with the property before St Bartholomew’s Day (24 August).150 
The process of obtaining Beheim’s enfeoffment from the margrave eventually 
extended from August 1436151 until the final reckoning in Nuremberg’s accounts 
in late 1441,152 with interventions by Wildenstein’s relative Ulrich Haller.153 In 
total, Wildenstein was lent 600 Gulden, which he repaid with the sale of the 
house to Michael Beheim on behalf of Nuremberg. Quite possibly the 400 Gulden 
loan in 1429 was also made with a view to the eventual purchase of the house by 
Nuremberg. The council sold the house to Beheim for 200 Gulden, showing that 
the purchase was not economically motivated.154
Thus most of what little noble property we can find within Nuremberg’s walls 
was bought up by the town, either directly or through patrician families. In 
146. Voit, Wildensteiner, p. 9.
147. Voit, Wildensteiner, p. 9.
148. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 31v (16.9.1429).
149. BB 12 ff. 204v-205r (28.5.1436).
150. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 33v.
151. BB 12 ff. 249v-250r (21.8.1436).
152. StAN Rep. 54 12 ff. 80v, 81v.
153. BB 13 ff. 195r-v (23.7.1438), 239v (23.10.1438).
154. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 33v.
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the case of the Paniersberg house, we can see the control which the council 
had exerted over this property since at least the fourteenth century. The 
present evidence from Nuremberg is too slim to project any trend, but it is well 
worth noting that studies of other towns have found similar actions by urban 
authorities to be part of a consistent pattern. Civic control of noble residence 
and property in towns could be extremely tight; its most extreme form was an 
outright ban on ‘knights’ residing in the town. Such a measure was written into 
the law of Freiburg im Breisgau in 1178155 and the statutes of Hamburg in 1270 
and 1279,156 and also featured at Lübeck.157 The exclusion of nobles from the town 
in this way was probably not so much an end in itself as a device to restrict 
the influence of regional princes within the walls,158 and perhaps also to keep 
rural disputes from spreading into the urban space.159 Most towns were less 
strict on the issue of residence, but virtually all towns sought in some way to 
control, and sometimes to reduce or eliminate, urban property owned by non-
burghers, which inevitably impacted on rural nobles. At Worms in 1299 Johannes 
Holderbaum promised to sell his house ‘zum Hohenbaum’ to no one except a 
burgher of Worms who was resident in the city and who was neither a cleric nor 
a knight (ritder).160 In Göttingen the authorities from the early fourteenth century 
deliberately made property-owning within the town harder for nobles and other 
non-burghers: their possessions could only be held for an individual’s lifetime, 
and sold only to burghers.161 The council’s success in driving out noble property-
owners, considered both legal anomalies and symbols of princely overlordship, 
is measured by Arend Mindermann through a change in Göttingen’s sumptuary 
155. Fleckenstein, ’Bürgertum und Rittertum,’ p. 80.
156. Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt, p. 339.
157. Demski, Adel und Lübeck, p. 95.
158. Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt, pp. 339-341.
159. Alfred Haverkamp, ’“Innerstädtische Auseinandersetzungen” und überlokale 
Zusammenhänge in deutschen Städten während der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts’, 
in Reinhard Elze and Gina Fasoli (eds.), Stadtadel und Bürgertum in den deutschen Städten des 
Spätmittelalters (Berlin, 1991), p. 124.
160. Stadtarchiv Worms, 001A / Abt. 1 A I Nr. 89 (29.7.1299). Accessed at http://www.deutsche-
digitale-bibliothek.de/item/ZS5IVKOWCNAGDKZ77QFY6D4XG3Z54XWL (29.3.2015). 
Discussed in Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 30.
161. Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt, p. 338.
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laws, which in 1340 and 1354 accounted for nobles living in the town, but 
apparently saw no need to do so in 1367.162 Katrin Keller describes a policy of 
deliberately buying up noble properties in the small Saxon town of Delitzsch.163 
In 1456 the ownership of urban property by nobles who were not also burghers 
was a cause for complaint at Basel.164
As we will see later in this chapter, there can be little doubt that at Nuremberg the 
council’s desire to closely control all aspects of life within the walls also impacted 
on the presence of the nobility in the town in all its forms. The limited evidence 
for noble property in Nuremberg could match a pattern described most fully by 
Mindermann for Göttingen: an original cluster of noble properties around the 
residence of the town’s overlord (in Nuremberg, the twin imperial and burgravial 
castle) which were sold in the fourteenth century. In part, this involved their being 
’neutralized’ by the town in terms of both their independence from its jurisdiction 
and their potential as points of princely influence in the town.165 It is conceivable 
that both the Hasenburg and Wildenstein properties in Nuremberg survived into 
the fifteenth century because their owners engaged closely with the urban elite: 
Wildensteiner were allies and sometimes burghers of Nuremberg throughout the 
period during which they owned the Paniersberg house, and the Hasenburger 
were connected to the Nuremberg Waldstromer through marriage.166 But we 
must also remain open to the possibility that these families initially acquired, 
rather than preserved, their urban property through these connections, and there 
is also a chance that the nobility’s real presence in Nuremberg as residents and 
property-holders has never properly been appreciated due to the nature of the 
surviving sources. A study with a broader chronological basis will be required to 
address these questions.
162. Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt, pp. 332-335.
163. Keller, ’Kontakte und Konflikte,’ p. 503.
164. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 37.
165. Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt, pp. 332-338.
166. Fleischmann, Rat und Patriziat, genealogical table ‘Waldstromer’; BB 3 f. 45v (14.3.1410).
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There is another side to the civic control of noble residence in the town: it could be 
deployed as a tactic to control the nobles themselves. In 1257, at Mühlhausen in 
Thuringia, Berthold Truchseß von Schlotheim and his sons bought an urban curia 
from the burghers and with it the ius perfecte civilitatis as part of the settlement of 
a dispute between him and the town.167 Urban property was rarely used quite so 
explicitly to bind a noble to a town for political reasons, but towns often had an 
interest in settling their noble allies within the walls. Where citizenship was used 
as a form of alliance, it could be tied to continued residence in the town, and lost 
if the noble moved out.168 In the fifteenth century, some outburgher treaties at 
Cologne provided a house in the city,169 though on balance it seems unlikely that 
many noble outburghers ever lived in Cologne.170 Nördlingen’s noble Paktbürger 
were generally supposed to reside in Nördlingen, according to their treaties with 
the town171 – again, it is unclear whether this was also common practice.
Although Nuremberg had no such system of citizen-allies in the fifteenth century 
(see chapter six), the council sometimes stipulated residence in the town as part 
of its service contracts with nobles. In January 1445 and again in 1458 Hans 
von Rechenberg was retained with the requirement to live in Nuremberg,172 
and Konrad von Heideck was to reside in Nuremberg for his ten-year service 
term from February 1445.173 But it seems improbable that Heideck in particular 
would actually have lived in the city. In October 1446 he was certainly based 
outside, as he was asked to come to Nuremberg with six or eight servitors.174 As 
we will see in chapter six, Heideck’s alliance with Nuremberg was largely one 
of mutual defence against Margrave Albrecht Achilles, and it is difficult to see 
how withdrawing Heideck from the personal supervision of his own territory 
167. Hans J. Domsta, Die Kölner Außenbürger. Untersuchungen zur Politik und Verfassung der Stadt 
Köln von der Mitte des 13. bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts (Bonn, 1973), p. 28 n. 70.
168. e.g. at Schlettstadt in Alsace: Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 34.
169. Domsta, Kölner Außenbürger, p. 108.
170. Domsta, Kölner Außenbürger, pp. 55-56, 76, 80.
171. Kießling, Stadt, pp. 75-78.
172. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 90r; StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 177r.
173. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 84r (20.2.1445).
174. BB 18 f. 67r-v (3.10.1446).
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and bringing him into the already well-protected town would have benefitted 
either side. What then was the purpose of the residency clause? In the context 
of the clear relationship between urban residence and council control of noble 
behaviour, it is possible that this was another instrument by which Nuremberg 
could exert leverage over Heideck if necessary, rather than an injunction always 
to be taken literally.
Residence and property in the town might also be used to attract nobles into 
the town’s service, as Domsta suggests was the case at Cologne.175 Nuremberg’s 
leading noble servitors were given the largely honorific title of imperial chief 
magistrate (Reichsschultheiß), and a complex of buildings in a prominent location 
opposite the castle entrance were known until their destruction in 1945 as the 
Reichsschultheißenhof, implying that they were the chief magistrate’s official 
residence. But I have not been able to discover any substance behind this tradition, 
and what we do know about this structure rather suggests that it was not the 
residence of the Reichsschultheiß. Murals painted there in the late fourteenth 
century depicted the arms of the Nuremberg Ebner family, when no Ebner is 
recorded as having been Reichsschultheiß,176 and in 1442 the building was known 
as ‘Ellwanger’s house beneath the castle’, again referring to a Nuremberg family 
not known to have provided a Reichsschultheiß.177 Noble chief magistrates may 
have resided elsewhere in Nuremberg, and certainly many lower ranking noble 
servitors were based in the city (see p. 267), but this could only ever amount to a 
very small number of noble residents.
In 1516 Jos Humpiß seems to have felt that a clear segregation of town and 
nobility was axiomatic for Swabia. The evidence for Nuremberg seems to suggest 
that the situation there was if anything more extreme in the 1440s. But this hardly 
175. Domsta, Kölner Außenbürger, p. 108.
176. F.A. Nagel, ’Wandmalereien des 14. Jahrhunderts im Reichsschultheißenhof zu Nürnberg’, 
Mitteilungen des Vereins für die Geschichte der Stadt Nürnberg, 35 (1937); Wilhelm Schwemmer, 
’Zwei Fresken der Luxemburger in Nürnberg’, Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte, 114 
(1978), pp. 543-544.
177. Müllner, Annalen, p. 357: ‘Ellwangers Behausung unter der Vesten’.
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represents the end of the story for the nobility in the town: in many towns they 
were to return in strength in the early modern period, as the ever-increasing pull 
of social, cultural and economic opportunities eventually made many towns, at 
least seasonally, the nobility’s residence of choice.178 Nor is it even half of the 
story for the late Middle Ages, for if the nobility were being squeezed out of the 
town as residents and property owners then they simply had to find other ways 
to engage with urban amenities.
The Status of Nobles in Nuremberg
Nobles in Nuremberg were for the most part ‘guests’ of the city, which was at least 
as much a legal status as a social relationship.179 The council sought to regulate 
the entry and exit of all outsiders according to the needs of the moment and on a 
case-by-case basis: between July 1449 and June 1450, at the height of the Second 
Towns’ War, a record was kept of all those entering Nuremberg through the Laufer 
Gate, including the purpose of their journey and accommodation in the city.180 
During peacetime control was less restrictive, and the only nobles known to have 
been entirely barred from entering Nuremberg were those under interdict. In the 
late summer of 1441 a messenger was sent to Georg von Wildenstein to instruct 
him not to come to Nuremberg, as his excommunication had been announced 
there;181 in June 1442 the priest of St Sebald had informed the council that Georg 
was an excommunicate once again, and that if he came to Nuremberg all divine 
services would have to be suspended.182 Ulrich von Wiesenthau believed that he 
could spare the city this trouble by getting his interdict lifted for eight days before 
and after a hearing in Nuremberg.183
178. See Johanek, ’Adel und Stadt,’ p. 33; Georg Heilingsetzer, ’Adel in der Stadt. Spätmittelalter 
und frühe Neuzeit’, in Peter Csendes and Johannes Seidl (eds.), Stadt und Prosopographie. Zur 
quellenmäßigen Erforschung von Personen und sozialen Gruppen in der Stadt des Spätmittelalters 
und der frühen Neuzeit (Linz, 2002), p. 61.
179. For example, in 1440 Frederick III granted Nuremberg the privilege of not having to hear 
the suit of a ‘guest’ against another ‘guest’ if the issue had not arisen within Nuremberg: 
Müllner, Annalen, ii, 343.
180. Zeilinger, Lebensformen im Krieg, p. 20.
181. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 72v.
182. BB 15 f. 259v (14.6.1442).
183. BB 15 f. 337r (5.11.1442).
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Other nobles were of course guests of honour. In so far as these relationships 
are visible today, guests were formally honoured primarily through gifts of 
wine184 and through being accorded an armed escort over a certain distance 
beyond Nuremberg on their entrance or exit.185 This escort could also be a 
practical security measure, and most of the time it was probably something of 
both, but certain occasions had a clear diplomatic component. For instance, an 
unusually large contingent of eighteen horses under the command of Wigeleis 
von Wolfstein, imperial chief magistrate at the time, was provided for unnamed 
electors’ counsellors as they rode out of Nuremberg on their return from the new 
king, Frederick III, in Austria.186 The recording of the Weinschenk has already been 
mentioned, and this reveals a great variation in the number of nobles honoured 
per Frage (usually a period of just less than a month). In some Fragen just one or 
two nobles received wine from the city; the busiest Frage of those recorded in the 
1440s was that which fell in November 1441 and featured a tournament hosted in 
Nuremberg by Margrave Albrecht Achilles (see also below pp. 65-66): wine was 
dispensed to at least 133 clearly identifiable nobles during the tournament, plus 
a further five who visited in the ordinary course of events.
What was the distinction between an honoured and an ordinary guest? The fine 
political and social judgements which would have been involved here can hardly 
be reconstructed, but in general this status depended on a combination of the 
standing of the person and the purpose of their visit. Mid-ranking nobles from 
the immediate region who might be expected to have visited Nuremberg quite 
often do not necessarily appear frequently in the Schenkbuch, even those who 
had a good relationship with Nuremberg. For instance, members of the Parsberg 
family appear in just two Frage between 1439 and 1445, both in connection with 
major events in the city (the tournament of November 1441 and the imperial diet 
of 1442).187 Higher-ranking nobles (such as Heinrich I and his son Heinrich II von 
184. Schenkbuch 1422–1445: StAN Rep. 52b 315.
185. See Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 485-490 and the original accounts in StAN Rep. 54.
186. Sander, Haushaltung, p. 490.
187. StAN Rep. 52a 315 ff. 162v, 165v.
59
Plauen, mentioned in thirteen Frage),188 or those with imperial connections (e.g. 
Hartung von Klux, eight Frage between 1439 and 1444)189 were perhaps honoured 
every time they visited Nuremberg. Wine and escorts were frequently bestowed 
on unnamed counsellors of princes, which suggests that it was their status in 
princely service which earned them the honour, whilst the council’s unusual 
largesse at the tournament of November 1441 was undoubtedly more a reflection 
of the honour of Albrecht Achilles than of the individual, independent honour 
of each of his guests. The Schenkbuch could have been a diplomatic reckoning as 
much as a financial account (at Basel the Weinschenk lists were read to the council 
each week as a reflection on the town’s political standing),190 but in this capacity it 
was clearly very much more a record of political engagement at the highest level 
than of Nuremberg’s relations with its noble neighbours.
The day-to-day negotiation of nobles’ status within Nuremberg is more clearly 
visible in the Briefbücher, which preserve many letters granting safe conduct in the 
city. Again, it is unclear exactly which nobles and what types of visit to the town 
required or received safe conducts. Certainly those nobles who had reason to fear 
Nuremberg’s combined police and judiciary (see chapter four) would have sought 
a guarantee of their safety. These nobles were often granted safe conduct in order 
to ‘answer for themselves’ (sich zu verantworten) before the council.191 But as we 
saw above (pp. 50-51), Count Michael of Wertheim also sought safe conduct in 
order to receive medical treatment near the end of his life. Indeed, when in 1406 
the noble Frank von Kronberg asked the city of Frankfurt for safe conduct for a 
meeting of the Society of the Stag in the town, he added in a postscript: ‘Good 
friends, you know well that knights and squires do not like to ride into the imperial 
cities without a strong safe conduct – please don’t take offence that I write to you 
188. StAN Rep. 52b 315 ff. 151v, 154v, 157v, 159r, 163r, 165r, 166r, 170r, 172r, 176r-v, 179r-v.
189. StAN Rep. 52b 315 ff. 145v, 155r, 157v, 161r, 165r, 168r, 171r, 181r.
190. Valentin Groebner, Liquid Assets, Dangerous Gifts: Presents and Politics at the End of the Middle 
Ages (Philadelphia, 2002), p. 24.
191. e.g. BB 17 f. 67r-v (13.7.1444).
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thus’.192 For Zotz, this fear of entering the city without a ‘strong’ safe conduct 
was the reason that later in the fifteenth century the organizers of the ‘Four Land’ 
tournaments preferred to hold their events in the residence towns of princes (e.g. 
Heidelberg, Ansbach) or in episcopal cities (Mainz, Würzburg, Worms).193
Kronberg’s letter is an arresting testimony, but it is highly unlikely to reflect actual 
practice at Nuremberg. The number of safe conducts recorded is minuscule in 
comparison to the number of noble visits to the city which are known, let alone 
probable. Perhaps the more routine cases were not registered in the Briefbücher, 
but on balance it seems likely that most nobles simply came and went as they 
pleased, most of the time. There is certainly little evidence that nobles feared for 
their safety in the city, as Kronberg implies; he may have been generalizing from 
personal experience, as the Kronberg family had a particularly difficult relationship 
with Frankfurt in the late fourteenth century.194 But irrespective of their precise legal 
status in the town, it is clear that the council expected to set certain boundaries 
on the behaviour of nobles within the walls, and possibly also in the immediate 
vicinity of the town. Some of these boundaries seem to have been part of a generally 
accepted standard of behaviour when under anyone’s safe conduct. For instance, 
sometime before December 1421 the brothers Friedrich and Lorenz von Wolfstein 
applied for safe conduct in Nuremberg, and when this was granted they were told 
that ‘we [the inner council] would gladly see that safe conduct in our town and also 
to and from our town is properly observed’.195 An Ulrich Hubner then accused the 
Wolfstein brothers of sending him a ‘rude, filthy libel’ whilst under Nuremberg’s 
safe conduct.196 The brothers replied that to the best of their knowledge the letter 
had been written at Neumarkt in der Oberpfalz, and with this answer the council 
192. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ pp. 40-41: ‘Auch lieben freunde so wißt ir wole das riter und 
kneht nit gerne in die richsstede riden, sie haben dann ein fry strack geleide daz nemet nit 
fur ubel daz ich uch daz schriben’.
193. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 41.
194. See Elsbet Orth, Die Fehden der Reichsstadt Frankfurt am Main im Spätmittelalter. Fehderecht 
und Fehdepraxis im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden, 1973), p. 98.
195. BB 5 f. 180r (23.12.1421): ‘wir gern sehen, daz das geleyt in unser stat und auch zu und von 
uns geleytlich gehalten wurd’.
196. ibid: ‘ein grober unsawbrer Scheltbrief’.
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was satisfied – the ‘rudeness’ or otherwise of the slander was of no consequence, so 
long as it was not produced under Nuremberg’s safe conduct. The extent to which 
the rules governing safe conduct applied to nobles in the town in other capacities 
probably varied from case to case. Certainly there is no mention of safe conduct 
for Heinrich von Egloffstein in Nuremberg’s repeated demands during the winter 
of 1441/42 that he compensate them for an attack on his fellow noble Reinhard 
Redwitzer because it occurred in the immediate vicinity of the town and shortly 
after Redwitzer had left Nuremberg. Nuremberg claimed its right to take Egloffstein 
to task on this matter solely from the proximity of the ambush to the city.197
Particularly difficult situations arose when nobles sheltered from their enemies 
under safe conduct in the town.198 On 14 February 1448 Nuremberg wrote to 
inform the bishop of Würzburg that Johann von Heideck’s castle of Wellnheim 
was under attack by Margrave Albrecht Achilles.199 The bishop of Eichstätt and 
Count Palatine Otto were also involved in this assault, and three days later all three 
princes wrote to Nuremberg about Johann’s presence in the city.200 The council 
justified themselves with the reply that Johann had been granted safe conduct to 
attend several genuine legal hearings in Nuremberg, but that he had already been 
refused further leave to remain there before the princes’ letter arrived. Although 
Johann was the brother of one of Nuremberg’s chief noble allies (Konrad von 
Heideck), the city had never enjoyed a particularly good relationship with him, 
and were clearly prepared to sacrifice him in order to placate the coalition of 
princes. But it was still a difficult diplomatic situation for the council, brought 
about ultimately by their insistence on strictly, if sometimes informally, controlling 
the presence of rural nobles and other outsiders in the town. However, there was 
no chance that such incidents would induce the council to take a more relaxed 
approach. The council’s tight grip on urban life was a deeply ingrained attitude, a 
product of opportunity, motive and fear. The patriciate as a social class had been 
197. BB 15 ff. 139r (20.11.1441), 152v-153r (12.12.1441).
198. See also examples from Lübeck: Demski, Adel und Lübeck, pp. 62, 230.
199. BB 18 ff. 459v-460r (14.2.1448).
200. BB 18 f. 466r-v (17.2.1448).
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able to dominate the town economically and politically since 1348, and sought 
maximum advantage from this. The more it did so, the more it feared unrest and 
disturbance. Officially, the council often justified its policies on the grounds of 
the large population of Nuremberg, with the implication that such a multitude of 
people needed to be kept in good order.201
Imperial, Princely and Noble Events in Nuremberg
The best documented aspect of the occasional presence of nobles in the town is 
their attendance at all sorts of assemblies and gatherings in Nuremberg. These 
were generally not initiated by the city council, with the significant exception of 
the annual display of the imperial relics and regalia (Heiltumsweisung). Every year 
from 1424 on the first Friday after the Easter week many nobles were part of the 
crowd which gathered for the spectacle in Nuremberg’s main marketplace and for 
the associated fair.202 But Nuremberg was also a regular venue for events organized 
by emperors, kings, princes and nobles, each with very different implications for 
the town’s relationship with the rural nobles who gathered at these occasions. 
A visit from a Roman king or emperor was confirmation of Nuremberg’s self-
consciousness as a particularly imperial city, and the nobles who attended imperial 
diets could be seen as witnesses to this renewal of Nuremberg’s sense of purpose in 
the imperial and universal order. The nobles who participated in events hosted by 
Hohenzollern princes could perhaps appear more ambiguous, depending on the 
state of Nuremberg’s relations with the Hohenzollern at the time; but we have also 
seen that nobles were elevated in Nuremberg’s scale of honour by close association 
with princes, and thus a princely occasion in the city could have been an opportunity 
to strengthen ties with the regional nobility by according them something of the 
prince’s dignity. Events organized by rural nobles themselves were superficially 
more straightforward, but in practice fraught with diplomatic difficulties for the 
city, especially the possibility that the council might become both host and guest 
at a noble function for which they had to pick up most of the bill. The political 
201. e.g. BB 18 ff. 198v-199r (23.3.1447).
202. Julia Schnelbögl, Die Reichskleinodien in Nürnberg 1424–1523 (1962).
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components of these gatherings varied according to their purpose and the status of 
the host, but the principal social events – festive dances, tournaments and church 
services – featured in the greatest diets and the more intimate celebrations of noble 
societies. So too did the work by the civic authorities which facilitated these events: 
maintaining security, preparing buildings and spaces, arranging accommodation 
for guests and managing and articulating the legal and social status of the visitors.203
Why did princes and the nobility so commonly make use of the town for their 
gatherings? Many historians have shared Andreas Ranft’s astonishment (see above, 
p. 47) at the readiness of the nobility to engage with the town to the extent of using 
the town’s space for their premier social occasions. This astonishment has been 
answered by an assertion of the town’s simple practicality as a central place with 
the necessary infrastructure for accommodating large numbers of participants.204 
This was undoubtedly the primary reason for nobles to hold their events in the 
town (alongside a possible role for the town as a relatively neutral space in noble 
geopolitics), but other, secondary, reasons for the nobility to gather within the walls 
may have had more significant, certainly more complex, implications for nobles’ 
relations with the townspeople. Andreas Ranft leads the field in the interpretation of 
noble behaviour in the late medieval town with his vision of the town as a ’stage for 
noble life… on which social value and prestige could be asserted and find resonance 
right at the origin of the antagonistic forces [the towns]’.205 Ulrich Andermann sees 
a similar function for tournaments in the town in holding back a ‘devaluing’ of 
knighthood by the very patricians in whose towns the events took place.206
There can be no doubt that the town was a temporary ’stage’ for display and self-
representation by the nobility. But who was the audience, and what was the moral 
of the play? At these prestigious occasions nobles entered the city en masse, so 
203. See ChrdtSt, iii, 349-401; Schnelbögl, Reichskleinodien, pp. 106-116; Endres, ’Turniere und 
Gesellenstechen,’ pp. 266-267.
204. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 48.
205. Ranft, ’Adel und Stadt,’ p. 63: ‘Bühne adligen Lebens… auf der es gelang, soziale Geltung 
und Prestige zu behaupten und Resonanz gerade dort zu gewinnen, wo die konkurrierenden 
Kräfte ihren Ausgang nahmen’.
206. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 66.
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perhaps whatever they had to say was a story to be told amongst themselves. But 
equally we could see the presence of groups of nobles in the city for a particular, 
time-limited purpose as an environment conducive to the growth of ‘us and them’ 
mentalities. Did the urban elite’s function as a more or less generous host help to 
neutralize this threat, or did their simultaneous position as more or less welcome 
guests create irresolvable conflicts, social cracks which could only be papered over 
with more wine and more dancing? Were nobles haughty and aloof visitors who 
condescended to their hosts, or were they comfortable urbanites equally at home 
in the city as in the country? Both these spectres are raised by the many gatherings 
of the nobility in Nuremberg, and the continuum between the two is wide open.
Imperial and Princely Occasions
Nuremberg was a proud host of frequent imperial diets: ‘for such diets are held 
with us more often than at other places’, as the council noted in 1440.207 A modern 
enumeration lists thirty-eight imperial gatherings in the period 1401–1491.208 Not 
all of these featured the personal presence of the king or emperor, but all would 
have attracted nobles in various capacities from across the Empire and beyond. 
During the 1440s King Frederick III made an extended stay in Nuremberg from 29 
April to 21 May 1442 on his way to his coronation at Aachen,209 and presided over 
a full imperial diet between 1 August and 11 October 1444.210 There were other 
imperial gatherings too, but these two royal visits naturally offer the best sources.
We can take the imperial diet of late summer and autumn 1444 as an example of the 
sort of nobles that a top-rank imperial occasion might bring to Nuremberg. The total 
number of nobles who are mentioned as witnesses of charters and court judgements, 
listed in the Schenkbuch for the period of the diet or mentioned in eye-witness 
reports is 93; if we include the nobles whose presence is possible but not certain, this 
207. BB 14 f. 118v (11.2.1440): ‘als denn sollicher teg mer zu uns denn andern ende gelegt werden’.
208. Reinhard Seyboth, ’Reichsstadt und Reichstag’, Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung, 52 
(1992), p. 211.
209. ChrdtSt, iii, 375 n. 2.
210. RTA 17 pp. 225-622.
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number rises to 146.211 This is still a remarkably small number for an imperial diet 
lasting over two months, especially compared to the 133 nobles who attended just 
a few days of events hosted by Albrecht Achilles in November 1441 (see above, p. 
58). The comparison is probably skewed in favour of Achilles’ tournament: the fact 
that this occasion was accorded its own sub-entry in the Schenkbuch suggests that 
extraordinary gifts of wine were part of the council’s welcome for that event; for the 
imperial diet, it is clear that a normal Weinschenk practice continued, just on a larger 
scale, and thus our list of attendees is less complete. But other evidence suggests 
that the two occasions were in many ways similar, in that both were essentially 
occasions for the nobility of Franconia, the Upper Palatinate, northern Bavaria and 
eastern Swabia, the areas which formed Nuremberg’s extended hinterland. Achilles 
was able to attract nobles from all of these regions, ranging far beyond his own 
clientele. But the Roman king drew few nobles from outside the groups who might 
be found in Nuremberg for other, theoretically less prestigious occasions. This says 
something about the weakness of royal authority beyond Franconia and Swabia, 
but more about the importance of the imperial diet for transacting serious business 
as opposed to any celebration of imperial identity. Those nobles from further afield 
who did come to Nuremberg were there in the service of princes – Austrians who 
had travelled with the king himself, or counsellors of the count palatine or margrave 
of Brandenburg – or were nobles from southern Swabia and the Upper Rhine who 
were closely engaged with the major issue of the moment: the war between the Swiss 
Confederation and the Habsburg–Zurich alliance and the associated incursion of the 
French Dauphin and his ‘Armagnac’ mercenaries into Alsace.212
Achilles’ tournament differed somewhat from the imperial diet in the depth of 
interaction which it created between Nuremberg and the noble attendees. Nobles 
were responsible for liaison with Nuremberg on Achilles’ behalf: Walter von 
211. Sources: Regesta Imperii; RTA 17; StAN Rep. 52b 315 ff. 179r-181v; ChrdtSt, iii, 398-401. 
The main cause of uncertainty is the impossibility of knowing whether many of the nobles 
who received fiefs and privileges from the king in Nuremberg were personally present or 
represented by others.
212. See most recently: Duncan Hardy, ’The 1444–5 Expedition of the Dauphin Louis to the Upper 
Rhine in Geopolitical Perspective’, Journal of Medieval History, 38, 3 (2012), pp. 358-387.
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Hürnheim and Sigmund von Lentersheim undertook this task in July 1441 (the 
tournament was to be held in August before being postponed to November).213 
They did so in person, and were presented with wine by the council.214 We have 
already seen that the council probably made an effort to distribute wine to all 
those present at the tournament itself. The remaining content of the occasion in 
terms of town-noble relations remains elusive, however. Given that Achilles was, 
just a few years later, to develop a very strong rhetoric which denigrated the towns 
in the cause of noble solidarity under his leadership (see pp. 241-250 below), it 
is with hindsight ironic that one of his first ceremonial encounters with a wide 
spectrum of the regional nobility was staged in and by Nuremberg. Imperial diets 
could also be a difficult time for the towns in terms of their social and political 
standing: in 1444 the towns were not included in many of the discussions by the 
princes, which left their envoys feeling nervous and their rulers indignant.215 But 
anything we might extrapolate from these difficult relationships between princes 
and towns in respect of town-noble relations remains speculative: I have found 
virtually no evidence for the behaviour of nobles and townspeople towards one 
another at imperial and princely occasions aside from the many gifts given by the 
city council to nobles largely on account of their positions in princely service. One 
exception to this are the financial transactions of the Bohemian Aleš of Sternberg 
at the 1431 imperial diet in Nuremberg, which will be discussed below (pp. 74-75).
Noble Occasions
It was rarely possible for individual nobles or even small groups to hold major 
events in Nuremberg, though this is not to say that they did not stage significant 
occasions. On 9 February 1441 the young lord of Plauen (Heinrich II) and the young 
lord of Heideck (Johann III) jousted in Nuremberg, and the council provided the 
necessary security personnel, together with wine, candles and fruit for a dance.216 
213. RB 1b f. 5v (18.7.1441).
214. StAN Rep. 52b 315 f. 160r.
215. ChrdtSt, iii, p. 388; RTA 17 pp. 496-497.
216. StAN Rep. 54 11 f. 81r-v.
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It is not clear whether many other nobles were present, however, as the Schenkbuch 
mentions only an average number of nobles for the relevant Frage.217 But generally 
nobles arranged their gatherings in the town as groups, and often as formally 
constituted societies. The importance of particular towns for particular societies – 
such as Heidelberg for the Society of the Donkey and Regensburg for the Unicorn 
– has been firmly established by Andreas Ranft and others.218 For Nuremberg, the 
Society of the Clasp (the ‘Fürspänger’) was the most important noble fraternity. 
This society was established in 1392, and may have been named after the girdle 
of the Virgin Mary donated in 1355 by Emperor Charles IV to the Church of Our 
Lady (Frauenkirche) in Nuremberg. Certainly the society had endowed an altar 
there and at other churches dedicated to the Virgin in Würzburg and Bamberg 
within seventeen years of its foundation.219 These altars were the locations for large 
funeral masses in memory of members of the society. Such funerals are recorded 
at Nuremberg in 1443 (for a Georg Schenk and Konrad von Seckendorff) and 1444 
(for Georg von Seckendorff) thanks to the wine which the council presented to the 
society for the occasion.220 These funerals also involved a meal for those attending, 
and required an average of 100 people to be accommodated in the town, all under 
a common safe conduct.221 Although these large gatherings of nobles might be 
expected to cause some trouble for the townspeople in general, it was actually 
events within the Frauenkirche which eventually soured the relationship between 
the Fürspänger and Nuremberg, as we will see below (pp. 71-72).
Other events were organized in Nuremberg by more ad hoc groups within the 
nobility, or in a degree of cooperation with princes. A joust in January 1440 
could have been organized by Margrave Friedrich of Brandenburg, who was 
in attendance, but it could equally have been the initiative of the seventeen 
217. StAN Rep. 52b 315 ff. 157v-158r.
218. Ranft, ’Adel und Stadt,’ pp. 56, 59.
219. Andreas Ranft, Adelsgesellschaften: Gruppenbildung und Genossenschaft im spätmittelalterlichen 
Reich (Sigmaringen, 1994), pp. 40-43, 77.
220. StAN Rep. 52b 315 ff. 174v, 181r.
221. Ranft, Adelsgesellschaften, pp. 87, 95.
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named Franconian and Bavarian nobles who were present.222 Perhaps the largest 
tournament ever hosted by the nobility in Nuremberg took place in 1434, with 
352 participants including Hohenzollern and Wittelsbach princes, organized by 
the nobles of the ‘Four Lands’ (Franconia, Bavaria, Swabia and the Rhineland).223 
The costs for the city were substantial: 71 lb. for wine and 28 lb. for two dances.224 
It was therefore common practice for nobles to be required to make deposits 
against such events being postponed.225 Tournaments and even dances could also 
endanger peace and good order in a town,226 and consequently permission to hold 
them was not always granted. In August 1436 Konrad von Seckendorff and other 
unnamed nobles applied for permission and safe conduct to hold a tournament 
in Nuremberg, with the backing of Margrave Friedrich of Brandenburg, but were 
turned down on the grounds that at the last tournament in Nuremberg ‘improper 
things… the like of which never before conceived’ had occurred.227
This refusal has been related to the non-admission at the 1434 tournament of 
certain citizens of Nuremberg who had been knighted by Emperor Sigismund 
on the Tiber bridge in Rome,228 and the importance of these events for our 
understanding of wider town-noble relations has obscured the significance of 
the 1436 refusal for the presence of the nobility in Nuremberg. Rudolf Endres has 
asserted that it represented an abrupt end to the tradition of noble tournaments 
in Nuremberg,229 but this was clearly not the case, even if later tournaments were 
smaller affairs than that of 1434.230 And such politically charged circumstances as 
the non-admission of knights dubbed by the emperor to a tournament were not 
222. StAN Rep. 52b 315 ff. 151v-152r. See also Sander, Haushaltung, p. 639; Müllner, Annalen, p. 
342; and Gustav von Egloffstein, Chronik der vormaligen Reichsherrn jetzt Grafen und Freiherrn 
von und zu Egloffstein (Aschaffenburg, 1894), p. 137.
223. Endres, ’Turniere und Gesellenstechen,’ p. 270; Zotz, ’Adel, Bürgertum und Turnier,’ p. 485.
224. Zotz, ’Adel, Bürgertum und Turnier,’ p. 482.
225. Zotz, ’Adel, Bürgertum und Turnier,’ p. 481.
226. Some examples in Demski, Adel und Lübeck, pp. 45-46; Zotz, ’Adel, Bürgertum und Turnier,’ 
p. 475; Keller, ’Kontakte und Konflikte,’ p. 504.
227. Müllner, Annalen, pp. 319-320: ‘unbillige Ding… dergleichen zuvor niemand gedenke’.
228. Endres, ’Turniere und Gesellenstechen,’ p. 273; Zotz, ’Adel, Bürgertum und Turnier,’ p. 485.
229. Endres, ’Turniere und Gesellenstechen,’ p. 270.
230. For a tournament organized by the Fürspänger in the 1460s see Ranft, Adelsgesellschaften, p. 97.
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the only reasons that tournaments and jousting might not be permitted within 
Nuremberg’s walls. The security implications of these events seem to have 
been foremost in the council’s considerations when in February 1444 it refused 
a request from Sigmund von Seckendorff and Heinrich Tanndorfer to joust in 
Nuremberg. ‘Such things are dangerous (sorklich) and not well advised at this 
moment,’ the council wrote; it would, however, grant safe conduct if the nobles 
wished instead to engage in ‘sensible play with lances’.231
Aside from this issue of security, it is far from clear how nobles might have interacted 
with their burgher hosts in the context of noble events in the town. We know that at 
Würzburg the Fürspänger society invited the council to its meal at the guesthouse 
in which the council itself generally entertained visitors.232 The Nuremberg council 
would not have qualified for lesser treatment on the grounds of rank or importance. 
Here we are directly confronted by the paradoxical position of the city council as 
a guest at an event which it in part hosted, at least in terms of providing essential 
logistics. Andreas Ranft argues that the councillors were invited to the meal as 
‘service providers’ (Dienstleistungsgeber) to the nobility, and thereby not as the 
nobles’ equals.233 But in many ways the meals, dances and security arrangements 
for the nobility’s occasions were an extension of the Weinschenk which also played a 
prominent role at these events: they were gifts which honoured those who received 
them, but in no way implied that the giver was inferior to the receiver. Indeed, to 
claim the right to give such gifts was itself an assertion of independent movement 
on the political stage and of course a display of wealth and power – fundamentally, it 
was an assertion of nobility. Whether the rural nobles read Nuremberg’s diplomatic 
signals in this way is impossible to judge.
Practicalities could certainly be troublesome, given the council’s concern for 
security and control in its urban space, but it must also be remembered that there 
231. BB 16 f. 207r-v (3.2.1444): ‘wann nu sollichs ding sorklich und zuzeiten nicht wol geratend 
sein… wurd euch aber synnlich mit dem sper bey uns zu kurtzweyln…’.
232. Ranft, Adelsgesellschaften, p. 88.
233. Ranft, Adelsgesellschaften, p. 95.
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was another, annual event which brought nobles to the town very much as guests 
of the council, and entirely on the council’s terms. The Heiltumsweisung attracted 
many rural nobles, and in respect of these visitors has only received less attention 
than it might do from historians due to the loss of the Heiltumsbuch, a record of 
high-ranking guests at the annual festivities. This book was available to Johann 
Müllner, who preserved the names of the visitors of comital rank and above,234 
and reduced the remaining nobles to unnamed ‘knights and squires’. We also 
need to consider the presence of nobles en masse and ‘on parade’ at events such 
as tournaments alongside the more frequent and mundane visits of individual 
nobles to Nuremberg. I will turn to these visits after examining the role that the 
town’s churches played in the nobility’s urban presence.
Nobles and Nuremberg’s Churches
For the rural nobility, Nuremberg’s churches were as important as any of the 
other institutions and amenities which the town possessed, but in a very different 
way. Except for the establishments of the mendicant orders, Nuremberg’s 
monastic and parish churches were in themselves much the same as churches 
and monasteries in the countryside, but their urban setting was a crucial factor 
for the nobility. This is suggested by the particular function which these churches 
performed for nobles as sites of memory and memorialization. Again, the town 
was a stage, in death as well as in life – but who exactly was the audience, and 
what was the message that they were supposed to take home? These questions 
must be borne in mind, but the available evidence draws us to further questions 
about the changing relationship of the nobility with Nuremberg over the course 
of the later Middle Ages.
To some extent, the engagement of nobles with Nuremberg’s churches appears 
to follow the pattern of gradual withdrawal from the town which I suggested 
might apply to noble property and residence in the city. The burial of nobles from 
234. Schnelbögl, Reichskleinodien, pp. 144-145.
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the Egloffstein and Wildenstein families in Nuremberg’s mendicant churches 
is attested during the fourteenth century,235 but no such burials are known in 
the fifteenth. In 1370 a Petrissa (or Petronella) von Streitberg was prioress of St 
Klara’s,236 one of Nuremberg’s leading convents, whereas the only evidence that I 
have found for nobles entering Nuremberg’s monasteries in the fifteenth century 
is for those retiring to the cloistered life. We have already encountered Martin von 
Wildenstein, who spent his last days with the Carthusians in Nuremberg (pp. 50-
51 above), and twelve years earlier, in 1454, Barbara von Seckendorff had entered 
St Klara’s. From 1420 she had been the second wife of the burgher Peter Rieter 
I, and so was already a long-standing member of Nuremberg’s community.237 
Connections between the nobility and Nuremberg’s churches continued through 
the Teutonic Order and the church of St Jakob, which was linked to the Order’s 
headquarters in Nuremberg and under the Order’s jurisdiction – but here we are 
straying beyond the definition of the nobility for the purposes of this study.
The one aspect of noble interaction with Nuremberg’s churches which remained 
strong was the Fürspänger society’s tradition of holding funeral masses in the 
Frauenkirche. The society had endowed an altar there, and kept its own cope and 
altar cloths in the church for use at these masses.238 But in 1442 the church warden 
Stephan Schuler noted that the church itself gained nothing from the society beyond 
the leftover wax after each service.239 Later in the century even these masses would 
become an unintended victim of the city council’s desire for complete control over 
the space within the walls. Andreas Ranft has highlighted two of the council’s 
policies which made the nobles’ position at the Frauenkirche too uncomfortable 
for them to continue to engage with Nuremberg very intensively beyond the 1460s: 
the council sought increasing control over all of the prebends established in the 
city, including that attached to the Fürspänger altar, whilst simultaneously driving 
235. Egloffstein, Chronik, p. 86; Voit, Wildensteiner, p. 22.
236. Dieter Zöberlein, ’Vom Rittergut zum markgräflichen Amt Streitberg’, Archiv für Geschichte 
von Oberfranken, 85 (2005), p. 46.
237. Fleischmann, Rat und Patriziat, ii, 857.
238. Ranft, Adelsgesellschaften, p. 82.
239. Ranft, Adelsgesellschaften, pp. 83-84.
72
unbeneficed clergy out of the city, so that the society found it increasingly difficult 
to find a priest to officiate at the masses. Eventually, the council gained control of 
the Fürspänger’s benefice, and revived it under its own auspices in 1508.240
The Urban Economy
Directly or indirectly, it was Nuremberg’s economic role that ultimately drew 
the nobility to the city. The city’s wealth and population density created the 
churches and civic spaces which the nobility used as their ‘stage’, and nobles’ 
occasional presence in the town was closely linked to their economic interests 
too. For instance, the annual Heiltumsweisung was accompanied by a trade fair,241 
which made the connection between social and economic occasions that nobles 
elsewhere created for themselves by arranging meetings and dances in towns to 
coincide with markets and fairs.242 Yet economic relations between townspeople 
and nobles within the city itself are only rarely glimpsed in our sources. Is this 
because they were so mundane and ubiquitous that they did not generally merit a 
written record? Historians are no longer predisposed to view the noble economy 
as autonomous and independent of the urban market, but the questions which this 
implies await answers.243 The invisibility of these relations is partly due to the fact 
that they were often conducted through intermediaries of lower status. Nobles’ 
agents and deputies would have made purchases and collected payments in the 
town on their masters’ behalf, and it was also imperative for nobles that their 
peasant dependents had access to the market. Complaints about uncustomary 
tolls and charges for peasants selling goods in the town formed part of the regular 
lists of grievances against Nördlingen drawn up by the counts of Oettingen.244 But 
does this surprising absence of evidence for economic relations in the town also 
reflect something of their nature and perhaps also their extent?
240. Ranft, Adelsgesellschaften, pp. 82-84.
241. Schnelbögl, Reichskleinodien, pp. 129-137.
242. Ranft, ’Adel und Stadt,’ p. 56; Keller, ’Kontakte und Konflikte,’ p. 503.
243. Sven Rabeler, ’Adliges Wirtschaften und städtische Märkte. Ökonomische Beziehungen 
zwischen Adel und Stadt im Mittelalter’, unpublished paper presented at the conference 
‘Turnier, Tanz und Totengedenken. Stadt und Adel im Mittelalter’ (Schaffhausen, 2014).
244. Kießling, Stadt, pp. 85, 90.
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By the fifteenth century Nuremberg had gained a Europe-wide reputation for 
the products of its craftsmen, especially in metalwork, and most especially 
for its weapons and armour. This industry would obviously have been of 
considerable interest to the nobility, and we can only suppose that the meagre 
records of nobles’ interactions with Nuremberg’s armourers are fragments of a 
substantial relationship. This is certainly strongly suggested by a letter which the 
inner council wrote in 1405 to Wilhelm von Pappenheim, asking him to return 
a helmet which he had taken by mistake from the workshop of Elsbeth, wife of 
Andreas Trumpler.245 Friedrich von Heideck had brought the iron helmet to the 
workshop for it to be ‘made ready and completed’, but when Pappenheim visited 
the workshop independently he was mistakenly informed by Elsbeth’s servant 
that the helmet belonged to Schweiker von Gundelfingen. The Gundelfingen and 
Pappenheim families were from the same region, and Pappenheim decided to 
take the helmet on Gundelfingen’s behalf. The involvement of the council was 
then needed to undo the servant’s error. There is no suggestion that Pappenheim’s 
personal presence in the workshop was in any way unusual, and we could even 
imagine the workshop as a kind of meeting place for the rural nobility of the 
region – even if they did not encounter one another personally there, they certainly 
encountered each other’s personal and prized armour. As well as armour, we 
also find nobles paying for cannon246 and carpentry247 from Nuremberg, and we 
have already come across Michael of Wertheim seeking the services of medical 
professionals. Our few sources mainly concern disputes over payment,248 and it 
can be presumed that many similar transactions passed off without incident.
The importance of the town’s market for the nobility might be expected to have 
left more traces. Certainly city-dwelling merchants kept records of transactions 
which have occasionally survived. A well-known example is the trading book 
245. BB 1 f. 61r-v (24.9.1405?).
246. BB 5 f. 88v (3.10.1422).
247. BB 4 f. 123v (26.11.1415).
248. See BB 17 f. 228r (4.3.1445); BB 18 f. 223r-v (24.4.1447).
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of the Holzschuher family of Nuremberg from 1304–1307,249 which reveals that 
two-thirds of the Holzschuhers’ debts for cloth (in terms of both the value and 
the quantity of the cloth) were contracted by nobles.250 Few sources have yet 
come to light for the fifteenth century, though a full study of the records of the 
burgravial Landgericht might reveal much more (see also pp. 218-219). In January 
1439 Konrad Tanner of Nuremberg brought a case in the Landgericht against 
Hans von Künsberg over debts for cloth (which was not produced in Nuremberg 
in any great quantity, but was obviously much traded there).251 The council 
certainly helped nobles to obtain luxury fabrics via the city market: a black silk 
cloth (atlaß) was sent to Johann of Guttenstein at his request,252 though the council 
were unable to procure any black samite with gold decoration for Count Ludwig 
of Württemberg.253
The Bohemian Aleš of Sternberg had a rather more intriguing interaction with the 
urban market: at some point before January 1432 he purchased a consignment of 
unspecified merchandise (kauffmanschacz)	from	Jan	Klupatz	of	Pilsen	(Plzeň),	for	
300 Gulden on credit.254 This transaction probably took place in connection with 
the imperial diet in Nuremberg of February and March 1431, after which Sternberg 
remained in the town until at least 20 May.255 It became part of an increasingly 
bitter dispute (and later feud – see pp. 290-292 below) between Sternberg and 
Margarete Pirgerin of Nuremberg when Sternberg accused her of impounding 
182 Gulden on account of Sternberg’s supposed debts to the now deceased Jan 
Klupatz (Sternberg maintained that he had repaid Klupatz256), with which she was 
supposed to redeem Sternberg’s pledges in Nuremberg.257 Sternberg also accused 
249. Das Handlungsbuch der Holzschuher in Nürnberg von 1304–1307, eds. Anton Chroust and 
Hans Proesler (Erlangen, 1934).
250. Rabeler, ’Adliges Wirtschaften’.
251. StAN Rep. 119a 115 f. 11v.
252. BB 17 f. 26v (19.5.1444).
253. BB 14 f. 106v (9.1.1440).
254. StAN Rep. 2c 19 f. 1 (23.1.1432). For the identity of Jan Klupatzen see ibid f. 3v.
255. BB 9 f. 112r-v (20.5.1431).
256. StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 2v-3r (20.3.1432).
257. StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 1 (23.1.1432), 2v-3r (20.3.1432).
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Pirgerin of abandoning the Kaufmannschatz purchased from Klupatz, which she 
had promised to bring to Nuremberg, and suggested that since she did not act as 
she had promised, she may have been complicit in its loss; on top of this, she was 
supposedly withholding his register of business in Nuremberg (meine register… 
darInne alle meine sache beshriben seint, die ich do zuhandeln habe).258 Sternberg’s 
financial affairs in Nuremberg were evidently extensive enough to require this 
register for their management, but it seems unlikely that he was genuinely 
engaged in commercial activity with the merchandise he had purchased. In 1437 
he stated that both the merchandise and the 182 Gulden were intended for the 
repayment of his debts in the city.259
It is only when we enter the fields of banking and finance that the true scale of 
the nobility’s economic engagement with Nuremberg begins to become apparent. 
Many nobles were just as capable of extending credit as they were of receiving it, 
and consequently many financial relations formed networks which included both 
town and country. But the town as a central space within this network performed 
certain important functions. In the first instance, it was simply a clearing house 
for all sorts of payments and transactions. Leopold of Leuchtenberg was to collect 
his pay from the archbishop of Mainz for service against the Hussites at Sigmund 
Stromer’s house in Nuremberg,260 and the emperor Sigismund frequently made 
payments to his retainers via Nuremberg financiers.261 In 1415 Landgrave Johann of 
Leuchtenberg agreed to pay his cousin Landgrave Georg an annual stipend of 200 
or 300 Gulden, to be collected in Nuremberg.262 A more unusual payment was the 
498 Gulden which Fritz and Hans von Waldenfels were supposed to receive at the 
house in Nuremberg belonging to Heilsbronn monastery. The council maintained 
that this was a ransom paid by Jakob Tyrhabter of Augsburg, and refused to allow its 
258. StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 2v-3r (20.3.1432), 4r-v (31.3.1434).
259. StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 5r-6r (9.4.1437).
260. Illuminatus Wagner, Geschichte der Landgrafen von Leuchtenberg (3: Die Zeit der grossen 
Verkäufe 1407 – 1487), 6 vols. (Kallmünz, 1951), p. 63.
261. Examples: Wagner, Leuchtenberg 3, p. 80; Regesta Boica 13 p. 191 (14.1.1431); BB 14 ff. 
105v-106r (9.1.1440).
262. Wagner, Leuchtenberg 3, pp. 32-33.
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collection (see also pp. 296-297).263 The council itself could also play an active role in 
the transmission of payments in Nuremberg: they were to receive the 1,800 Gulden 
which Konrad von Limpurg and Heinrich von Pappenheim owed to Hans Ungnad, 
the royal chamberlain. The council also had the debt bond in its possession.264 This 
arrangement was made near to the end of Frederick III’s stay in Nuremberg in 1444, 
and the council may well not have accepted this role as an intermediary if it were 
not for the importance at an imperial level of the nobles concerned.
Although finance could be raised in many places and in many ways, the town 
obviously offered a concentration of financial services which brought nobles 
within the walls. In February 1422 Johann of Leuchtenberg was desperately 
trying to raise funds to repurchase the castle of Grafenwöhr from the Count 
Palatine before a deadline to do so expired: he tried to do this in Nuremberg, 
although the money was due to be repaid in Regensburg, and time became so 
tight that he had to ask the Landrichter of Amberg whether he could not receive 
the money in Nuremberg instead. (Leuchtenberg failed to meet the deadline, and 
lost his claim to Grafenwöhr.)265 Given a more relaxed schedule, nobles could 
probably arrange credit via their political and social networks, but Nuremberg 
also housed an important financial institution in the shape of the city’s Jewish 
community. It is difficult to say exactly how Jewish financiers related to wider 
credit networks, but noble interaction with Jewish finance was more likely to be 
exclusively financial than credit relations with Christian citizens, and therefore 
more closely tied to the physical presence of the Jews in Nuremberg.266 Many of 
these loans would also have been secured on valuable pledges lodged with the 
lenders in Nuremberg, and nobles sometimes sought the council’s intervention 
to prevent the sale of these pledges after they had defaulted.267
263. BB 16 ff. 228a-228f (2.3.1444).
264. BB 17 f. 124r (10.10.1444).
265. Wagner, Leuchtenberg 3, p. 52.
266. For examples of loans from Nuremberg Jews see: BB 9 f. 29 (3.8.1430); BB 14 f. 103r (5.1.1440); 
BB 15 ff. 185v-186r (7.2.1442); BB 17 f. 83r-v (24.7.1444); BB 18 ff. 6v-7r (19.7.1446); BB 18 ff. 
384v-385r (10.11.1447).
267. BB 17 ff. 160v-161r (25.11.1444), 193v (20.1.1445).
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The city and its citizens also performed a basic banking function for rural 
nobles by accepting deposits of their money and important documents. These 
relationships only become visible when they became troublesome, for instance 
in the case of Hans von Hirschhorn, who in 1440 repeatedly asked Nuremberg to 
continue holding a document of his beyond the originally agreed date, to which 
Nuremberg reluctantly agreed. (The deadline for the document’s collection 
slipped from April to June to August.)268 Predictably, problems could arise 
when a depositor died and his heirs tried to gain access to the documents: Peter 
Heyden of Nuremberg found himself in this predicament over a sealed chest of 
documents which was left with him by the Münzmeister family and requested 
by the Grumbach clan and Burkhard Schenk von Roßberg.269 The most explosive 
incident of this sort was the claim by Hans and Fritz von Waldenfels that their 
father Kaspar had entrusted to Heinrich Imhoff a document which was worth 
40,000 Gulden to them, and that Nuremberg was withholding this letter from 
them ‘with violence, unjustly and arrogantly’ (see also p. 296).270 With this clear 
potential for trouble, why did towns undertake to guard documents and even 
cash for nobles? It was certainly a widespread practice: a good example from 
beyond Nuremberg is that of Hans von Gemmingen (c.1410–1490), who lodged 
debt bonds worth 1,000 fl. and 2,900 fl. and 5,000 fl. cash with the council of 
Heilbronn.271 Most probably the disruptive potential of these arrangements was 
just a side-effect of their value to Nuremberg and its citizens of the relationship 
of trust which was reinforced by the original deposit of the documents or money. 
This was an important way of strengthening ties with the nobility which involved 
both diplomatic exchange and creating an urban presence for the nobility which 
was entirely under the council’s control.
268. BB 14 ff. 153v (26.3.1440), 185v-186r (10.6.1440).
269. BB 14 ff. 158v-159r (9.4.1440), 173v-174r (18.5.1440).
270. Otto von Waldenfels, Die Freiherrn von Waldenfels. Stammfolgen mit urkundlichen Belegen. I. 
Teil (von 1248 bis Mitte des 16. Jahrh.) (Munich, 1952), p. 154. BB 16 228a-228f (2.3.1444): ‘mit 
gewalt, onrecht, und in hohemüt’.
271. Andermann, ’Einkommensverhältnissen,’ p. 69.
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The more that the economic shades into the political, the closer we come to 
grasping the extent and significance of particular forms of relationship between 
town and nobility. Is this a reflection of the nature of these relationships, or of the 
surviving sources? Economic interaction was surely far more extensive than can 
be directly observed, but we should also guard against assuming an economic 
centrality for the fifteenth-century city commensurate with that of cities today.
Hosts and Agents
Economic, social and political aspects of the nobility’s interaction with the town met 
in the person of the ‘host’ (wirt) who managed a noble’s business in the city. A number 
of burghers are mentioned as ‘hosts’ of particular nobles, though never as an explicit 
reference to the nobles actually lodging with these citizens. That nobles did stay with 
individual burghers as well as or instead of staying at hostelries in the city seems likely, 
and can possibly be glimpsed in several sources. A number of cases in the burgravial 
Landgericht concern debts for ‘board’ (zerung), including a claim by Adam Braunwart 
relating to a 30 Gulden debt incurred by Jakob von Streitberg, part of which Braunwart 
had loaned to Streitberg, and part of which Streitberg had consumed at Braunwart’s 
(czu im verczert), and for a 10 Gulden debt by Jakob’s brother Hans, also for board, 
this time explicitly at Braunwart’s house (domus).272 Some nobles who received wine 
from the council also appear to have been staying with particular burghers at the 
time: Georg von Murach with Paul Vorchtel in 1444,273 and a count of Henneberg, 
Count Ernst of Gleichen and various Saxon courtiers with Martin Haller later the 
same year.274 However, the burghers that we encounter under the title of ‘host’ are all 
to be found managing nobles’ affairs in Nuremberg in the nobles’ absence.
These burghers included Konrad Hersbrucker, named as host of Heinrich von 
Plauen in 1422,275 Endres Haller as host of Johann of Leuchtenberg in 1432,276 and 
272. StAN Rep. 119a 115 f. 12r. Other examples: Rep. 119 27 (24.10.1431); Rep. 119a 115 f. 11v.
273. StAN Rep. 52b 315 f. 177r.
274. StAN Rep. 52b 315 f. 180r.
275. BB 5 f. 208r (21.3.1422).
276. BB 9 f. 223r (27.3.1432).
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Heinrich Imhoff as host of Kaspar von Waldenfels (active 1393–1441).277 The best 
recorded of these relationships is that of Ulrich Fütterer and Aleš of Sternberg, 
thanks to Aleš’ long-running dispute with Margarete Pirgerin. Fütterer was a 
wealthy merchant with trading interests at Milan and Antwerp;278 we first hear 
of his connection to Sternberg in January 1432, and the Bohemian had probably 
stayed with Fütterer during Sigismund’s imperial diet at Nuremberg in spring 
1431. Fütterer was handling payments that were supposed to be made to and 
by Sternberg in Nuremberg, and despite the fact that most of these transactions 
seem to have gone awry, Sternberg referred to Fütterer in 1434 as ‘my dear host’ 
(mein lieber wirt).279 Fütterer died in 1436, and as Sternberg continued to make his 
demands for compensation he recalled money which was supposed to have been 
deposited with Fütterer when Sternberg had ‘stood’ in relation to him (alz ich zu 
Im stund).280 The difference between the courteous manner in which Sternberg 
refers to Fütterer and the invective that he heaped on Margarete Pirgerin (see 
below, pp. 210-211) shows clearly that the ‘host’ was more than just another agent 
in the city, and indeed the language of ‘standing’ with one’s host suggests the role 
of a patron somehow responsible for his guest.
Long-term relationships between hosts and guests can be seen elsewhere too. 
Johannes Rothe (c.1360–1434) in his Thuringian Chronicle tells us that in 1370 
Burgrave Albrecht of Kirchberg often stayed in Erfurt at the house of the burgher 
Heinrich ‘of the Paradise’ (do lagk her zu herberge) – this led to Albrecht seducing 
Heinrich’s wife, and Heinrich’s killing of Albrecht in revenge.281 Burghers had 
hosts too, for instance Hans Götzen for the Nuremberger Niclas Sieghart at 
Erfurt,282 and Kilian Leinecker for all citizens of Nuremberg at Schorndorf, around 
277. BB 16 f. 228br-v (2.3.1444).
278. Fleischmann, Rat und Patriziat, ii, 404.
279. StAN Rep. 2c 19 f. 4r-v (31.3.1434).
280. StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 5r-6r (9.4.1437).
281. Johannes Rothe, Düringische Chronik des Johannes Rothe, ed. Rochus v. Liliencron (Jena, 
1859), p. 619.
282. BB 3 f. 65v (14.6.1410).
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30 km east of Stuttgart (der auch unser und der unsern wirt daselbs ist).283 Despite the 
fragmentary evidence, we can see that the ‘host’ as a provider of accommodation 
and an agent was a commonplace arrangement, including between townspeople 
and rural nobles. The business dimension of the relationship should warn us 
against reading too much sociability into it without further evidence, but clearly 
this was one way in which townspeople and nobles could enter into close and 
multifaceted relationships, originating in the nobles’ need to engage with the 
urban economy from a distance.
Conclusion: the distant centre?
There can be no doubt as to the scale of the rural nobility’s presence in Nuremberg. 
Nobles of all sorts were frequently found in the town in various capacities, so that 
the council could tell a noble from even the outermost reaches of the city’s hinterland 
(Hintze Pflugk of Schwarzenburg, near the Bavarian-Bohemian border) that they 
would speak to him about a certain matter next time he came to Nuremberg.284 
But nobles were almost always in the city on a short-term basis, and subject to 
fairly intensive and increasingly intrusive regulation by the city council as to their 
status within the walls and possibly the duration of their stay as well. Despite 
the importance of Nuremberg’s spaces, churches, markets and financial services 
for nobles, it seems unlikely that nobles ever had much chance to feel themselves 
to be stakeholders in Nuremberg as either an imperial city or a regional centre. 
Their presence there was too temporary and precarious, a situation which could 
well have conflicted with nobles’ recurrent and unavoidable need for the town in 
so many ways. If the town was a stage for the nobility’s self-presentation, it was 
a rented auditorium with borrowed props and scenery. As an economic centre of 
gravity it never quite allowed those who felt its pull to find their feet. Suspended 
in an intermediate state as guests honoured with gifts but never allowed to outstay 
their welcome, they often needed the intervention of their hosts to complete their 
connection with the city’s amenities and opportunities.
283. BB 14 ff. 215v-216r (8.8.1440).
284. BB 16 f. 105r-v (13.8.1443).
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We may need to rethink Nuremberg’s centrality in relation to the rural nobility. 
Nuremberg’s general centrality is plain to see in its status as a German, if not 
a European metropolis in the fifteenth century. For the majority of nobles who 
visited Nuremberg, it was also their local city: probably not the centre from 
which they sourced day-to-day necessities, but still the leading central place in 
their region. In this respect Nuremberg for the rural nobility of its region was 
comparable to the importance of Newcastle for a resident of Durham today. But 
I believe that there are good reasons to reject this direct analogy based on the 
hierarchy of urban centrality. The city was not as central to the noble economy as a 
city is to the residents of its hinterland today, and was probably important mainly 
for relatively occasional purchases of luxury and specialist goods. Nobles would 
also not have needed to travel personally to Nuremberg for more routine business, 
and the social contexts in which they came to the city were all extraordinary in the 
sense of non-routine, however frequently they may have recurred. Furthermore, 
there were not insignificant barriers to nobles’ involvement in Nuremberg life. 
These were not erected against them, but were an unavoidable consequence of 
the council’s remorseless drive and (perceived) urgent need to control everything 
and everyone within the walls. These factors could have combined to make 
Nuremberg less like Newcastle to a resident of modern-day Durham, and more 
like London: economically and culturally dominant, socially a major point of 
reference, but always somewhat distant. In the case of Durham and London this 
distance is primarily geographical; for Nuremberg and the rural nobility it was 
also economic, social and political. In addition, there are signs that this distance 
was widening over time.
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Fig. 2: Tüchersfeld, 42 km north east of Nuremberg (2012)
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3.
THE COUNTRYSIDE: LORDSHIP 
AND LAND 
The distance between the rural nobility and the urban space had much to do with 
the relationship between nobles and townspeople, but ultimately it was also a 
consequence of nobles’ very deep roots in the countryside. The countryside not only 
sustained nobles, it made the nobility possible as a social class: without the long-
term security of landowning within an agrarian economy as a source of wealth the 
very concept of a hereditary nobility on a large scale would have been untenable. Of 
course, the countryside was equally vital to the town, and where nobles controlled 
rural space and resources they ensured a certain dependency of townspeople on 
their rural lordship. But the countryside was both the nobility’s strength and its 
greatest weakness. In comparison to the town, its wealth (and therefore population) 
was dispersed over a very wide area, and the space and its economic potential 
were consequently harder to control and direct towards any single interest, either 
communal or individual. In the particular conditions of fifteenth-century Franconia, 
no person or group could exercise authority over a coherent, contiguous and 
bounded rural space with the same economic power as was contained within the 
well-defined urban area. The economic potential of princes or groups of nobles was 
tremendous, but it was fragmented. This made rural authority porous and – unless 
control could be extended and maintained over sufficient space and resources – 
potentially impoverished. We can hardly know how any one noble, let alone a 
majority of nobles felt towards their rural patrimony, except in the atypical case (and 
stylized self-presentation) of the sixteenth-century humanist Ulrich von Hutten, for 
whom the countryside was a place of poverty (at least for his ‘starveling peasants’), 
dirt, unpleasant smells, and unremitting mindless toil.285
285. Ulrich von Hutten to Wilibald Pirckheimer, 25.10.1518. Translated: Thomas Brady, ’A 
Nobleman Transformed by Education and Travel – Ulrich von Hutten (1488-1523)’, German 
History in Documents and Images, accessed 26.11.2015: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.
org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3707.
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Whatever the nobility’s attitude towards the countryside, it was undeniably 
their countryside. At the village level they had no real rivals for power, as the 
authority of the princes was either absent or devolved to a noble district governor 
with substantial de facto independence.286 But the town and townspeople also 
had a substantial presence in the rural space, provoking debate and controversy 
both then and now. As we saw above (pp. 11-13), the main charge against the 
‘haughty burghers’ in the Complaint of the Rightful Lordship of the Nobility was 
that they had been appropriating, seizing and buying up princely lordship – 
towns, castles, lands, people and property – fortifying this land, and wishing 
to be rulers, judges and noblemen themselves, ‘all without reason’ (unberuffter 
sach).287 We will see, however, that the theoretical objections to townspeople as 
rural landlords were disregarded in practice time after time, and not least by 
nobles themselves. Nobles and burghers were partners as well as competitors in 
the rural space, but this did not necessarily reduce conflict or tensions between 
them as each other’s neighbours, lords and subjects in the countryside. The noble 
experience of townspeople in the countryside is hardly more accessible to us than 
burghers’ experience of nobles in the town, but close examination of the nature 
and dynamics of burghers’ rural interests can suggest answers to some of our 
questions about how nobles and burghers understood one another as members 
of a common community in the countryside. 
The Complaint would have us believe that townspeople had no ‘reason’ to 
involve themselves in rural lordship. It was supposed to be against their sworn 
commitment to urban, communal life. This apparently paradoxical attraction of 
the countryside for the urban elite has intrigued historians too, and an assessment 
of the motivations for burgher rural lordship can inform our understanding of 
its consequences for relations between townspeople and the rural nobility. We 
will see that multiple impulses lay behind the presence of townspeople in the 
countryside, and this is reflected in two broad categories of interaction with the 
286. See Zmora, State and nobility, p. 42.
287. Bayerische Staatsbibliothek ms. Cgm 4930, f. 20r.
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rural nobility, which I will address separately: one concerns the ownership of and 
lordship over rural land and dependent rural residents by the civic authorities, 
urban institutions controlled by these authorities, and by individual burghers; 
the other is the town’s concern with security and control throughout the entire 
rural space, beyond their own landholdings, which will be considered in chapter 
four. Although the constrained, concentrated urban space creates something of a 
literal focal point for town-noble relations, the real focus of this relationship is in 
many ways on the countryside, where townspeople had a permanent and deep 
involvement which contrasted with the impermanence of the nobility in the town. 
As both a cause and a consequence of this deep involvement, the issues at stake 
between town and nobility in the countryside were of even greater significance 
than those which played out in the town.
Who’s Whose? Contested Peasants and Burghers
In much of southern Germany, the central issue between town and nobility 
concerning the rural land and its people was what happened when land and 
people were separated – when rural residents either left the land to live in the 
town, or when the town extended its authority over country dwellers without 
also exercising lordship over their locality. Both processes raised difficult 
questions about the town’s capacity to accept as burghers individuals who had 
previously been dependent peasants of the rural nobility. For Hermann Mau 
(historian of the noble society of St George’s Shield, writing in 1941) this ‘burgher 
question’ (Bürgerfrage) was the ‘pinnacle’ of the clash of interests between town 
and nobility.288 Certainly it was a major source of tension in this relationship, 
but it is important to note that the disruptive potential of this issue extended far 
beyond town-noble relations. Ultimately, all independent political authorities – 
towns, nobles, princes and churches – were in competition for one of the most 
valuable resources which any of them could possess: a subject population and 
the related control over the land worked by this population. Overlords naturally 
288. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, p. 109.
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did everything they could to defend against attacks on this resource, whilst 
on the lookout for opportunities to go on the offensive themselves. Therefore 
the nobles of St George’s Shield, whilst complaining vehemently about the 
towns’ appropriation of their dependents, were also constantly concerned to 
prevent (or at least regulate) the movement of dependents between themselves. 
Corresponding clauses appeared in the majority of the society’s charters between 
1406 and 1482.289 As an example of nobles looking to ‘poach’ dependents (albeit 
indirectly) we can take Counts Haug and Ulrich of Montfort’s 1409 privilege for 
their town of Bregenz, which allowed the town to accept burghers from imperial 
or territorial towns or from the countryside beyond the Montforts’ jurisdiction.290
Thus there were no real gamekeepers in the business of rural lordship, and plenty 
of poachers willing to put on the gamekeeper’s coat when threatened by the tactics 
which they themselves used against others. But the discussion, both medieval and 
modern, has focused on the towns’ ability and propensity (and particularly that 
of the more substantial imperial cities) to enlarge their subject populations at the 
expense of princes and the nobility. In part this reflects the inevitable reality of 
rural to urban migration in any developing economy, such as that of late medieval 
Germany. This was perhaps such an omnipresent movement of people that it 
attracted little overt comment at the time and has been beset with misconceptions 
in modern scholarship. In particular, the well-worn tag ‘Stadtluft macht frei’ (‘the 
town’s air sets you free’) seems to better reflect anachronistic assumptions about 
‘civic freedom’ and noble autocracy than any genuine medieval experience – 
though for some it may have been advantageous to exchange the rule of a noble 
lord for that of a city council. The exact role that this migration played in town-
noble relations is also surprisingly difficult to determine. It was a regular feature 
in the periodical lists of complaints exchanged between the counts of Oettingen 
and the town of Nördlingen, and was regulated by the two in 1452: the counts 
289. Herbert Obenaus, Recht und Verfassung der Gesellschaften mit St. Jörgenschild in Schwaben. 
Untersuchungen über Adel, Einung, Schiedsgericht und Fehde im fünfzehnten Jahrhundert 
(Göttingen, 1961), p. 20.
290. Obenaus, Recht und Verfassung, p. 21 n. 42.
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agreed to renounce all of their dependents who had already moved to the town, 
and promised to ask for moderate compensation in the future.291 But for the most 
part this issue as a matter for controversy is overshadowed by (and sometimes 
impossible to distinguish from) the towns’ success in attracting burghers who 
remained resident in the countryside. These external citizens or ‘outburghers’ were 
and are most commonly known as ‘paleburghers’ (Pfahlbürger), a term first attested 
around 1230.292 The phenomenon was especially pronounced in the South West 
of the German-speaking lands: Zurich received 700 paleburghers in the period 
1350–1400, and 400 in 1401 alone,293 whilst Lucerne took on 1,000 in the years 1385 
and 1386.294 In 1503 the paleburgher network of Freiburg im Breisgau totalled 150 
households, equivalent to a tenth of the urban population.295 This process led, in the 
view of Peter Blickle, to ‘defeudalization’ in the area of modern-day Switzerland, 
and allowed towns to buy up rural lordships cheaply by first undermining them. 
Similarly, Hermann Mau envisaged the towns thriving at the nobles’ expense by 
draining them of their best dependents and by ‘hollowing out’ their lordships.296
According to this assessment, we might expect the paleburghers to be a 
substantial source of conflict between townspeople and nobles. As might equally 
be expected, this was perhaps not always the case: in 1340 the knights Brun and 
Burkhard von Erbach allowed a number of their peasants to become burghers of 
Ulm, and asked the city to protect these dependents.297 (It is not clear whether this 
arrangement was mutually beneficial, whether it was forced onto the Erbacher 
291. Kießling, Stadt, p. 89.
292. Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 31.
293. Peter Blickle, ’“Doppelpass” im Mittelalter. Ausbürger in oberdeutschen und 
schweizerischen Städten und der Verfall der feudalen Herrschaft’, in Helmut Bräuer and 
Elke Schlenkrich (eds.), Die Stadt als Kommunikationsraum. Beiträge zur Stadtgeschichte vom 
Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Karl Czok zum 75. Geburtstag (Leipzig, 2001), 
p. 40.
294. Blickle, ’Doppelpass,’ p. 42.
295. Tom Scott, Freiburg and the Breisgau. Town-Country Relations in the Age of Reformation and 
Peasants’ War (Oxford, 1986), p. 82.
296. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 13, 64-65, 106.
297. Gustav Veesenmeyer and Hugo Bazing (eds.), Ulmisches Urkundenbuch Bd. 2. Tl. 1. Die 
Reichsstadt. Von 1315-1356 (Ulm, 1898), no. 194. Mentioned in Otto Hohenstatt, Die 
Entwicklung des Territoriums der Reichsstadt Ulm im XIII. und XIV. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 
1911), p. 86.
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by Ulm, or whether it simply regularized an existing state of affairs.) But the 
paleburgher question was very much a live issue at the highest political level. 
High-profile imperial prohibitions on paleburghers were issued in 1231,298 1356,299 
1389,300 and 1431.301 The first three proclamations in this series (contained in the 
so-called Statutum in favorem principum, the Golden Bull of Charles IV, and his 
son Wenceslas’ Eger Landfriede respectively) were driven by the demands of the 
princes, but Sigismund’s statute against the paleburghers of 1431 was, as we will 
see shortly, a product of the relations between the Swabian towns and their noble 
neighbours. The Bürgerfrage was a focal point in town-noble relations in Swabia 
and on the Upper Rhine from an earlier date, however. In 1372 Charles IV told 
Straßburg (Strasbourg) that the lords and knights in Alsace were unwilling to 
make peace on account of their dependents which Straßburg had received as 
burghers.302 And the dispute ran right through society from the imperial level 
down to court cases brought by an individual noble against a particular town, 
such as that of Hans von Landeck against Freiburg im Breisgau in 1452, in which 
Landeck called upon the Golden Bull and Sigismund’s 1431 statute.303
But the Bürgerfrage dispute which had the most far-reaching consequences was 
that between the Society of St George’s Shield and the Swabian League during 
their negotiations for an alliance under the patronage of King (and later Emperor) 
Sigismund between 1426 and 1434, which continued in attenuated forms until at 
least 1440.304 By the time Sigismund arrived on the shores of Lake Constance in 
late 1430, it was already clear that the paleburghers were the main stumbling 
298. Ludwig Weiland (ed.), Constitutiones et Acta Publica Imperatorum et Regum (Hanover, 1846), 
no. 304 (p. 419).
299. Wolfgang Fritz (ed.), Die Goldene Bulle Kaiser Karls IV. vom Jahre 1356 (Weimar, 1972), pp. 71-73.
300. RTA 2, p. 165.
301. RTA 9, p. 566. See also Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 116-134.
302. Obenaus, Recht und Verfassung, p. 27 n. 72.
303. Scott, Freiburg, pp. 84-85.
304. For the main phase of the negotiations see Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 60-203. For the later 
phases see Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 216-247; Harro Blezinger, Der schwäbische Städtebund 
in den Jahren 1438-1445. Mit einem Überblick über seine Entwicklung seit 1389 (Stuttgart, 1954), 
pp. 53-54; Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, pp. 95-96; BB 14 109v-110r (17.1.1440), 116r-v (3.2.1440), 
119v-120v (11.2.1440). See also pp. 225-227 below.
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block between the two leagues, and that this was making the king ill-disposed 
towards the towns.305 His statute against the paleburghers, issued in March 1431, 
was perceived by the towns as a grant made to the knighthood of St George’s 
Shield and to the detriment of the Swabian League, though Sigismund’s intention 
was to remove the main hindrance to an alliance between the two.306 It had little 
effect on either the paleburgher situation or the alliance negotiations: Ulm simply 
advised its partners in the Swabian League to act with great discretion when it 
came to receiving new burghers for as long as the king was in Upper Germany.307 
The paleburgher question was still at the heart of the matter when negotiations 
finally petered out early in 1440.308 The reasons for the failure of these efforts 
certainly extended beyond the matter of the paleburghers, but there is abundant 
evidence that it was a much debated and hotly contested issue over a long 
period of time. It was also the most concrete of the issues at stake, around which 
wider, less definite fears and frustrations could coalesce. The question of the 
paleburghers may well have become something of a symbol of noble demands 
for change and compromise, and of the towns’ intransigent response.
The paleburghers were therefore a major part of the south German landscape of 
town-noble relations, with which Nuremberg was intimately linked. Nuremberg 
remained distinct from the Swabian towns in a number of ways, however, and 
perhaps the chief of these was its complete lack of paleburghers. There can 
never be a clear answer as to why Nuremberg did not utilize an instrument for 
the extension of urban power over the countryside which was so vigorously 
deployed elsewhere. No doubt Nuremberg’s guiding political principle of 
scrupulous loyalty to the monarchy played a major role, though the different 
structure of Nuremberg’s economy from those of the Swabian towns may have 
been the really decisive factor: paleburghers would have contributed little 
towards protecting Nuremberg’s long-distance trade or its access to the timber 
305. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 110-111, 118.
306. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 100-134.
307. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 133-134.
308. Blezinger, Städtebund, p. 60.
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and mineral resources of its region, whereas in Swabia the paleburghers helped 
towns to control rich agricultural hinterlands which were an integral part of 
their important cloth industries. Compared to these two factors, any desire not 
to antagonize the regional nobility would probably have weighed only lightly in 
the council’s considerations. More by accident than design, Nuremberg found 
itself without the burden of controversial paleburghers in its relations with its 
noble neighbours. This is important to bear in mind as we move forward to 
consider the significance of other causes of antagonism between townspeople 
and nobles, as well as discourses about town and nobility which spanned Upper 
Germany. In the meantime it is also important to note that beyond one or two 
very fragmentary references little of the entire Bürgerfrage complex of issues is 
visible in the correspondence between Nuremberg and the nobility which I have 
analysed. However, the lack of paleburghers hardly hindered Nuremberg and its 
citizens from asserting themselves in the countryside as landowners.
Burghers as Rural Landowners
Why did townspeople throughout the German-speaking lands acquire so much 
rural property? We have already noted the attitude of the anonymous author 
of the Complaint of the Natural Lordship of the Nobility towards the ‘unnatural’ 
authority of the burghers in the countryside, and we must now consider why 
rural property-holding was in fact so very normal for so many burghers if we 
are to understand its implications for their relationships with the rural nobility. 
Extensive scholarship on various aspects of town–country relations in the late 
Middle Ages has already identified a wide range of potential motives for burgher 
rural landholding, commensurate with the diversity of the phenomenon itself. 
Individual burghers and urban corporations ranging from parish churches and 
charitable hospitals to city councils themselves collectively owned an array of rural 
property, including all types of agricultural land (especially arable land, meadows 
and vineyards), village jurisdictions and lordship rights, and rural infrastructure 
such as mills and trip hammers for metalworking (the latter were especially 
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important to Nuremberg’s economy). No object of rural lordship or economic life 
was too big or too small to attract townspeople’s attention: some towns took over 
the administration of substantial areas of the countryside in a single transaction, 
whilst other burghers claimed the smallest of lordship dues (such as the proceeds 
from church fairs) or purchased annuities which were secured on specific pieces 
of rural land without ever having actual possession of the land itself.
The motivations for and dynamics of burgher rural landholding have to be 
deduced from its observable structures and patterns. What was purchased, where 
the purchases were located, how they were purchased and from whom, and how 
they were administered or exploited after purchase are the key indicators.309 
But it is also important to consider how the different actors within the urban 
community related to one another in their acquisition of rural lands and rights. 
Often it is impossible to distinguish between the actions and strategies of 
individuals, corporations and communes, meaning that behaviour at any one of 
these levels could have been subordinate to the interests of another. Elsbet Orth 
has emphasized the unity of Frankfurt’s individual and corporate acquisitions 
policy,310 and Bernd Schneidmüller notes that Frankfurt’s patricians often acquired 
smaller parcels of land within a larger district once the town or another individual 
had taken control of the area.311 Does this mean that the town might acquire 
land and jurisdictions in order to create opportunities for its citizens to invest 
in the surrounding area with more confidence and security? Certainly citizens 
could take advantage of a town’s expanding control over its surroundings, and 
powerful individuals undoubtedly sought to influence communal policy in their 
interests. In the case of Nuremberg, Valentin Groebner has noted that the Tucher 
family initially focused on the area to the immediate north of the city, and then 
spread their interests following the expansion of Nuremberg’s territory in the 
309. Compare Elisabeth Raiser, Städtische Territorialpolitik im Mittelalter. Eine vergleichende 
Untersuchung ihrer verschiedenen Formen am Beispiel Lübecks und Zürichs (Lübeck & Hamburg, 
1969), p. 20.
310. Orth, Fehden, p. 99.
311. Schneidmüller, ’Territorialpolitik,’ p. 124.
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early sixteenth century. As part of this process, Georg Holzschuher was deputed 
to negotiate the purchase of Hersbruck, Reicheneck and Heideck in 1505, and 
pushed for the acquisition of Heideck in particular as he was involved in a 
legal dispute over property there.312 In the most extreme case of an individual’s 
influence over communal affairs, Heinrich Toppler of Rothenburg ob der Tauber 
almost single-handedly created his town’s later territory – which by 1430 covered 
400 km2 – between 1383 and 1406, initially as his own personal estate.313 Toppler 
did not so much influence communal policy as pursue his own interests so 
effectively as to make communal policy subordinate to his own.
It is also readily apparent that civic authorities frequently tried to harness and to 
some extent coordinate the purchases of corporations and individuals in their vision 
of the communal interest. A memo from the Nuremberg Ratsbuch for 1441 reveals 
the kind of restrained but alert interest which a city could take in the fortunes of its 
citizens’ rural landholdings. ‘Take note,’ the incoming Bürgermeister are reminded, 
‘of the many repurchases of our burghers’ property in the countryside.’314 It was 
common for city councils to insist on first refusal when citizens sold rural land, or 
even to prohibit burghers from selling to non-citizens.315 Some towns (for example, 
Memmingen and Nördlingen) went further and actively used urban corporations 
– especially hospitals – as agents for the purchase and administration of substantial 
rural territories.316 In addition to complicating our assessment of purchasers’ 
312. Valentin Groebner, ’Ratsinteressen, Familieninteressen. Patrizische Konflikte in Nürnberg 
um 1500’, in Klaus Meier and Ulrich Schreiner (eds.), Stadtregiment und Bürgerfreiheit. 
Handlungsspielräume in deutschen und italienischen Städten des Späten Mittelalters und der 
frühen Neuzeit (Göttingen, 1994), p. 292.
313. Ludwig Schnurrer, ’Der Bürger als Grundherr. Die Grundherrschaft Heinrich Topplers aus 
Rothenburg (+ 1408)’, in Hans Schulze (ed.), Städtisches Um- und Hinterland in vorindustrieller 
Zeit (Cologne, 1985), pp. 62-65
314. RB 1b ff. 7v, 12v: ‘In acht zu haben von der unsern mercklich widderkewfen auff dem lande’.
315. For examples see Heinz Dannenbauer, Die Entstehung des Territoriums der Reichsstadt 
Nürnberg (Stuttgart, 1928), p. 123; Wieland Held, ’Die Land- und Grundrentenerwerbungen 
sowie die Bemühungen um ländliche Gerichtsrechte von seiten des Rates und der Bürger 
der Stadt Erfurt vom 12. Jahrhundert bis 1400’, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, (1979), p. 
164.
316. Peter Blickle, ’Zur Territorialpolitik der oberschwäbischen Reichsstädte’, in Erich Maschke 
and Jürgen Sydow (eds.), Stadt und Umland. Protokoll der X. Arbeitstagung des Arbeitskreises 
für südwestdeutsche Stadtgeschichtsforschung Calw 12.-14. November 1971 (Stuttgart, 1974), pp. 
57-60; Kießling, Stadt, pp. 39-40.
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motives, this tactic of purchase through proxy could have important implications 
for townspeople’s relations with the nobility. Wolfgang Leiser has argued that 
smaller towns used their hospitals as purchasing agents to avoid directly provoking 
the nobility. He also describes citizens as potential ‘straw men’, who could make 
purchases on behalf of the town and then sell the land to the civic authorities after 
a decent interval had elapsed.317 Elsbet Orth agrees that rural powers such as the 
nobility feared the towns’ extension of their authority in the countryside, but 
believes that this thwarted any attempt to use citizens’ property as a basis for the 
expansion of communal interests.318 Indeed, it is hard to see that the ruse which 
Leiser envisages could possibly have fooled anyone, given the obvious interlinking 
of all parts of the urban polity. Citizens often made purchases on Nuremberg’s 
behalf, but it was so apparent that they were acting in concert with the city council 
that the historical record often leaves us unclear as to whether the city or the citizen 
sealed the final deal (for an example from the urban context, see the purchase of the 
Paniersberg house from Hans von Wildenstein, pp. 51-52 above).
It stands to reason that different parts and aspects of the urban community would 
have had different, though often overlapping interests in the acquisition and 
management of rural property. The further intertwining of these interests through the 
ways in which individuals, corporations and communes supported or subordinated 
one another’s aims, or sometimes failed to do so, is an essential component in our 
understanding of both townspeople’s motivations as rural landowners and the 
relationships with the rural nobility which were generated and shaped by this 
landowning. The author of the Complaint saw burghers’ rural landholdings as 
inherently disruptive of the harmony between the nobility and townspeople, whose 
proper sphere was the strictly delimited urban space. But we only have to step 
outside of this logic of ‘separate spheres’ to see that certain types of rural property 
317. Leiser, ’Territorien,’ pp. 970-971. See also Karl-Friedrich Krieger, ’Bürgerlicher Landbesitz 
im Spätmittelalter. Das Beispiel der Reichsstadt Nürnberg’, in Hans Schulze (ed.), Städtisches 
Um- und Hinterland in vorindustrieller Zeit (Cologne, 1985), p. 94.
318. Elsbet Orth, ’Stadtherrschaft und auswärtiger Bürgerbesitz. Die territorialpolitischen 
Konzeptionen der Reichsstadt Frankfurt im späten Mittelalter’, in Hans Schulze (ed.), 
Städtisches Um- und Hinterland in vorindustrieller Zeit (Cologne, 1985), pp. 115-116.
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were of obvious interest to certain citizens – the iron-forging trip hammers of the 
Upper Palatinate to the metalworkers of Nuremberg, for instance – and furthermore 
that different motivations for the acquisition of rural property would have different 
consequences for town-noble relations. Some aspects of townspeople’s rural lordship 
are less immediately intelligible, however. Why, for instance, would patricians who 
normally specialized in long-distance trade concern themselves with the complex 
business of administering many scattered parcels of rural land?319 And did they 
develop a particular ‘urban’ model of investment in the rural space, or did they 
follow the same strategies in their rural lordship as did nobles?
A number of historians have shown that rural land could perform various 
‘banking’ functions for urban commercial elites. Land could be used to store 
capital so that it was both secure over the long-term and could be quickly realized 
when needed. Where land performed this function, we might expect to see a 
lively land market within the urban commercial society, and this is exactly what 
Konrad Fritze found at the Hanseatic trading centre of Stralsund.320 Wieland Held 
has argued that Fritze’s picture also fits Erfurt, even though only 30 of 153 sources 
attesting to land changing hands at Erfurt in the period 1321–1400 document 
transactions between citizens, compared to 81 of 109 sources between 1370 and 
1450 at Stralsund.321 Held instead showed that the wealthiest burghers in sixteenth-
century Erfurt had around 15 per cent of their total wealth in land, consistent with 
its postulated function as an economic security measure. Less wealthy citizens, 
with a greater need for security, had proportionately more invested in land.322 In 
the case of fourteenth-century Nördlingen, Rolf Kießling has been able to track 
the changing urban market in rural land against its economic context. Between 
the 1320s and 1340s the citizens of Nördlingen purchased large quantities of land 
319. See Wieland Held, Zwischen Marktplatz und Anger. Stadt-Land-Beziehungen im 16. Jahrhundert 
in Thüringen (Weimar, 1988), p. 79.
320. Konrad Fritze, ’Soziale Aspekte der Stadt-Land-Beziehungen im Bereich der wendischen 
Hansestädte (13. bis 16. Jahrhundert)’, in Hans Schulze (ed.), Städtisches Um- und Hinterland 
in vorindustrieller Zeit (Cologne, 1985).
321. Held, ’Land- und Grundrentenerwerbungen,’ p. 163.
322. Held, ’Land- und Grundrentenerwerbungen,’ pp. 40-41.
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as the town’s economy boomed, with another wave of purchases in the 1360s 
and 1370s. But in the 1380s there was a marked trend towards the sale of rural 
land, as lucrative opportunities arose in the new fustian industry, which required 
substantial capital.323 There is also the possibility that the security provided by 
capital invested in rural estates could benefit a merchant’s credit rating.324
To what extent did other economic motives play a part in burghers’ acquisition of 
rural land? In particular, to what extent did townspeople look not just for a balance 
of security and flexibility, but also for some sort of return on their investment? 
These questions have proved harder to answer than those relating to land as a more 
passive investment. Speculation in land prices might be difficult to determine from 
the bare records of transactions,325 and was clearly not a dominant factor in any case, 
as many burghers retained their estates over long periods of time and managed 
them intensively. But how exactly we should interpret the records of townspeople 
as managers of their rural ‘businesses’ is a contentious question, complicated 
further by the conceptual straitjackets of separate ’burgher’ and ‘noble’ cultures 
and the search for the origins of modern capitalism. Was investment in land an 
investment in production or the hallmark of a conservative ‘rentier’ mentality? The 
question is at least slightly anachronistic, but it still frames the entire debate about 
burghers as rural entrepreneurs, or otherwise. The ‘rentier mentality’ interpretation 
is the comfortable leader amongst historians,326 and there are certainly some 
good examples of townspeople profiting from their rural lands (and dependent 
peasants) simply by exploiting rental income and manorial dues as far as they 
possibly could.327 Examples of investment in new or more market-orientated forms 
of rural production have been celebrated, for instance Peter Stromer of Nuremberg 
becomes the ‘pioneer’ of planned arboriculture for his suggestion in 1368 that areas 
323. Kießling, Stadt, pp. 113-115.
324. Otto Brunner, ’Zwei Studien zum Verhältnis von Bürgertum und Adel’, in Otto Brunner 
(ed.), Neue Wege der Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte (Göttingen, 1968), pp. 270-271; Held, 
Marktplatz und Anger, p. 79.
325. See Krieger, ’Landbesitz,’ p. 92, Held, Marktplatz und Anger, pp. 80 and Kießling, Stadt, pp. 
153-154 for speculation as a possible motive.
326. See Schubert, Einführung, p. 143.
327. Fritze, ’Soziale Aspekte,’ p. 30; Scott, Freiburg, pp. 40, 98.
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of very sandy soil be planted with conifers.328 The distinction between bourgeois or 
‘proto-capitalist’ and ‘feudal’ models obscures the fact that many burghers tried to 
turn a profit from their rural land, and that the traditional manorial model simply 
presented itself most readily in the majority of cases.
The mixed record of rural land as an economic boon to towns does give some 
cause to pause for thought, however, even if we do not wholeheartedly accept 
the traditional view that all late medieval landowners were facing falling rental 
incomes.329 The problem here is that we only have figures from municipal 
territories, which show some towns receiving around one fifth (Göttingen in 
1500, Hildesheim in 1450330) or a quarter or more (Ulm in 1519,331 Rothenburg in 
1574332) of their income from their rural lands and others (notably Nuremberg, 
until 1707333) actually recording a loss. It is almost certain that the motivation for 
the establishment of communal rural territories was not purely economic, but the 
same need not apply to individual burghers – insofar as we can consider them 
separate from communal strategies. Yet municipal policies could also aim at the 
economic control of the surrounding area and a more general policy of attempted 
or enhanced self-sufficiency in terms of food and raw materials. Numerous 
historians have cited this as a factor in townspeople’s acquisition of rural land,334 
but concrete examples are harder to come by. Elisabeth Raiser suggests that this 
control of the rural economy was chiefly of interest to towns dominated by their 
craft guilds,335 but there are some more specific cases, for instance Erfurt’s ability 
328. Fritz Schnelbögl, ’Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung ihres Landgebietes für die Reichsstadt 
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to control its crucial woad industry simply by owning the villages in which the 
crop was produced.336 There can be no doubt that Nuremberg placed a high 
value on control over certain resources in its immediate vicinity, particularly 
the imperial forests (on which more below, p. 114).337 In the early eighteenth 
century Nuremberg resisted a move to hop production which many inhabitants 
of its territory desired out of fear for supplies of grain and meat (and due to 
worries about deforestation),338 but this does not imply that the council would 
have been so restrictive at an earlier date. In practice, economic control of the 
surrounding area may have been more of a side-effect than a primary motivation 
for many towns in the acquisition of their rural land, as no town of any size 
could realistically hope for more than a small gain in the security of its overall 
supply of food and raw materials from even quite an extensive territory. Only in 
certain circumstances did a policy of economic control through rural property 
truly make sense – Nuremberg and its forests may be one such case (see also the 
example of the Kornberg quarries, pp. 116-117 below).
If towns and townspeople acted largely as ‘rentier’ landlords in the countryside, 
were they therefore following traditional patterns of ‘noble’ behaviour in other 
ways as well? Was the social dimension of their rural lordship an aspect of their 
‘nobility’ – or their aspiration to nobility? This will always be difficult to unravel, 
because (as we have seen) elite townspeople tended to have a thoroughly ‘noble’ 
appearance within the town as well, so that it is difficult to tell what rural estates 
added to their sense of self. Certainly landed estates were a fundamental part 
of what made them who they were. One description of the Lübeck elite of 1384 
identified them as ‘the honourable council, the rich merchants, and those rich 
from property’ (de rike van gude weren).339 To an extent, landed property was as 
important a foundation of an urban patriciate as it was of the nobility, as it provided 
336. Held, ’Land- und Grundrentenerwerbungen,’ p. 158.
337. Schnelbögl, ’Bedeutung,’ p. 283.
338. Schnelbögl, ’Bedeutung,’ pp. 291-293.
339. Demski, Adel und Lübeck, p. 181 n. 93.
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security of long-term prosperity.340 Yet we have already seen that the sixteenth-
century elite of Erfurt had on average only 15 per cent of their wealth invested in 
land: enough to tide them over a period of tough trading conditions, but hardly 
sufficient to maintain their elite status if their commercial activities were to be 
seriously reduced. The elites of other, mostly smaller towns relied much more 
heavily on rural property to underpin their status, but the continued commercial 
activity of the Nuremberg patriciate into the sixteenth century suggests that they, 
like the merchants of Erfurt, had only a limited interest in rural property.
Another theory of burgher rural landholding places it at the heart of urban elite 
identity, but in a very different way. Rolf Kießling has made the strongest case for 
land ownership as an ‘aristocratic’ tradition inherited from the ministeriales ancestors 
of urban families (see also above, pp. 29-30).341 For Kießling, the ministerial families 
who dominated Nördlingen in the early fourteenth century set the ‘elite’ pattern – 
including rural landowning – which was copied by rising financier and commercial 
families. It may not be helpful to attach labels such as ‘ministerial’ or even ‘aristocratic’ 
to the tradition of rural landholding amongst urban elites, but there can be no doubt 
that it was a widespread customary practice. In fact, Held’s findings from sixteenth-
century Erfurt show that the practice extended well beyond the narrow elite who 
could plausibly have participated in an ‘aristocratic’ heritage.342 The non-elite 
burghers could in turn have been aping the pretensions of their social betters, but 
probably there were other forms of conspicuous consumption which would have 
better fulfilled this function than the few plots of agricultural land beyond the walls 
into which some middling burghers sunk a good proportion of their total wealth.
The same argument – that burgher rural landholding was too widespread a practice 
to reflect any ‘aristocratic’ sensibility – counts against the theory that townspeople 
340. Sergij Vilfan, ’Stadt und Adel. Ein Vergleich zwischen küsten- und binnenstädten zwischen 
der oberen Adria und Pannonien’, in Wilhelm Rausch (ed.), Die Stadt am Ausgang des 
Mittelalters (Linz, 1974), p. 65 argues that only landed wealth could allow the formation of 
a patriciate.
341. Kießling, Stadt, pp. 153-154. The same point is made briefly by Boockmann, ’Lebensgefühl,’ 
p. 35.
342. Held, ’Land- und Grundrentenerwerbungen,’ pp. 40-41.
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as a group maintained rural property in order to emulate and compete with the 
rural nobility. Yet it is possible that certain sections of urban society were motivated 
by this need for rural property as a vehicle for social mobility, and the idea has 
been popular amongst historians. Rural landowning has been taken as indicative 
of a ‘fascination with noble lifestyles’,343 a desire to rise into the ‘lords’ world’ 
(Herrenwelt)344 or to conform at least superficially to noble-chivalric habits.345 But 
there is very little conclusive evidence of townspeople using their rural estates 
to gain entry into the nobility or to represent themselves as nobles until the later 
fifteenth century. Only then do we find patricians taking toponyms from their 
country estates: for example, Hans Waldmann of Zurich, who bought Dübelstein 
castle in 1487 and became Hans Waldmann von Dübelstein.346 There was a rush 
for faux-noble titles by the patriciate of Nuremberg in the early sixteenth century, 
as the very concepts of ‘town’ and ‘nobility’ became increasingly incompatible 
in the minds of contemporaries. These same families did not flaunt their rural 
properties to a remotely comparable extent in the mid-fifteenth century, and so 
there is little (beyond an anachronistic transposition of a later state of affairs) to 
suggest that they were buying rural land as a passport to nobility.
Nonetheless, the acquisition of substantial amounts of rural land did confer 
on wealthy townspeople some of the attributes of nobility. Perhaps the most 
important of these were not those which conferred markers of status, but those 
with a more hard-headed political appeal. Consolidated blocks of rural land gave 
elite burghers bases outside of their towns, which could be useful during (or as 
insurance against) political difficulties within the commune. We have already 
seen the independent power acquired and expressed via the rural landholdings 
of Heinrich Toppler of Rothenburg, though this could not prevent his arrest and 
probable murder by his fellow citizens in 1407.347 The medium-sized Swabian 
343. Leiser, ’Territorien,’ p. 971.
344. Brunner, ’Zwei Studien,’ pp. 270-271.
345. Krieger, ’Landbesitz,’ p. 94.
346. Spieß, ’Aufstieg,’ p. 11.
347. Schnurrer, ’Bürger,’ pp. 62-65
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town of Memmingen likewise had trouble with burghers who could become 
powerful enough to dominate, challenge or break away from the commune, using 
rural land as a base to do so. The Sättelin family became increasingly estranged 
from Memmingen after purchasing the nearby lordship of Eisenburg in 1455, and 
the town’s council found itself in an impossible situation in 1510, when the Vöhlin 
family was trying to acquire enhanced rights for their lordship of Ungershausen: 
some feared that this could create an independent power bloc outside of the 
town, others that opposing the Vöhlin would drive them out of Memmingen 
altogether.348 Nuremberg was never in danger of being held to ransom in this way 
by any individual or family, but the power of the commune was reason in itself 
to seek an independent alternative. Valentin Groebner has described the Haller 
family as pursuing their own territorial policy in the second half of the fourteenth 
century, acquiring a series of castles and rights over Lauf and Hersbruck.349 By 
the 1500s patrician families were increasingly likely to be seeking an independent 
rural position for themselves, from the failed attempts of Wolf Holzschuher at 
Gräfenberg in the early part of the century350 to the later success of the Geuder 
family at Heroldsberg. Throughout the early modern period the Geuders were thus 
able to shift their allegiances between Nuremberg and the Franconian nobility.351
Whereas individual burghers had reason not to be too open about the political 
motives behind their rural purchases, the political imperatives behind communally-
directed acquisitions were more overt. Schnurrer includes the self-confidence of the 
growing towns in a list of factors behind their rural expansion,352 but any confidence 
was probably deeply defensive and mixed with considerable circumspection, if 
not apprehension. Many historians have cited towns’ need for security in certain 
spaces as a major cause of their acquisition of rural land.353 Aside from control over 
348. Kießling, ’Umlandgefüge,’ p. 58.
349. Groebner, ’Ratsinteressen,’ pp. 292, 306 n. 58.
350. Groebner, ’Ratsinteressen,’ p. 299.
351. Gerhard Pfeiffer, ’Nürnberger Patriziat und fränkische Reichsritterschaft’, in Norica. 
Beiträge zur Nürnberger Geschichte (Nuremberg, 1961), pp. 35-39.
352. Schnurrer, ’Bürger,’ p. 61.
353. In general terms: Andermann, ’Kriminalisierung,’ pp. 160-161; Scott, Freiburg, pp. 40-46, 77, 
100; Fritze, ’Soziale Aspekte,’ p. 21; Kießling, ’Umlandgefüge,’ p. 38.
101
the agrarian economy and the production of certain raw materials, which we have 
already noted, the objects of control which have been identified are chiefly the 
roads and highways which were the towns’ trade arteries, in order to shelter this 
trade from both tolls and robbery.354 There may also have been a desire to protect 
the rural property of burghers from unfriendly overlords,355 and some have argued 
for a more general desire to control the space around the town so as to keep other 
lords at a safe distance, even separated from the town by a ‘protective wall’ of 
rural property.356 This may be pushing the point a little too far in most cases, but 
there is also some very clear evidence of towns’ concern with particular security 
objectives in their acquisition of rural property. Frankfurt am Main was especially 
keen to secure the bridges over the river Nidda, which half encircles the city to 
the north and west. The city gained its first Nidda crossing at Bonames (around 
8 km to the north) in 1368, and in 1428 Frankfurt received an imperial privilege 
allowing it to pull down the bridges over the Nidda for defensive purposes.357 
Lübeck expressly named security concerns as its main motivation in certain cases. 
In 1359 the Hanseatic metropolis bought the town of Mölln from the princes of 
Saxony-Lauenburg ‘for the defence of our land (terra) and the common imperial 
highways’,358 and when in 1405/06 an opposition group demanded that no burgher 
should be allowed to purchase rural property beyond the town’s first defensive 
line (the lantwere) the council replied that the same property in the hands of nobles 
loyal to princes (hovelude) would make the roads unsafe.359
This points us towards the protection of the roads from depredations by nobles in 
particular, which will be discussed in chapter four. But we also glimpse a moment 
354. Diethard Schmid, ’Das Umland als Gegenstand der Kommunikation im mittelalterlichen 
Regensburg’, in Jörg Oberste (ed.), Kommunikation in mittelalterlichen Städten (Regensburg, 
2007), p. 72; Andermann, ’Kriminalisierung,’ pp. 160-161; Held, Marktplatz und Anger, 
pp. 90-91; Kießling, ’Umlandgefüge,’ pp. 53-54; Schnurrer, ’Bürger,’ p. 61; Hohenstatt, 
Entwicklung, p. 120.
355. Orth, ’Stadtherrschaft,’ p. 120. See also Schmid, ’Umland,’ p. 72.
356. For the ‘protective wall’ (Schutzwall) see Raiser, Territorialpolitik, p. 32. See also Schmid, 
’Umland,’ p. 72; Schnurrer, ’Bürger,’ p. 61.
357. Orth, ’Stadtherrschaft,’ pp. 113, 116-117; Schneidmüller, ’Territorialpolitik,’ p. 125.
358. Demski, Adel und Lübeck, p. 143: ‘propter defensionem terre nostre et communis strate 
regie’.
359. Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 210-211.
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of internal opposition to the expansion of the town into the countryside through 
ownership of property. Lübeck was hardly unique in this respect, however. There 
were similar calls at Rostock in 1408 and 1428, probably (as at Lübeck) related to 
the strain on the civic purse caused by the defence of widespread landholdings.360 
The council at Braunschweig blamed its own bankruptcy in 1374 on the many 
castles which it had taken on as pledges.361 It is hardly surprising therefore that 
other towns were more cautious. Schwäbisch Hall was reluctant to take control 
of Limpurg castle, and Ulm declined to make a series of possible acquisitions 
(Blaubeuren, Kirchberg, Erbach and Burgau).362 In January 1447 Nuremberg 
politely declined an anonymous nobleman’s offer of a castle for sale.363 This 
circumspection is entirely consistent with a defensive, security-orientated strategy.
What then should we make of the substantial ‘territories’ assembled by some 
towns over the course of the later Middle Ages? This period has traditionally been 
described as the era of the emerging ‘territorial state’ in Germany, a time of flux 
when all major political players, towns included, were making a grab for power at 
the regional level supposedly abdicated by the weakened Empire. Consequently 
the favoured term for towns’ policy towards their rural possessions was until 
relatively recently Territorialpolitik.364 From the mid-1980s onwards historians 
such as Rolf Kießling and Ulrich Andermann have favoured Umlandpolitik 
(‘hinterland’ or ‘environs’ policy)365 and somewhere between the two is the rarer 
Landgebietspolitik (‘rural area’ policy).366 Umlandpolitik has the clear advantage of 
reflecting the variety of different ways in which towns sought to influence their 
360. Fritze, ’Soziale Aspekte,’ p. 31.
361. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 210.
362. Gerd Wunder, ’Reichsstädte als Landesherrn’, in Emil Meynen (ed.), Zentralität als Problem 
der mittelalterlichen Stadtgeschichtsforschung (Cologne & Vienna, 1979), p. 82.
363. BB 18 f. 144v (17.1.1447).
364. Orth, ’Stadtherrschaft,’ p. 116; Schneidmüller, ’Territorialpolitik’; Blickle, ’Territorialpolitik’; 
Raiser, Territorialpolitik.
365. Kießling, ’Umlandgefüge’; Kießling, Stadt; Andermann, Gewalt, p. 202.
366. Manfred Wilmanns, Die Landgebietspolitik der Stadt Bremen um 1400 unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Burgenpolitik des Rates im Erzstift und in Friesland (Hildesheim, 1973); 
Raiser, Territorialpolitik, p. 13; Gerhard Fouquet, ’Stadt-Adel. Chancen und Risiken sozialer 
Mobilität im späten Mittelalter’, in Günther Schulz (ed.), Sozialer Aufstieg. Funktionseliten 
im Spätmittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit (Munich, 2002), p. 182.
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surroundings beyond direct ‘territorial’ control, but it also avoids giving the 
impression of a ‘deliberate territorial policy with anti-feudal and anti-princely 
overtones’ which, in Tom Scott’s words, ‘so rarely informed the motives of the 
ruling elites of German cities’367 and which owes more to a teleological narrative of 
German ‘territorialization’ than to medieval sources. The idea of a town’s territory 
was not entirely foreign to the late Middle Ages: a royal charter from 1298 refers 
to Nördlingen’s territorium.368 But it is not clear that this means a directly ruled 
area of land, as Nördlingen barely possessed such a ‘territory’ at the time.369 More 
common is the nebulous gebiet (area, district), mentioned in connection with rural 
authority granted to Nördlingen in 1349 and Straßburg in 1339.370
Does the lack of evidence for deliberate territory-building or ‘territorial’ consciousness 
in the towns mean that we should view the large agglomerations of land and 
jurisdictions which ended up under civic or burgher lordship as entirely contingent, 
effectively accidental by-products of fundamentally more conservative strategies? 
This would misrepresent the multiplicity of very deliberate and purposeful ways 
in which burghers and civic authorities sought to influence and control their rural 
surroundings, but it does reflect the fact that the expansionist, ‘territorial’ impulse 
was at best only one factor amongst many in the construction of what became the 
rural territories of many German-speaking towns.371 The relative importance of the 
various economic, socio-cultural and political factors identified above varied with 
time and place, and was highly dependent on the character of individual towns: their 
size, political situation, economic makeup and so on. For example, Raiser compares 
the importance of control over trade routes for Lübeck (ruled by a patrician elite 
focused on long-distance trade) with Zurich’s deeper interest in and protectionist and 
exploitative policies towards its wider hinterland, reflecting the dominance of its craft 
guilds.372 But many towns cannot be fitted too snugly into any typology. Nuremberg 
367. Tom Scott, Society and Economy in Germany 1300-1600 (Basingstoke, 2002), p. 138.
368. Kießling, ’Umlandgefüge,’ p. 35.
369. Kießling, Stadt, pp. 38-58.
370. Kießling, Stadt, p. 33; Wunder, ’Reichsstädte als Landesherrn,’ p. 81.
371. The one likely exception to this rule is Bern: see Raiser, Territorialpolitik, p. 22.
372. Raiser, Territorialpolitik, p. 158; Leiser, ’Territorien,’ p. 977.
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is perhaps one such town: its patrician rulers were thoroughly orientated towards 
long-distance trade, but also acutely concerned with the needs of the city’s very 
particular and renowned artisan-industrial production. I will consider Nuremberg’s 
‘territorial’ development in more detail later in this chapter.
What were the likely consequences of the nature of burgher rural landholdings and 
wider Umlandpolitik for towns’ relationships with the rural nobility? Towns’ and 
burghers’ intentions are only part of this story – noble perceptions of their actions 
counted for at least as much, if not more (see below, pp. 118-119). But the structures 
and dynamics of townspeople’s rural interests played their role, and we certainly 
have to think our way into the late medieval experience of towns’ rural expansion, 
where the long-term narrative of gradual territorial accumulation dissolves for the 
most part into many smaller gains and reverses, with occasional tactical coups and 
strategic retreats. This mixed picture would have been full of even deeper ambiguity 
from the perspective of many rural nobles. On the one hand, there is little evidence 
for some of the more antagonistic forms of rural expansion by townspeople which 
have been suggested by historians. Burghers who bought rural property to act the 
part of nobles or to transform the rural economy along urban, commercial lines, 
along with towns which sought wide-ranging and absolute control over extensive 
territories, are largely tricks of hindsight. The economic behaviour of townspeople 
in the countryside tended to be prudent and conservative, with their attitudes 
towards rural property mirroring those of the nobility in the most fundamental 
and unostentatious ways. On the other hand, towns also had powerful political 
motives for the development of their rural interests and properties. These too were 
fundamentally conservative and defensive, but they could easily be construed as 
aggressive, especially as many nobles were amongst those against whom towns 
sought to defend themselves. The potential for misunderstanding was considerable, 
but to what extent was this potential realized? To answer this question we must take 
into account two other important aspects of townspeople’s interaction with nobles 
in the countryside: their roles as subjects, vassals and other subordinates of rural 
nobles, and their relationships with nobles as their rural neighbours.
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Townspeople under Noble Lordship
In debates both medieval and modern, townspeople in the late medieval countryside 
generally appear as competitors of the rural nobility for land and authority. It 
is therefore vitally important to take into account the role of townspeople as 
nobles’ subordinates in the rural space. For the most part this meant burghers 
as vassals of rural nobles, holding land from them in fief. These relationships 
were entered into freely and for mutual benefit, and thus cut to the heart of the 
question of noble resentment towards burgher rural landholding – how deep and 
how fundamental could this opposition have been, given that nobles themselves 
facilitated townspeople’s landed presence in the countryside? The relationship 
between nobles and burghers as lords and vassals is entangled with much wider 
questions about the late medieval feudal system, and particularly the status of 
burghers as vassals in general. To understand noble lordship over burghers in 
the countryside we must question the purpose of these relationships, and the 
consequences of their position at the interface of noble and burgher identities.
The nature of all feudal relationships in the late Middle Ages has posed 
serious questions for historians, given that the whole system of social contracts 
apparently designed to provide a fighting force for a feudal lord was hardly ever 
used for that purpose in this period. The role of burghers as vassals intensifies 
this problem still further: what was the place of these notorious non-combatants 
in the feudal order? Whatever position we take on the actual fighting capacity of 
burghers, there is little or no evidence of any citizens going to war for their noble 
lords as vassals. Nor did they need to: as Steffen Patzold’s recent overview of late 
medieval feudalism clearly demonstrates, feudal relationships were endlessly 
adapted and varied in the late Middle Ages to serve all sorts of purposes. Princes 
used feudal structures to develop their territorial lordship as well as to build noble 
clienteles, and all social groups found feudal modes of expressing hierarchy and 
responsibility or obligation useful for understanding and moulding the complex 
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order of the Empire.373 Patzold also outlines a particular role for burghers as 
vassals of kings and emperors – as financiers, hosts, confidants and diplomats.374 
But did burghers perform similar roles on a smaller scale for rural nobles? This 
cannot be assumed, and we will examine the evidence from Nuremberg shortly.
In part the answer to this question of the role of burghers as vassals to rural nobles 
lies in the relationship of the two groups as co-vassals in the feudal clienteles 
of princes. In particular, did burghers enjoy equality with nobles in their status 
as vassals? This question simmered for some time as a sub-plot of German 
historiography, until Karl-Friedrich Krieger established the current orthodoxy in 
1979.375 According to Krieger’s model, burghers in northern and eastern Germany 
did face some discrimination as vassals in comparison to nobles: in general, they 
could not automatically inherit fiefs or continue as sub-tenants when a lord died 
without heirs (with the result that his fiefs reverted to his feudal lord), but had 
to pay a fee (Lehnware) of around 10 per cent of the purchase price of the land to 
continue in possession. Some towns also felt a need to obtain privileges or court 
rulings against the practice of selling fiefs occupied by burghers to a new feudal 
lord of lower status.376 In south and west Germany, by contrast, there were barely 
any special fees or other disadvantages attached to burgher vassalage.377
The particular, and perhaps (in some eyes) peculiar status of burghers as vassals 
was noted in the south too, however. The right of burghers to receive fiefs (and 
sometimes also to grant them) was well established by custom, but it was also 
buttressed by a series of imperial privileges granted to individual towns, and 
sometimes expressly conferring the right to hold fiefs more nobilium.378 And there 
373. Steffen Patzold, Das Lehnswesen (Munich, 2012), pp. 117-118.
374. Patzold, Lehnswesen, pp. 109-110.
375. Karl-Friedrich Krieger, Die Lehnshoheit der deutschen Könige im Spätmittelalter (ca. 1200-1437) 
(Aalen, 1979), pp. 137-151. Restated with some additional material in Karl-Friedrich Krieger, 
’Bürgerlehen’, in Albrecht Cordes (ed.), Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (Berlin, 
2008).
376. Krieger, Lehnshoheit, pp. 137-147.
377. Krieger, Lehnshoheit, pp. 147-150.
378. Krieger, Lehnshoheit, p. 149. See also Lieberich, ’Rittermässigkeit,’ p. 77.
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were some smaller points of contention too: the question of whether burghers 
could judge nobles in feudal courts was live amongst the vassals of the abbeys of 
Kempten and St Gallen in the early fifteenth century, for instance.379 During this 
century the noble vassals of the bishops of Würzburg also seem to have secured 
better inheritance terms for their fiefs than those enjoyed by burghers.380
Even ahead of this development, Bishop Johann von Egloffstein of Würzburg (1400-
1411) had organized his register of fiefs and vassals (Lehnbuch) around a division 
between nobles (of all ranks) and burghers (together with peasants).381 It is difficult to 
know what to make of this piece of bureaucratic categorization and its implications 
for social identity. There is no evidence for the division representing two different 
types or qualities of fief, though Cord Ulrichs argues that it reflects the fact that 
burgher vassals were never called upon for military service, unlike the nobles. 
Equally, it may reflect tensions at the time between the bishop and his towns.382 
But clearly this division had some use beyond the Würzburg episcopal retinue as 
well, because the Lehnbücher of Counts Johann II and Georg I of Wertheim (1444 
and 1454 respectively) also included special sections for the burghers of Würzburg 
and Nuremberg.383 Did this result from a difference in the way in which the counts 
treated their vassals from these two towns in a legal sense, or was it more a marker 
of the particular political status of these vassals? As burghers of these two large 
towns they were especially closely aligned to particular regional powers, whereas 
the middling and lesser nobles enfeoffed by the counts would have had multiple 
allegiances amongst the princes, and hence in some senses a different relationship 
with the counts of Wertheim as one of their feudal lords.
At the end of the day, perhaps the only distinctive feature of burgher vassalage 
commonplace in southern Germany was the requirement or custom that fiefs be held 
379. Krieger, Lehnshoheit, p. 150.
380. Ulrichs, Lehnhof, p. 41.
381. Ulrichs, Lehnhof, pp. 41-42.
382. Ulrichs, Lehnhof, pp. 41-42.
383. Alfred Friese, Der Lehenhof der Grafen von Wertheim im späten Mittelalter (Würzburg, 1955), 
pp. 19, 42-43.
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by individuals, rather than a corporation. This meant that a town often had to supply 
citizens who could be invested with a fief on its behalf, for example two citizens of 
Frankfurt for the county of Bornheimer Berg as an imperial fief in 1475,384 or the case 
of the house on the Paniersberg in Nuremberg which we have already encountered 
(above, pp. 51-52), in which Andreas Volckamer and Berthold Nützel were initially 
proposed as vassals of Margrave Friedrich on Nuremberg’s behalf, and then replaced 
by Michael Beheim. This practice probably accounts for many of the occasions on which 
burghers seem to be acting as ‘straw men’ for communal land purchases (see above, 
p. 93). And fief-holding by individual burghers was certainly extremely widespread, a 
normal practice under almost all feudal lords.385 There were certainly some substantial 
differences between princes, however: only 2 per cent of the vassals recorded in the 
Lehnbuch of the Count Palatine of 1401 were burghers, whereas 59 per cent of the bishop 
of Würzburg’s fiefs were occupied by burghers or peasants.386 The overall number of 
burghers holding fiefs from nobles was probably extremely high as well, but is difficult 
to pin down. The Landbuch created by Emperor Charles IV in 1375 for his margraviate 
of Brandenburg is particularly revealing, and shows that the five major noble families 
of the Altmark region had enfeoffed burghers with 85 per cent (by value) of the fiefs 
which they held from the margrave and had chosen to re-grant.387 Given the more 
propitious conditions for burgher vassalage in southern Germany we might expect 
to see similar figures there, but in fact the snapshot provided by the two Wertheim 
Lehnbücher shows only a few vassals from Würzburg and just six from Nuremberg.388
The evidence for burghers as noble vassals and subjects from my corpus of 
Nuremberg sources is also in many respects rather thin. Naturally there were 
cases in which the status of a particular property as fief or allod was disputed, 
but these do not develop into or connect with wider conflicts.389 There is some 
evidence of feudal lords attempting to maximize their jurisdiction over their 
384. Schneidmüller, ’Territorialpolitik,’ p. 122
385. Krieger, Lehnshoheit, p. 137.
386. Spieß, ’Aufstieg,’ p. 10.
387. Helbig, ’Städte,’ pp. 229-230. See also Krieger, Lehnshoheit, pp. 138-139.
388. Friese, Lehenhof, pp. 19-21.
389. For example, BB 18 f. 276v (21.6.1447). BB 15 f. 332r (25.10.1442); BB 16 f. 29r-v (11.3.1443).
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fiefs, as such moves were sometimes resisted by Nuremberg on the grounds 
that the matter was solely between the burgher vassal and their sub-tenant,390 
or that it concerned other non-feudal matters such as meadow rights391 or the 
ownership of sheep.392 As the council was usually arguing that the dispute was 
not just outside of feudal law but ‘beneath’ this law’s competence (it did not 
concern the land or fief itself, only aspects of the land’s usage), the potential for 
these tensions to become anything more serious was correspondingly low. In 
fact, only in the area of feudal law do we find any relaxation of the boundaries 
between town and noble jurisdictions, which both parties were normally so keen 
to enforce. Arnold von Seckendorff allowed a dispute between members of the 
Groland family which had come before him as a feudal matter to be judged by 
the council,393 whilst Nuremberg agreed to Ulrich von Egloffstein hearing a case 
involving a fief of his after Egloffstein had told the two parties that he would not 
try the case without Nuremberg’s permission.394 
The only evidence of burghers trying to reduce their obligations to rural nobles 
as feudal lords are the occasional requests that burghers be spared the journey 
to receive their fiefs or attend the court of feudal lords such as the counts of 
Oettingen or Wertheim in person due to insecurity in the countryside.395 There is 
no evidence of a concerted campaign by burghers to transform fiefs into allods, 
as was attempted by Heinrich Toppler at key points in his personal ‘territory’,396 
and as Wieland Held suggests could have been the case in the Hanseatic towns 
and possibly at Erfurt.397 Nor do we see any of the more aggressive policies by 
rural lords of the kind which forced Frankfurt am Main to claim a special tax-
exempt status for ‘old burgher properties’ (Altbürgergüter) in the second half of 
390. BB 15 ff. 24v-25r (26.5.1441).
391. BB 7 f. 107r (14.10.1426).
392. BB 18 f. 200v (28.3.1447).
393. BB 18 f. 477r (28.2.1448).
394. BB 18 f. 78v (13.10.1446).
395. BB 14 ff. 123v-124r (15.2.1440), 169v-170r (4.5.1440), 171v-172r (13.5.1440). BB 18 f. 378v 
(28.10.1447).
396. Schnurrer, ’Bürger,’ p. 67.
397. Held, ’Land- und Grundrentenerwerbungen,’ p. 166.
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the fifteenth century.398 A crucial difference between Frankfurt and Nuremberg in 
this respect was that the powerful comital feudal lords of Nuremberg’s citizens 
(Wertheim, Oettingen and others) were based some distance from the city, 
whereas Frankfurt was geographically much closer to the counts of Hanau.
Can we glean anything of the substance of these relationships from these rather 
insubstantial disputes? In October 1447 Count Georg of Wertheim summoned 
three leading patricians of Nuremberg (Leopold Haller, and the brothers Erhard 
and Leopold Schürstab) as his vassals to Wertheim – the council asked that the 
burghers be excused due to the dangers of the journey.399 If these patricians had 
attended Wertheim’s court, what would have awaited them? Perhaps an element 
of ritual, reaffirming or subtly reshaping hierarchies and mutual obligations; 
perhaps a confidential discussion with the count about the latest imperial politics 
or about the count’s financial needs – the patricians would have had services 
to offer in both respects, had they been minded to do so. But there is not at 
present any evidence for such relationships between nobles and burghers being 
established or maintained via the conventions of vassalage. To say that these 
conventions were therefore empty would be a perilous argument from silence, 
however. We know that burghers in southern Germany were not considered to be 
‘second class’ vassals, and that the citizens of Cologne at least once asserted their 
‘usefulness’ as vassals (nutze lenemanne).400 Above all, we know that burghers 
were very commonly vassals of rural nobles, even if the exact contours of this 
phenomenon are elusive. Thus we must keep looking for the ‘use’ of these 
relationships, though perhaps we should not look too far beyond some fairly 
prosaic financial arrangements (whilst noting that Franconian nobles did not 
have the same potential to profit from fiefs held by burghers as did the nobility 
of Brandenburg). And regardless of whether the primary value of burghers as 
nobles’ vassals was economic or socio-political, it is clear that nobles welcomed 
398. Orth, ’Stadtherrschaft,’ pp. 134-136, 139, 144-145.
399. BB 18 f. 378v (28.10.1447). Compare Friese, Lehenhof, pp. 19-20.
400. Domsta, Kölner Außenbürger, p. 118 n. 551
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townspeople into their rural lordship space as partners – on the nobles’ terms, of 
course, but on terms that created a kind of equality in that they were mutually 
beneficial.
Nobles and Townspeople as Rural Neighbours
Whether townspeople entered the countryside as subjects of nobles, princes or 
churches, or as lords in their own right, they found themselves sharing the rural 
space with the nobility. Indeed, it was very likely that their rural land would be 
lying close or adjacent to that of a noble family. Only in the immediate vicinity of 
Nuremberg – mostly within the fertile area to the north which extended no more 
than 10 km from the city – do any villages appear to have been entirely owned 
by citizens of Nuremberg.401 ‘Neighbourliness’ was part of the way in which the 
city council understood these relations formed by proximity. When in 1444 the 
burgher Hans Kraft accused the noble Hans von Mayental of mowing hay in a 
meadow belonging to Kraft’s dependent Fritz Eyring, and of further threatening 
Eyring as he tried to harvest his other crops, Nuremberg called Mayental’s 
behaviour ‘unneighbourly’ (unnachperlich).402 But lying behind this skirmish was 
perhaps also a more fundamental dispute over the ownership of the land: Kraft 
asserted that he had bought the village in question (Biengarten, 30 km north 
west of Nuremberg) from Mayental and his brothers nine years ago. Certainly 
the possibility that townspeople and nobles could find themselves laying claim 
to the same piece of land, or to the same source of income or lordship rights, 
was an inevitable consequence of sharing rural space. Alternatively, the dispute 
may have been solely between Mayental and the peasant Fritz Eyring, which 
reminds us that the complex issues of who had which rights in which spaces 
were multiplied by the thousands of peasant dependents for whom nobles and 
townspeople were responsible. Rural lordship was – in the words of Hillay Zmora 
– an ‘unfailing recipe’ for disputes,403 and indeed disputes of precisely the sort 
401. Dannenbauer, Entstehung, p. 165.
402. BB 17 ff. 89v-90r (3.8.1444).
403. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 107.
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that took place in part via Nuremberg’s written correspondence. It is impossible 
to tell how many other cases were resolved orally or within villages and rural 
communities themselves, and whether the escalation to official letters to and 
from the city council represented a failure of other forms of conflict resolution. 
But we can take the cases which are preserved in the Briefbücher as a sample, 
however representative, from this important part of the day-to-day relations (and 
continuous friction) between town and nobility. In particular, we can also ask 
how these disputes progressed, and how serious they could become.
The forms and causes of rural disputes were manifold, but there are some clear 
patterns and themes. Sheep farming was a leading economic activity for both 
nobles and townspeople, but was also a regular source of trouble between them, 
with extensive sheep runs encroaching on other rural estates or on common 
land and the sheep themselves being easily rustled, sometimes by their own 
shepherds.404 Customary rights over common land in general were contested,405 as 
were game rights and related issues of trespass.406 In August 1440 the nobleman 
Georg Fuchs zu Dingolshausen complained that Christian Haller of Nuremberg 
had ordered a hare trap belonging to Fuchs and the abbot of Münchberg to be 
lifted off its stand (and thereby made useless for catching hares). Haller responded 
that his dependents’ crops and vineyards had been trampled by an ‘improper’ 
hunt – presumably intended to drive hares into the trap – which had caused 
damage such as Haller had never seen the like of before and did not intend to 
suffer again; therefore he had had the trap lifted, and considered himself within 
his rights to do so.407 Disputes of unknown origin between dependents could also 
flare into significant skirmishes.408 But the ultimate cause of most problems was 
the interpenetration of lordship rights within the same rural communities. When 
404. For example: BB 7 f. 168r-v (30.4.1427), StAN Rep. 15 11 (24.8.1434), BB 14 f. 289v (14.12.1440), 
StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 67r, BB 15 f. 39r (10.6.1441), BB 18 ff. 336v-337r (5.9.1447). See Zmora, State 
and nobility, pp. 56-57.
405. e.g. BB 15 f. 178r (23.1.1442).
406. BB 14 f. 195r-v (1.7.1440).
407. BB 14 f. 224r-v (18.8.1440).
408. e.g. BB 18 f. 363v (13.10.1447). For a fight at a church fair see BB 15 ff. 58r-v (7.7.1441), 61v 
(10.7.1441); RB 1b f. 11r (9.8.1441).
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the wardens of the Nuremberg’s New Hospital took into custody one of their 
dependents for rent arrears, Wilhelm Marschall complained that the hospital had 
also arrested the peasant’s son, who was under Marschall’s jurisdiction.409 When 
Nuremberg asked Weigel Strobel not to pursue a court case against a dependent 
of Hans Coler, Coler asserted that he had ordered the peasant to sell the property 
which he rented from Strobel precisely so that he was not under two lordships.410 
Fundamental lordship rights could become intensely fragmented, such as the 
village court at Wendelstein, which had four different occupants who took it in 
turns to act as the judge. In 1447 the quarters were all held by Nuremberg citizens, 
but the installation of one of these as the judge still provoked a dispute with Georg 
von Seckendorff and others, who had dependents under the court’s jurisdiction.411
These ‘neighbourly’ disputes could involve a degree of violence and intimidation. 
There are many accusations of nobles threatening Nurembergers’ dependents, or 
claims that dependents were ‘insecure’ vs. nobles, meaning that they feared attack 
or arrest (for more on ‘security’ against individuals and corporations, see pp. 
206-207 below).412 Intimidation could be more specific as well: we have already 
seen the threats against Fritz Eyring made by Hans von Mayental, and in 1443 
Georg von Wildenstein, district governor of Hersbruck, told the representative of 
Margarete Harsdorfer not to thresh her tithes at Hohenstadt, near Hersbruck.413 It 
was not always nobles who were accused of using force: in 1441 Hans Löffelholz 
was forced to deny having captured two dependents of Konrad and Heinrich von 
Pappenheim.414 As was common in all sorts of disputes, property of the opponent 
or his relatives could be distrained,415 and disputed property could be forcibly 
seized.416 Jakob von Wolfstein even accused Nuremberg of having him followed 
409. BB 14 f. 195r-v (1.7.1440).
410. BB 16 f. 91r-v (17.7.1443).
411. BB 18 f. 146r (18.1.1447).
412. e.g. BB 7 f. 168r-v (30.4.1427), BB 8 f. 140r (22.4.1429), BB 14 f. 289v (14.12.1440).
413. BB 16 f. 135v (5.10.1443).
414. BB 15 ff. 6v-7r (29.4.1441).
415. e.g. BB 7 ff. 221r (11.10.1427), 236v (5.12.1427).
416. BB 16 f. 242r (12.3.1444).
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in a dispute which Nuremberg claimed was to do with rents from a meadow 
belonging to the New Hospital (see below, pp. 189-191, for nobles complaining of 
being tailed by Nuremberg).417 In all of these respects rural disputes took forms 
similar to feuding behaviour, and tended towards feud-like conflicts. But from the 
material that I have seen, there is no evidence of a full-scale or formally declared 
feud arising from the constant low-level tensions of rural lordship.
The rural property of Nuremberg and its citizens formed a dispersed but ultimately 
very substantial body of land in the countryside. Nobles were more or less obliged, 
but also in various ways motivated to interact with this space. In my body of sources, 
this interaction is most noticeable through nobles’ interest in the raw materials which 
townspeople controlled. This was not always amicable: in 1444 Hans Löffelholz 
complained that Heinrich, Hermann and Hans von Aufseß had felled a great deal of 
timber in his forest at Wiesent in order to improve or repair their castle at Freienfels, 
without his permission.418 But nobles sometimes did ask permission. Hans Stauf 
von Ehrenfels asked for two mill stones from Nuremberg’s quarries, and was 
granted this request in so far as the council had a right to the stone (the quarrymen 
themselves and Nuremberg’s Geuder family had to be considered too).419 The 
forests and their timber were always a particularly sensitive matter for Nuremberg, 
however. The council retrospectively endorsed a purchase of wooden roof shingles 
by Hans von Egloffstein at Diepersdorf, east of Nuremberg, whilst asserting that 
such transactions were against forestry custom, but refused a request from Wolfram, 
Konrad, Diepold and Georg von Egloffstein (Hans’ cousins) for building timber for 
use in their residence at Henfenfeld.420 Undoubtedly Nuremberg’s careful protection 
of its resources could cause frustration, but there was no shame in being denied 
the use of them. In later years even Emperor Maximilian was refused deliveries of 
certain rare clays found in the imperial forests.421
417. BB 15 f. 307r (7.9.1442).
418. BB 17 f. 60r-v (4.7.1444).
419. BB 18 f. 194v (23.3.1447).
420. BB 15 f. 281r (19.7.1442).
421. Schnelbögl, ’Bedeutung,’ p. 280.
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We might expect disputes over ownership of the land itself to have been the 
most substantial flashpoint in the countryside, especially when we consider that 
not just real estate could be contested, but also incomes drawn from it and all 
sorts of lordship rights associated with it, as well as authority over the peasants 
who worked it. Here again we find the complexity of rights and claims which 
overlapped and intersected, for instance in a lengthy dispute between Sebald 
Ellwanger of Nuremberg and Jakob and Peter von Wolfstein over their mutual 
rights at the neighbouring villages of Allersberg and Altenfelden.422 Authority 
over individuals proved especially problematic. A standard phrase for asserting 
rights to a peasant dependent was to claim jurisdiction over them ‘with door and 
nail’ (mit Tür und Nagel),423 a legal jargon which almost mocks the impossibility 
of actually pinning dependents down to one lordship. Peasants’ own attempts 
to exchange one lord for another may well lie behind the many protestations 
that townspeople and nobles were laying claim to dependents who had not been 
released from obligations by another lord.424 We also find the same use of low-
level violence and compulsion: the capture of dependents,425 distraint of property 
(in one case nothing more than a bird trap, i.e. a  largely symbolic act)426 and 
forcible appropriation of contested land and property.427 The traditional methods 
of arbitration could also be used: a land dispute between the New Hospital and 
Rudiger von Erlingshofen ended up as a case before Duke Albrecht of Bayern-
München.428 The complexities of land transactions created by the constant need 
of both burghers and nobles to invest and realize capital in land were fodder 
for further disagreement. It was often stipulated that land which had been sold 
could be repurchased by the seller for a certain price at certain times, but when 
422. BB 7 ff. 221r (11.10.1427), 236v (5.12.1427); Regesta Boica 13, p. 117 (3.3.1428).
423. e.g. BB 15 ff. 90v-91r (21.8.1441). For the phrase see ’Nagel’, Deutsches Rechtswörterbuch, 
accessed 22.6.2015: http://www.rzuser.uni-heidelberg.de/~cd2/drw/e/na/nagel.htm.
424. e.g. BB 4 f. 122v (22.11.1415). BB 14 f. 5v (6.7.1439). BB 17 ff. 150r-v (14.11.1444), 164v-165v 
(2.12.1444). BB 18 f. 423r (4.1.1448).
425. BB 4 f. 122v (22.11.1415). BB 16 f. 152r-v (31.10.1443).
426. BB 7 f. 221r (11.10.1427).
427. BB 7 f. 221r (11.10.1427).
428. Regesta Boica 13 p. 384 (29.8.1436); BB 14 ff. 261r-v (25.10.1440), 307v (31.1.1440); BB 15 f. 48r 
(19.6.1441).
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Lorenz von Wolfstein tried to invoke such a clause the widow of Otto Tucher in 
Nuremberg denied that such provision had ever been made in this case. She was 
nonetheless willing to consider a repurchase by Wolfstein, but only if ’the money 
was on the table’.429
One especially contested rural place is worth considering in more detail, as it 
displays both the tensions around the control of particular rural resources and 
the complex interlocking of rights and tenures. A small elevation in the forest 
around 9 km to the south of Nuremberg known as the Kornberg produced 
some of the best weather-resistant building stone and durable millstones within 
easy reach of the city (this was almost certainly the quarry from which Hans 
Stauf von Ehrenfels requested millstones).430 In the early fourteenth century it 
was owned by a noble family named after the nearby settlement and fortified 
residence of Kornburg. A portion was sold to the Küdorfer family of Nuremberg, 
which in 1410 came into the possession of Konrad Geuder. In the meantime, the 
Kornburg family died out and were inherited by a branch of the Seckendorff 
clan.431 From 1424 the co-owners of the Kornberg quarries disputed mutual rights 
there, until an arbitration by Margrave Friedrich of Brandenburg in 1427 gave 
Hans von Seckendorff overall control with the right to appoint the master of the 
quarries (Bergmeister).432 But the importance of the Kornberg’s resources ensured 
that this was not the end of the disputes there. In 1445 a large flood damaged 
buildings in Nuremberg, and the council resolved to win stone for the rebuilding 
from the valuable deposits at Kornberg. They established a new quarry close 
to the old workings, but on what they considered to be their property, part of 
the imperial forest rather than the Seckendorff estate.433 But Georg and Hiltpolt 
von Seckendorff naturally protested that the new quarry was detrimental to 
429. BB 7 ff. 205v-206r (26.8.1427): ‘were auf dieselbe zeit bar gelt da geweß’.
430. Otto Geiger, ’Die Steinbrüche am Kornberg bei Wendelstein’, Mitteilungen des Vereins für 
Geschichte der Stadt Nürnberg, 22 (1918), p. 147.
431. Ernst Wiedemann, ’Die Besitzverhältnisse am Kornberg bei Wendelstein’, Mitteilungen des 
Vereins für Geschichte der Stadt Nürnberg, 23 (1919), pp. 89-90.
432. Wiedemann, ’Besitzverhältnisse,’ p. 91.
433. Müllner, Annalen, p. 376; Geiger, ’Steinbrüche,’ p. 150.
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their rights at Kornberg. The case quickly escalated to arbitration by Albrecht 
Achilles’ Landrichter Hans von Seckendorff, a hearing at Cadolzburg,434 a formal 
suit in the burgravial Landgericht by Georg von Seckendorff, an appeal against 
this case by Nuremberg to the king, and Seckendorff’s own request for justice 
from the king (whilst continuing to pursue his Landgericht case with the support 
of Albrecht Achilles).435 But the matter was resolved towards the end of 1446, 
when Nuremberg purchased Kornberg from Georg von Seckendorff.436 The city 
immediately placed the quarries under communal oversight,437 though they were 
unable to buy out the Geuder family’s share until 1472.438
The purchase of Georg von Seckendorff’s rights at Kornberg ensured that 
potentially the most explosive dispute over rural land and resources of the 
1440s was fairly rapidly defused, albeit by removing the competition rather 
than finding an accommodation – I will consider the possible implications of his 
method of conflict resolution in the following section. But this was just the most 
eye-catching of the many ways in which rural disputes were resolved before they 
became more substantial conflicts, whilst many more probably never threatened 
to grow beyond their village context. Despite their constant recurrence, and 
despite all the petty violence and intimidation, I have found no evidence of rural 
disputes between townspeople and nobles developing into genuine feuds. This 
contrasts with feuds amongst the rural nobility, who frequently fought over rural 
land and rights (or at least justified their fighting with such claims).439 Historians 
have also often asserted that burghers’ rural land holdings led to feuds with 
the nobility, without offering specific examples. Most recently Hillay Zmora 
connected patricians’ rural land – as ‘an unfailing recipe for disputes with the 
434. Geiger, ’Steinbrüche,’ p. 150.
435. The following sources make no explicit mention of Kornberg, but almost certainly relate to 
this dispute: Regesta Imperii 13.14 nos. 322, 323, 337, 338, 340, 341, 343, 344, 352, 355.
436. Regesta Imperii 13.14 no. 370 (24.11.1446).
437. Geiger, ’Steinbrüche,’ p. 151.
438. Wiedemann, ’Besitzverhältnisse,’ p. 91. See also Schnelbögl, ’Bedeutung,’ pp. 274-275.
439. See examples throughout Zmora, State and nobility.
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landed nobility’ – to feuds by nobles against towns.440 These feuds will thus have 
to be re-examined below (chapter seven), but for now we must ask whether 
wider, less specific tensions around townspeople’s rural lands were generating 
more significant antagonism between town and nobility.
Land and Territory
When taken as a whole, over the course of several centuries, the gradual expansion 
of townspeople’s rural landholdings and of communal territories appears from 
our perspective to represent a replacement of the nobility by townspeople as the 
local elite in substantial parts of the German countryside. It seems as though 
townspeople were ‘buying out’ the rural nobility, and many historians have 
certainly read the situation in this way. ‘The late medieval Umlandpolitik of the 
towns became a virtual clearance sale of the nobility’, as Ulrich Andermann has 
asserted.441 Perhaps it was this interpretation which Hillay Zmora had in mind 
when he translated a ‘useful prescription... by Doctor [i.e. Margrave] Albrecht 
of Brandenburg, Franconia’s dispensing chemist, for the malady of the poor 
margravial noblemen who are dispossessed by those of Nuremberg’.442 Is this 
powerful polemic against the towns (which advocates the kidnap and ransom 
of wealthy merchants) making a point about the ‘buying out’, or even forcible 
‘dispossession’ of the nobility? The term which Zmora translates as ‘dispossessed’ 
is ‘vertriben’, meaning literally ‘driven out’,443 and is a word frequently found in 
the anti-town rhetoric of the 1440s which Margrave Albrecht Achilles sponsored 
(see below, pp. 241-250). It appears together with verbs of force and pressure 
(drucken, gedrungen, bedrengen etc.) to suggest that the towns are in a general 
440. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 107. See also Dannenbauer, Entstehung, p. 168.
441. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 207: ‘Die spätmittelalterliche Umlandpolitik der Städte geriet 
geradezu zu einem Ausverkauf des Adels’. See also Gerhard Rechter, ’Wenn ihr nicht einen 
streich haltet, so müßt ihr mehr straich halten. Zum Verhältnis zwischen Niederadel und 
Städten in Franken’, in Kurt Andermann (ed.), ‘Raubritter’ oder ‘rechtschaffene vom Adel’? 
Aspekte von Politik, Friede und Recht im späten Mittelalter (Sigmaringen, 1997), p. 143.
442. Zmora, State and nobility, pp. 107-108. Emphasis mine.
443. The original German is found in Ernst Schubert, ’Albrecht Achilles, Markgraf und Kurfürst 
von Brandenburg 1414-1486’, in Gerhard Pfeiffer and Alfred Wendehorst (eds.), Fränkische 
Lebensbilder 4 (1971), p. 140. For the Middle High German ‘vertrîben’ see Matthias Lexer, 
Mittelhochdeutsches Taschenwörterbuch, 38th ed. (Stuttgart, 1992), p. 283.
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sense oppressing the nobility and forcing them from their rightful leadership of 
society, not specifically driving them from their rural lands.444 The Complaint of 
the Rightful Lordship of the Nobility does, as we have seen, couple a generalized 
protest about the overmighty towns with specific reference to rural land. But 
the accusation made in the Complaint is that the towns had been appropriating, 
seizing and buying up princely lordship and setting themselves up as rulers over 
this land, not taking land from the nobility itself (see above, p. 11-13). Neither of 
these two texts is therefore clear evidence that the nobility experienced the rural 
expansion of the towns as a hostile take over, and the issue needs to be looked at 
again from the records of land transactions.
The Complaint certainly takes up the themes of a wider unease about townspeople’s 
rural lands and jurisdictions. We have already noted the clause against paleburghers 
in the 1231 edict known as the Statutum in favorem principum, and the same document 
also contained a blanket ban on all extra-mural jurisdiction exercised by imperial 
towns.445 The opposition of princes to the rural expansion of the towns is well 
attested from 1231 onwards, and became seen as a natural and plausible motive 
for conflict between princes and towns. Writing in the first third of the fifteenth 
century, Johannes Rothe of Eisenach explained that the cause of a conflict between 
Erfurt and Landgrave Friedrich of Thuringia in the early 1300s was the fact that:
those of Erfurt had bought up many villages, courts and advocacies in 
the villages surrounding them, against the will of his father Landgrave 
Albrecht, against his will and against the will of his late brother, and 
he wished to have them back. They [those of Erfurt] also held many 
villages, courts and castles from the nobles (irbarn lewte) of his Land, 
whilst he was feudal lord over the Land and without his permission, 
which he wished to see changed.446
444.	 For	instance	RTA	15	p.	377:	‘wie…	die	stette…	sich	underniemen…	den	adel	zů	drucken,	
under	sich	zů	bringen	und	zů	vertriben’.
445. Weiland, MGH Const. II, no. 304 (p. 419).
446. Rothe, Düringische Chronik, p. 524: ‘dorumbe das die von Erfforte vil dorff unde gerichte 
unde voitei yn den dorffirn umbe sich gekouft hatten weder seinen vatir lantgraven 
Albrechte weder seynen willen und seynes brudir seligen, unde die wolde her weder gehat 
habin. ouch sso hetten sie dorf, gerichte unde sloss weder die irbarn lewte yn seyme lande, 
die weile das her eyn lehnherre von des landes wegen obir were, ane seynen willen unde 
wort, unde mute do eyn wandel umbe’.
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What is notable here is that although Friedrich appears as a staunch opponent 
of Erfurt’s rural expansion (at his expense), his nobility seem to have colluded 
in this by allowing the townspeople to occupy rural properties. To what extent 
Rothe envisages these nobles as having done so willingly is unclear. But we have 
already seen that many nobles enfeoffed burghers as part of mutually beneficial 
relationships, despite some wider misgivings (above, pp. 105-111). Therefore we 
must also ask whether the sale of rural land by nobles to burghers was less of a 
‘clearance sale’ and more of a business transaction between equal partners. Or 
did the broader discourse of opposition to burghers’ rural authority influence 
nobles’ experience of their own land transactions with burghers?
It is difficult to read Nuremberg’s ‘territory’ for clues as to how nobles might have 
interacted with it, not least because throughout the fifteenth century the territory itself 
was a composite of lordship in various different forms. The council exercised direct 
authority over certain areas of land, which did not always extend greatly beyond 
the imperial forests to the east of the city on either bank of the Pegnitz. Ultimate 
jurisdiction over these forests was acquired in stages from the thirteenth century 
until the purchase from Margrave Friedrich I in 1427 (though even after this date 
the Hohenzollern and the counts palatine still had substantial rights in the forests).447 
Elsewhere the commune had a measure of de facto control over areas where the 
property of burghers, and especially that of patricians, predominated – in practice 
this meant the immediate vicinity of Nuremberg itself, within 10 km from the walls. 
But beyond this area Nuremberg’s citizens owned a huge array of properties within 
a 50 km radius of the city, and even some properties 75 km from Nuremberg itself.448 
From 1439 those nearer to Nuremberg were organized into a shifting structure of 
rural captaincies (Hauptmannschaften), which provided a measure of communal 
coordination for the burghers’ dependents to improve their defensive potential.449 
The Hussite threat had prompted the city to draw up the first of what became a 
447. Dannenbauer, Entstehung, pp. 110-114.
448. For instance, Heinrich Rummel’s vineyard at Volkach on the Main, over 75 km from 
Nuremberg: BB 15 f. 300r-v (18.8.1442).
449. Dannenbauer, Entstehung, p. 156.
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series of censuses of rural dependents in 1431; further surveys were made in 1439, 
1441 and 1446.450 In Heinz Dannenbauer and Karl-Friedrich Krieger’s analysis, these 
reveal a total of 5,813 dependent peasants of military capability, 3,984 of which 
were subject to private citizens. 70–75 per cent of these were subject to members of 
patrician families.451 A survey made in 1497 counted 5,114 households with 14,576 
individuals aged fifteen or over, which Hofmann extrapolates to give an estimated 
total population of around 25,000, living at 769 different places and organized into 
42 Hauptmannschaften.452 Shortly afterwards, in 1504, Nuremberg used the War of the 
Bavarian Succession to grab a block of Wittelsbach land to the east,453 giving the city 
a contiguous territory of over 1,200 km2, which it held until the dissolution of the 
Holy Roman Empire. But it is crucial to distinguish Nuremberg’s fifteenth-century 
territory from this later aggrandizement, which doubtless fulfilled some ambitions 
harboured by the council in the 1400s, but was also a highly opportunistic move.
Within this fifteenth-century conglomerate of diverse and often dispersed rights 
and properties, the larger jurisdictions were acquired from princes, but many 
individual castles, villages or smaller holdings were naturally purchased from 
nobles. The largest of these transactions was the castle of Lichtenau (35 km south 
west of Nuremberg), together with some surrounding villages, which was bought 
from Friedrich II of Heideck in 1406. It seems most likely that the proximity of 
Lichtenau to the burgravial and later margravial centre at Ansbach made it of 
interest to the council, and the deal was facilitated by the Heideck family’s close 
connections to Nuremberg (see below, p. 257). This did not prevent complications 
arising, however. The bishop of Würzburg claimed overlordship, and had to be 
compensated by Heideck,454 whilst the Teutonic Knight Friedrich Holzschuher 
raised unknown objections, forcing Nuremberg to call on the pledged security 
450. Krieger, ’Landbesitz,’ p. 79.
451. Krieger, ’Landbesitz,’ pp. 79-84; Dannenbauer, Entstehung, pp. 158-161.
452. Hanns Hubert Hofmann, Nürnbergs Raumfunktion in der Geschichte (Hannover, 1974), p. 95; 
Dannenbauer, Entstehung, pp. 161-165.
453. See Pfeiffer, Nürnberg, pp. 122-123.
454. Dannenbauer, Entstehung, p. 149.
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from Heideck’s guarantors for the sale.455 In 1409 Nuremberg sold the entire 
property to the patrician Heinrich Rummel. Dannenbauer speculated that this 
was because of Lichtenau’s distance from Nuremberg and proximity to the 
Hohenzollern power base; Krieger instead suggests that the sale was made to 
reduce tensions with Ansbach.456 In any case, Nuremberg does not seem to have 
followed up or repeated the policy elsewhere. There were other substantial and 
controversial purchases by individual burghers, notably the acquisition of the 
village Stopfenheim (44 km south of Nuremberg) by Peter Haller and Peter 
Rieter from the Seckendorff family in 1423.457 But following a strong expansion of 
citizens’ rural presence in the immediate vicinity of Nuremberg in the fourteenth 
century458 the process seems to be slowing in the earlier fifteenth century,459 and 
in the 1440s the only substantial purchases from the nobility were related to the 
affair of the Kornberg quarries, which we will revisit shortly.
In the case of Nuremberg there is clearly no evidence for a ‘buying out’ of the nobility 
by townspeople in a literal sense. Individual purchases could cause tensions as 
the transaction became snagged on details and the claims of third parties, but 
these do not seem to have been long-lasting (the dispute over Lichtenau did not 
impede the later close alliance between Nuremberg and the lords of Heideck, for 
example). Furthermore, the movement of property was not all one way: there are 
examples of nobles buying rural incomes from burghers.460 Many purchases by 
burghers concerned only incomes from the land, rather than the title to the property 
itself.461 Other land was mortgaged, or acquired with a right of repurchase – only 
rarely did nobles ‘sell up’ with no option to regain their property later. And we 
have already seen that towns were generally very judicious, if not cautious, in 
455. Dannenbauer, Entstehung, p. 150. BB 1 ff. 161r (12.12.1406), 171v (26.1.1407).
456. Dannenbauer, Entstehung, p. 150; Krieger, ’Landbesitz,’ p. 94.
457. Regesta Imperii 11.1 no. 5597 (29.7.1423); BB 6 ff. 31v-32r (27.8.1423); Regesta Boica 13 p. 117 
(28.2.1428).
458. Summarized by Schnelbögl, ’Bedeutung,’ p. 289.
459. This would match the pattern at Nördlingen (Kießling, Stadt, p. 115), and possibly Munich 
(Schneider, Niederadel, p. 317).
460. Waldenfels, Waldenfels, pp. 165-166; Regesta Imperii 13.19 no. 100 (15.1.1451).
461. Krieger, ’Landbesitz,’ p. 85 maintains that this was the norm in northern Germany.
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their acquisition of substantial rural properties (above, p. 102). All of these factors 
suggest that we need to analyse land transactions between nobles and burghers 
as part of a regional land market in which no one group necessarily had the upper 
hand, rather than through the prism of a ‘crisis’ and consequent ‘clearance sale’ of 
the nobility. Many towns did establish predominance in their immediate vicinity, 
but rarely to the complete exclusion of the nobility: within 10 km of Berlin the 
value of burgher property outstripped that of nobles by a ratio of 2:1, and within 
an 11-20 km radius burghers had just slightly more land by value than nobles.462 
Beyond Nuremberg there were also some spectacular individual acquisitions by 
towns, but even these are not manifestations of insatiable rural expansion by the 
towns at nobles’ expense. In 1383 Rothenburg bought the lordship of Nordenberg 
for 7,000 fl. from the last of the Küchenmeister von Nordenberg family, who then 
continued to occupy this land as a vassal of the town, in a transaction of a type 
also frequently enacted between nobles and princes.463 In 1382 Counts Konrad 
and Friedrich of Helfenstein mortgaged their entire lordship to Ulm for 37,000 
Gulden, and much (though not all) of this eventually came to Ulm in perpetuity. 
This did not come about until 1414, and there can be no certainty that Ulm ever 
aimed to permanently acquire the entire complex of property.464
This link between finance and land is at the heart of the complex property market 
which should be our frame of reference for land transactions between town and 
nobility. Nuremberg’s first great privilege of 1219 stipulated that when a ‘lord’ 
(dominus) could not repay a loan, the creditor from Nuremberg should hold his 
property as a pledge.465 In the history of Vienna called the Fürstenbuch, written by 
Jans Enikel in the late thirteenth century, the Viennese burghers’ chief wish from 
their prince was that he force his ministeriales to repay their loans, and enfeoff 
462. Krieger, Lehnshoheit, p. 139 n. 116.
463. Schnurrer, ’Bürger,’ pp. 65-66; Gerhard Rechter, ’Das Verhältnis der Reichsstädte Windsheim 
und Rothenburg ob der Tauber zum niederen Adel ihrer Umgebung im Spätmittelalter’, 
Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung, 41 (1981), p. 47.
464. Hohenstatt, Entwicklung, pp. 90-103.
465. Werner Schultheiß, ’Geld- und Finanzgeschäfte Nürnberger Bürger vom 13.-17. 
Jahrhundert’, in Stadtarchiv Nürnberg (ed.), Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte Nürnbergs 
(Nuremberg, 1967), p. 61.
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the burghers with their villages if they cannot pay.466 There is evidence from 
Nuremberg in 1332 of a debt being settled by a payment in land.467 Some nobles 
undoubtedly did ultimately lose the property which they had for whatever 
reason pledged as security or mortgaged to towns, princes and fellow nobles. 
The frustration of this situation is clearly expressed in a letter of 1421 by Johann 
III of Leuchtenberg to King Sigismund, asking that the king repay 10,000 fl. of 
his late brother Wenceslas’ debts to Leuchtenberg so that Johann can redeem the 
castle of Grafenwöhr from the Count Palatine before a deadline to do so expires. 
Johann describes the castle as well situated and defensible, with a rich vein of 
ore recently discovered on its land, and worth 24,000 fl. to him – but his plea was 
in vain, and Grafenwöhr passed to the Palatinate.468 It is rarely possible to tell 
whether or not any given creditor deliberately engineered such a situation, but 
some must have taken advantage of the opportunity. Yet credit dealings could 
be manipulated by debtors as well: Markus Bittmann suggests that the noble 
family of Klingenberg deliberately ran up very high debts with the town of Stein 
am Rhein, which then purchased itself from the Klingenberg lordship in 1457 in 
exchange for annulment of these debts, and therefore at a vastly inflated price.469
A full assessment of this aspect of the land market between town and nobility 
will have to await a deeper investigation of the credit market. But another point 
of possible tension around the circumstances of land sales by nobles to towns is 
suggested by Nuremberg’s one major purchase of the 1440s, that of Kornberg. 
We have already seen that the city’s ‘buy out’ of the Kornberg quarries from 
Georg von Seckendorff effectively resolved a threatening dispute over this 
valuable resource. Only a few months later, in March 1447, the council were also 
negotiating the purchase of Georg’s village and castle of Kornburg, just south of 
the quarries.470 In April the council asked their contacts at the royal court to help 
466. Brunner, ’Zwei Studien,’ pp. 257-258. See also Kießling, Stadt, pp. 153-154.
467. Schultheiß, ’Geld- und Finanzgeschäfte,’ p. 72.
468. Wagner, Leuchtenberg 3, pp. 51-52.
469. Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, pp. 210-213.
470. BB 18 f. 205r (31.3.1447).
125
arrange the transfer of this imperial fief.471 The town’s servitor Erhard Yener was 
charged with the mission to the court, and he was accompanied by Georg von 
Seckendorff. In late April Yener wrote to say that Seckendorff was reluctant to 
come with him to Styria (where Frederick III was often resident) or to stay any 
longer at Vienna. The council told him to make it clear to Seckendorff that they 
wished him to stay with Yener in order to bring the matter to a conclusion.472 
The king’s permission was soon secured, however.473 Throughout this whole 
process the council named itself as the purchaser, but at some point before 1 
November 1447 this role was taken on by Peter Rieter (whose descendants later 
occupied Kornburg). Rieter was certainly well placed to mediate between the 
council and the Seckendorff brothers Georg and Hiltpolt, as he was married to 
their aunt Barbara (see p. 42).474 Was Rieter’s involvement necessary to smooth 
over differences with the Seckendorff family, or did he provide the capital whilst 
the council handled the diplomacy? It is certainly difficult to know what to make 
of the figure of Georg von Seckendorff in Vienna, reluctant to travel further in 
what might have felt like Nuremberg’s errand. Had the town used its superior 
financial muscle to force him not just from his valuable quarries, but also his 
manorial lordship, in order to close down all possible difficulties over the future 
of the Kornberg? Or had Seckendorff used Nuremberg’s eagerness to resolve 
the Kornberg matter to strike a hard bargain and realize capital which he could 
invest elsewhere? Whatever the answer, the purchase of Kornburg must have had 
substantial implications for Nuremberg’s relations with the large and influential 
Seckendorff clan.
The specific circumstances of individual purchases were probably far more 
significant for town-noble relations than the total quantity of land which changed 
hands or the ratio of burgher to noble land in a given area. Indeed, any tensions 
471. BB 18 f. 217v (17.4.1447).
472. BB 18 f. 245r-v (19.5.1447).
473. Regesta Imperii 13.14 nos. 376 (15.5.1447), 377 (17.5.1447).
474. Gerhard Rechter, Die Seckendorff. Quellen und Studien zur Genealogie und Besitzgeschichte, II: 
Die Linien Nold, Egersdorf, Hoheneck und Pfaff (Neustadt an der Aisch, 1990), p. 301. See also 
Regesta Imperii 13.14 no. 394 (20.12.1447).
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around townspeople’s rural land must have had much more to do with perceptions 
than market realities. The amount of property which moved from noble hands to 
burgher ownership was a small fraction of the total rural land, and very few noble 
families were genuinely ’bought out’ by townspeople. These transactions may 
have been dwarfed by changes within the land-holding structure of the nobility 
itself. ‘The overall impression,’ notes Hillay Zmora, ‘is that property not only was 
not alienated from the nobility, but was rather being concentrated in the hands 
of families of noble office holders.’475 And we have seen that even the evidence 
for a noble perception of increasing urban domination in the rural space is shaky, 
perhaps simply a misreading of the sources within the ‘clearance sale’ paradigm. 
It is possible that nobles perceived all purchases of rural land by burghers – 
from princes and churches as well as from the nobility – as a hostile take over of 
‘their’ space, because once owned by towns or townspeople property would be 
subject to civic regulations which sought to force its sale only to other citizens 
(though these rules were often broken), and because rural property under urban 
ownership might be less available to the nobility in other ways too, for example 
as a fief or part of a district office. In this latter respect, it remains to be seen to 
what extent nobles were able to benefit from the town’s patronage (see chapter 
six) as they did from that of princes. But surely the single most salient point in 
the noble experience of towns’ rural expansion is nobles’ active participation in 
this process – whatever wider misgivings they may have had, these remained too 
general to stand up against the immediacies of specific situations, so that when 
the price was right, a sale could be made.
475. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 59.
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Conclusion: holding the balance?
The overall noble experience of townspeople as holders of land and jurisdiction 
in the countryside remains in many ways elusive. Kurt Andermann has called 
for more investigation of the subject,476 and when historians take a position 
on the question their opinions can diverge wildly: we have seen that Zmora 
considers rural land to be a cause of feuds between townspeople and nobles, 
but for Ulrich Andermann burghers’ rural land formed a ‘common interest’ 
(Interessenverbindung) with the rural nobility.477 Some crucial issues certainly 
remain largely uncharted territory. But the sources from Nuremberg for burghers 
and nobles as rural neighbours and the substantial historiography on the nature 
and purposes of burgher rural landholding suggest that both positive and 
negative extremes are wide of the mark when it comes to reading townspeople 
and nobles as rural lords. Their rural relationships were characterized by mutual 
financial interests – but not necessarily a common interest as landowners 
in the same mould and with the same objectives – and by constant low-level 
friction and sometimes violence, but hardly ever explosive or entrenched 
conflict. Townspeople in the countryside presented a deeply ambivalent face 
to the nobility: as rural landowners much like them, but with a different set of 
geopolitical priorities; and as an expanding and vigorous power, but also one 
which grew haltingly and with some but ultimately limited overall direction and 
purpose. This certainly seems to be the case for Nuremberg, where there were 
no paleburghers to heighten tensions, and where the town’s fifteenth-century 
’territory’ had no definite form and no clear periphery which could draw a line 
between ‘town’ and ‘nobility’.
Given this ambivalence, nobles’ reactions were likely to be contingent on the 
ways in which shared rural lordship interacted with other aspects of their 
476. Kurt Andermann, ’Raubritter – Raubfürsten – Raubbürger? Zur Kritik eines untauglichen 
Begriffs’, in Kurt Andermann (ed.), ‘Raubritter’ oder ‘rechtschaffene vom Adel’? Aspekte von 
Politik, Friede und Recht im späten Mittelalter (Sigmaringen, 1997), p. 24.
477. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 65.
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relations with townspeople (finance, patronage, membership of regional political 
communities) and on the specific circumstances of individual relationships 
and transactions. This could have allowed a vague sense of disquiet to coexist 
with a lively participation in a system of rural lordship which fully accepted 
townspeople as partners, subjects and even overlords. This fine balance seems 
to have persisted into the later fifteenth century, when separate town and noble 
identities may have been hardening. The issue of burghers’ rural land was clearly 
being debated in Saxony around 1500: in 1498 Saxon and Thuringian knights 
complained about the amount of land in their villages held by townspeople, but 
in 1523 Saxon electoral counsellors remarked that it was up to the knights to 
decide whether they enfeoffed burghers or not.478 At Nuremberg, the expansion 
of the urban community’s collective rural property happened mostly alongside 
nobles’ rural interests rather than directly against them, with varying levels of 
mutual benefit or friction generated along the way.
478. Held, Marktplatz und Anger, p. 76.
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4.
THE COUNTRYSIDE: SECURITY 
AND CONTROL
The ambiguities in the relationship between townspeople and nobles as rural 
landlords give way to sharper contrasts when we turn to the question of security 
in the rural space. We have already seen the ways in which towns sought to 
enhance the security of their citizens in the countryside through the purchase of 
strategic rural properties and fortifications, and also some of the ways in which 
the rural order was disturbed by petty disputes between nobles and townspeople 
as landowners. Yet we have also noted that these disputes in themselves rarely 
threatened to grow beyond their village contexts, and that Nuremberg did not 
have a highly developed defensive territory. In the 1440s the council directly 
administered a broad swathe of forest to the east of the city and indirectly 
controlled the fortified residences of patricians in the immediate vicinity of the 
town, together with the castle at Lichtenau via the Rummel family. But these 
possessions were not remotely sufficient for the protection of both the city’s 
trade arteries and the rural properties of its citizens. Other and different security 
measures were needed, and this need was largely conditioned by Nuremberg’s 
relationship with the rural nobility.
Three fundamental aspects of the rural nobility shaped Nuremberg’s rural security 
concerns. The first was the fact that the particular security interests of the nobility 
only rarely aligned with those of Nuremberg. We have already seen that nobles 
were not intimately involved with the commercial life of the town (pp. 72-78), 
and that the business of rural lordship generated innumerable conflicts. Nobles 
operated in a rural space in which violence was endemic and indeed systemic, 
and to an extent burghers’ own rural lordships were also part of this system of 
frequently violent self-assertion and self-defence. But Nuremberg’s trade as it 
traversed the roads to and from the city was doubly threatened by the (at best) 
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indifference of the nobility towards Nuremberg’s commerce and by the inherent 
instability of the countryside in which this commerce had only an indirect 
involvement. The second factor, however, was nobles’ responsibility to society as 
a whole for the protection of travellers, the weak and infirm, and of justice more 
generally. This was both a tenet of chivalric ideology and a practical fact on the 
ground where nobles controlled tolls and safe conduct on the roads. It meant that 
the town could work with nobles to ensure security, and that it was obliged to do 
so in many cases (often at a cost). But this responsibility naturally conflicted to 
some extent with nobles’ detachment from the particular forms of rural security 
which Nuremberg sought. The paradox was compounded by a third aspect of the 
nobility, which was nobles’ character as the chief disturbers of the rural peace. 
Whether nobles were feuding with Nuremberg directly or with third parties they 
were equally a threat to rural security from the city’s perspective, as we will see 
below from a case-by-case analysis of ‘robberies’ committed by nobles.
When townspeople entered the rural space in order to guarantee their particular 
form and understanding of security, they inevitably did so with political and 
military backing. Security needed to be underwritten by power, and we will see 
that the towns were short of ‘soft power’ options when it came to their rural 
security. Where ideas and attitudes conducive to the towns’ concept of security 
were thin on the ground, strong-arm politics had to suffice. Furthermore, towns 
such as Nuremberg could be perceived as trespassing on the prerogatives of 
the nobility through security-related activities of any sort: if not on the actual 
property of nobles, then on nobles’ right and responsibility to maintain order 
and protect justice. This amounts to a serious potential for conflict even before we 
consider the possibility that nobles whose violent actions were seen as legitimate 
by a good number of their noble peers could nonetheless pose a threat to the 
town, and thus fall foul of its security measures. But how far did Nuremberg 
actually impinge on the rural nobility and restrict its freedom to run the rural 
space according to its rules? Was Nuremberg indeed playing by a different set 
of rules altogether from those adhered to by the nobility? Ideas of town–noble 
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relations as a clash of cultures presuppose these differences, but also ignore some 
crucial aspects of the problem. For instance, towns were competing with princes 
far more than with rural nobles as providers of rural security over large areas, 
and for all the practical differences between towns’ security measures and noble 
feuding behaviour, city councillors understood the feuding logic that drove 
noble violence, and indeed followed this logic themselves in other contexts. 
We can only find the balance between these generalizing perspectives through 
a careful reading of real and individual relationships between Nuremberg and 
rural nobles. Whereas the preceding chapter was largely about town action and 
noble reaction, we now need to tackle three main stages, as nobles act (or fail to 
act), the town reacts, and nobles respond in turn to this reaction.
Nobles as Protectors: Roads, Tolls and Markets
Since almighty God has ordained the nobility for the furtherance of justice and 
peace…
Charter of the Society of St George’s Shield, 1482.479
The nobility as a divinely instituted protector of peace and justice was a common 
theme, also taken up in the preamble to the nobility’s case before the pope, 
cardinals, emperor and electors in the Complaint of the Natural Lordship of the Nobility. 
The nobility’s task as defined here was to ‘protect widows and orphans against 
unjust force and to help all to justice, both rich and poor’.480 The conventional 
pieties, comfortable generalities and the fantasy figures of helpless ‘widows 
and orphans’ found in these statements of noble intent do not necessarily show 
them to be hollow, but they do suggest the difficulty of turning this ideology into 
concrete action. In the burghers’ response to the nobility’s case in the Complaint 
‘those who desire peace, law and justice’ are given a more specific and thereby 
more troublesome form: ‘namely peasants, artisans and merchants’.481 The latter 
479. Obenaus, Recht und Verfassung, p. 90, n. 220: ‘Syd got der almechtig den adel hat geordnet, 
gerechtikait und frid zu furdern…’.
480. Bayerische Staatsbibliothek ms. Cgm 4930, f. 20r: ‘beschirmen sullen wittwen vnd weysen 
vor vnrechtem gewalt vnd auch allermeniglich helffen dez rechten er sey arm oder reich’.
481. ibid, f. 21r-v: ‘die des frids vnd gesetz der gerechtikeit begern mit namen veltpawer 
hantwerker vnd kauffleut’.
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in particular were supposed to be protected in a double sense: by a special peace 
which embraced other non-combatant groups such as clerics and pilgrims, and by 
a special peace for travellers on the roads, where merchants and their goods were 
most vulnerable.482 This protection for travellers was given substance by the duty to 
provide safe conduct (Geleit) in defined areas and on certain stretches of highway, 
with the associated right to levy tolls. This responsibility was often vested in rural 
nobles, either on account of their own authority or as functionaries or vassals of 
princes. But the potential for abuse and failure in a system which guaranteed 
nobles and princes a straightforward and regular cash income in exchange for 
performing an extremely difficult task (the securing of a given rural area against 
all forms of violence) was easy for contemporaries to imagine. The thirteenth-
century moralizing poet Freidank made tolls one of the chief instruments of the 
‘robbery’ which filled the German lands:
Courts, advocacies, currency and tolls
They were all originally well-intentioned
But now they have become nothing but robbery.483
There was certainly potential for the distinction between tolls and the outright 
appropriation of property to become blurred.484 Corruption within the system of 
tolls and safe conduct is also one of the cornerstones of the burghers’ riposte to the 
noble Complaint. The burghers allege that the nobility burden them with new tolls 
and oblige them to pay for safe conduct on the imperial highways, ‘though these 
ought to be free’.485 Complaints about oppressive tolls and taxes were a significant 
part of a wider set of common criticisms of the nobility; even when the link was 
not made explicit, there is a clear connection between tolls and robbery as twin 
aspects of a nobility which supposedly takes more than it is owed by society. 
These were attitudes characteristic of the late Middle Ages, and we will encounter 
482. See Andermann, Gewalt, p. 117-118.
483. Quoted in Andermann, Gewalt, p. 86: ‘Tiuschiu lant sint roubes vol: / gerihte, voget, münze 
und zol / diu wurden e durch guot erdaht,/ nu sint si gar ze roube braht’.
484. Lullies, Fehde, p. vi; Görner, Raubritter, p. 224.
485. Bayerische Staatsbibliothek ms. Cgm 4930, f. 21r: ‘Den wollen ye die herscher des adels den 
vnttertan des reichs purger arm vnd reich dringen vnd ubersetzent dy mit newen zollen 
vnd zinssen… vnd geleit musen nemen auff dez reichs strassen die doch frey sol sein’.
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more of them later, but they were also perfect material for the post-medieval 
construction of a clash of bourgeois and noble cultures. What are the relationships 
between these tropes of social commentary, in both their medieval and modern 
incarnations, and the daily reality of interaction between townspeople and nobles 
through the protective functions of the latter in the countryside?
The maintenance of safe conduct required continual negotiation, which created 
a substantial body of correspondence. Within this diplomatic activity there were 
certain routines. Twice a year the council requested safe conduct for its merchants 
to the lenten and autumn fairs at Frankfurt am Main from a series of nobles 
with jurisdiction over the road from Nuremberg to Frankfurt, either in their 
own right or as princely office holders: the counts of Castell and Wertheim, the 
Schenk von Limpurg family, and governors at Tauberbischofsheim, Miltenberg 
and Aschaffenburg.486 For merchants attending the annual fair at Nördlingen, the 
margravial governor or the town council at Gunzenhausen and the counts of 
Oettingen were responsible for security on the roads.487 But this shorter journey 
could prove more troublesome than the route to Frankfurt. In 1439 Count Johann 
of Oettingen was involved in a feud against the Pappenheim family, and was 
also responsible for the kidnap of Straßburg citizens. Meanwhile, it was seriously 
feared by Nördlingen that he planned to take that town by stealth, and in 
September 1440 the brothers Johann and Ulrich of Oettingen attacked the town 
of Lauingen.488 Ulrich of Oettingen simultaneously supported the minor noble 
Rudolf von Bopfingen in a feud against Nuremberg (see below, p. 289).489 These 
events not only unsettled the region, they also seem to have split the Oettingen 
family, with Johann and Ulrich’s uncle Ludwig and their brother Wilhelm 
initially refusing to provide Nuremberg with safe conduct to the Nördlingen 
fair in 1440 because of their differences with their nephews and brothers.490 For 
486. For example, in 1443: BB 16 ff. 98v (24.7.1443), 185r (30.12.1443).
487. For example BB 8 f. 37r (17.5.1428). BB 14 f. 169v (6.5.1440). For expenses associated with 
travel to the Frankfurt and Nördlingen fairs, see Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 518-521.
488. Blezinger, Städtebund, pp. 47, 55-56, 65. See also Obenaus, Recht und Verfassung, p. 71 n. 145.
489. BB 14 ff. 124r-126r (17.2.1440).
490. StAN Rep. 15a 102 18 (11/15.5.1440).
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their part, Johann and Ulrich suspected that Nuremberg would therefore try to 
provide its own safe conduct, which they strongly opposed; Nuremberg flatly 
denied this allegation.491 The following year, however, the Nuremberg accounts 
record a payment to the town’s servitor Michael von Ehenheim for security 
patrols as Nuremberg’s merchants entered and left the Nördlingen fair.492 These 
disturbances around Nördlingen in 1440 suggest that the safe conduct which the 
counts of Oettingen were habitually asked to provide was not just a formal grant 
of permission to use roads nominally under their authority, but was to some extent 
armed and effective protection. In more normal years, the standard grant of safe 
conduct by the counts of Oettingen asked that the Nuremberg merchants keep 
together in one group on the correct road, so that they could be better protected.493
The road to Frankfurt was similarly unsettled in 1441. For the lenten fair in that 
year the council seems to have abandoned the usual route along the Main valley, 
as late in the day (on Ash Wednesday) it requested safe conduct from Johann, 
Ulrich and Wilhelm of Oettingen, alongside Ludwig of Württemberg and the 
Count Palatine Otto, to secure an indirect route to Frankfurt via Swabia.494 This 
expedient apparently failed, as Nuremberg later told Augsburg that they had 
been unable to obtain safe conduct, and advised the Augsburger not to visit the 
fair.495 The situation in the Main valley appears to have been little better in the 
autumn, when Count Wilhelm of Castell and Konrad von Limpurg both refused 
safe conduct on account of the general insecurity, and Nuremberg was obliged 
instead to ask Margrave Albrecht for safe conduct on a different route.496 Nobles 
were also worried about specific feuds against Nuremberg which might make 
their task harder: in 1437 Nuremberg provided a list of their current opponents 
alongside their requests for safe conduct to Frankfurt,497 and in 1447 the counts 
491. StAN Rep. 15a 102 18 (19.5.1440). BB 14 f. 180r (22.5.1440).
492. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 68r.
493. e.g. StAN Rep. 15a 102 18 (17.5.1445).
494. BB 14 f. 325r (1.3.1441). See also BB 14 f. 327r (7.3.1441).
495. BB 14 ff. 335v-336r (18.3.1441).
496. BB 15 f. 96r (27.8.1441).
497. BB 12 f. 345v (2.3.1437).
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of Oettingen expressed a direct concern that Nuremberg may have become 
involved in dangerous feuds.498 In February 1440 Nuremberg protested against 
Ludwig and Wilhelm of Oettingen’s refusal to provide safe conduct for special 
lenten foodstuffs beyond Oettingen, which was almost certainly linked to the 
simultaneous declaration of feud against Nuremberg by Ulrich of Oettingen.499 
As we have seen, Ludwig and Wilhelm were not supporting Ulrich’s aggressive 
policy at this time, but they may well have had misgivings about their ability to 
provide effective protection against their relative.
In one sense, these examples of failed cooperation between town and nobility 
to establish rural security for a limited space and time are clear evidence for the 
dysfunctionality of this system and its associated relationships. Townspeople 
would naturally baulk at paying tolls for safe conduct which was no longer 
guaranteed as soon as a serious threat emerged. But more importantly, these 
incidents are the exceptions demonstrating the rule that Nuremberg did rely 
on rural nobles to provide real security in the countryside. Nobles performed 
a genuine function which Nuremberg struggled to replace when these nobles 
were not able to fulfil their obligations. We can see this all the more clearly from 
Nuremberg’s requests for protection against specific threats. These requests were 
often directed at nobles with authority in the hill country between Franconia, 
Thuringia, Saxony and Bohemia, which was crossed by the important road from 
Nuremberg to Leipzig and Poland. A particular danger arose here in the autumn 
of 1446 with a feud declared by Heinz Röder of Mechelgrün, to the east of Plauen 
(see below, pp. 298-299). In February 1447 Nuremberg asked the counsellors of 
Margrave Johann to ensure that their lord cooperated with Friedrich of Saxony 
and Heinrich II von Plauen to provide safe conduct, as had been the case in the 
time of Heinrich von Plauen’s father, Heinrich I (who had died in the final days 
of 1446).500 Nuremberg also wrote to both Heinrich I and Heinrich II von Plauen 
498. BB 18 ff. 258v-259r (1.6.1447).
499. BB 14 f. 126v (17.2.1440).
500. BB 18 ff. 167v-168r (15.2.1447).
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that they could do little against the ‘robbers’ from such a great distance; instead, 
Nuremberg told the younger Heinrich, it was proper for them to pay their tolls to 
the lords and princes and to request safe conduct.501 The council thus responded 
to a crisis in this relationship between payment of tolls and provision of effective 
security by expressly reaffirming it. In other situations urban authorities did 
take matters into their own hands, as we will see below, but there were clearly 
many instances in which the city was reliant on rural nobles for rural security, 
and enough occasions on which this relationship functioned to maintain the 
credibility and value of the system as a whole.
Even when nobles had failed to prevent an attack under their safe conduct, the 
city council could still call on them to ensure the return of, or compensation 
for, the property taken. Inevitably the overwhelming majority of these requests 
for assistance proved fruitless for one reason or another. But some nobles were 
thanked by Nuremberg for their help or at least willingness to help.502 The 
only case known to me of a noble honouring their safe conduct by restoring 
the property taken from Nuremberg citizens is that of the Bohemian Hanuš of 
Kolovrat, who promised to compensate Nuremberg if he and the rest of the 
Pilsener Landfriede could not get Aleš of Sternberg to return the goods taken 
from Fritz Euglein and Hans Meyer (see below, pp. 290-292, for Sternberg’s 
feud). Kolovrat promised to abide by the joint judgement of a representative of 
Nuremberg and a representative of Eger as to the value of the stolen property.503 
Around five months later, in April 1442, Kolovrat informed Hans Mayer that he 
expected the property to be returned.504 Some, possibly all, of Meyer’s property 
was still outstanding in September 1442,505 but Kolovrat then wrote to say that 
an unnamed Nuremberg citizen (most likely Meyer) could send for his property, 
which Kolovrat now had in his hands.506 2,400 lb. of copper was taken, of which 
501. BB 18 ff. 396v-397r (27.11.1447). See also BB 18 ff. 94v-95r (31.10.1446).
502. BB 5 f. 198v (19.2.1422), BB 11 f. 309v (3.7.1435).
503. Rep. 2c 19 f. 16v (22.11.1441).
504. BB 15 f. 233r-v (20.4.1442).
505. BB 15 f. 318r (25.9.1442).
506. BB 15 ff. 327v-328r (15.10.1442).
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all but 80 lb. was recovered by Kolovrat.507 It is not clear exactly what combination 
of circumstances stimulated or enabled Kolovrat to succeed where so many of 
his contemporaries failed, or did not even try. But the low success rate did not 
prevent the Nuremberg council from repeatedly calling on nobles to honour their 
safe conduct in this way. There was often little else that the council could do, and 
it had to be seen to be doing something to fulfil its own obligations to its citizens. 
One way or another, the city’s need for the security provided by rural nobles 
was continually reinforced, as the idea of this relationship was often useful even 
when its reality fell short of the ideal.
Another sign of the vitality and importance of these security relationships was 
the frequency of the disputes which they provoked. All of the clashes already 
outlined over the responsibility of nobles to provide safe conduct in dangerous 
and difficult circumstances show the reality of the obligations which it entailed. 
This reality could be heightened by Nuremberg in the form of an appeal to 
honour when a little more persuasion was necessary to bring nobles to meet their 
responsibilities, as the city council saw them. In September 1441 Nuremberg 
described an attack on oxen being driven to the Rhine under the safe conduct 
of Count Johann of Wertheim as being not only a robbery against its citizens, 
but also carried out ‘to your grace’s opprobrium and considerable dishonour’.508 
Nobles who were called upon as providers of safe conduct ran the risk of 
incurring substantial costs (see the example of Hanuš of Kolovrat above), but 
were also reaffirmed in an important and potentially lucrative lordship title. For 
all that nobles tried to refuse safe conduct in specific circumstances, we rarely 
observe them denying that they did indeed have this responsibility within a 
given space.509 Acknowledgement of the right to grant safe conduct was simply 
too valuable for nobles to ignore, even if it came at a price.
507. StAN Rep. 2c 19 (loose sheet).
508. BB 15 ff. 103v-104r: ‘ewern gnaden zusmacheit und mercklichen uneren’.
509. For an example of such a denial, involving Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg, see BB 12 ff. 35r 
(16.9.1435), 46 (6.10.1435).
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Part of this value was obviously pecuniary. Safe conduct not only aimed to protect 
trade, it also directed it through toll stations.510 Towns such as Nuremberg had too 
great a need of the security which nobles provided (whether real or conceptual) 
to fundamentally dispute these tolls. But naturally they were acutely sensitive to 
any increases in the rates charged or the overall number of tolls. It was difficult to 
agree on a fair price for a ‘service’ which was often ineffective, but which both sides 
still had reasons for upholding. In keeping with this partially idealized practice 
of safe conduct, Nuremberg tried to make custom the sole arbiter of a given toll’s 
validity. In February 1444 Paul Stromer of Nuremberg denied evading a toll at 
Feucht with the explanation that he would not wish to dispute this toll, as it was 
old-established (von alter herkomen).511 Whereas the standard complaint from the 
towns was of new and hence ‘illegal’ tolls,512 nobles most commonly claimed that 
merchants were not using the ‘proper’ roads, and thereby avoiding tolls. The 
council usually had a plausible answer: the normal roads were too dangerous at 
that time,513 or the toll itself had been moved to a less convenient location.514
These claims and counter-claims of tolls arbitrarily imposed and evaded were 
a regular part of the especially fraught relationship between Nördlingen and 
its often oppressively close neighbours the counts of Oettingen.515 But for 
Nuremberg the issues were less charged, and the most serious dispute over tolls 
to arise during the 1440s was an unusual confrontation with the Brandenburg 
nobleman Friedrich von Bieberstein. In late 1443 Bieberstein claimed that Hans 
Nagel, a servant of Nuremberg’s Peter Watt, had warned other merchants not 
to use Bieberstein’s roads and had thereby caused him considerable losses. He 
also claimed that the margrave of Brandenburg had told Nagel to spread this 
warning, suggesting that the real conflict may have been between noble and 
510. Artur Dirmeier, ’Information, Kommunikation und Dokumentation im transurbanen Raum’, 
in Jörg Oberste (ed.), Kommunikation in mittelalterlichen Städten (Regensburg, 2007), p. 54.
511. BB 16 f. 222r (19.2.1444).
512. See Kießling, Stadt, p. 86.
513. BB 4 f. 108v (2.9.1415).
514. BB 18 ff. 11v-12r (29.7.1446), 120r-121r (14.12.1446).
515. Kießling, Stadt, pp. 85-86, 90-91.
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prince.516 The ensuing correspondence stretched over nearly three years, and it 
seems that Bieberstein considered himself to be in a state of feud with Nuremberg 
(see below, p. 299).517 But alongside the possible involvement of the margrave, it 
is also important to note a previous dispute between Nuremberg and Bieberstein 
after the latter had robbed Nuremberg merchants in pursuit of claims against the 
Empire, which was again taken up alongside the toll controversy. Even in this 
case it is therefore difficult to isolate disputes over tolls as a significant cause of 
antagonism between Nuremberg and rural nobles. The consensus on the necessity 
of safe conduct and tolls was too strong, despite all the problems inherent in their 
operation.
Naturally towns tried to simplify matters by bringing important routes under 
their control whenever they could. Some very detailed boundary negotiations 
were necessary where the castle of Rothenberg claimed jurisdiction over short 
stretches of important roads leading to Nuremberg from the east.518 Of all the many 
rights of the Helfenstein dynasty which Ulm acquired by mortgage, the rights of 
safe conduct and associated tolls were clearly of greatest interest.519 Rothenburg 
and Memmingen both successfully expanded their jurisdiction over roads in their 
vicinity, and Frankfurt and Nördlingen received imperial privileges against the 
establishment of new tolls or the increase of old ones.520 Nuremberg received two 
privileges from Emperor Charles IV (1346–1378) allowing the city to provide its 
own safe conduct to those who requested it.521 This expansion of towns’ authority 
in the rural space has attracted much more attention than their cooperation with 
nobles to ensure security.522 But the Nuremberg sources provide clear evidence 
of this cooperation, despite the many practical and political problems and the 
516. StAN Rep. 2c 29 ff. 1r-2v.
517. The main correspondence is contained in StAN Rep. 2c 29.
518. Schnelbögl, ’Bedeutung,’ pp. 286-288.
519. Hohenstatt, Entwicklung, pp. 112-113.
520. Wunder, ’Reichsstädte als Landesherrn,’ p. 84. Kießling, ’Umlandgefüge,’ p. 54. 
Schneidmüller, ’Territorialpolitik,’ p. 130. Kießling, Stadt, p. 91.
521. Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 485-490.
522. An exception in the case of Frankfurt: Schneidmüller, ’Territorialpolitik,’ pp. 131-132.
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many points of friction. Safe conduct was often ineffective, or simply refused, 
and  nobles could certainly appear more concerned to protect their toll incomes 
than the travellers on their roads. Whether or not these nobles in turn perceived 
a contradiction within Nuremberg’s insistence on fixed ‘customary’ charges but 
flexible routes for merchants is unclear. But safe conduct mattered to nobles as a 
significant lordship right, and it was an absolute necessity for urban commerce. 
The importance of these structures encouraged both townspeople and nobles 
to preserve their form, even when they lacked substance. The distance between 
conditions on the ground and the high-sounding rhetoric of nobles as protectors 
did nothing to diminish the practical value of the concept of safe conduct.
Other aspects of nobles’ rural authority were not so readily deployed in the service 
of urban commerce, however. We will encounter nobles in other official functions 
in the following chapter, but here it is important to note that where nobles 
had oversight of markets and commercial activity outside of Nuremberg they 
sometimes had cause to impound the goods of Nuremberg merchants. In August 
1446 Hans von Schönberg, master of the court to Margaret of Saxony, confiscated 
some saffron at the market in Meißen.523 The council seem to have succeeded in 
bringing the sack of saffron back to Nuremberg for inspection, and informed 
Schönberg that they found it to be good.524 In this case a noble was obviously 
exercising quality control over market produce, but in other examples of goods 
detained in towns and marketplaces it is not clear exactly why the seizure was 
made.525 The property is always described by Nuremberg as aufgehalten (literally 
‘held up’), a term which could also be used to describe incidents which look very 
much more like highway robbery, as we will see below. Safe conducts and the 
associated tolls were much maligned in verse and polemics, but on the ground 
it was nobles’ judicial and administrative functions which really blurred the 
boundary between protection and expropriation, to which we must now turn.
523. BB 18 f. 20r-v (16.8.1446)
524. BB 18 ff. 46v-47r (15.9.1446).
525. e.g. BB 14 f. 277v (24.11.1440).
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Nobles as the Threat: Robbery and Insecurity
In the minds of many post-medieval observers, the ideal protective function of 
the nobility only served to highlight nobles’ supposed rapacity. The ‘decay’ and 
‘decadence’ of late medieval knighthood has been a common theme.526 Around 
1932 it was taken up by Andreas Singer, a school teacher at Parsberg in the 
Upper Palatinate, who compiled a chronicle of that town in an annalistic style 
with simple summaries of the sources he had collected. But he used one of his 
rare departures from this mode of writing to offer this succinct comment on the 
knighthood:
At the end of the thirteenth century knighthood became debased through 
rapacity and poverty, so that killing, plunder and every form of violence 
was no longer considered to be just common criminality.527
Here the teacher from a small country town spoke for his and many preceding 
generations on the perceived failings of the late medieval nobility. But just a few 
years later this consensus was disturbed by Otto Brunner, who ‘rehabilitated’ 
the feud as ‘an integral and constitutive part of the social order, rather than an 
aberration’ through his work ‘Land’ and Lordship, first published in 1939.528 If 
the medieval feud was socially ‘constitutive’, rather than ‘common criminality’, 
then the robbery and violence through which feuds were carried out must also 
have been legitimate. Or does this reading put the cart before the horse? Was the 
feud simply a cover for robbery? Werner Rösener made a high-profile argument 
for just this interpretation in 1982.529 Since then, a number of historians (most 
prominently Hillay Zmora) have steered the discussion away from the ‘legitimacy’ 
or otherwise of feuding towards the various possible uses and functions of this 
behaviour for the individuals who engaged in it. We will return to this debate 
526. Görner, Raubritter, pp. 5, 9.
527. ‘Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts entartete das Rittertum durch Raubsucht und Armut, so daß 
man Todschlag, Plunderung und jede Art von Gewalttat nicht mehr für gemeine Verbrechen 
hielt.’ Andreas Singer, Chronik von Parsberg (facsimile of manuscript in Burgmuseum 
Parsberg), p. 31a.
528. Brunner’s ‘rehabilitation’ of the feud: Zmora, State and nobility, p. 7.
529. Rösener, ’Problematik’. See also Thomas Vogel, Fehderecht und Fehdepraxis im Spätmittelalter 
am Beispiel der Reichsstadt Nürnberg (1404-1438) (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), p. 33.
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about the feud in chapter seven. For the time being, there are good reasons 
for considering ‘robbery’ as a phenomenon in itself if we are to understand 
Nuremberg’s responses to insecurity in the countryside.
The first of these is the fact that the ‘feud’ as a concept did not occupy the minds 
of late medieval people nearly so much as the idea of ’robbery’. Even in a society 
which understood and described virtually all conflict as a form of feud, it was 
‘robbery’ which really provoked debate. ‘Robbery’ was such a powerful concept 
of injustice that major political alliances could define themselves against it. In both 
the Baltic region and southern Germany the most significant leagues of towns, 
princes and even nobles described themselves as primarily a defence against 
robbery.530 The counsellors of the count of Württemberg suggested in 1428 that 
the sole purpose of an alliance between Württemberg, the Swabian League, and 
the Society of St George’s Shield should be to resist robbery, ‘which concerns all 
honour and honourable people in the towns and the country, all those who are 
pious and propertied’.531 Opposition to robbery could form part of grand political 
statements of intent, such as Sigismund’s agenda for an imperial diet in 1431 – ‘to 
root out the heretics [the Hussites] and to establish a general peace in the German 
lands and resist robbery’ – and Albrecht Achilles’ pithy advice to his vice-regents 
in 1472: ‘Maintain the peace, resist robbery, protect the game and stock the larder, 
in all these things you can do no wrong’.532
In these general statements, ‘robbery’ appears as an abstract force, to be 
combatted and ‘resisted’ as such. But other topoi of social and political debate 
presented robbery as the action of certain social groups. The most prevalent of 
530. For example, a league of 1329 involving Lübeck was a ‘pactum... pro reprimenda praedonum 
raptorumque audacia’ (Andermann, Gewalt, p. 174).
531. ‘allain umb das stuke (daz doch alle eere und erberkait in stetten und uff dem lannde, die 
fromen und die habenden anträffe), umb daz si der röubery dest bas widerstan möchten’ 
(Ulm to Nördlingen, 22.7.1428). Quoted in Mau, Rittergesellschaften, p. 75.
532. Sigismund: ‘sachen gen den keczern, damit sy ußgereut werden, und ouch das gemeiner 
frid in Deutschen landen gemacht und rauberey gewert werde’ (Mau, Rittergesellschaften, p. 
115). Achilles: ‘Behalt frid, weret rauberey, verhütt des wiltprett und meret uns die narung, 
so thut ir in allem recht’ (Ernst Schubert, Fürstliche Herrschaft und Territorium im späten 
Mittelalter (Munich, 1996), p. 33).
143
these depicted robbery as a particular vice of the nobility.533 For outsiders, this 
could be a particular vice of German nobles.534 Hans Sachs, the master-singer of 
Nuremberg (1494–1576), wrote a biting satire on a group of nobles who pleaded 
for the life of a robber to be spared until they learned that he was not in fact 
a nobleman, and therefore had no right to be a highwayman.535 Sources from 
both urban and clerical backgrounds all joined in with this particular critique 
of the nobility, and the Swiss Confederation tried to gain the Swabian towns as 
allies against the Burgundians by insinuating that lust for plunder had driven the 
nobility to support the Burgundians against the imperial cities.536 Earlier, in 1438, 
the Swabian town of Überlingen had written to Nuremberg to ‘recommend’ its 
alliance with the Society of St George’s Shield, as Nuremberg was considering a 
similar step. Überlingen described the alliance as a practical necessity for such 
close neighbours, but added that ‘these knights and squires are all inclined to 
peace, and robbery… is abhorrent to them’.537 In the eyes of this town, the fact 
that any given nobles were not notorious robbers was worthy of comment. We 
should also note, however, that the power of the ‘robbery’ allegation transcended 
tensions between townspeople and nobles. There are isolated references to nobles 
accusing other groups of nobles of robbery,538 and of course there were nobles 
who publicly opposed ‘robbery’ in general.539 Burghers, meanwhile, could also be 
included amongst the ‘plundering classes’, for example in the poetry of Heinrich 
der Teichner (c.1310–1372/78).540
533. Multiple examples in Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 82, 84, 94-95.
534. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 1.
535. Graf, ’Feindbild und Vorbild,’ p. 121.
536. On urban and clerical writers see Graf, ’Feindbild und Vorbild,’ p. 134; Andermann, 
Gewalt, pp. 102-103. On the Swiss propaganda: Rolf Sprandel, ’Stadt-Land-Beziehungen 
im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühneuzeit’, in Werner Rösener (ed.), Adelige und bürgerliche 
Erinnerungskulturen des Spätmittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit (Göttingen, 2000), p. 33.
537. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, p. 215: ‘Darzu so sint dieselben ritter und knecht all uff frid genaigt 
und ist in die röbry… zu mal widrig’.
538. e.g. Egloffstein, Chronik, p. 109.
539. Reinhard Seyboth, ’“Raubritter” und Landesherrn. Zum Problematik territorialer 
Friedenswahrung im späten Mittelalter am Beispiel der Markgrafen von Ansbach-
Kulmbach’, in Kurt Andermann (ed.), “Raubritter” oder “rechtschaffene vom Adel”? Aspekte 
von Politik, Friede und Recht im späten Mittelalter (Sigmaringen, 1997), p. 127.
540. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 87. See also Andermann, ’Raubritter’.
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To deplore robbery in these very general terms avoided the problem of determining 
which particular actions should be described as ‘robbery’. All political actors in 
late medieval Germany admitted the right of legal self-help through feud, even 
if they might also prefer to see something else in its place (see p. 28 above and p. 
193 below). This bound all parties to concede that, in theory at least, some acts 
of ‘robbery’ might be justified as feuding actions. But no person or corporation 
could concede that a feud waged against them was legitimate (as this would be to 
admit defeat in the contest), and so all violence perpetrated against them was in 
their view ‘robbery’ of the criminal, punishable kind. A proposed alliance between 
Nuremberg and the Society of St George’s Shield floundered on precisely this 
impossibility of objectively distinguishing feud from robbery. When Walter von 
Hürnheim and Haupt von Pappenheim arrived in Nuremberg in September 1438 
to negotiate on behalf of the society, they presented three points which had to be 
resolved for the alliance to gain their members’ approval. The third of these was 
that the parties should aid one another against ‘genuine highway robbery – for it is 
clear enough what is genuine robbery’.541  Nuremberg’s negotiators did not dispute 
the assertion that robbery was easy enough to identify as such, but complained 
that the ‘robbers’ never admitted that they were in the wrong. Instead they covered 
their backs with unfounded claims or improper feud declarations.542 In his reply, 
Haupt von Pappenheim appears to be talking at cross purposes with this point of 
view. He maintained that it was clear what constituted ‘genuine robbery’: those 
responsible will not have declared a proper feud, and their opponent will have 
offered them full and expeditious justice for their claims.543 This did not address 
Nuremberg’s contention that both the claims and the feud tended to be specious, 
and unsurprisingly the alliance did not come to fruition. It is neither possible nor 
necessary for modern observers to judge the legitimacy or otherwise of particular 
541. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, p. 235: ‘recht(em) straßenrewb – als man denn wol wisse, was 
rechter rawb heiße’.
542. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, p. 237: ‘nemen… ye unpillich sprüche für… oder teten ye unpillich 
entsagung’. This, of course, is exactly the position advanced by those historians who view 
the feud as simply a cover for robbery; but such a partisan statement can hardly be taken 
as evidence for this thesis. I will consider the problem further in chapter seven.
543. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, p. 237.
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acts of robbery, and there is something to be said for replacing the term ‘robbery’ 
itself with something more neutral.544 But this distinction between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ 
robbery is vital to bear in mind, especially when we try to understand the nobility’s 
response to the measures taken against robbery by towns such as Nuremberg.
Another reason for not allowing ourselves to be diverted by questions of 
‘legitimacy’ in cases of feuding is that such issues were actually irrelevant in 
the majority of ‘robberies’ committed by nobles against townspeople (and vice 
versa) when we consider the problem from the standpoint of the victim. Whilst 
all acts of robbery took place in the context of some form of feud, the majority of 
individual victims were not feud opponents of those who carried out the robbery. 
This can be deduced from the number of occasions on which Nuremberg citizens 
suffered violent attacks which were part of conflicts in which neither they nor 
their commune were directly involved. The extent of this ‘collateral damage’ 
in the practice of feuding can be seen most clearly from the records of attacks 
on villages and other rural property of burghers. These assaults might involve 
looting, burning, livestock rustling, and the kidnap of dependent peasants; such 
actions were the classic methods of a feuder aiming to force his opponent to 
recognize his claims by causing significant damage to his property but without 
rendering the opponent physically unable to fulfil the feuder’s demands. The 
vast majority of such attacks on Nuremberg citizens, however, can be identified 
as unintentional on one or more of five main grounds:
1. There is direct evidence that the attack was aimed at a third party. For example, 
in April 1441 Christoph von Notthafft, aiding the feud of Albrecht Tauchersdorfer 
against Nuremberg’s servitor Nicholas Grieß, rustled some sheep belonging to the 
Nuremberg citizen Schlüsselfelder during an attack on Grieß’s property.545 The 
feud between Tauchersdorfer and Grieß is otherwise well documented through 
544. For instance, the 2014 meeting of the Association of German Historians (the Historikertag) 
featured a session on the subject of ‘Güterwegnahme’ (‘seizure of goods’). See http://
www.historikertag.de/Goettingen2014/mittelalterliche-geschichte (accessed 19.8.2015). 
My thanks to Angela Huang for alerting me to this session.
545. BB 15 f. 7v (29.4.1441).
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Nuremberg’s interventions on behalf of Grieß, and at no point did Tauchersdorfer 
or his helpers declare any enmity towards the city. It therefore seems likely that 
there was no intent to attack Schlüsselfelder. The same can be said of the nobles 
from the Waldenfels and Harras families who complained about damage to their 
possessions following Nuremberg’s siege of Hans and Fritz von Waldenfels at 
Lichtenberg (see below, pp. 295-298).546 Their property was caught up in the 
extensive fighting; for instance, Hans von Harras’ room or dwelling (kempnat) on 
the town walls at Lichtenberg was used as an artillery platform for Nuremberg’s 
bombardment of the castle.547
2. Nobles could also expressly deny their intent to harm Nuremberg or its 
citizens after an attack. In October 1425 Werner von Parsberg wrote to the 
council with his concern that Nuremberg citizens might have been harmed in 
the course of his dispute with the cathedral provost of Bamberg.548 Fritz von 
Seldeneck attacked the village of Tronstat (Trunstadt, north west of Bamberg?) in 
1441, and subsequently told the council that he had no intention of attacking any 
Nuremberger, and had been informed that they had no property in the village.549 
Tensions over multiple attacks by Sigmund von Seckendorff in 1443 threatened 
to become a feud in their own right, but Seckendorff claimed to have targeted 
only the bishop of Bamberg.550 There is always the possibility that nobles in these 
and other similar cases were being disingenuous, though Nuremberg accepted 
some claims by nobles not to have knowingly attacked Nuremberg merchants 
on the roads.551 These claims were made by feud helpers, who might only have 
a tangental connection to the feud and could try to extricate themselves from it 
if necessary. The principal feuders (Hauptleute) were obliged by both the custom 
and logic of feuding to declare their enemies (even if they did not always do so 
546. See especially BB 17 ff. 20r-21r (12.5.1444), 27v-27v (19.5.1444), 45r (12.6.1444), 46v-47r 
(13.6.1444), 68r-v, 69r, 73r (15.7.1444), 108v-109r (23.9.1444).
547. BB 17 f. 68r-v (15.7.1444).
548. BB 7 f. 8v (8.10.1425).
549. BB 15 f. 21r-v (23.5.1441).
550. BB 16 f. 133r-v (27.9.1444).
551. e.g. BB 16 ff. 161r (22.11.1443), 196v (17.1.1444). ChrdtSt, ii, 75-76.
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before an attack was made). An active denial of enmity by a principal feuder, such 
as we see in the cases mentioned above, did not help the feuder to assert a claim 
and left them open to allegations that they were not abiding by feuding law, and 
hence were common robbers. It is thus highly unlikely that these feuders were 
using their feuds against third parties as a cover for attacks on Nuremberg, as 
there is no evidence of them simultaneously acting as helpers in any other feud 
against Nuremberg.
3. On other occasions, nobles expressed a willingness to return the property 
taken in exchange for a guarantee that there would be no future reprisals.552 In 
August 1443 Nuremberg accused Paul von Streitberg of an attack on Schnaittach, 
22 km east of the city, and by October an agreement had been reached with Hans 
von Streitberg which led to the burghers concerned itemizing and valuing the 
property supposedly taken. In December 1443 Nuremberg asserted that Hans 
had compensated their citizens and that they considered the matter closed 
(though Hans still had unspecified objections).553 In these cases it seems even less 
likely that nobles could be trying to cover their backs following attacks aimed at 
Nuremberg.
4. In contrast to the relatively orderly settlement following the attack on 
Schnaittach, it was more common for the ownership of property which had been 
attacked to be disputed. Many nobles claimed that certain people or properties 
which they had assaulted belonged to their enemies (or another third party), whilst 
Nuremberg citizens claimed them as their own. Christoph von Aufseß claimed 
that the peasant H. Andres of Tronstat (see above p. 146) belonged to a canon of 
Würzburg and to the abbey of Ebrach, against the claims of the Nuremberger 
Fritz Keiper.554 Wilhelm von Schaumberg claimed that the Nuremberg patrician 
Lorenz Haller himself was a burgher of Bamberg, and that his dependents 
552. For such a demand see BB 15 f. 38v (10.6.1441).
553. BB 16 ff. 113v (23.8.1443), 121r-v (3.9.1443), 136v (7.10.1443), 184r (27.12.1443).
554. BB 14 f. 353r-v (11.4.1441).
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were therefore ultimately responsible to the bishop of Bamberg.555 Sigmund 
von Seckendorff asserted the ’truth’ (warheit) that a dependent whose cow had 
been stolen was under the authority of the bishop of Bamberg, but Nuremberg 
presented the testimony of their citizen and the dependent himself against this.556 
In an especially complex case from 1446, Eberhard Rödel of Nuremberg tried 
to prove that some sheep taken by Heinrich von Lüchau during a raid on the 
abbey of Steinach were his alone, and not under the protection of the abbey at 
the time of the attack.557 Nuremberg also disputed the ownership of some of the 
property claimed by those who complained of damages following the siege of 
Lichtenberg.558
5. The city council frequently wrote to nobles to complain of their actions in a 
manner which makes it clear that the council did not understand the attack to 
have been aimed at its citizens or dependents. Sometimes the council named 
another party whom they believed to have been the real target, or they might 
simply write that the incident took place when a noble attacked unnamed 
‘enemies’, or when he attacked a certain village (implying that the real target 
was elsewhere in the same village).559 Do these cases show that the council was 
simply ignorant of the real state of affairs, or even drawing a veil over them 
for diplomatic reasons? It seems unlikely, given that secrecy and even subtlety 
were completely antithetical to the practice of feuding, especially once an attack 
had taken place. How could an opponent be brought to recognize the feuder’s 
claims if they (and the regional community more generally) were not well aware 
of the pressure that the feuder was exerting on them? A few nobles may well 
have attacked townspeople without a feuding motive, but the overall picture 
of violence perpetrated by nobles in the countryside is quite definitely one of 
feuding activity rather than a wave of criminality.
555. BB 15 f. 288v (11.5.1443).
556. BB 16 f. 133r (27.9.1443).
557. BB 18 ff. 67r-v (3.10.1446), 87r (21.10.1446).
558. BB 17 ff. 34r-35r (30.5.1444), 71r-72r (14.7.1444), 99r (29.8.1444).
559. e.g. for a named enemy see BB 15 ff. 271v-272r (5.7.1442); for unspecified enemies see BB 15 
ff. 109v-110r (30.9.1441); for an attack on a village, see BB 17 f. 75v (18.7.1444).
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There are of course a number of attacks on the rural property of Nuremberg and 
its citizens which cannot be so definitively described as ‘accidental’, but they 
generally lack any mention of wider animosity and do not clearly relate to any 
other known feud. The one exception to this generalization from the period 1440–
1448 (though it is a particularly violent exception) is the feud of Fritz and Hans 
von Waldenfels with Nuremberg, chiefly during its climax in early 1444 when 
the Waldenfels brothers attacked Nuremberg’s peasants as well as its merchants; 
the city responded with a force sent to capture the Waldenfels’ castles, but which 
also plundered the surrounding countryside.560 Nuremberg mounted further 
assaults on nobles’ rural residences in response to acts of highway robbery, but 
these attacks were not part of the cycle of feuding and robbery. They aimed to 
put an end to this form of violence – if necessary through capital punishment, 
which was entirely alien to feuding practice, and will therefore be considered 
separately below (pp. 184-187). Neither were the many low-level disputes 
between townspeople and nobles as rural neighbours (see pp. 111-118) part of the 
same problem as the insecurity created by robbery and feuding, simply because 
these neighbourly disputes were so much less violent and destructive.
The particular kind of violence generated by feuding, which accounted for the 
majority of what contemporaries labelled as ‘robbery’, was extremely prevalent 
in rural contexts owing to the frequent feuds which in one way or another 
involved rural nobles. Yet these nobles seem hardly ever to have attacked 
townspeople’s rural property deliberately, and townspeople did not truly feud 
against nobles in the rural space (though they were capable of immense violence 
towards nobles). The reason for the lack of deliberate aggression of this particular 
sort lies partly in the particular dynamics of feuding between town and nobility, 
which will be the subject of chapter seven. But the reason that nobles’ feuds 
caused so much collateral damage to burghers’ property is clear enough: as we 
saw in the preceding chapter (pp. 112-113), the property of different landowners 
560. See p. 146 above for the complaints of those third parties affected by this campaign, and pp. 
295-298 below for the feud itself.
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was so closely intermingled in most villages that it was virtually impossible to 
conduct the kind of violence which was demanded by feuding – demonstratively 
destructive violence, but carried out quickly to avoid further escalation – without 
also damaging the property of third parties. Much of the time nobles were not 
even aware that some of the objects of their assault did not actually belong to 
their enemies. There is also at least one explanation near to hand for the lack of 
deliberate attacks by nobles on burghers’ rural property: by instead attacking 
merchant convoys, noble feuders against Nuremberg could strike much closer to 
the heart of the city’s economy and thus cause considerably greater anxiety for 
their urban opponents.
Attacks on trade and travellers, in fact any breach of the special peace of the 
roads, were certainly a tremendous cause for concern for the urban authorities. 
This particular form of rural violence was simply too much of an existential threat 
to the city for it to be dealt with in such a matter of fact manner as the assaults on 
villages. This can make it harder to reconstruct the exact nature of the threat which 
Nuremberg faced. The urban sources on which we rely clothe many incidents 
of highway robbery in a particular rhetoric which is in equal parts formulaic 
and vehement. But behind the stereotyped misdeeds and injustices there was 
inevitably a more complex picture. Combined with the importance accorded in 
both medieval and modern discourse to robbery on the roads as a factor in town-
noble relations, this complexity makes an examination of the problem on a case-
by-case basis for our core 1440–1448 period necessary and worthwhile.
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Robbery on the Roads
And we have good reason to fear that there may be many who wish to take 
from our people what is theirs
Nuremberg to Counts Johann, Ulrich and Wilhelm of Oettingen, 1 June 1447.561
The council was afraid that potential robbers were everywhere, and plenty of 
those who did succeed in taking goods and kidnapping citizens were rural 
nobles. Each noble had his own individual motivation for entering into an act 
of robbery, but the council portrayed its opponents as identikit villains. Through 
its vituperative language and silence on the subject of motivation, the council 
consciously implied that its enemies were actuated by nothing more than greed 
or some other baseness. Acts of robbery were committed ‘against God, honour 
and the law’ (wider got, ere und recht), without warning or prior reservation of 
honour (as the law of feuding demanded), and when the council knew of no 
reason for the accused noble to feel any enmity towards them.
This aggressively defensive stance was a response to robbery on the roads in 
particular. The towns were especially concerned with the ‘imperial roads’, 
though it was not clear exactly which roads were to be understood as imperial. 
Ensuring the security of the roads in general was one of the tasks commonly 
associated with the ‘good emperor’,562 but contemporaries recognized that in the 
absence of this mythical figure they would have to take matters into their own 
hands. Towns formed alliances amongst themselves with a particular focus on 
highway robbery: ‘for the roads of the Holy Empire are beset with wicked, unjust 
violence and idle people, so that no honest or honourable person can safely travel 
or trade along them’, as a Swabian alliance of October 1441 put it.563 The towns 
also sought to combat robbery in alliance with other social groups, for instance 
561. ‘Und als wir besorgen müssen so mag der vil seyn die den unsern das Ir gern nemen.’ BB 
18 ff. 258v-259r.
562. See Brady, Turning Swiss, pp. 22-23; also Len Scales, The Shaping of German Identity: Authority 
and Crisis 1245-1414 (Cambridge, 2012), p. 104.
563. Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, p. 105: ‘das des hailigen richs straß von bösem unrechtem gewalt 
und unenndlichen lüten nider geleit wird, das niemant biderber noch erbrer die sicher wol 
gebuwen noch gewandeln mag’.
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demanding from the Society of St George’s Shield in 1440 that no safe conduct 
be given to those who attacked the imperial roads.564 But there is no doubt that 
robbery on the roads was always a particular concern of the commercially-
orientated towns, as can be seen from the conversation between Nuremberg and 
Haupt von Pappenheim in 1438 (see above, p. 144) in which Nuremberg was 
inclined to see all robbery as illegitimate, whilst Pappenheim was confident that 
a distinction could be made between robbery and feud. The difference in opinion 
stems less from a different understanding of the feud (Nuremberg did not dispute 
Pappenheim’s fundamental distinction) than from the differing points of view of 
victim and bystander.  
Nonetheless, we can be confident that when Nuremberg accused a noble of 
robbery or the capture of burghers, some sort of seizure of property or kidnap 
had probably taken place. Certainly I have found no record of a noble denying the 
actual taking of property, and the accused often confess to, even laud their own 
actions in order to argue their justification. Of course, the nobles concerned did 
dispute that a particular taking of goods or prisoners was an act of ‘robbery’. For 
instance, Georg von Riedheim argued that his capture of Burkhard Müfflinger 
(in 1434, as part of the feud by Werner Roßhaupter and the Riedheim family 
against Nuremberg) ‘was not done for the sake of ransom or robbery, but to help 
Roßhaupter to acquire a ‘pledge’ [to oblige Nuremberg to meet his demands]’.565 
The line between legal distraint of property and ‘robbery’ was not much clearer, 
and from our perspective it is further obscured by Nuremberg’s terminology. 
We have already seen that the detention of goods by nobles acting in official 
capacities was often described as aufhalten (above, p. 140), but this term was also 
frequently applied to events which look very much more like highway robbery.566 
The term’s wide field of meaning is confirmed by its use in the phrase ‘aufhalten 
564. Blezinger, Städtebund, p. 53.
565. Lore Sporhan-Krempel, ’Die Roßhaupter-Fehde 1433–1439’, Mitteilungen des Vereins für 
die Geschichte der Stadt Nürnberg, 61 (1974), p. 22: ‘sei nicht schatzungs- oder raubweise 
geschehen, sunder dem Roßhaupter eines pfandes zu helffen’.
566. e.g. BB 14 ff. 299v-300r (3.1.1441), 342r (25.3.1441).
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und name’, where name (or nome, literally ‘taking’) clearly refers to robbery.567 But 
even the matter-of-fact name contained a certain ambiguity regarding the intent 
behind the act, and so it was sometimes strengthened with an express reference to 
robbery (Raub) via the adjective ‘raublich’.568 Another even more ambiguous term 
for an attack on travellers was niederlegen (‘bringing down’), which conveyed the 
violence which might be involved but also avoided any judgement on whether 
or not the event was a ‘robbery’.569
The term ‘robbery’ (Raub and its derivatives) was so highly charged that it belongs 
firmly to the polemical sphere. For propagandistic purposes, actions were labelled 
as raublich and fortresses which supposedly sheltered robbers were described 
as robbers’ castles or houses (Raubschlösser or Raubhäuser).570 Nuremberg’s 
diplomacy made extensive use of this polemic, but this in itself made a softer 
line necessary when trying to reach pragmatic settlements. For this purpose, 
terms such as aufhalten could be useful. We might therefore ask how historians 
can possibly distinguish ‘robbery’ within this thicket of deliberately obscuring 
terminology. This is indeed impossible, but fortunately it is also unnecessary in a 
strict sense. The distinction which most exercised contemporaries – that between 
violence within and without a ‘proper’ feud – is irrelevant from our perspective. 
Most of the violence in question clearly occurred within a feuding context, even 
if the feuder did not observe correct procedure (for more on this see below, pp. 
303-305). The distinction between distraint and robbery is more significant, but 
our focus on property and prisoners taken on the roads comes to our aid here. 
Genuine distraint was most likely to take place in towns and villages, where it 
could be supervised and legitimated by the local authorities. Apparent attempts 
to ‘distrain’ property on the open road immediately awaken the suspicion that a 
feuding motive was involved.
567. For ‘aufhalten und name’ see BB 1 ff. 66v-67r (9.10.1405).
568. e.g. BB 17 f. 180r (22.12.1444).
569. e.g. BB 18 f. 460v: ‘aufgehalten und nydergelegt’.
570. e.g. BB 17 f. 63r (6.7.1444). See also Andermann, Gewalt, p. 245.
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Hence I believe that the following list of ‘robberies’ allegedly carried out by nobles 
(in bold type) against Nuremberg citizens between 1 January 1440 and 31 March 
1448 either on the roads or involving travellers or traders’ merchandise accurately 
reflects both real events and what contemporaries would have understood as 
‘robbery’ (i.e. seizure of goods or persons without a specific legal sanction), if we 
set aside the highly subjective distinction between feud and robbery. Certainly 
all of these incidents were treated as ‘robbery’ by the city council. Only a few 
possible highway robberies have been left out, as the sources which record these 
incidents make no clear reference to the roads, travellers or trade.
1. Before 28 January 1440 capture and robbery of Hans von Hof by 
Nicholas Baroc, castellan of Devín near 
Bratislava.571
2. 26 February 1440 capture of Hans Langen by Konrad 
von Brandenstein (district governor of 
Zwickau), near Naumburg. Langen was 
mistaken for a burgher of Bamberg,572 and 
had been released by mid-November.573
3. Around 14 September 1440 capture and robbery of Hans Layterbach 
by Wilhelm von Elm, at Zell am Main.574
4. Between 15 and 25 October 1440 robbery of C. Permeter by Wilhelm von 
Elm, near Ochsenfurt.575
5. Before 27 October 1440 robbery of Hans Lemlin and Paul Grundherr 
571. BB 14 f. 113v (28.1.1440). My thanks to Mark Whelan and Suzana Miljan for their help with 
the identification of Nicholas Baroc.
572. BB 14 ff. 156v-157r (1.4.1440), 173r-v (13.5.1440).
573. BB 14 f. 273v (14.11.1440).
574. BB 14 f. 261r (25.10.1440).
575. BB 14 f. 261r (25.10.1440).
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by Albrecht Gottsmann and Hans von 
Wiesenthau (Lemlin swears that none of 
the property belonged to Bamberg).576
6. 4 December 1440 capture and robbery of Lienhard Hofmann 
by servitors of Hermann von Seinsheim, 
Herr zu Schwarzenberg, who released 
Hofmann on learning that he was a burgher 
of Nuremberg.577
7. Before 5 December 1440 robbery of Fritz Keiper by Engelhard von 
Münster on river Main at Theres (wine 
taken to Zabelstein castle).578 Nuremberg 
assured Münster that Keiper was not a 
citizen of Bamberg, and Münster stated 
that he did not wish to harm Nuremberg 
or its citizens.579
8. 14 December 1440 robbery of merchants from Nuremberg 
(including	 Konrad	 Imhoff,	 Anthony	
and Herdegen Tucher, and Ulrich 
Stark), Augsburg, Lübeck and Breslau 
(Wrocław)	 by	Konrad and Lienhard von 
Gumppenberg and Hans von Schwangau 
between Augsburg and Donauwörth at 
Merdingen (Meitingen, north of Augsburg?); 
spoils taken to Scherneck. The goods taken 
576. BB 14 f. 262v (27.10.1440).
577. BB 14 ff. 297v-298r (29.12.1440).
578. BB 14 f. 285v (5.12.1440).
579. BB 14 ff. 291v (16.12.1440), 299v-300r (3.1.1441).
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were being transported from Venice.580 
Konrad and Lienhard von Gumppenberg 
claimed to be in a feud with Breslau.581
9. 24 March 1441 robbery of Nuremberg merchants by Hans 
von Streitberg Jnr. near Forchheim.582 
Property probably returned by 7 April 
1441.583
10. 19 May 1441 robbery of Nuremberg merchants C. 
Ruprecht, F. Kreß and Lorenz Fleischmann 
by Hans von Rechberg, Count Heinrich 
of Lupfen, Burkhard and Hans Münch on 
the Rhine near Kattenhorn, east of Stein am 
Rhein, as part of a much larger attack on 
ships bringing goods from Geneva to Ulm 
and elsewhere.584
11. Before 10 June 1441 theft of a travelling bag (watsack or veleß) 
containing clothes and silver beakers from 
Paul Grundherr and Johann Marquardi 
(en route to Austria) by Weimar von 
Muggenthal.585 (Initially the culprit was 
unknown to Nuremberg, but Weimar had 
been imprisoned by 9 August.)586
580. BB 14 ff. 292v (19.12.1440), 313r (3.2.1441), 322r (21.2.1441), 336r-v (19.3.1441), 340r (21.3.1441). 
StAN Rep. 54 11 f. 77v.
581. BB 14 f. 336r-v (19.3.1441).
582. BB 14 f. 342r (25.3.1441).
583. BB 15 f. 10r (7.4.1441).
584. BB 15 ff. 24b-24d (26.5.1441), 43v-44r (13.6.1441). Blezinger, Städtebund, pp. 71-72. See also 
Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, p. 118; Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, p. 105.
585. BB 15 f. 37v (10.6.1441); StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 82v.
586. RB 1b f. 14r; BB 15 f. 80v (9.8.1441).
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12. 18 June 1441 capture of dependents of Berthold 
Volckamer by Wilhelm von Elm between 
Windelsbach and Rothenburg ob der 
Tauber. Five horses were taken and four 
men	imprisoned,	 the	fifth	released	until	a	
future hearing (auf ein widerstellen).587
13. June 1441? capture of Hans Kraft Jnr. by the 
Seckendorff family at Sugenheim.588
14. Before July 1441? capture of Nuremberg burghers by Hynek 
Krušina of Schwanberg.589 In January 1445 
Nuremberg stated that Schwanberg may 
still be holding some of its citizens prisoner, 
possibly captured in a second attack.590
15. Before 2 September 1441 robbery of Nuremberg burghers by a 
‘vassal and servitor’ of Duke Friedrich of 
Saxony.591
16. Before 16 September 1441 robbery of Margarete Gretzer’s oxen, 
being driven to the Rhine through the safe 
conduct of Count Johann of Wertheim, 
by Dietrich and Hans von Mörl called 
‘Beheim’.592
17. Before 21 October 1441 capture of Nuremberg merchants Fritz 
Euglein and Hans Meyer by Aleš of 
587. BB 15 f. 50r (21.6.1441).
588. RB 1b ff. 7v, 13r.
589. RB 1b ff. 6v-7r, 12r.
590. BB 17 f. 199v (22.1.1445).
591. BB 15 ff. 99v-100r (2.9.1441).
592. BB 15 ff. 103v-104r (16.9.1441). See Vogel, Fehderecht, pp. 90-95.
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Sternberg, in Bohemia (in Hanuš of 
Kolovrat’s safe conduct). Goods taken 
included at least 2,400 lb. of copper (see pp. 
136-137 above).593
18. Before 13 November 1441 robbery of 61 Gulden from the serving girl 
of Peter Eitelholz by eight mounted men, 
who took the money to Schernau (near 
Dettelbach, on the Main), residence of 
(amongst others) Hans von Vestenberg.594
19. Before 15 November 1441 money taken from burgher Konrad 
Schwaben by the men of Burkhard von 
Magenbuch.595
20. Before 1 December 1441 robbery of fur from Christian Echter by 
Hans von Vestenberg of Schernau.596
21. Before 30 December 1441 eighteen horses and three wagons taken from 
Berthold Tucher’s dependent Konrad Meyer 
von Wolkersdorf on the road at Göppingen 
by Heinrich Schilling and Siegfried von 
Zillenhart.597 Zillenhart was later excused, 
though one of his servitors was implicated.598
22. Before 15 January 1442 Albrecht Pätzlinger captured by Konrad 
von Grumbach.599
593. BB 15 ff. 123r (21.10.1441), 318r (25.9.1442), StAN Rep. 2c 19 (loose sheet).
594. BB 15 f. 135v (13.11.1441).
595. BB 15 f. 136r (15.11.1441).
596. BB 15 f. 146v (1.12.1441).
597. BB 15 f. 162r (30.12.1441).
598. BB 15 f. 185r-v (5.2.1442).
599. BB 15 f. 172r (15.1.1442).
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23. Before 28 February 1442 two barrels taken from Fritz Ulrich near Villach 
by Niclas Lueger, in the belief (as Ulrich 
reported) that the barrels belonged to Venice.600
24. Before 6 June 1442 cotton and pepper taken from Konrad 
Paumgartner, Hans Gruber and Fritz 
Hiltpranter by Andreas Graben von Stein 
(Carinthia) on account of claims against 
Emperor Friedrich III.601
25. Before 23 June 1442 six barrels of pepper taken from Lienhard 
Reutheimer and Endres Rudolf by Counts 
Stanislaus and Tobergast of Meseritz (now 
Międzyrzecz	 in	western	Poland),	 in	belief	
that the barrels belonged to Breslau.602
26. Before 23 July 1442 capture of Hans Windsheimer by Reinhard 
Truchseß von Baldersheim; Nuremberg 
assure Baldersheim that Windsheimer has 
no connection to the town of Iphofen.603
27. Before 15 September 1442 robbery at ‘Kaltenloch’, Karl and Eberhard von 
Thüngen and Kilian von der Tann involved.604
28. Before 24 September 1442 capture and robbery (10 Gulden) of ‘poor’ 
burgher Hans Gartner by men under Hans von 
Wenkheim; mistaken for a citizen of Bamberg 
and imprisoned at Schwanberg (Steigerwald).605
600. BB 15 f. 193v (28.2.1442).
601. BB 15 ff. 256r-257v (6.6.1442), 272v-273r (9.7.1442).
602. BB 15 ff. 266v-267r (23.6.1442).
603. BB 15 f. 281r (23.7.1442).
604. BB 15 f. 311r-v (15.9.1442). Müllner, Annalen, ii, 359.
605. BB 15 f. 316r-v (24.9.1442).
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29. During 1442 robbery from Rothenfels involving Kilian 
von der Tann.606
30. Before 21 January 1443 capture of Ulrich Steinhaus by Hans von 
Luneck (Laineck?), in belief that he was a 
Bamberg subject from Forchheim. Already 
released from captivity.607
31. Before 25 February 1443 Heinrich von Gumppenberg accused of 
robbing Nuremberg citizens by the town 
of Kempten, though the council are not 
convinced of his guilt.608
32. Before 28 March 1443 robbery of Heinz Münzer by Werner von 
Schienen.609
33. Before 4 May 1443 capture of Hermann Roßlauf near 
Schlüsselfeld by Georg Schyng.610 By 
December Roßlauf was being held by 
Georg von Eberstein.611 He was still a 
prisoner of Eberstein in July 1444.612
34. 5 June 1443 barrel taken from Hans Ortolf by Hans von 
Rechberg, on the Rhine between Stein and 
Diessenhofen.613
606. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 359. BB 16 f. 27v (8.3.1443).
607. BB 16 f. 6v (21.1.1443).
608. BB 16 f. 24v (25.2.1443).
609. BB 16 ff. 37r (28.3.1443), 111r-v (20.8.1443).
610. BB 16 f. 54r (4.5.1443).
611. BB 16 f. 175v (11.12.1443).
612. BB 17 ff. 28r-v (20.5.1444), 80v-81r (23.7.1444).
613. BB 16 ff. 77v (13.6.1443), 102v-103r (6.8.1443).
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35. Before 17 June 1443 capture and imprisonment of Conz Kulein, 
Hermann Seidenvater, Heinrich Heiden 
(a beltmaker) and Kaspar Gottseigeert 
(a hatter) whilst on their way to a 
market at Amberg by Hynek Krušina of 
Schwanberg.614
36. Before 27 September 1443 robbery by Sigmund von Seckendorff 
at	 Burgebrach.	 (Seckendorff	 was	 feuding	
against the bishop of Bamberg at the 
time.)615
37. Before 31 October 1443 robbery at Fischbach, involving Georg von 
Egloffstein.616
38. 2 November 1443 robbery and capture of burghers by 
Hans and Fritz von Waldenfels, from 
Wartenfels.617 Also involved: Hans 
Engelhard von Streitberg.618 Müllner 
suggests that this took place at Kronach.619
39. Before 19 November 1443 robbery of the courier Heinz Lungen, 
who was carrying money to Miltenberg 
for Hermann Herdecker, by Hans von 
Seckendorff, even after Lungen had 
told	 Seckendorff	 to	 whom	 the	 money	
belonged.620
614. BB 16 ff. 80r (17.6.1443), 86v-87v (9.7.1443). StAN Rep. 2c 27 f. 21r (25.6.1443).
615. BB 16 ff. 133r-134r (27.9.1443).
616. BB 16 f. 153r (31.10.1443). See also BB 18 f. 1r (14.7.1446).
617. BB 16 ff. 161v-163r (23.11.1443). See also Waldenfels, Waldenfels, p. 154.
618. ChrdtSt, ii, 75-76, Müllner, Annalen, ii, 366.
619. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 365.
620. BB 16 f. 160r (19.11.1443).
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40. Before 25 November 1443 capture of Ulrich Staindel by Heinrich Zenger 
zu Regenstauf; release promised if Nuremberg 
can	confirm	that	he	is	their	citizen.621
41. February 1444 robbery by Fritz von Waldenfels at 
Judenbach (near Sonneberg).622
42. Before 20 February 1444 capture of servitor Hans Bindenschuh by 
Georg von Wildenstein, district governor 
of Hersbruck.623
43. 1 March 1444 capture of two citizens of Breslau and two 
of Nuremberg (Seitz Mühlfeld and Ulrich 
Bogler) by Fritz von Waldenfels, who took 
them to Lichtenberg.624
44. Before 5 March 1444 robbery by Fritz von Waldenfels at 
Gräfenthal (French or Italian wine en route 
to Leipzig taken).625
45. Before 28 March 1444 iron belonging to Ulman Hegnein taken 
on the river Main by Karl von Thüngen 
zu Reußenberg and Ditz von Thüngen zu 
Thüngen.626
46. Before 15 April 1444 servitors Hans Bogner, Nickel Rudel, Hans 
Grutsch and Wilhelm Plankenberger’s 
servant captured by servitors of Ulrich 
621. BB 16 f. 163r-v (25.11.1443).
622. ChrdtSt, ii, 59. BB 16 f. 229r-v (5.3.1444).
623. BB 16 f. 224r (20.2.1444).
624. BB 16 f. 235v (8.3.1444).
625. BB 16 pp. 229r-v, 232r (5.3.1444).
626. BB 16 f. 260v (28.3.1444).
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Sack, governor of Coburg (possibly related 
to the ongoing feud with Hans and Fritz 
von Waldenfels).627
47. Before 15 June 1444 capture of Contz and Ulm Pesler, dependents 
of	Nuremberger	Niclas	Muffel	and	Wentzla	
Ortolf, by Albrecht Klack at Wendelstein.628
48. Before 15 July 1444 robbery on the Untersee (the arm of lake 
Constance between Konstanz and Stein am 
Rhein) by Burkhard and Hans Münch von 
Landskron, Melchior von Blumeneck and 
Pentelin von Heimenhofen.629
49. Before 23 July 1444 attack on Nuremberger transporting 
French/Italian wine (Wellischwein) by 
Asmus von Eberstein; forgiven at the 
request of the bishop of Würzburg.630
50. Before 29 July 1444 probable capture of four horses from a 
wagon carrying wine between Markt 
Einersheim and Possenheim by Paul von 
Streitberg (Nuremberg did not send the 
letter to Streitberg which they drafted 
regarding this incident).631
51. Before 22 December 1444 robbery by Georg von Waldenfels in 
Brandenburg or Lusatia.632
627. BB 17 ff. 3r (15.4.1444), 10v (20.4.1444), 23v-24r (15.5.1444).
628. BB 17 ff. 49v-50r (15.6.1444).
629. BB 17 f. 74v (15.7.1444).
630. BB 17 ff. 79v, 80v-81r  (23.7.1444). See also BB 17 f. 35r (2.6.1444).
631. BB 17 f. 85v (29.7.1444).
632. BB 17 ff. 180r-182r (22.12.1444).
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52.	1445	 Georg	Pfinzing	captured	by	Georg von der 
Kere and taken to Ebersberg.633
53. Before 23 January 1445 iron belonging to Sigmund Pfritzer taken on 
Lake Constance by Heinrich von Reischach, 
advocate of Jakob Truchseß zu Waldburg at 
Bregenz, and Hans von Gastraß, advocate 
of Margrave Wilhelm of Hochberg at 
Bregenz. Nuremberg assured them that the 
iron was being transported to St Gallen, and 
not to their (unnamed) enemies.634
54. Before 3 February 1445 robbery by servants of Konrad von 
Brandenstein, though Nuremberg are sure 
that Brandenstein did not order this.635
55. Before May 1445 robbery near Frankfurt an der Oder by Georg 
von Waldenfels and Friedrich von Bieberstein 
(see also nos. 51 above and 69 below).636
56. 1446 robbery by Count Johann of Oettingen.637
57. Before 3 September 1446 robbery of two horses and cash and 
capture	of	Fritz	Zipfler	in	Bayern-Landshut	
territory near Ried im Innkreis by Georg 
Auer (with seven companions).638
58. Before 8 October 1446 capture of Niclas Wolfart, Otten Herdegen, 
Apel Arnold and Schönpeter whilst on a 
633. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 377.
634. BB 17 f. 196r (23.1.1445).
635. BB 17 ff. 206v-207r (3.2.1445).
636. Waldenfels, Waldenfels, pp. 157-158.
637. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 382.
638. BB 18 ff. 30v (3.9.1446), 35v-36v (6.9.1446).
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pilgrimage to the Holy Blood (of Wilsnack) by 
Heinz Röder, taken to Mechelgrün castle.639 
Schönpeter had escaped by 27 March 1447.640
59. Before 8 October 1446 robbery by the brother of Heinrich von 
Gräfendorf, a Saxon/Thuringian noble.641
60. Before 15 October 1446 capture and robbery of Peter Heimikin, 
Jorg Lennfelder, Cyriacus Hofman, 
Heinrich Ropusch and Heinz Wagner by 
Georg Hopfgarten (a Thuringian noble).642 
Released without ransom by 5 November.643
61. Before 19 October 1446 Hans Steinberg, Peter Kotzler and Ulrich 
Huter captured near Gnotzheim (south of 
Gunzenhausen) and taken to Stockenfels 
castle (east of Burglengenfeld), where they 
were imprisoned by Heimram Heuras and 
‘Tannhäuser’.644 A hearing at Burglengenfeld 
on 30 January 1447 reached a settlement.645
62. Before 4 November 1446 Heinz Moren captured by Yanko and Georg 
Gfeller, the latter a servant of Jakoubek of 
Vřesovice, and ransomed for 175 Gulden 
(though Nuremberg do not suggest that 
Vřesovice	was	involved).646
639. BB 18 f. 68r (8.10.1446).
640. BB 18 f. 200r (27.3.1447).
641. BB 18 ff. 72v-73r (8.10.1446).
642. BB 18 ff. 80v-82r (15.10.1446).
643. BB 18 ff. 93v-94r (5.11.1446).
644. BB 18 ff. 83v-84r (19.10.1446), 91v-92r (25.10.1446), 110r (21.11.1446). Müllner, Annalen, ii, 389.
645. BB 18 ff. 149v (26.1.1447), 153v-154r (31.1.1447), 167r-v (14.2.1447).
646. BB 18 f. 98v (4.11.1446).
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63. Before 19 November 1446 Hans Rotbusch captured by Hans and 
Fritz von Waldenfels.647 He was kept in a 
cellar at Lichtenberg, before being handed 
over to Heinz Röder, who tried to ransom 
him.648
64. Before 13 April 1447 a wagon taken in the territory of Duke 
Wilhelm of Saxony by Count Ludwig of 
Gleichen. In their reply to Duke Wilhelm, 
Nuremberg	linked	this	incident	to	the	conflict	
between Wilhelm and his brother Friedrich.649
65. Before 20 May 1447 capture of Michael von Puch near the castle of 
Hilgartsberg (west of Passau, under governor 
Wilhelm von Aichberg) by Georg Auer.650
66. Before 21 August 1447 robbery by Balthazar von Watzdorf in the 
territory of Heinrich von Gera.651 Watzdorf 
later stated that he did so in order to gain 
a guarantee of ‘security’ from Nuremberg, 
and the matter was settled through the 
mediation of Heinrich von Gera.652
67. Before 20 September 1447 capture of servitor Peter Motter by Fritz von 
Waldenfels.653 Motter had been released by 
22 November.654
647. BB 18 f. 109v (19.11.1446).
648. BB 18 ff. 124v-126r (20.12.1446).
649. BB 18 f. 215r-v (13.4.1447).
650. BB 18 f. 246r-v (20.5.1447).
651 BB 18 f. 324v (21.8.1447).
652. BB 18 ff. 373v-374r (24.10.1447).
653. BB 18 f. 344v (20.9.1447).
654. BB 18 f. 394r-v (22.11.1447).
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68. 10 November 1447 capture and robbery of Hans Dobritsch 
of Wöhrd (near Nuremberg) and Cunz 
Roßtauscher (Scheurer’s servant), along 
with ‘der Frey’ of Amberg and Sigmund, 
Schmidmeier’s servant from Vienna, 
between Plattling and Straßkirchen by 
Georg Auer and three companions. 15 
Gulden were taken from Dobritsch, a sack 
of pennies from ‘der Frey’, and a bag of 
papers from Roßtauscher. Hans Dobritsch’s 
finger	 was	 cut	 off,	 and	 he	 was	 made	 to	
carry a feud letter to Nuremberg.655
69. Before 10 February 1448 robbery by Friedrich von Bieberstein, lord 
of Beeskow and Storkow (in present-day 
Brandenburg).656
70. Before 14 February 1448 robbery of two barrels of knives and other 
property belonging to Endres Zeringer and 
his company by Seifried Badewitz, captain 
of Ottmachau (Otmuchów) in Silesia.657
71. Before 14 February 1448 Sigmund Fürer robbed on the road 
to Bohemia, and the property taken 
to Wernberg castle under Heimram 
Notthafft.658
655. StAN Rep. 2c 30a f. 2r; BB 18 f. 388r-v (16.11.1447).
656. BB 18 ff. 456v-457r (10.2.1448).
657. BB 18 f. 460v (14.2.1448).
658. BB 18 f. 461r (14.2.1448). See also Müllner, Annalen, ii, 392.
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It is naturally harder to find burghers who were accused of robbery against nobles 
in the sources created by the urban administration. Some such allegations are 
preserved, but they all refer to very different circumstances from the various forms 
of ‘highway robbery’ listed above. Hans von Muggenthal accused Nuremberg of 
the ‘robbery’ (Nome) of his father and late brother, of which the council denied 
all knowledge.659 This was almost certainly related to the execution of Weimar 
von Muggenthal following his own act of robbery (see no. 11 above and p. 186 
below). In an opaque incident, Heinrich von Helmstatt accused Christian Imhoff 
of appropriating a horse without his permission (on ewer willen vnd wissen 
vnterwunden), but Imhoff said that the horse was captured in the forest; it died 
in Imhoff’s possession.660 There are clear allegations that burghers appropriated 
property or captured individuals in the course of business disputes, or disputes 
between rural lordships, and of course in their responses to rural insecurity. But 
none can be in any way interpreted as robbery on the roads, which was a product of 
a particular kind of feuding violence in which burghers did not generally engage. 
We can therefore focus on the allegations against nobles for the time being.
From just the outline figures – seventy-one separate robberies in ninety-nine 
months, or almost one incident every forty-two days – we can see why the city 
council was so concerned by the constantly recurring menace of highway robbery 
by rural nobles. But when we consider that these events were geographically 
very widely spread we also realize how little this problem seriously impeded the 
overall commerce of the town. Trade could continue as normal most of the time 
and in most places – but this only ensured that merchants and travellers were 
always vulnerable to the sporadic and often unpredictable threat of robbery. 
Around a quarter of the total number of incidents between 1440 and March 1448 
definitely took place within the context of feuds against Nuremberg which did 
not originate in the robbery itself.661 These robberies included serious attacks by 
659. BB 17 f. 192v (19.1.1445).
660. BB 16 f. 55v (7.5.1443).
661. Nos. 14, 16, 17, 35, 38, 41, 43, 44, 51, 55, 57, 58, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 (19 in total).
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Nuremberg’s most dangerous feud opponents of these years: Hynek Krušina 
of Schwanberg; Aleš of Sternberg; Dietrich von Mörl (known as ‘Beheim’); the 
Waldenfels brothers Hans and Fritz; and Georg Auer (for more on these feuds see 
chapter seven). But if Nuremberg’s own enemies accounted for only a quarter of 
the threat, what comprised the remainder?
Nearly as many robberies (22.5 per cent of the total) were clearly aimed at other 
targets whose identity is known.662 This might be clear from cases of mistaken 
identity,663 from a dispute over the victim’s real identity or allegiance,664 or from a 
noble’s declaration of his enmity against a third party.665 In this sample there is one 
instance of the periodically recurring problem of attacks on Nuremberg citizens by 
nobles with claims against the emperor (no. 24). In other cases the intended target 
can be reconstructed from contextual sources: for example, the significant robbery 
at Kattenhorn on 19 May 1441 (no. 10) was part of a major feud by a group of nobles 
against the Swabian League (see also below, pp. 248-249).666 It is worth noting that 
of all these attacks on known third parties, just five targeted imperial or free cities 
(seven if we include Breslau, which had substantial de facto independence), and that 
these five were all part of the same complex of feuds against the Swabian League 
as the Kattenhorn robbery.667 The most common intended target was actually the 
bishop of Bamberg (whether directly or via burghers of Bamberg). This wave of 
feuds against Bamberg is almost certainly related to the enormous debts of the 
bishopric, which were calculated in 1440 to be 322,294 fl. 3,213 lb. 11 d.668 Sigmund 
von Seckendorff, who attacked Nuremberg citizens and their property in the course 
of his feud with Bamberg in 1443 (see no. 36 and p. 148 above), was still trying to 
recover his father’s loans to the bishops of Bamberg in 1454.669
662. Nos. 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 48 (16 in total).
663. Nos. 2, 23, 25, 28, 30.
664. Nos. 5, 7, 26.
665. Nos. 8, 36.
666. This is also the case for nos. 21, 32, 34 and 48.
667. Nos. 10, 21, 32, 34, 48 (also 8, 25).
668. Johann Looshorn, Die Geschichte des Bisthums Bamberg (Munich & Bamberg, 1886), iv, 249.
669. Looshorn, Geschichte, iv, 273-274.
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A number of other cases can also be reckoned to the total of attacks aimed against 
third parties. In four cases another opponent is mentioned, but not named.670 
In two cases a settlement was negotiated as an independent matter (i.e. not in 
connection to the resolution of a wider conflict), which would not be consistent 
with feuding (and not much more consistent with outright theft).671 Two robberies 
which took place in Saxony in October 1446 were most probably related to the 
conflict between Dukes Friedrich and Wilhelm of Saxony which broke out around 
this time, and in which Nuremberg was not closely involved.672 This gives a total 
of twenty-four attacks which probably did not directly target Nuremberg, 33.8 
per cent of the total sample. In a further three cases, there is some doubt as to 
whether a noble was actually responsible for an attack.673
This leaves twenty-five robberies which cannot be immediately explained as either 
attacks against Nuremberg or against third parties. Some of these, however, are 
very likely to have been part of feuds against third parties. Wilhelm von Elm (see 
nos. 3, 4 and 12) was in a conflict of unknown origins with Rothenburg and the 
Swabian League, which led to his execution (see p. 185 below).674 The capture of 
Hans Kraft by members of the Seckendorff family (no. 13) could well have been 
part of the same feud against Bamberg as Sigmund von Seckendorff’s actions. A 
series of robberies in the Main valley area from late 1441 and 1442 suggest general 
unrest in that region, possibly the latter stages of the conflict between Bishop 
Sigismund of Würzburg and his cathedral chapter (see p. 221).675 The capture of 
several Nuremberg servitors by Ulrich Sack, governor of Coburg, in April 1444 (no. 
46) immediately followed Nuremberg’s withdrawal from the siege of Lichtenberg, 
which might have taken the city’s army through Coburg territory. Paul von Streitberg 
(no. 50) was active in many feuds in the 1440s, but none against Nuremberg.676 It is 
670. Nos. 6, 39, 40, 53.
671. Nos. 9, 49.
672. Nos. 59, 60.
673. Nos. 31, 54, 62.
674. Blezinger, Städtebund, p. 78.
675. Nos. 18, 20, 22, 27, 29.
676. Zöberlein, ’Streitberg,’ p. 48.
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inevitable that some incidents may never be located within a wider conflict simply 
through lack of evidence, especially those for which we must rely on the evidence 
of Müllner’s chronicle (see p. 40).677 But it would almost certainly be possible to 
contextualize more cases through further research. The leading candidate for 
future investigation is the robbery by Weimar von Muggenthal (no. 11): whatever 
the cause of this incident, it proved to be a fatal miscalculation on Weimar’s part, 
as it led to his execution in Nuremberg (see below, p. 186).
Perhaps the most important factor which can be brought to bear on these 
unexplained cases is the logic of feuding. If nobles had claims against Nuremberg 
which they sought to assert through violence, it is highly likely that they would 
have declared these claims at some stage, and that the sources generated by the 
city would have preserved the council’s response. Thus it seems likely that not 
just the third of all individual robberies which definitely targeted other parties, 
or even the almost 50 per cent which quite possibly did, but in fact nearly three-
quarters of all robberies against Nuremberg from the period 1440 to March 
1448 were not aimed at the city or its citizens. There is always the possibility 
that some robberies took place outside of feuds, or that feuds themselves were 
simply a cover for robbery, but we will see in chapter seven (pp. 285-287) that 
the historiography of the feud in late medieval Germany has moved away from 
this view of the relationship between robbery and feuding. Robbery by nobles 
outside of feuding, i.e. pure criminality by any understanding of medieval law, 
offers no explanation for the tremendous prevalence of robbery, for all that it 
might explain certain isolated cases.
The high levels of ‘collateral damage’ in highway robbery by nobles had causes 
fundamentally similar to those which applied to attacks on villages. Nobles simply 
did not always know exactly who they were assaulting. They could certainly be 
capable of distinguishing between merchants from different towns or regions: a 
group of Swabian towns complained in 1439 that only their merchants had been 
677. Nos. 52, 56.
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attacked by Erasmus Torer, and that merchants from Bavaria had been allowed 
to pass unhindered.678 Sometimes nobles claimed to have tried to warn merchants 
of their intent to attack a third party.679 But whenever merchants from different 
towns travelled in convoys, the practical difficulty of singling out particular 
targets in the mêlée of an ambush must have been enormous. This is even before 
we consider the implications of merchants or couriers from one town carrying 
goods which belonged to merchants of another town, potentially alongside or 
even within their own goods. Towns such as Nuremberg consequently recognized 
that any threat to the security of the roads was a direct threat to their commercial 
interests. The council frequently responded to news of feuds involving nobles 
with a request that they not attack the imperial roads.680 Instead, these nobles 
should attack their opponents ‘where one ought to strike one’s enemies’ (da 
man veynd besuchen sölt).681 The council had other concerns too: allegations that 
nobles were harbouring other robbers, and robberies which were carried out in 
the vicinity of Nuremberg against citizens of other towns, for whom Nuremberg 
then had to intervene with its noble neighbours.682
A case-by-case analysis of the problem has revealed for the first time the balance 
between the two most fundamental types of robbery from the perspective of the 
victim: those attacks which deliberately targeted a victim, and those which caught 
them in the metaphorical net of the ambush.683 The latter was by far the greater 
danger. This distinction made little difference to the merchants and citizens who were 
actually attacked, but it is crucial for understanding the way in which Nuremberg 
and other towns responded to the problem of rural insecurity. This insecurity 
was created by feuding, but the towns did not experience it as such. The urban 
678. Blezinger, Städtebund, p. 41.
679. BB 7 f. 65v (13.6.1426).
680. e.g. BB 16 ff. 101r-102r (7.8.1443); BB 17 f. 260r (21.4.1445).
681. e.g. BB 9 f. 259r-v (17.6.1432).
682. Nobles harbouring robbers: e.g. BB 18 f. 333r-v (2.9.1447). Robbery against other towns: e.g. 
BB 15 f. 260v (14.6.1442).
683. Görner, Raubritter, pp. 173-238, distinguishes three ‘types of robbery’, but these are actually 
causes of robbery, and therefore really types of feud. Hahn, ’Landadel und Stadt,’ p. 286, 
shows some appreciation of how many robberies occurred in the context of larger disputes 
with third parties.
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authorities could hardly keep track of all the different feuds which could at any 
time affect their citizens, especially as the feuds could smoulder for many years. For 
instance, in 1434 Eberhard von Dottenheim took cloth from Nuremberg merchants 
in an ambush which he claimed was part of a feud he had had declared against the 
town of Straubing: the feud dated back to 1420.684 The council was also accustomed 
to refuting the validity of feuds by nobles against the city, and was in no position 
to judge the legitimacy or otherwise of all the many feuds which threatened the 
peace of the roads. Given that they were such a menace, it must have been tempting 
to automatically discount their legitimacy, as with those against Nuremberg itself. 
At the very least, the council denied that attacks on the roads were a legitimate 
part of feuding.685 In consequence, the feuding behaviour of nobles appeared from 
the town’s perspective to be generalized insecurity in the countryside, a plague 
of almost random and probably illicit violence. An allegation of robbery against 
a noble who threatened Nuremberg’s security was a powerful polemical weapon 
against this threat, but it was also a weapon which lay near to hand on account of 
the town’s own experience of events. Its force and efficacy were created to a large 
extent by the contrast between the stark reality of the actual seizure of goods and the 
complex legal situation through which the noble justified this seizure. The resulting 
disjuncture between the perspectives of the urban elite and the rural nobility on 
security in the countryside became one of the key flashpoints in their relationship.
Responses to Insecurity
Various responses to the inadequate security situation in the countryside consumed 
considerable energy and resources, and collectively they were the single most 
significant aspect of the Umlandpolitik of a major town such as Nuremberg (see 
also pp. 102-103 above). Not all of these responses can be considered equally 
684. StAN Rep. 2c 23 f. 4r (31.1.1435) and loose sheet (16.9.1420).
685. Andermann, ’Kriminalisierung,’ p. 154 notes that town chroniclers would not have been 
able to judge the ‘legitimacy’ of feuds, but that they also wished to present them as illegal 
for reasons including a desire the ‘criminalize’ the feuder’s actions. I have argued above (p. 
28, see also p. 193) that there is no evidence for an intent to criminalize the feud in general, 
but this does not detract from the natural inclination of victims of violence to discount the 
legitimacy of the particular violence which afflicts them.
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here. We have already seen that towns aimed to enhance their security through 
territorial expansion (pp. 100-102), and we have also encountered alliances of 
regional powers against robbery (pp. 142, 151-152). These aspects of the security 
situation will remain in the background for the time being, not least because they 
were not prominent at Nuremberg in the 1440s. Nuremberg did not at this time 
have a significant extra-mural territory beyond the imperial forests, and even 
once it had joined the Swabian League in late 1444 it was still reliant largely on 
its own resources for rural security in its own surroundings, as the league’s other 
powerful members were distant from Nuremberg’s hinterland.
Nuremberg compensated for these relative weaknesses with an assertive security 
policy in the countryside beyond its territory. It responded to the most direct threats 
– feuds by nobles against the city – with aggressive counter-feuds that used many of 
the methods of the wider security policy, but are in themselves best understood as 
part of the feuds which provoked them (see chapter seven). At this stage we need to 
understand Nuremberg’s response to generalized insecurity and to the permanent, 
omnipresent threat of robbery created by the network of noble feuds which ran 
throughout the countryside. This chiefly took the form of regular mounted patrols 
of the city’s surroundings, to which I will turn shortly. But first we need to consider 
Nuremberg’s policy towards castles and other fortifications in its hinterland.
The city’s chief aim was to neutralize fortifications and prevent their use by ‘robbers’. 
The destruction of robbers’ nests had been an important demonstrative act of peace-
keeping for the kings and emperors of previous generations: Rudolf of Habsburg 
had been praised for this activity in particular by a Bavarian chronicler.686 In 1397 
Wenceslas had established a Franconian and Bavarian Landfriede at Nuremberg, 
and then immediately set out to break castles to the east of the city.687 Both the 
military force and the list of targets were probably provided by Nuremberg, which 
then received privileges prohibiting the rebuilding of these castles, or any others 
686. Scales, Identity, p. 123.
687. Egloffstein, Chronik, pp. 95-96; Pfeiffer, Nürnberg, p. 80.
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which might in future be destroyed by the king with Nuremberg’s help within 
five German miles (c.37 km) of the city.688 But there were to be no more such 
expeditions from Nuremberg, although King Rupert mounted a castle-breaking 
campaign in 1405 from Frankfurt am Main.689 Nuremberg retained an imperial 
sanction for the destruction of castles, however, through privileges which forbade 
their construction within a mile (c.7.5 km) of the town.690 Within this immediate 
vicinity of the city the council had other means of controlling fortified places. Many 
small fortified residences in this area were owned by burghers, which enabled the 
council to impose obligations to open these residences to the town’s forces when 
necessary and to offer the council first refusal on any sale of the property.691 In 
1449 Nuremberg further tightened its grip on its immediate surroundings with the 
construction of a Landwehr, a basic line of defence consisting of a ditch and ‘block 
houses’, which doubled as a territorial marker.692
These measures were designed to keep threats of any kind – from robbers to potential 
besiegers – at a distance from the city itself. As such, they were as important for 
Nuremberg’s sense of security as for the actual prevention of attacks. This protective 
cushion was reinforced by an outer ring of defence. The organization of dependent 
peasants into military units (Hauptmannschaften, see pp. 120-121) was intended more 
to raise a militia than to pacify the countryside, but there was probably some kind 
of defensive arrangement in place along the river Schwabach, which cuts across the 
northern approach to Nuremberg around 16 km from the city. The council made 
payments to servitors for maintaining the ‘system on the Schwabach’ (Ordnung an 
der Schwabach), including the writing of a small book related to this Ordnung (see 
also the significance of the river Nidda for Frankfurt, p. 101).693
688. Pfeiffer, Nürnberg, pp. 80-81; Regesta Boica 11 p. 191 (6.1.1401).
689. Orth, Fehden, pp. 74-75.
690. Dannenbauer, Entstehung, p. 134 n. 919.
691. Rudolf Endres, ’Zur Burgenverfassung in Franken’, in Hans Patze (ed.), Die Burgen im 
deutschen Sprachraum. Ihre rechts- und verfassungsgeschichtliche Bedeutung (Sigmaringen, 
1976), p. 328; Pfeiffer, Nürnberg, pp. 77-78; Schnelbögl, ’Bedeutung,’ p. 283.
692. Pfeiffer, Nürnberg, p. 92.
693. Sander, Haushaltung, p. 471; StAN Rep. 54 12 ff. 75r, 76v; ChrdtSt, ii, 84. See Sander, 
Haushaltung, table 2, for further defensive measures within 15–20 km of Nuremberg.
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Exploiting the potential of rural populations and natural boundaries doubtless 
gave good returns on the investment required, but the highest level of security 
could only be guaranteed by the control of the main castles in a given area. In this 
respect, Nuremberg’s policy was surprisingly restrained (see also pp. 101-103). The 
purchase of the castle at Lichtenau (p. 121) is usually understood as a response to 
the threat posed by the Hohenzollern margraves at Ansbach rather than insecurity 
more generally, and the only other castle in which Nuremberg showed any 
sustained interest was the fortress at Hohenstein, nearly 30 km to the north east. 
This castle did not directly protect any major trade route, but it was a potential 
threat to travellers in the Pegnitz valley both west and north of Hersbruck, as well 
as commanding an area in which Nuremberg’s citizens had many rural properties. 
It was under the lordship of the Wittelsbach dukes of Bayern-Ingolstadt, and rather 
than take outright control Nuremberg relied on its relationship with the nobles 
who held the castle from Bayern-Ingolstadt to effectively neutralize it. 
Between 1430 and 1432 the council paid Mathes von Mangersreuth 50 Gulden 
per year for the ‘opening’ of Hohenstein (meaning that it could be used by 
Nuremberg’s forces whenever they saw fit).694 This did not entirely prevent 
the castle from being associated with local unrest which harmed Nuremberg’s 
citizens.695 In March 1436 Nuremberg wrote to Ludwig VII of Bayern-Ingolstadt to 
inform him that Werner von Parsberg would reply to Ludwig himself concerning 
the ‘redemption’ (losung) of Hohenstein.696 Parsberg was clearly in negotiations 
to take control of the castle by buying out a current (unnamed) pledge-holder. 
He was also at the time a servitor of Nuremberg (see chapter six) and was well-
placed to act as an intermediary between Nuremberg and Duke Ludwig as he 
had previously been active in the service of the latter as well.697 Parsberg was in 
control at Hohenstein by February 1438, when he disputed some accounts with 
694. StAN Rep. 54 9 f. 62r; Sander, Haushaltung, p. 452.
695. BB 9 ff. 105v (30.4.1431), 240v (7.5.1432). See also BB 8 f. 42r (2.6.1428).
696. BB 12 f. 153v (21.3.1436).
697. e.g. BB 5 f. 215r (21.4.1422).
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Mangersreuth.698 Müllner believed that Ludwig VII of Bayern-Ingolstadt offered 
to sell Lauf and Hohenstein to Nuremberg in 1440, before they were captured by 
Albrecht Achilles during Ludwig’s war with his son.699
There was further trouble with the governor of Hohenstein, this time Heimram 
Scholl, in July 1441,700 but in August of the same year the council heard that Georg 
von Wildenstein wished to take control of Hohenstein and become Nuremberg’s 
servitor. Ulrich Haller was tasked with finding out more.701 The deal was done 
in January 1442: Wildenstein was lent 800 Gulden to ‘buy’ (kaufen) Hohenstein 
castle, which would be repaid through a nominal stipend of 200 Gulden per year 
for four years, in return for which Wildenstein opened the castle to Nuremberg 
(this loan was guaranteed by Werner von Parsberg).702 The advantages for both 
sides were clear, but it is important to note that Wildenstein had initiated this 
arrangement. Nuremberg took its opportunities to control Hohenstein castle and 
was willing to invest in doing so, but it did not continually strive to keep the 
castle in its power; furthermore, it also achieved control at Hohenstein solely 
through cooperation with members of the rural nobility.
All of the methods which Nuremberg deployed in its efforts to enhance rural security 
were drawn from a repertoire which provided security solutions for towns throughout 
the German lands. From the thirteenth century onwards we find various attempts to 
limit the construction or reconstruction of castles in the vicinity of towns: at Lübeck in 
1226 (within 15 km of the river Trave along its entire length), via an alliance between 
Rhenish cities in 1273, or through imperial privileges for Schwäbisch Hall in 1339 and 
698. BB 13 ff. 114v-115r (19.2.1438). See also BB 13 f. 206v (7.8.1438).
699. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 346.
700. BB 15 f. 39r (10.6.1441); StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 67r (10.6.1441); RB 1b f. 4r.
701. RB 1b f. 11r (11.8.1441).
702. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 132v (30.1.1442). For Wildenstein in possession of Hohenstein see BB 
15 ff. 260v (14.6.1442), 295v (11.8.1442), 314v (20.9.1442), 367v-368r (7.1.1443).
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Nördlingen in 1398, for example.703 Other towns were more active than Nuremberg: in 
1249 Hildesheim purchased a castle specifically in order to destroy it following incidents 
of ‘robbery and arson’,704 and even Nuremberg’s much smaller neighbour Windsheim 
proceeded very aggressively against castles under the cover of wider conflicts in the 
region ‘in order to be rid of… irritating and often dangerous neighbours’.705 From 
Frankfurt am Main we have evidence of the city enforcing its 1336 privilege against 
new fortifications, towns and tolls within five German miles (c.37 km), though it 
mostly came to an accommodation with nobles who had flouted this ban.706 Ulrich 
Andermann has asked whether towns attempted to ‘demilitarize’ certain areas in the 
interests of their security,707 but this probably overstates the intent, as rural nobles (who 
were inherently ‘military’) were often left in place by towns. The preferred option was 
to co-opt nobles by binding them to the town in some way. At Bremen the normal tactic 
of acquiring ‘open’ castles was coupled with the extraction of explicit promises that 
the castle-dwellers would not harm merchants or commit robbery on land or water.708 
The Hanseatic towns were perhaps the most active group of cities when it came to 
cooperating in alliances against robbery and for the breaking of robbers’ houses.709 
But Frankfurt am Main also mounted multiple expeditions against castles in the later 
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries,710 and from 1432–1448 the city occupied the 
castle of Hattstein – 15 km to the north west in the Taunus hills – until the cost became 
too great and the castle was returned to its original owners.711
703. Lübeck: Demski, Adel und Lübeck, p. 40. Rhenish alliance: Bernhard Kreutz, ’Mainz, Worms 
und Speyer im Spannungsgefüge zwischen Bischof, Adel und Reich um 1300’, in Monika 
Escher, Alfred Haverkamp, and Frank G. Hirschmann (eds.), Städtelandschaft – Städtenetz 
– zentralörtliches Gefüge. Ansätze und Befunde zur Geschichte der Städte im hohen und späten 
Mittelalter (Mainz, 2000), p. 319. Schwäbisch Hall: Wunder, ’Reichsstädte als Landesherrn,’ 
p. 81. Nördlingen: Kießling, Stadt, p. 55.
704. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 199.
705. Gerhard Rechter, ’“difficulteten und beschwerden”. Beobachtungen zum Verhältnis der 
kleineren Reichsstädte Frankens zum niederen Adel am Beispiel Windsheim’, in Rainer A. 
Müller (ed.), Reichsstädte in Franken. Vol. 1: Aufsätze 1: Verfassung und Verwaltung (Munich, 
1987), pp. 298-300, quote at p. 298.
706. Orth, ’Stadtherrschaft,’ pp. 106-107, 109-110; Schneidmüller, ’Territorialpolitik,’ p. 130
707. Andermann, ’Kriminalisierung,’ p. 161; Andermann, Gewalt, p. 206.
708. Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 200-201.
709. See Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 183-185, 238-239.
710. Orth, Fehden, pp. 160-161.
711. Schneidmüller, ’Territorialpolitik,’ p. 127
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From this brief overview we can see that towns in general made no real attempt to 
eject or displace the rural nobility; similar to the ways in which burghers acquired 
rural property, the enhancement of security against robbery happened as much in 
cooperation with nobles as it did in opposition to them.712 The comparison with 
other towns also shows Nuremberg’s policy towards castles in the surrounding 
countryside to have been relatively restrained.713 Nuremberg was fortunate in that 
it did not face any immediately threatening fortifications: the city had in fact grown 
at the foot of and had now incorporated the most imposing fortress in the region 
(the imperial castle), whilst sheer economic power had enabled its citizens to control 
the smaller fortified residences in the immediate vicinity. Beyond this area, the 
council was possibly reluctant to risk an aggressive policy against fortifications, or 
perhaps hamstrung by the lack of existing territorial bases from which to operate. 
Either way, Nuremberg was unlikely to antagonize large numbers of rural nobles 
through routine opposition to their castles. But the city still felt a need to project 
its power into the countryside in order to counteract the threat of robbery. As it 
did not control the region’s network of castles, the council instead ordered regular 
mounted patrols of the countryside, focusing on the important roads. These patrols 
did become a significant point of tension between town and nobility.
Patrols, Arrests and Punishments
Nuremberg’s rural patrols were by no means an anti-noble operation. In the 
first place, they were often led by nobles in the city’s employment (see below 
and chapter six). Neither did they target nobles explicitly. Their objective was to 
counter the actions of general malefactors and peace-breakers, most often referred 
to as schädliche Leute (literally ‘damaging people’).714 This malleable phrase could 
be put to many uses: the towns themselves were labelled ‘schedlich leüt’ by the 
1523 Apology for the Schweinfurt League (see pp. 16-17).715 But the existence of 
712. Also recognized by Andermann, Gewalt, p. 171.
713. Rudolf Endres has made a similar point from a comparison with other territorial powers in 
Franconia: Endres, ’Burgenverfassung,’ p. 328.
714. See Andermann, Gewalt, p. 161
715. Schottenloher, Flugschriften, p. 105.
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such a category of people, defined not so much by any specific crime but by their 
general harm to the common good, was a crucial precondition for the towns’ 
extension of their authority and power into the policing of the countryside – for 
this activity certainly was ‘policing’ in the sense that its aim was to prevent and 
detect crime and to maintain order. However, understandings of criminality and 
of the towns’ right to combat it beyond their walls became extremely contentious 
once the complex reality of rural insecurity began to expose the comfortable 
vagueness of the legitimating concept of schädliche Leute.
The towns typically sought imperial and princely privileges to underpin their 
right to police the countryside; these first appear during the fourteenth century, 
and were frequently reconfirmed.716 The privileges allowed schädliche Leute, 
malefactors (Übeltäter) or robbers (rauber, spoliatores etc.) to be captured by the 
town’s forces either anywhere or within the town’s ‘territory’ (the former was 
most common, and the latter was probably not a reference to any tightly defined 
area).717 There were also differing clauses on whether and where captives could be 
tried and punished: Nördlingen received its right to try malefactors separately in 
1398, and it was normally stipulated that the trial and punishment could only take 
place within the town’s jurisdiction.718 Nuremberg was probably in the vanguard 
of this process, with a privilege against schädliche Leute dating from 1320.719 On 
31 May 1433, at his imperial coronation in Rome, Emperor Sigismund confirmed 
this right to catch highway robbers and punish them in Nuremberg according to 
the council’s judgement, so long as they were not brought to Nuremberg through 
the boundaries (marked by a ditch or a wall) of another capital jurisdiction.720 
Frederick III issued a much more general privilege shortly after his accession 
716. e.g. Berlin, Cölln and Spandau (first mentioned 1317) (Helbig, ’Städte,’ p. 231); Greifswald 
(1321) and Stralsund (1325) (Andermann, Gewalt, p. 160); Nördlingen (1349) (Kießling, 
Stadt, p. 35); Hamburg (1359) (Andermann, ’Kriminalisierung,’ pp. 159-160); (Lübeck 
(1374) (Andermann, Gewalt, p. 159). For privileges issued to Rothenburg and Dinkelsbühl 
in 1398, see Regesta Boica 11 pp. 119 (6.1.1398), 139-140 (3.10.1398).
717. For example, Hamburg was initially privileged ‘infra territorium vestrum’. In 1468 this 
was extended to ‘everywhere’ (allenthalben) (Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 158-159).
718. Kießling, Stadt, pp. 35, 90.
719. Leiser, ’Landgebiet,’ p. 231.
720. Regesta Boica 13, p. 261.
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in 1440: Nuremberg could simply proceed against all those who had harmed 
its citizens as it saw fit.721 But the council knew that such documents could 
only ever form part of the constant effort needed to assert its right to police the 
countryside. The city therefore presented itself as being not only privileged by 
the Empire to arrest suspected robbers, but positively obliged to do so for the 
sake of the Empire, justice and the common good.722 This case was also argued 
from custom.723 All towns were acutely conscious of the need to defend these 
privileges, so that when the nobleman Georg von Bebenburg declared a feud 
against Schwäbisch Hall over a rural mêlée in which twenty-one of his men had 
been taken prisoner and subsequently executed by the town, Ulm described the 
matter to the other leading towns of Upper Germany as an important precedent 
for the right of imperial cities to judge malefactors.724
The right to police the countryside was regularly exercised by patrols of mounted 
men employed by Nuremberg. It is not entirely clear, however, whether these 
patrols aimed chiefly to protect travellers, to make arrests, to gather information or 
to act as a deterrent. In practice they probably did something of all these tasks, but 
it is important to note that the regular patrols were not large enough to seriously 
oppose the very substantial raiding parties which nobles sometimes assembled as 
part of their feuds. The largest contingent recorded during the 1430s and 1440s 
comprised eighteen horses,725 and in general the number could be anything between 
seven and twelve.726 The patrols could range at least 30 km from Nuremberg (for 
instance, westwards to Emskirchen and Markt Erlbach) along any of the major 
roads leading to the city.727 The protection provided for merchants travelling to 
and from the Nördlingen fairs (80 km from Nuremberg) may have taken the 
721. Regesta Imperii 13.14 no. 16 (17.5.1440). See also Müllner, Annalen, ii, 343.
722. e.g. BB 15 f. 80v (9.8.1441); BB 16 ff. 87r (9.7.1443), 107v (14.8.1443).
723. BB 7 f. 118r (26.11.1426): ‘als unsere eltern auf uns bracht haben’.
724. Blezinger, Städtebund, pp. 86-87.
725. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 68r.
726. See the compilation of account entries in Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 491-493.
727. Emskirchen: StAN Rep. 54 11 f. 81r. Erlbach: Sander, Haushaltung, p. 493.
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patrols further afield.728 The transport of wine from the Main valley certainly drew 
Nuremberg’s patrols into the hills of the Steigerwald, at least 50 km from the city.729 
Individual deployments could last up to four days.730 With between 63 and 108 
horses and riders available at any one time,731 Nuremberg had the capacity to 
mount several such patrols simultaneously, and this seems to be the way in which 
the city’s forces were utilized. Other towns and town leagues developed slightly 
different structures: for example, both the Swabian League and Lübeck had forces 
of at least thirty men under the command of a single captain.732 Frankfurt’s efforts 
were directed firmly towards the protection of merchants entering and leaving its 
fairs, and this task consumed 15 per cent of the municipal budget.733
The patrols may have roamed far from the city, but the entire operation was 
minutely controlled from the centre. This can be seen not only from the precise 
accounts which were kept of the patrols’ expenses, but also through the lists of 
‘enemies’ of various kinds which were drawn up by Nuremberg, in common 
with most other towns.734 This administration created a powerful institutional 
memory to support the armed forces which could be just as much a cause for 
concern as the patrols themselves.735 In 1427 Reinhard von Hartheim, governor 
of Wertheim, wrote to Nuremberg to clarify a rumour that his name had been 
entered into a book of schädliche Leute kept by the town (Nuremberg denied 
that this had happened).736 Conversely, there is evidence from Frankfurt of a 
book of feuds being used to confirm that a captured individual was not in fact 
728. e.g. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 68r.
729. Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 491-492.
730. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 68r.
731. Gerhard Fouquet, ’Die Finanzierung von Krieg und Verteidigung in oberdeutschen 
Städten des späten Mittelalters’, in Bernhard Kirchgässner and Günter Scholz (eds.), Stadt 
und Krieg. 25. Arbeitstagung des Südwestdeutschen Arbeitskreises für Stadtgeschichtsforschung in 
Böblingen 1986 (Sigmaringen, 1989), p. 62.
732. Blezinger, Städtebund, p. 17; Demski, Adel und Lübeck, pp. 75-76.
733. Fouquet, ’Finanzierung,’ p. 55; Orth, Fehden, pp. 116-117.
734. The surviving registers from Nuremberg have been published: Werner Schultheiß (ed.), 
Die Acht-, Verbots- und Fehdebücher Nürnbergs von 1285-1400 (Nuremberg, 1960). See 
Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 178, 234-237; Lullies, Fehde, p. 113.
735. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 76 describes writing as ‘another weapon townsfolk were good 
at plying’.
736. BB 7 f. 172v (12.5.1427).
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an enemy of the town.737 Reputation was an important part of the concept of 
schädliche Leute, but it may be too much to claim (with Ulrich Andermann) that 
simply having one’s name written in a book of robbers or outlaws was treated 
as evidence of guilt.738 Probably more worrying was the way in which the urban 
administration undoubtedly targeted particular individuals with patrols on the 
basis of denunciations. For example, in August 1441 the Nuremberg Bürgermeister 
reminded their successors to order patrols against those indicted by Weimar von 
Muggenthal (see no. 11 on p. 156).739
The patrols could gather intelligence and make would-be attackers think twice, but 
they probably had little capacity to actually arrest suspected robbers – especially 
if the accused were nobles, surrounded by retainers and with a fortified residence 
from which to operate. Hans von Wildenstein was arrested for robbery after 
entering Nuremberg on a safe conduct provided by the Palatine administration 
at Amberg,740 but most nobles needed to be taken from their castles and other 
fortifications. This form of arrest obviously had much in common with the breaking 
of castles as a preventative measure against robbery and as a demonstration of 
peace-keeping power (see pp. 174-175). Indeed, if a castle was suspected of housing 
robbers anyone caught within it was likely to be treated as such.741 Conversely, to 
make the siege of even a small fortification worthwhile the fortification itself had to 
be of interest, unless the robbers housed within were especially notorious.
But sometimes Nuremberg’s forces did break into a nobleman’s residence simply 
in order to arrest him. This was the fate of Weimar von Muggenthal, who was taken 
from his father’s ‘house’ (hawse) at Eichenhofen (probably near Parsberg, in the 
southern Upper Palatinate) along with two servitors. The servitors were released, 
but Muggenthal was executed on 11 August 1441.742 He had earned Nuremberg’s 
737. Orth, Fehden, p. 104.
738. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 243.
739. RB 1b f. 15r.
740. BB 3 f. 85v (28.10.1410); Voit, Wildensteiner, p. 10.
741. Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 248-250.
742. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 82v; BB 15 f. 82v; ChrdtSt, x, 160 n. 5.
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enmity by attacking the councillor Paul Grundherr and the municipal secretary 
Johann Marquard and robbing them of a silver beaker whilst they were travelling 
to the royal court in Austria as Nuremberg’s representatives in a dispute between 
the council and the house of the Teutonic Order in the city.743 Some property 
was also taken by Nuremberg in the attack on Eichenhofen, and Muggenthal’s 
‘better horse’ was later sold for 40 Gulden.744 This was probably the stallion which 
Weimar’s brothers Lienhard and Hans later claimed as their own,745 whilst Ottilie 
von Muggenthal wrote that Berthold Volckamer had promised her, in her ‘grief’ 
(trubsal), that Nuremberg would return the property which was taken; he denied 
any knowledge of this.746 Hans von Muggenthal was still pursuing claims for 
compensation more than three years later.747 This suggests that Nuremberg was 
essentially able to brush off any repercussions from the attack on Eichenhofen. 
But it was also most probably only a lightly defended house, and other targets 
required full military expeditions: for instance, the war against Hans and Fritz 
von Waldenfels (see pp. 295-298) and the Swabian League’s expedition against 
castles in the Altmühl valley in 1446, in which Nuremberg participated.748 These 
expeditions, with the associated looting and burning, had the character of counter-
feuds rather than policing operations, and did not necessarily lead to the capture 
of those accused of robbery. This forced the council to offer bounties: 2,000 Gulden 
for Hans and Fritz von Waldenfels alive, or 1,000 Gulden for the pair dead.749
What really distinguished Nuremberg’s ‘policing’ from noble feuding was an 
outcome that involved some kind of judicial punishment. The penalty for robbery 
was death, but the execution of a noble was obviously a matter of enormous political 
sensitivity. Regina Görner found almost no evidence for punishments of any sort in 
743. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 82v.
744. ChrdtSt, x, 160 n. 5.
745. BB 15 f. 113v (4.10.1441).
746. BB 15 f. 113r (4.10.1441).
747. BB 17 f. 192v (19.1.1445).
748. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 383.
749. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 370. See also Regesta Boica 12 p. 244 (11.4.1416) and Egloffstein, 
Chronik, p. 123.
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Westphalia,750 and Elsbet Orth concluded from her study of Frankfurt that knights 
(unlike their servitors) were rarely executed after they had been captured for robbery, 
chiefly because of the many interventions on their behalf from powerful figures.751 
But sometimes towns tried to circumvent the diplomatic difficulties of an execution 
by carrying it out before any requests for clemency could arrive. In 1474 Hildesheim 
executed Henning Rekeling even before a proper executioner could reach the town, 
as the council knew that the duke of Brunswick would intercede for Rekeling.752
Essentially the same haste was shown by Nuremberg as they pushed for the 
execution of Wilhelm von Elm by Rothenburg ob der Tauber between October and 
December 1441. Elm had attacked Nuremberg citizens on at least three occasions in 
the course of feuds against other opponents, and in June 1441 his victims had been 
dependents of the prominent councillor Berthold Volckamer (see nos. 3, 4 and 12 on 
pp. 154 and 157). Thus when Rothenburg besieged the castles of Ingolstadt (south 
of Würzburg) and Giebelstadt and captured Elm at the former, Nuremberg wrote 
to express their great pleasure (begirlichen frewden) before they had even received 
Rothenburg’s official report.753 But the council soon feared that a forthcoming 
diet at Mergentheim would delay the case against Elm in Rothenburg, and that a 
settlement might even be reached at the diet; they urged their representatives in 
Rothenburg (Karl Holzschuher and Berthold Volckamer) to push for a hearing as 
soon as possible, and to keep the diet at Mergentheim secret from the Rothenburg 
authorities.754 Over a fortnight later Nuremberg suggested that Rothenburg should 
at least interrogate the prisoners, as they would learn what would be ‘worthwhile 
and necessary for all imperial towns to know’.755 Then on 2 December Nuremberg 
was finally able to thank Rothenburg for news of the execution of Wilhelm von 
Elm, tipping the messenger a pound of new Haller.756
750. Görner, Raubritter, pp. 251-258.
751. Orth, Fehden, p. 33.
752. Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 307-308.
753. BB 15 ff. 124r (25.10.1441), 125r (26.10.1441).
754. BB 15 ff. 126v-127r (30.10.1441).
755. BB 15 f. 138r (17.11.1441): ‘das allen Reichstetten nutz und notdurft wer zuwissen’.
756. BB 15 f. 147r.
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The only noble to be executed in Nuremberg during the 1440s was Weimar 
von Muggenthal, on 11 August 1441.757 He is known to have been in prison 
in Nuremberg from 9 August, and he was kept in the ‘loch’, the small prison 
beneath the city hall which also hosted interrogations using torture.758 Margrave 
Albrecht Achilles, Bishop Albrecht of Eichstätt and Counts Wilhelm and Ulrich 
of Oettingen all intervened on Weimar’s behalf, and Nuremberg replied to them 
on 9 August with nothing more than an assertion of the city’s obligation to the 
Empire and to the common good to capture suspected robbers.759 The same 
justification was used post hoc in a reply to Albrecht III of Bayern-München, with 
the additional mention of Nuremberg’s imperial privilege to capture robbers and 
allow justice to proceed against them.760 In both letters the council mentioned 
Weimar’s ‘many’ robberies on the imperial highways, contrary to God, honour 
and justice, though only the one attack on Grundherr and Marquard is recorded.
Muggenthal was beheaded, which represented an act of mercy in comparison 
to death by breaking on the wheel, the prescribed punishment for robbery.761 
This was suffered on 8 October 1434 by the nobleman Peter von Leonrod for 
the murder of ‘Red Hans’ and possibly further killings.762 Other executions 
of nobles by Nuremberg are scattered throughout the late Middle Ages, from 
Eppelein von Gailingen (of later legend, see p. 24) in 1381763 to Friedrich von 
Giech in 1490764 and Sebastian von Seckendorff-Nold in 1512.765 Of the executions 
carried out by other towns, it is worth mentioning that of Georg von Riedheim, 
757. BB 15 f. 82v; StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 82v. On 24 July 1447 a Hans von Steußlingen was executed 
for robbery in Nuremberg, and he may have been a member of a Swabian noble family 
(Müllner, Annalen, ii, 389; BB 18 ff. 295v-296r (24.7.1447)).
758. BB 15 f. 80v (9.8.1441); RB 1b f. 14r.
759. BB 15 f. 80v (9.8.1441).
760. BB 15 f. 86v (16.8.1441).
761. Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 309-310.
762. Sander, Haushaltung, p. 504; BB 11 f. 167v (20.12.1434). Müllner, Annalen, ii, 315.
763. Pfeiffer, Nürnberg, p. 77.
764. Joseph Morsel, ’”Das sy sich mitt der besstenn gewarsamig schicken, das sy durch die 
widerwertigenn Franckenn nitt nidergeworffen werdenn”. Überlegungen zum sozialen 
Sinn der Fehdepraxis am Beispiel des spätmittelalterlichen Franken’, in Dieter Rödel 
and Joachim Schneider (eds.), Strukturen der Gesellschaft im Mittelalter. Interdisziplinäre 
Mediävistik in Würzburg (Wiesbaden, 1996), p. 162.
765. Rechter, ’Verhältnis zwischen Niederadel und Städten,’ p. 133.
187
governor of Höchstädt, by Augsburg in February 1441. This actually took place 
at Donauwörth after Augsburg’s forces had ambushed Riedheim as he left that 
town, where he had spent time under safe conduct.766 There were many more 
executions of nobles’ retainers as well. These included at least nine ‘helpers and 
spies’ of the Waldenfels brothers,767 two retainers of Georg von Egloffstein in 1441 
and 1444,768 a servitor of Paul von Streitberg called Hans Stübich,769 and Hans 
Engelhard, a retainer of Georg von Wildenstein.770 Some of these cases attracted 
almost as much political attention as those of nobles, with the Counts Palatine 
Otto and Ludwig both intervening for Hans Engelhard. Feuds were commenced 
or further aggravated in response to executions of retainers, for example a feud 
by Hilpolt von Fraunberg in 1413 (related to the execution of his servitor Wilwolt 
Römer) and Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg’s response within an existing feud 
to the execution of Hans Frank for stealing from churches (see below, p. 193).771 
Further retainers of nobles were arrested and imprisoned for serious crimes 
such as robbery and then released on a promise not to exact revenge (Urfehde),772 
whilst the eventual outcome of a number of cases is unknown.773 The overall 
numbers were not large, and executions of nobles themselves were certainly 
infrequent – though this can hardly have diminished the importance of the 
event when it did occur. And although widely spaced on average, executions 
of nobles were potentially more damaging for town-noble relations when they 
happened to cluster together, such as the cases of Georg von Riedheim, Weimar 
von Muggenthal and Wilhelm von Elm in 1441.
766. Blezinger, Städtebund, pp. 69-70.
767. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 369, 376.
768. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 351-352, 370.
769. BB 18 ff. 32r (5.9.1446), 39r (10.9.1446), 43r (13.9.1446). Müllner, Annalen, ii, 383.
770. BB 18 ff. 414v (24.12.1447), 417v (29.12.1447), 424v (5.1.1448), 443v (29.1.1448), 475r (24.2.1448), 
492v-493r (26.3.1448). Müllner, Annalen, ii, 393.
771. Fraunberg: StAN Rep. 2c 16 ff. 5r (28.2.1413), 40r-v. Schwanberg: BB 16 ff. 86v-87v (9.7.1443).
772. e.g. BB 15 ff. 49v-50r (20.6.1441); StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 68r; StAN Rep. 2a 896 (27.6.1441). BB 17 
f. 247v (31.3.1445).
773. e.g. BB 17 ff. 150r (13.11.1444), 153r-v (17.11.1444). BB 18 ff. 1r-v (14.7.1446), 3r-v (18.7.1446); 117r 
(7.12.1446), 118v-119r (12.12.1446); 236v (11.5.1447).
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Nobles’ Reactions
Although only a small number of ‘robbery’ cases came to any sort of judicial 
end, nobles’ reaction to the towns’ overall policing policy began with the patrols 
in the countryside. Nobles themselves were also patrolling the roads, in various 
capacities: on 7 December 1441 Kaspar von Hayn, captain of Freyburg (Unstrut, 
in Saxony), supposedly chased Nuremberg citizens travelling to the annual fair 
at Halle (Saale) into a village and then obliged them to pay for a horse he said 
had been injured in the pursuit.774 Sometimes Nuremberg’s patrols encountered 
groups of nobles in the countryside, with considerable potential for confusion 
and misidentification. In December 1429 Albrecht von Egloffstein complained 
that Nuremberg’s men had chased him on horseback. In reply, Nuremberg 
denied ordering a patrol directed against Egloffstein in particular, and the town’s 
servitor Peter Heidenaber gave his version of events: he and his companions 
were stationed in a village when some other mounted men came across them, 
and immediately fled. So Heidenaber and the others chased after them, without 
knowing their identities. Only when both groups reached another village and 
spoke to one another did the men from Nuremberg realize whom they had been 
following.775 In October 1447, a similar incident occurred involving the noble 
Paul von Streitberg. Nuremberg’s servitors claimed that whilst stationed near 
Bamberg they moved to investigate four unknown riders, who also made off at 
speed. The pursuers from Nuremberg only managed to get their hands on a boy, 
who refused to say who the riders were.776 In 1443 Sigmund von Seckendorff 
alleged that Nuremberg had stationed men in order to ambush him, and that these 
men had shot his horse and chased after him.777 The Swabian nobleman Hans von 
Rechberg described in 1453 how two groups of his own retainers had failed to 
recognize each another in the field and had chased one another until their horses 
were too tired to continue. They then came across a group of the Swabian towns’ 
774. BB 15 f. 157r (16.12.1441).
775. BB 8 ff. 209v-210r (19.12.1429).
776. BB 18 f. 365r (16.10.1447).
777. BB 16 ff. 129v-130r (19.9.1443).
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servitors, who attempted to arrest one of Rechberg’s men. Rechberg alleged that 
once his men had been cornered in a church, the towns’ servitors tried to poison 
them.778
Clearly it was very easy for misunderstandings to arise between groups of armed 
men in the countryside. In light of this, it is not surprising that we find a certain 
number of nobles writing to Nuremberg to express a suspicion, perhaps also 
a fear, that the council was targeting them with its patrols. From the council’s 
replies we learn that between 1440 and March 1448 Nuremberg was accused by 
eighteen separate nobles of having them personally followed or watched.779 Some 
of these nobles made multiple allegations. Another five (at least) complained 
on behalf of others allegedly followed or captured by Nuremberg’s patrols.780 
Nuremberg never admitted to following any one noble in particular, though it 
did not explicitly deny the complaint from Sigmund von Seckendorff that he had 
been chased and shot at. Otherwise, the city council usually explained that its 
patrols were simply protecting the roads in general, and that any incidents were 
accidental. In a few cases, the allegation seems to arise from a conflict in which 
Nuremberg was only tangentially involved. For instance, Christoph Notthafft 
zum Weißenstein accused Nuremberg of ordering their servitor Nicholas Grieß 
to tail him,781 when Grieß was already in a serious dispute with Notthafft on his 
own, personal account (see pp. 145-146). The context of other allegations is at 
the moment unknown. Certainly none of the nobles concerned, with the partial 
exception of Sigmund von Seckendorff (see pp. 148, 169, 295), are recorded as an 
enemies of Nuremberg at the time of the alleged patrols.
778. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, p. 233.
779. BB 14 f. 351v (8.4.1441). BB 15 ff. 6r-v (28.4.1441), 17r (18.5.1441), 29v (31.5.1441), 96r (30.8.1441), 
307r, 308v (11.9.1442). BB 16 ff. 56r (7.5.1443), 59v-60r, 61r (11.5.1443), 64r (15.5.1443), 65r, 
67r-v (20.5.1443), 84v (28.6.1443), 93v (19.7.1443), 107v (14.8.1443), 129v-130r (19.9.1443), 262v 
(31.3.1444), 265v-266r (3.4.1444). BB 17 ff. 25v (16.5.1444), 143v (4.11.1444), 219r (19.2.1445), 
245v (27.3.1445). BB 18 ff. 348r (20.9.1447), 365r (16.10.1447), 376v (27.10.1447), 452v-453r 
(10.2.1448). StAN Rep. 2a 948 (2.12.1443).
780. BB 16 ff. 114v-115r (28.8.1443). BB 17 ff. 14v-15r (4.5.1444). BB 18 ff. 1r-v (14.7.1446), 3r-v 
(18.7.1446), 117r (7.12.1446), 188v-189r (13.3.1447). See also the cases of Hans Stübich and 
Hans Engelhard, nn. 769-770 above.
781. BB 16 f. 84v (28.6.1443).
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Nobles often prefaced their accusations with the explanation that they had 
heard it rumoured that Nuremberg was following them, or that they had been 
told of this ‘secretly’. Coupled with the fact that none of the alleged incidents 
can be situated in a known conflict directly between Nuremberg and the noble 
concerned, this detail seems telling. Nuremberg may of course have had reasons 
to hide the extent of its policing activity where it could, and we have already seen 
that the council did target individual nobles (who may in turn have had reason 
to fabricate charges). But the evidence from the civic accounts suggests that most 
patrols were general deployments in a particular area or to protect particular 
groups of merchants, whilst also ranging widely across the countryside in small, 
highly mobile groups. These could easily be understood by nobles engaged in 
feuding activity as a threat, which a noble could have tried to forestall by obliging 
the council to confirm or deny any particular intent against them personally: 
a public denial of animosity would reduce the council’s freedom to prosecute 
a nobleman if he did fall foul of one of the patrols. Undoubtedly there were a 
number of false allegations and disingenuous denials, but the credibility of these 
relied on the many incidents of simple misunderstanding and on noble concerns 
about the patrols in general.
There are also indications that the allegations were stoked not just by fear and 
suspicion, but also by anger and resentment. They all contained the implicit 
accusation that Nuremberg’s behaviour was secretive, underhand and therefore 
dishonourable. Sometimes these charges were made explicit. Hilpolt von 
Fraunberg accused Nuremberg of tailing him ‘in body and property… more by 
night than by day’ and of breaking an agreed peace by stationing men outside 
his castle;782 Georg von Schaumberg suggested that Nuremberg planned to 
ambush him and treat him roughly;783 Hans von Rabenstein accused the city 
782. StAN Rep. 2c 16 ff. 5r (28.2.1413) (‘nach meinen leib und gut stellt mer bey nacht dann bey 
tag’), 39r.
783. BB 16 f. 262v (31.3.1444): ‘wir bestellt haben sullen, Wa euch die unsern überreiten, euch 
unfruntlichs zubeweisen’.
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of plotting against his ‘body and honour’;784 Hans von Crossenawe complained 
that he had left Nuremberg in a state of friendship with the city, but the council 
had still posted men ‘on every road, pass and way’ to tail him.785 Nuremberg 
twice denied having secret plans to capture Hans von Rabenstein,786 and the 
city’s feud opponents Fritz von Egloffstein and Fritz von Waldenfels alleged that 
Nuremberg was plotting their deaths.787 These more specific allegations were not 
necessarily misunderstandings – some were almost certainly fairly accurate in 
terms of the basic facts – and the anger, real or simulated, is very clear from the 
language. Around the end of the fifteenth century, the feuding nobles Konrad 
Schott and Christoph von Giech raised the rhetoric to a new level by describing 
Nuremberg’s retainers as ‘hunting dogs’ (hetzrüden) and Giech himself as a ‘poor, 
hunted nobleman’.788 Meanwhile, Paul von Absberg calmly thanked Margrave 
Friedrich for alerting him to danger from Nuremberg’s retainers, and said he 
would be glad to harm them on the margrave’s behalf however he could.789
One brief but telling exchange also reveals nobles’ resentment towards the 
justice which some of their number received in Nuremberg. In December 1434 
Nuremberg’s town clerk, Johannes Dumm, was sent to Hohenburg on the river Inn 
east of Munich, residence of Georg von Fraunberg, to negotiate the release of the 
burgher Jakob Auer. (Auer was accused by another noble, Hans von Villenbach, 
of complicity in the murder of Villenbach’s brother.) Johannes Dumm stayed with 
Fraunberg for some time waiting for an answer to Nuremberg’s request that Auer 
be freed, until he approached Fraunberg’s bailiff to demand one. The bailiff replied 
that he could see no way that Auer could be found guilty unless, as he feared would 
happen, Villenbach could produce six other men prepared to swear to Auer’s guilt. 
According to a common legal custom, the resulting seven oaths would be enough 
784. BB 15 f. 17r (18.5.1441): ‘nach ewerm leib und eren’.
785. BB 17 f. 25v (16.5.1444): ‘nachdem und ir in guten freuntschafft von uns geschiden seit, alle 
strasse, steig und wege verlegen und auf euch halten haben lassen’.
786. BB 15 f. 29v (31.5.1441). BB 17 f. 219r (19.2.1445).
787. Egloffstein, Chronik, p. 121. BB 18 f. 348r (20.9.1447).
788. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 27. Seyboth, ’“Raubritter” und Landesherrn,’ pp. 123-124.
789. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 100.
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to convict him. ‘My God,’ responded Dumm, ‘We hope that it is not the law of this 
court that one stranger may convict another with seven oaths.’ The bailiff replied: 
‘But you in Nuremberg convict men with your knives.’ Dumm informed the bailiff 
that his masters in Nuremberg did not execute anyone who was not guilty.790 The 
bailiff – not himself a noble, but the head of a noble’s household – was clearly 
accusing Nuremberg of practising summary justice, and given the status of the 
speaker and the context of the widespread suspicion of Nuremberg’s policing 
activities it seems that the bailiff was criticizing summary justice against nobles. 
Nuremberg had in fact executed the noble Peter Leonrod just a few months earlier 
(see p. 186 above), though the bailiff made no explicit reference to this event.
From a modern perspective, the justice dispensed by Nuremberg against noble 
robbers does appear to have been extremely rough, at least in a procedural sense. 
Ulrich Andermann points out that we should not confuse unwritten with ‘formless’ 
procedure, but also argues that standard court proceedings could not deal with 
’increasing criminality’, including robbery by nobles, and were replaced by an 
essentially inquisitorial process which became virtually arbitrary.791 As Andermann 
himself notes, however, we have barely any evidence for the actual judicial procedure 
which followed an arrest,792 whilst it seems unlikely that ‘increasing criminality’ 
was in fact straining the system. What concerned contemporaries was not the way 
in which the interrogation and trial were conducted, but the interpretation of the 
distinction between feud and robbery. Nobles reacted with anger and often violence 
when a town deployed police and judicial measures within what they considered 
to be a genuine feud. On the Upper Rhine, Hans von Rechberg responded to 
Basel’s executions of his followers by drowning randomly selected prisoners and 
allowing their bodies to float downstream to the city; he argued that he had been 
pursuing a ‘chivalrous war’ (ritterlicher krieg triben) and that Basel should have 
790. StAN Rep. 2c 22 f. 3r-v: ‘do iah ich wir hoffen zu got, das es der Schrannen Recht hie nicht 
seÿ das kein gast, den andern über sybenden müg, do sprach er nu über sibendt doch Ir 
die leute mit ewern messern do iah ich mein herren Rechtfertigen nÿemande Er hab dann 
mercliche schulde auf Im’.
791. Andermann, Gewalt, pp. 274, 289-290.
792. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 306.
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fought likewise, instead of involving the hangman.793 Rechberg warned Ulm in 
1452 that if the town executed his men, he would cease to behave as a knight and 
would kill any prisoners he took.794 In the same vein, the Bohemian Hynek Krušina 
of Schwanberg accused Nuremberg of hanging Hans Franken in an ‘open feud’ 
and thereby starting a ‘hangman’s war’ (hennkender kriege).795
But none of this implies that Nuremberg was fighting with judicial weapons 
against feuding per se. All towns formed a tightly-defined space within which 
substantial security measures could be enacted with a reasonable degree of success, 
and the urban authorities may well have wished to recreate these conditions in the 
countryside.796 But we know that they only tried to do so in relation to the roads. 
We have already seen that Nuremberg suggested that nobles should make their 
attacks elsewhere, ‘where one ought to strike one’s enemies’ (see p. 172). The feud 
was only to be contained, not stamped out. Elsbet Orth argues that the elimination 
of feuding was not in the interests of the towns (even if it had been possible), as 
it would have compromised their independence.797 Although towns very rarely 
declared offensive feuds, their ability to do so was worth something, as it carried 
the threat of the devastating force which a powerful town could bring to bear. Nor 
did they have any need to sacrifice the institution of the feud to the battle against 
insecurity in the countryside so long as this insecurity could be interpreted as 
robbery rather than feuding. From the townsperson’s point of view, it must very 
often have seemed that this was indeed what they were experiencing.
Nobles operated with exactly the same fundamental distinction between licit and 
illicit violence (feud and robbery), but their differing self-interest led them to apply 
it in different ways. We can see this most clearly in the 1523 Apology pamphlet (see 
pp. 16-17), in which the nobility’s spokesman (Cuntz Frenckel) insists that the 
793. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, p. 222 n. 17.
794. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, pp. 223-224.
795. BB 16 ff. 86v-87v (9.7.1443).
796. Andermann, Gewalt, p. 173 and Görner, Raubritter, p. 168 contend that they did.
797. Orth, Fehden, p. 140.
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nobility have just as much reason as anyone else to oppose robbery, as it renders 
nobles insecure in their own castles and villages.798 Questions from his interlocutor 
Marckhans give Frenckel several opportunities to assert that the Schweinfurt League 
of nobles had sworn not to support peace-breakers, and that the league therefore did 
not oppose the recent castle-breaking expedition of the Swabian League, despite being 
formed expressly in opposition to this and similar actions.799 The difficulties faced by 
nobles in ideologically countering the towns’ measures against robbery could not 
be better exemplified: they cannot openly oppose the combatting of robbery, and 
so how can they then oppose the destruction of castles which this entails? Frenckel 
therefore offers other explanations for the actions of the Swabian League – as part of 
the towns’ schemes to seize all power in southern Germany – and the conversation 
remains focused on the malicious intentions of the towns, without further reference 
to the fundamental dilemma inherent in the nobility’s inability to distance itself 
sufficiently from ‘robbery’ to be able to neutralize the towns’ self-righteous narrative 
about smashing robbers’ nests and bringing peace to the countryside. The author of 
this pamphlet was forced to retreat into conspiracy theories and tit-for-tat insults, 
as he could not deny the need to resist robbery in general, whilst a defence of each 
individual feud would have been exhausting and ultimately fruitless.
Conclusion: insecurity and ideological control
In this chapter we have encountered (for the first time in this study) a serious clash 
of interests between town and nobility. There was barely any scope for them to agree 
on which particular actions constituted legitimate force and which represented 
illicit violence, as the same violence by which nobles sought to defend and advance 
their interests was intensely damaging to the interests of towns such as Nuremberg, 
even when individual towns and nobles were not directly opposed to one another. 
Yet this clash remained precisely a clash of interests. There is no evidence that it 
developed into a wider struggle either over the fundamentals of rural security or 
over the fundamental right of recourse to legal self-help through the feud.
798. Schottenloher, Flugschriften, p. 107.
799. Schottenloher, Flugschriften, p. 105.
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Townspeople and nobles cooperated extensively to ensure security in the 
countryside, and in this respect their interests aligned sufficiently to help 
maintain a creaking and barely adequate system of security through safe conduct. 
But this cooperation was also always a relative sideshow, partly because of the 
ineffectiveness of the safe conduct system, but more because the towns’ main 
partners and rivals in the business of rural security were the princes. Disputes over 
safe conduct with nobles could only ever remain very localized, whereas those 
between towns and princes could become a matter for politics at the imperial 
level. At the Nuremberg diet of 1444 the envoys of Frankfurt am Main had some 
difficulty obtaining confirmation of the privilege which allowed them to patrol 
the roads around their city when the royal chancellor Kaspar Schlick raised the 
possibility that this might be inappropriate: ‘the princes want to protect their 
roads themselves’, he suggested.800 
Eventually, of course, Frankfurt received its privilege.801 Motivated by pure self-
interest and deploying mostly naked force, the towns gained at least parity with 
the princes as de facto guardians of rural security. This powerful intrusion into 
the countryside generated in some ways remarkably little conflict with the rural 
nobility. It was chiefly noble violence, in the form of feuding, which the towns 
wished to combat, but the countryside did not become a running battle between 
the forces of feuding and policing. This was in part because the two were not 
inherently opposed. Both townspeople and nobles recognized that some violence 
needed to be controlled and that some was permissible. The only question was: 
which particular violence could be labelled as either feud or robbery?
The law was clear, and we have witnessed Haupt von Pappenheim spelling it out with 
absolute certainty and conviction. But the law was also at the mercy of the subjectivity 
of those enforcing it. This was generally the towns, wherever they were not restrained 
by the princes. It seems clear that the nobility were, in this respect, both militarily 
800. RTA 17 no. 228k (6.9.1444): ‘die fursten wollen selbst ir straißen schuren’.
801. Regesta Imperii 13.4 no. 85 (4.10.1444).
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and ideologically on the defensive. Their military defeats were usually of only short-
term significance, however: destroyed castles could be rebuilt, and feuds thwarted 
in one location could be pursued elsewhere. The ideological battle was much more 
dangerous. The feud was not dying or even remotely weakened as an idea, but it 
was still impotent against the towns’ arsenal of the Empire and the ‘common good’, 
coupled with persons defined as ‘harmful’ to these untouchable ideals. The feud was 
too individual to oppose these collective values, though of course the importance of 
individual feuds to the success and survival of individual nobles was what sustained 
the feuding system. So noble frustration at the obstacles placed in their way by 
the towns – which were mostly minor irritants, but were sometimes deadly – was 
channeled into a restrained but occasionally explosive resentment to which a close 
reading of the Nuremberg sources offers a rare point of access.
Nuremberg’s policing of the countryside was a genuine threat to nobles: physically, 
materially, and to their social role as protectors and lords in the countryside. 
Although their anger was not always an outburst of raw emotion, it was a reaction 
to a perceived threat and a provocation. The hard reality of this resentment is also 
suggested by the places in which we find it expressed: in brief, to-the-point letters 
to the Nuremberg council, and in such chance records of day-to-day interaction 
as the snatch of conversation between the bailiff and the town clerk. It is not 
immediately present in the set-piece statements of noble antagonism towards the 
towns, such as the Complaint of the Rightful Lordship of the Nobility. In the previous 
chapter we were compelled to ask why the Complaint focuses on ‘towns, castles, 
lands, people and property’, when there is limited evidence for conflict between 
townspeople and nobles as rural lords and plentiful records of their cooperation 
in this sphere. Now that we have clear evidence for conflict over authority in 
the countryside in another form, we can begin to consider the possibility that 
the ‘castles and lands’ are to a large extent reifications of a less tangible power 
exercised by the towns in the countryside, which many nobles feared and resented 
but could not always openly oppose without entering into a difficult relationship 
with fundamental values which they and townspeople both shared.
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5.
COMMUNITIES AND 
COMMUNICATION
The interdependence of town and country which we have explored in the 
preceding chapters was the foundation for various forms of community which also 
extended beyond the rural and urban social and economic system into political 
action and customs. Nuremberg and many members of the rural nobility were 
both fully integrated into some of these communities, but the communities also 
extended beyond them to embrace third parties who could have a considerable 
influence on relations between townspeople and nobles. The most significant 
actors in this respect were of course the princes, from the emperor to local 
magnates and prelates. The communities as a whole were anything but neutral 
in terms of town-noble relations, and it is in this category of relationships that 
we see some of the greatest extremes of conflict and cooperation. We will see 
very clearly that the towns were not islands in a feudal sea with which they had 
nothing in common, but it will also be apparent that closeness did not necessarily 
bring harmony. Communities in themselves were therefore highly ambivalent 
structures so far as relations between townspeople and nobles were concerned: 
did this ambivalence translate into a similarly ambivalent coexistence in town-
noble relations more widely, or did certain aspects of the multifaceted communal 
relationships loom larger than others?
The answer to this question will depend heavily on the quality of communication 
and the strength of networks between townspeople and rural nobles. We might 
reasonably suppose that good communication and network structures would 
have helped to diffuse the inevitable tensions, whilst failures in these areas could 
have exacerbated them. This must therefore be our first area of investigation, 
before we consider how townspeople and rural nobles made use of the networks 
to which they had access. The influence of third parties poses an interpretative 
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problem throughout this part of the study – how far did townspeople and nobles 
subordinate their interests to those of others, or indeed use third parties to 
advance their interests? This issue will be directly addressed in the final section 
of the chapter, as we turn to look at the influence of princes on relations between 
Nuremberg and the rural nobility through the particular case of Margrave 
Albrecht of Brandenburg-Ansbach.
Another aspect of ‘communal’ relations between townspeople and nobles was the 
business community which transcended any divide between town and country 
and formed partnerships between the economic strengths and resources of the 
two. The Briefbücher and other sources which form the backbone of this study 
are not well suited to a thorough investigation of this subject, and no judgements 
can be made here about its vitality or depth. Certainly there were many credit 
relationships between townspeople and nobles (including nobles who provided 
credit to burghers), though these could be more about cementing political 
partnerships than investment.802 We need to look further for clear evidence from 
Nuremberg of genuine business partnerships in the mining sector,803 but such 
partnerships certainly were established in sheep farming. Both land for grazing 
and the sheep themselves were used as forms of credit and investment.804 It is 
important to note the possibility of these relationships, although their extent 
cannot yet be assessed.
Contact and Communication
The communities into which Nuremberg was bound functioned necessarily 
through channels of communication. Structures and techniques of communication 
were all the more important in relationships between townspeople and rural 
802. On noble creditors see BB 16 ff. 40v-41r (5.4.1443), 58r (9.5.1443); BB 17 ff. 252v-253r (7.4.1445). 
Also Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, p. 217.
803. See Schubert, Herrschaft, p. 11; Hahn, ’Landadel und Stadt,’ p. 295.
804. See BB 1 ff. 148r (16.9.1406), 155v (9.11.1406). BB 18 ff. 390v-391r (19.11.1447). StAN Rep. 15 
11 (24.8.1434). Regesta Boica 13 pp. 13-14 (25.6.1423), 165 (10.11.1429). Dietrich Deeg, Die 
Herrschaft der Herren von Heideck. Eine Studie zu hochadeliger Familien- und Besitzgeschichte 
(Neustadt an der Aisch, 1968), p. 115.
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nobles as social distances between them needed to be bridged. We have already 
seen that the two formed quite distinct social groups, that the nobility were 
constantly present but never firmly established in the town, and that townspeople 
were very much at home in the countryside but unable to agree with the nobility 
on what constituted legitimate violence in that space. Communication had to 
cross these divides and conflicts of interest; we will see that the message did not 
always come through unscathed. Poor communication leading to mistrust is one 
of the characteristics of the relationship between town and nobility identified 
by Klaus Graf: it aided the escalation of Cold War-style tensions between two 
ideologically polarized camps (see above, pp. 33-34).805 But the nature of our 
sources also suggests that a brief study of communication between Nuremberg 
and the rural nobility will prove worthwhile. The Briefbücher offer an invaluable 
perspective on all sorts of communication: written communication naturally, but 
also oral communication. In addition, they reveal a society deeply marked by 
miscommunication.
Means and Places of Communication
Nuremberg’s importance as a regional commercial centre ensured that it was also 
a significant communication space. Nobles could of course send envoys to the 
town or request formal hearings before the council when they had particular 
grievances or concerns, but there were also opportunities to converse with 
townspeople in the course of more general visits to the city. We have already seen 
(pp. 66-70) that nobles held many events in the town as organized groups and 
societies and that these events included intercourse with burghers as the nobles’ 
hosts and guests at dinners and dances, as spectators at tournaments, and in 
other contexts. But the meetings between townspeople and nobles in Nuremberg 
of which we hear via Nuremberg’s letters seem to represent individual visits 
805. Graf, ’Feindbild und Vorbild,’ pp. 126-127.
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by nobles with unknown business in the town.806 One small window on to an 
acrimonious meeting is provided by a letter from September 1440, in which 
Heinrich Imhoff of Nuremberg claimed to have politely asked the wife of Diewald 
Zebinger (from an Austrian family prominent in the regime of Frederick III) to 
leave his house after she insulted his guest, and denied Diewald’s allegation 
that he pushed her down the stairs.807 On other occasions a face-to-face meeting 
in Nuremberg could clear the air. Whether the meeting was arranged for this 
purpose or whether it was more fortuitous is never clear, but the latter possibility 
is strongly suggested by the events of February 1443, when Johann von Heideck 
claimed that the councillor Karl Holzschuher had accused his servitor of robbery. 
Nuremberg had prepared a written reply when Johann came to town and received 
a satisfactory answer from Holzschuher.808 We can see from the way that oral 
messages were mentioned and discussed in Nuremberg’s correspondence that 
the two frequently complemented one another, but there is the possibility that the 
resort to writing sometimes represented a failure of less formal and more direct 
forms of communication.
Opportunities for townspeople and nobles to meet outside of Nuremberg seem 
to have been largely conditioned by the structures of the wider communities to 
which both belonged. All of the meetings between citizens and nobles from the 
period 1440–1448 for which a location is known took place in princely residence 
towns or administrative centres (Amberg, Bamberg, Eichstätt, Gunzenhausen, 
Kulmbach, Stuttgart, Würzburg).809 Sometimes we learn that the meeting did 
806. References to meetings between townspeople and nobles in Nuremberg with no known 
context: BB 14 f. 262v (27.10.1440 – Albrecht Gottsmann and Hans von Wiesenthau); BB 15 f. 
11v-12r (6.5.1441 – Heinrich von Plauen – see also StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 9v-10r and loose letter 
in same file dated 13.7.1443); BB 17 ff. 69r (15.7.1444 – Heinrich von Gera), 106r (16.9.1444 
– Hintze Pflugk); BB 18 ff. 318v (12.8.1447 – Albrecht Notthafft), 322r (16.8.1447 – Hans 
Küchenmeister von Nordenberg).
807. BB 14 f. 237r-v (12.9.1440). There was a long-running dispute between Diewald and various 
members of the Imhoff family: Regesta Boica 13 pp. 388-389 (6.11.1436); BB 14 f. 323r 
(27.2.1441).
808. BB 16 ff. 16v-17r (15.2.1443).
809. BB 14 ff. 145r (4.3.1440 – Gunzenhausen), 313v (6.2.1441 – Bamberg), 354v (12.4.1441 
– Kulmbach); BB 15 ff. 4v (26.4.1441 – Würzburg), 131v (4.11.1441); 205v-206r (7.3.1442 – 
Stuttgart); BB 17 f. 105v (16.9.1444 – Amberg).
201
indeed take place on the fringes of a princely court or other assembly.810 Citizens 
of Nuremberg, and especially members of the inner council, were only very 
rarely dispatched as envoys to rural nobles.811 The town’s servitors generally 
functioned as intermediaries (see chapter six). But at princely courts in the vicinity 
of Nuremberg (especially those of the Hohenzollern margraves at Cadolzburg 
and Baiersdorf) nobles could probably reckon on an opportunity to speak with a 
member of Nuremberg’s elite. Not all nobles had access to these courts, however, 
and aside from the city itself there was no forum in which townspeople and nobles 
could regularly make direct contact with one another which was not controlled 
by a third party. Nobles with links to Nuremberg’s service clientele (see chapter 
six) were able to correspond with individual councillors,812 and applicants for 
employment by Nuremberg often addressed themselves to a prominent member 
of the civic elite.813 Demand for places in Nuremberg’s service outstripped supply, 
and nobles doubtless hoped to increase their chances of success with a direct 
appeal to an influential figure within the city. But exactly how these contacts 
were made and how well-developed they were is unclear.
By introducing a medium and intermediaries (messengers and envoys), writing 
made communication more unstable and less secure than was possible in a face-
to-face meeting. It was common for letters to go astray, and (more significantly) 
it was easy to exploit the hazards of writing in order to deliberately sabotage 
communication. Both Nuremberg and its noble correspondents frequently 
commented that they had not received letters they were expecting or which had 
supposedly been sent.814 The most common reason given by the council for the 
non-delivery of a letter was that the noble’s messenger had not waited to take 
810. BB 14 f. 354v; BB 15 f. 131v.
811. e.g. BB 5 f. 88v (3.10.1420); BB 15 f. 12r (6.5.1441).
812. Mathes von Mangersreuth and Stephan Koler: BB 9 ff. 88r (6.2.1431), 110r (14.5.1431), 134r 
(3.8.1431). Johann von Heideck and Paul Grundherr: BB 16 ff. 46r (15.4.1443), 88v (15.7.1443). 
Friedrich von Künsberg and Karl Holzschuher: BB 17 f. 221r (22.2.1445).
813. BB 17 ff. 35v (1.6.1444), 105v-106r (16.9.1444), 188r (7.1.1445). Probably also: BB 16 f. 106r-v 
(13.8.1443); BB 17 ff. 106r (16.9.1444), 244r (23.3.1445); BB 18 f. 385r-v (10.11.1447).
814. e.g. BB 9 f. 131r (20.7.1431). BB 11 f. 173v (3.1.1435). BB 15 ff. 205v-206r (7.3.1442). BB 17 ff. 
17v-18r (10.5.1444), 77r-v (20.7.1444).
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the answer with him;815 they might also claim that the answer had been delayed 
for some good reason,816 that a third party connected to the noble had refused to 
receive the letter on his behalf,817 or that the letter had been entrusted to travellers 
setting out in the right direction who had promised to see that it was delivered.818 
One letter, in which Nuremberg refuted an allegation by Hans von Streitberg that 
they were having him followed, details a whole sequence of miscommunications: 
after Streitberg had written and spoken to Bürgermeister Konrad Paumgartner, 
the council wrote a reply but did not give it to Streitberg’s messenger, as he did 
not request it; they instead intended to give the letter to Streitberg’s brother, who 
(they had heard) was in Nuremberg at the time. But he turned out to have left the 
town. So the council gave the letter to the burgher Fritz Keiper, who reported that 
he had delivered it along with other letters. But ‘in case’ Hans had not received 
this letter (as he claimed he had not), Nuremberg repeated their message.819 Some 
tangles of this sort may have been less innocent than they are presented, and we 
have clear evidence that communication difficulties could awaken or entrench 
suspicion: the council alleged that the messenger of their feud opponent Georg 
Auer was ordered to leave the city before they could hand him their reply, and 
that Nuremberg’s messenger could not locate Auer because he ‘did not want 
to be found’.820 The same accusation (of deliberately evading a reply) was also 
levelled at Rudolf von Bopfingen.821
Communication between the town and the rural nobility was generally 
remarkably smooth, but was always at risk – not just as a conduit of meaning, 
but also as a carrier of trust. Neutral spaces were invaluable, but in practice 
this meant spaces which were controlled by princes whose relations with both 
townspeople and nobles were changeable and often troubled. Nobles’ visits to 
815. BB 5 f. 171r (31.10.1421). BB 9 f. 131r (20.7.1431). BB 11 f. 173v (3.1.1435). BB 16 f. 63r (15.5.1443).
816. BB 17 ff. 94v (12.8.1444), 183r-v (29.12.1444).
817. BB 14 ff. 118v-119r (10.2.1440). BB 17 f. 221r (22.2.1445).
818. BB 5 f. 171r (31.10.1421). BB 15 f. 247r-v (13.5.1442).
819. BB 15 f. 6r-v (28.4.1441).
820. BB 18 ff. 442r-443r (26.1.1448).
821. BB 14 ff. 118v-119r (10.2.1440).
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Nuremberg also presented opportunities, but reliance on these visits ensured 
that communication would be erratic and ultimately under the council’s control. 
Writing was clearly indispensable, but the quantity of writing produced only 
magnified its unreliability. The unceasing flow of letters from Nuremberg’s 
chancery could also be a problem in itself. As part of his feud against Nuremberg 
around 1500, the noble Konrad Schott captured the city councillor Wilhelm Derrer 
and cut off his right hand; in the version related by the Nuremberg chronicler 
Heinrich Deichsler, Derrer originally extended his left arm, but Schott insisted on 
the right, so that Derrer would write him no more letters (so schreibstu mir keinen 
brief mer).822 Schott is here made to display his irritation at Nuremberg’s letter 
writing, for which he would have had good reason as a feud opponent of the city. 
But since any utterance made during a feud was a public statement – and since 
these words may in any case have been put into Schott’s mouth as something he 
would be likely to say – it is worth asking whether or not the sentiment might 
have resonated more broadly. There is indeed some evidence that nobles found 
Nuremberg’s communication difficult or troubling, perhaps even infuriating.
Information and Suspicion
However smoothly communication functioned, it was inevitable that townspeople 
and nobles would often be lacking information about one another. This was not 
necessarily representative of a lack of communication altogether: the council and 
certain nobles regularly exchanged news about wider political events, especially 
during the Hussite Wars and the 1444 Armagnac threat.823 Nuremberg was 
clearly valued by nobles as a source of news about the king and events in general: 
Johann von Leuchtenberg, for instance, asked for a report on ‘business’ (wandel) 
at Nuremberg.824 Occasionally the council asked nobles other than those in its 
822. ChrdtSt, xi, 605. See Zmora, State and nobility, p. 28.
823. BB 6 ff. 99v (22.7.1424), 192r (17.8.1425). BB 8 f. 232r-v (11.2.1430). BB 9 ff. 178r (27.11.1431), 193r 
(27.12.1431), 210r-v (6.2.1432), 231r (9.4.1432). BB 10 f. 38 (30.8.1432). BB 11 f. 28 (12.5.1434). 
BB 14 f. 123v (15.2.1440). BB 17 f. 114r-v (6.10.1444). StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 1 (23.1.1432), 2v-3r 
(20.3.1432), 4r-v (31.3.1434). RTA 17 no. 225/11 (22.9.1444).
824. BB 3 f. 198 (4.1.1412). Also BB 17 f. 32v (25.5.1444).
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employment for information on particular issues in their regions,825 and received 
some apparently unsolicited announcements and warnings.826 But mostly this 
exchange took place within existing relationships: news items and requests for 
information were usually appended to letters dealing with other business, and 
the nobles involved were generally well-known to the council; they were for 
the most part Nuremberg’s partners in various regional and imperial political 
communities. Where nobles were less well connected to the town, both sides 
could display a fundamental ignorance of one another. Nobles were sometimes 
unsure exactly which of their fellow nobles were active in Nuremberg’s service,827 
and when Nuremberg first heard of the robbery committed against citizens of 
Windsheim by members of the Waldenfels family (a prominent lineage in Upper 
Franconia) the council had to undertake thorough research (unser erfarung so wir 
fleislichst gemugt haben tun lassen) in order to be able to report to Windsheim on the 
location of the Waldenfels’ castles and on their political affiliation.828 Lichtenberg 
– the Waldenfels’ main residence – is over 110 km from Nuremberg, but it was 
close to the main trade routes to Leipzig and Poland, and just three years later 
Nuremberg would lay siege to the castle there. Yet at the point of first encounter 
the council was apparently unaware of its location.
Given these gaps in basic knowledge and the unreliability of communications 
in general, it is no surprise that townspeople and nobles were often unsure of 
each other’s intentions and attitudes. This generated intense and possibly self-
nourishing fears and suspicions. Nuremberg was especially wary of numerous 
gatherings of armed nobles supposedly assembling in the countryside. Sometimes 
these were said to be under the leadership of a prince or princes, though mostly 
no particular leader was known or mentioned. Some were clearly attributed 
to the nobility, however. In April 1440 Nuremberg warned its satellite towns 
825. BB 6 ff. 112r (16.9.1424), 167v (30.4.1425). BB 16 f. 106v (13.8.1443). StAN Rep. 54 11 f. 69r; Rep. 
54 12 f. 76v.
826. BB 16 f. 28r-v (8.3.1443).
827. BB 3 f. 249v (6.8.1412); BB 5 f. 114v (14.2.1421).
828. BB 14 f. 354v (12.4.1441).
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Windsheim and Weißenburg that its envoys had been informed at various courts 
of numerous gatherings amongst the nobility (adel), and that the imperial towns 
ought to be on their guard.829 The towns communicated vigorously amongst 
themselves about these assemblies, and Nuremberg dispatched around eighty 
letters to various correspondents about these threats between 1440 and March 
1448. But the council’s fears that hostile armies were assembling rarely seem to 
have been realized. Undoubtedly many of these ‘gatherings’ were little more 
than rumours.
Nobles in turn had their own particular and recurring suspicions about 
Nuremberg’s activity. We have already seen that many nobles were apparently 
worried about the city’s rural ‘policing’ operations, and almost as many expressed 
suspicion that the town was undertaking espionage against them or another 
noble. During our core period of 1440 to March 1448 at least nineteen nobles 
accused individuals of being Nuremberg’s agents or ‘secret servants’ (heimliche 
Knechte).830 These allegations were – naturally – all refuted by Nuremberg. But it 
is worth noting – in parallel with the pattern of allegations about rural patrols 
– that hardly any of these suspected spies can be aligned with a known conflict 
between the town and the noble(s) involved. Only the suspicion which fell on 
Kilian Leinecker, Nuremberg’s ‘host’ at Schorndorf in Württemberg, can be 
clearly linked to the conflict with members of the Urbach family from the same 
area.831 Some further allegations may have been stimulated by the wide-ranging 
Waldenfels feud in the first half of 1444, but the only clue here is geographical 
proximity.832 We know for certain that in the early sixteenth century Nuremberg 
did employ the impecunious nobleman Lorenz von Leuzenbrunn to report back 
829. BB 14 f. 158r (4.4.1440).
830. BB 14 ff. 211r (26.7.1440), 216v-217r (8.8.1440); BB 15 ff. 31d (5.6.1441), 40v (12.6.1441), 84v 
(14.8.1441), 119v (16.10.1441), 221v (23.3.1442), 323v-324r (11.10.1443); BB 16 ff. 175v (11.12.1443), 
192r (8.1.1444); BB 17 ff. 8v (20.4.1444), 10v (24.4.1444), 19r (12.5.1444), 108v (19.9.1444); BB 18 
ff. 57r-v (24.9.1446), 447v (3.2.1448); BB 19 f. 1v (28.3.1448). StAN Rep. 54 11 f. 67v.
831. BB 14 ff. 216v-217r (8.8.1440). StAN Rep. 54 11 f. 67v.
832. BB 17 ff. 8v (20.4.1444), 10v (24.4.1444), 19r (12.5.1444).
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on the activity and speech of his fellow nobles even during peacetime,833 but the 
alleged ‘heimliche Knechte’ of the 1440s are different in that they are probably all 
of non-noble status. Did Nuremberg really maintain a network of covert agents 
throughout the surrounding countryside, or are we in fact witnessing nobles who 
doubted both the loyalty of some of their retainers and the good intentions of the 
city, and conflated the two perceived threats? Either way, suspicion apparently 
ran deeper than its occasional moments of crystallization in specific allegations.
Other nobles expressed a more general suspicion that Nuremberg was in turn 
suspicious of them. The council denied allegations of this sort from at least 
twenty-eight nobles between 1440 and March 1448.834 Some of these were clearly 
connected to the feud with Hans and Fritz von Waldenfels,835 especially the 
Waldenfels brothers’ capture of Nuremberg’s servitor Peter Motter.836 In all other 
cases where the context of the alleged suspicion is mentioned or can be deduced, 
the issues involved relate to rural violence by nobles (i.e. feuding and ‘robbery’).837 
Nuremberg also denied having any enmity towards many nobles, sometimes 
in response to a specific allegation.838 This was often coupled with or replaced 
by a positive assurance of good relations.839 In various ways, nobles frequently 
wrote to Nuremberg to inquire about their standing with the town to achieve one 
fundamental end: they wanted the council’s ‘security’, a written assurance from 
833. Joseph Morsel, La noblesse contre la ville? Comment faire l’histoire des rapports entre nobles et 
citadins (en Franconie vers 1500)?, Habilitation diss. (Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), 2009), pp. 
279-304.
834. BB 14 ff. 160v (9.4.1440), 164v (18.4.1440), 174v (16.5.1440), 250v-251r (7.10.1440), 301v-302r 
(4.1.1441), 329r (10.3.1441); BB 15 ff. 79r (8.8.1441), 137v (16.11.1441), 351v (24.11.1442); BB 16 
ff. 54r (4.5.1443), 63r (15.5.1443), 178r (13.12.1443); BB 17 ff. 13v-14r (4.5.1444), 18v (12.5.1444), 
22v (13.5.1444), 24v-25v (16.5.1444), 59r-v (3.7.1444), 94v (12.8.1444), 112v (4.10.1444), 148r-v 
(12.11.1444), 219r (19.2.1444); BB 18 ff. 2v-3r (18.7.1446), 72v-73r (8.10.1446), 178r (28.2.1447), 
279v (27.6.1447), 317v (11.8.1447), 350r (22.9.1447), 365r (16.10.1447), 376v (27.10.1447).
835. BB 17 ff. 18v (12.5.1444), 94v (12.8.1444), 219r (19.2.1444).
836. BB 18 ff. 350r (22.9.1447), 365r (16.10.1447), 376v (27.10.1447).
837. Specific attacks: BB 14 ff. 301v-302r (4.1.1441); BB 15 ff. 79r (8.8.1441), 137v (16.11.1441); BB 
18 ff. 2v-3r (18.7.1446), 178r (28.2.1447), 317v (11.8.1447). General attacks on roads: BB 14 f. 
329r (10.3.1441); BB 17 f. 22v (13.5.1444). Feuds: BB 16 f. 178r (13.12.1443); BB 17 ff. 13v-14r 
(4.5.1444).
838. e.g. BB 14 ff. 187r-188r (11.6.1440), 239v-240v (17.9.1440); BB 15 ff. 1 (21.4.1441), 96v 
(30.8.1441), 190r-v (16.2.1442), 238r (4.5.1442); BB 17 ff. 74v (15.7.1444), 100r-101r (1.9.1444), 
148v (12.11.1444), 206v-207r (3.2.1445); BB ff. 72v-73r (8.10.1446).
839. e.g. BB 17 ff. 183r-v (29.12.1444), 206v-207r (3.2.1445).
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the council that it was not undertaking anything against them.840 Nobles were well 
aware that the council’s word did not necessarily mean that they were safe from 
Nuremberg’s attentions, but the statement in itself was worth having as it limited 
the council’s room for manoeuvre to some extent, and made subsequent action 
against that noble harder to justify within feuding conventions, which decreed 
that all enmities must be openly declared. For its part, the council was obliged 
to give the noble the requested reassurance if it was not reasonably certain that 
it might wish to open hostilities with him, as the request for security carried the 
implicit (sometimes explicit) threat of a feud if it was refused.841 In line with its 
usual circumspect policy, the council only admitted its suspicion of a noble on 
two interrelated occasions during our period in the 1440s.842
Nobles might therefore have exaggerated their fear or suspicion in order to 
effectively intimidate the council into granting them its security by giving the 
impression that they considered themselves to have nothing to lose by declaring 
a feud if security was refused. Hence the many vague references to rumours and 
hearsay which had supposedly caused the noble to believe that he was suspected 
(see also the similar accusations about rural patrols, pp. 189-191 above). But the 
underlying reality is that nobles were concerned that their feuding activity or 
reputation could cause them to fall foul of Nuremberg’s rural policing operation, 
and they sometimes saw a need to forestall this threat. There probably was a certain 
amount of genuine suspicion, especially about possible espionage (tellingly, it is 
the retainers close to the nobles who are the real subject of their fear, not the 
distant town), but the crux of the matter was how Nuremberg communicated 
the security which a noble demanded. It had to be clear and unambiguous, and 
Nuremberg’s writing did not always offer quite the sort of clarity that nobles 
required.
840. As well as denying suspicion and enmity and assuring good relations, Nuremberg 
frequently issued explicit statements of security. Some examples: BB 17 ff. 28r-v (20.5.1444), 
41v (8.6.1444), 241r (19.3.1445).
841. e.g. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 350-351.
842. Concerning Hans and Georg von Egloffstein: BB 17 ff. 65r (10.7.1444), 67r-v (13.7.1444); 
Müllner, Annalen, ii, 369.
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Messages and Meanings
Nuremberg’s chancery used a series of set phrases in order to assure nobles of their 
security, and was only ever specific about times and places in relation to the safe 
conducts which the council issued for the duration of particular negotiations. But 
some nobles were clearly unhappy with this lack of specificity. In 1434 Eberhard 
von Dottenheim attacked a convoy of merchants in the area of Uffenheim, targeting 
(so he later claimed) merchants from Straubing, but also taking a large amount 
of cloth which was claimed by citizens of Nuremberg.843 The council outwardly 
hoped for an amicable solution, and informed Dottenheim that it knew of nothing 
other than good relations with him at that time (using one of the chancery’s 
formulae: wir wissen sust zu disen zeiten mit ewch nicht zuschicken haben denn guts).844 
Dottenheim replied sarcastically that much time passes in one day (daz gar vil zeit 
in dem tag hingeet), and demanded that Nuremberg give him an assurance that 
they would not attack him without fourteen days’ notice, warning that otherwise 
he would be forced to take measures he would rather avoid.845 Shortly afterwards 
Dottenheim did declare a feud on the grounds that Nuremberg’s answer to his 
request for security contained ‘hidden words’ (verdeckte worte).846
Other nobles claimed that they could not ‘understand’ Nuremberg’s assurances of 
security, though with less drastic consequences.847 Like Dottenheim, these nobles 
probably wanted Nuremberg to be more specific, whilst the council refused to 
restrict its freedom to act to the extent that the noble demanded. The demand 
placed the council on the defensive, and nobles who wanted a more detailed 
assurance of security (or who wanted an excuse to declare a feud) pressed home the 
advantage. Late in 1444 Heinz Röder, a noble from the Vogtland district between 
Franconia and Saxony, wrote to Nuremberg claiming that he had ‘often’ heard 
843. StAN Rep. 2c 23, especially ff. 2r-v (30.10.1434), 3r-v (4.12.1434), 4r (31.1.1435), 84r (4.10.1434).
844. StAN Rep. 2c 23 ff. 5v-6r (16.2.1435).
845. StAN Rep. 2c 23 f. 6r (19.2.1435).
846. StAN Rep. 2c 23 f. 6v (7.3.1435).
847. BB 5 f. 226v (3.6.1422 – Thomas von Rosenberg); BB 16 f. 93v (19.7.1443 – Christoph Notthafft); 
BB 17 f. 266r (27.4.1445 – Weigel Strobel).
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that he was ‘insecure’ in relation to the city; the council replied with a standard 
denial of enmity.848 Nearly two years later, in October 1446, Nuremberg received 
Röder’s reply, in which he declared a feud against Nuremberg on the grounds that 
the council had replied to his request for security with ‘hidden words’ (verdackte 
worte). The council in turn accused Röder of capturing pilgrims from Nuremberg 
(see pp. 164-165, 298-299).849 It is not clear whether Röder hoped by this aggressive 
stance to acquire another assurance of security from Nuremberg, or whether he 
wished to establish a post hoc justification for his capture of the pilgrims; but 
in either case it is interesting that he chose to pursue his objective by accusing 
Nuremberg of duplicitous communication, just as Eberhard von Dottenheim had 
accused Nuremberg of using ‘hidden words’ alongside his detailed objection to 
the lack of specificity in Nuremberg’s assurance of security.
This assault on the trustworthiness of Nuremberg’s writing, used by two nobles 
with residences over 200 km apart from one another, was apparently one which 
held some promise of success as a justification for opening hostilities. This would 
be crucial for the outcome of any resulting conflict, which would be decided in 
one way or another by princes or by the noble’s peers. Even when the stated 
grounds for the feud were not wholly genuine, they always had to be plausible. 
In these particular cases, other nobles needed to agree that Nuremberg might 
use ‘hidden words’. We have seen that nobles might well have suspected the 
city of seeking to aggressively police the countryside under the cover of vague 
assurances of security, but why the direct attack on the council’s use of language? 
Certain observable differences between the writing styles of the council and those 
of rural nobles offer one possible explanation.
It is of course in one sense misleading to compare the writing of the council with 
that of individual nobles, as the two are the results of very different processes. But 
this difference is the crucial factor. Nuremberg’s letters are clearly the products 
848. BB 17 f. 148v (12.11.1444).
849. BB 18 ff. 72v-73v (8.10.1446).
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of a sophisticated bureaucracy which had model letters and formulaic phrases 
available for every recurring aspect of the city’s correspondence. In this way, an 
order from the council to issue a particular type of letter could easily be realized 
by the chancery staff. Nobles, on the other hand, would have had at most a 
smaller team of secretaries, and appear to have dictated at least some of their 
correspondence. Certainly some of the letters written by nobles which ended up 
in Nuremberg’s archives bear strong marks of individuality. This is particularly 
the case for those written by Nuremberg’s Bohemian feud-opponents Hynek 
Krušina of Schwanberg and Aleš of Sternberg, whose letters are fortuitously 
preserved in the special files relating to their feuds which were compiled by the 
civic authorities.
Aleš and Hynek’s letters are sometimes repetitive, and they are peppered with 
interjections such as ‘as God is my witness’, in contrast to the relentlessly measured 
language employed by Nuremberg. Hynek, for instance, tells Ulrich of Rosenberg 
that he cannot come to a diet in Prague because ‘as God is my witness, the gout is 
killing me, and I cannot come’ (das waiß got daz mich die gicht zerpricht und kan nicht 
kumen).850 This particular letter is marked in the feud file as having been translated 
from Czech, but the invocation of God and the explicit reference to a named illness 
clearly distinguish its language and register from those used by Nuremberg and its 
citizens (at least those letters from citizens which were recorded in the Briefbücher). 
For instance, Berthold Nützel excused himself from a meeting on the grounds that 
he had become ’somewhat unwell’ (so ist mich… etwas kranckheit angestossen).851 
Aleš of Sternberg makes no effort to disguise his anger in his letters concerning 
his dispute with Margarete Pirgerin (see above, pp. 74-75). He describes ‘how that 
Gredel [Margarete] is making a great turmoil in my affairs’, and fumes that ‘I have 
never earned [such treatment] from you [the council], and I hope never to deserve 
that you should allow the evil old bag (bösen hawt) to cheat me in this way, that 
she should so harass me with her spite, when I hope that I am more to be believed 
850. StAN Rep. 2c 27 f. 13r (11.2.1442).
851. BB 12 ff. 204v-205r (28.5.1436).
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than she’.852 Even when we make some allowance for the interface between Czech 
and German in these cases the difference is still clear, especially when we consider 
that Sternberg in particular was a significant political figure (he called himself a 
‘weighty man’853) who regularly moved in imperial circles, including at diets in 
Nuremberg. His colourful letters were not those of a backwoods rustic, but of a 
cosmopolitan nobleman making an unambiguous statement.
We can make some more immediate comparisons between the letter-writing habits 
of Nuremberg and of certain nobles. The ways in which the two threatened one 
another, for instance, could be very different. Nuremberg’s standard threat against 
its feud opponents was an extremely veiled warning that unless the noble withdrew 
their feud the council would have to consider the matter ‘as it is’, i.e. as potential 
robbery. For instance, when Ulrich von Oettingen declared a feud against Nuremberg 
in February 1440 the council replied that they could not consider his feud to be 
legitimate and that if any harm came to any Nuremberger ‘we would be obliged to 
consider it and regard it as it is in itself’.854 Of course, the threat which ultimately 
lay behind these rather anaemic words was the town’s police patrols and judicial 
procedure, leading potentially to execution as a highway robber. Aleš of Sternberg, 
characteristically, was more direct concerning his dispute with Margarete Pirgerin: 
‘If this is not settled as I have described to you above, I will have to consider the 
possibility that your burghers will not be able to travel freely through Bohemia, and 
that those who travel to Bohemia will have to pay for this, which as God knows 
I would really rather not do’.855 This is not to say that nobles were not capable of 
veiling their threats just as ominously as the council did (for instance, Eberhard von 
852. StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 2v-3r: ‘…mir die Gredel groß werren macht In meinen sachen… und 
ich habe es umb euch nye verschult und ungern wider euch verschulden welde, daz ir der 
bösen hawt ein sollichs uber micht gestattet, daz sie Iren mutwillen so mit mir treiben sol, 
wann ich hoff mir sey baß zu gelawben denn Ir’.
853. Rep. 2c 19 f. 28v: ‘als ich denn Ein Swerer man byn’.
854. BB 14 f. 125r (17.2.1440): ‘so müsten wir es von unsrer notdurfft wegen dafür halten und 
haben als es am Imselbs ist’.
855. StAN Rep. 2c 19 f. 6r (9.4.1437): ‘wer daz mir das nicht wurde vericht so als ich euch oben 
geschriben hab so must ich darauff gedencken, daz die ewern nicht hetten ein freyen zug 
durch Beheim, uncz mir das ye betzalen müsten die die gen Beheim zihen, und got weiß 
daz ich das gar ungern tet’.
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Dottenheim: ‘you will force me to take measures which I would rather avoid’856), but 
nobles were always more likely, and indeed better able, to be more direct, because 
they were speaking as individuals rather than as a corporate bureaucracy.
Even when there was no particular difference in register, the whole manner 
of writing employed by the town could differ from the practice of even one of 
Nuremberg’s closest noble allies. In June 1448 Margrave Albrecht Achilles sent a 
bluntly threatening letter to Konrad II von Heideck, ordering him to cease work on 
a mine. This was to become the trigger for the war the following year, and given that 
Achilles had been in dispute with Heideck and Nuremberg since at least November 
1447, Heideck had every reason to take the threat very seriously.857 He wrote to one 
of Nuremberg’s leading councillors, Karl Holzschuher, with a warning of a reported 
muster by Achilles, and a request for advice on the composition of his reply:
Also dear Karl, I enclose a transcript of a letter sent to me by Margrave 
Albrecht, as well as a draft of my reply, but which I do not wish to send 
without your advice. And I beg of you that you will inform me in writing 
if you think that anything therein should be improved or altered. For 
this I would be much indebted to you.858
To which Karl Holzschuher replied:
I do not doubt that Your Honour knows best how to deal with your 
affairs	according	to	your	situation,	but	if	Your	Grace	would	like	to	use	
more honourable words (mer ersamer wort) in your reply, whilst still 
making clear and not omitting the main issue, I have composed a text of 
my own and enclosed it here. I leave it for Your Honour to expand upon 
or to condense as pleases you and meets your needs, and I beg that you 
accept this from me in good faith.859
856. StAN Rep. 2c 23 f. 4r: ‘so dringt Ir mich zu sachen, der ich gern uberhaben wer’.
857. See BB 18 ff. 386v-387r (15.11.1447).
858. StAN Rep. 15a 102 5 (19.6.1448): ‘Auch lieber Karl schicke Ich dir hiemit ein abschrift eins 
briefs den mir Marggrave Albrecht zu geschickt hat Auch die antwortt die ich dorüber 
begriffen. aber doch on deynen Rate noch nicht hin hab geen lassen Und bit dich ob dich 
yendert dorinn gedewcht die zu bessern odern verandern mich das schriftlich wissen 
lassen Das stet mir gar In gut gein dir zuerkennen’.
859. StAN Rep. 15a 102 5 (20.6.1448): ‘zweifelt mir nicht ewr edel wisse ewr notdurfft nach 
ewrer gelegenheit nach dem besten fürczunemen, Ob aber ewr gnade etwas mer ersamer 
wort in söllicher ewrer antwurt wölt geprawchen, damit Ir doch in der hawptsache ewr 
notdurfft wol meldet und nicht begébet, als Ich ein schrift von mir selbs begriffen und 
hiereyn geslossen han. das setz ich zu ewr edel zu mindern und zu merren nach ewrer 
notdurft und gefallen und bitt das also gütlich von mir zuvernemen’.
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Both Heideck’s and Holzschuher’s drafts are also preserved.860 Holzschuher changed 
none of the substance of Heideck’s letter, but he did make it 28 per cent longer by 
expanding the salutation and the summary of Achilles’ letter, and by softening the 
tone of the demand that Achilles drop his case against Heideck. Holzschuher turned 
Heideck’s somewhat blunt response into a more polished text which followed the 
rules of the Nuremberg chancery. It stands to reason that Heideck would have had a 
less sophisticated chancery at his disposal, and this is certainly the impression given 
by the two letters. Heideck was not the only noble to ask for letter-writing advice 
from Nuremberg: in October 1444 the council had advised Friedrich von Künsberg 
on the content of his reply to the bishop of Bamberg, and later they expressed their 
approval of a reply of his to Hans von Hirschhorn.861
Although nobles might have valued and even sought to imitate the style of 
Nuremberg’s chancery, this style was in general more verbose and less direct 
than the writing which nobles often produced themselves. There is no doubt that 
Nuremberg’s letters were intended to be clear and unambiguous just as much as any 
noble’s (which is to say that any ambiguity was deliberate), but a comparison of the 
two styles potentially exposed Nuremberg’s writing to charges of duplicity. And it 
was not just the communication of Nuremberg’s bureaucracy that nobles sometimes 
had difficulty in dealing with; the bureaucracy’s personnel were sometimes an 
obstacle to mutual understanding as well. When the town clerk Johannes Dumm 
was negotiating with Georg von Fraunberg to secure the release of Jakob Auer (see 
pp. 190-191 above) he was accompanied by one of Nuremberg’s noble servitors, 
Rudolf von Eben. As the discussions reached an impasse, Fraunberg said to Dumm:
‘Hans, don’t take this personally, but I must speak with Rudolf von Eben 
alone.’ And he said to Rudolf: ‘You’re an old courtier (hofmensch), and 
you know the manners of court types, come here and let me speak with 
you’. And so he spoke with him for a good while.862
860. StAN Rep. 15a 102 5.
861. BB 17 ff. 136v-137r (30.10.1444), 154r-v (18.11.1444).
862. StAN Rep. 2c 22: ‘hanns habts nicht in übel, Ich musse mit Rudolffen von Eben in sunderheit 
reden. Und iah zu Im Rudolff du bist ein altes hofmensch, du waist der hofflewt gewonheit 
wol, gee her laß mich mit dir reden, Also redet er ein gute weil mit Im.’
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It is not at all clear that one of the patrician councillors would have received the 
same treatment as Dumm, but it is readily apparent that an important member of 
the civic bureaucracy was felt unable to understand the nuances of communication 
between nobles. It was men such as Dumm who wrote Nuremberg’s letters, and 
they operated within an administrative space which was more detached from 
their masters than could ever have been the case for a noble’s secretary. Nobles 
knew that Nuremberg spoke to them through its bureaucracy – especially when 
relations were tense, and more had to be communicated in writing – and this may 
have created an impression that the town’s words were muffled or slippery. This 
made credible the dramatic accusations that Nuremberg used ‘hidden words’, 
and introduced further fragility into Nuremberg’s relationships with nobles 
within the political communities on which the council otherwise relied to sustain 
more direct forms of communication.
Political Communities
The town of Nuremberg began life as a subordinate member of an imperial 
community, literally and figuratively in the shadow of the royal castle. By around 
1300 members of the town’s elite were acting as partners of kings as well as their 
subjects, providing finance for the wars of Albert I.863 In 1340 a royal Landfriede 
in Franconia recognized Nuremberg as a full member of the regional political 
community at the highest level, alongside princes and leading nobles.864 But 
Nuremberg had wider horizons too, and the city’s supra-regional role as a link 
between Bohemia and the western parts of the Empire was an important factor 
behind its extremely profitable partnership with the Luxemburg dynasty in the 
second half of the fourteenth and the early fifteenth centuries. One of the final 
tangible benefits to accrue to Nuremberg from this relationship was the arrival in 
1424 of the imperial insignia, sent by order of King Sigismund for perpetual safe-
keeping beside the Pegnitz (see also above, pp. 62 and 70). Nuremberg’s status 
863. Pfeiffer, Nürnberg, p. 39.
864. Gerhard Pfeiffer (ed.), Quellen zur Geschichte der Fränkisch-Bayerischen Landfriedensorganisation 
im Spätmittelalter (Munich, 1975), pp. 28-30.
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as the most imperial of all imperial cities was thereby emphatically underscored, 
whilst the interaction of the Luxemburg partnership with Nuremberg’s industrial 
and commercial prosperity ensured the city’s place amongst regional power 
brokers long before the council had bought out the last vestiges of Hohenzollern 
overlordship in 1427.
Nuremberg was therefore closely bound into multiple political communities 
despite – and to some extent because of – its relative independence from the 
Empire and from local strongmen. Certainly the city’s independence was a 
reflection of its status as a regional power in its own right and of its value to 
kings and emperors even though it lay outside of their core dynastic territories. 
The outlook and circumstances of patricians, merchants and the whole civic 
population were deeply conditioned by their city’s undeniable political weight 
and by its self-proclaimed role as a cornerstone of the Empire. Nobles too were 
members of these communities: some on their own account, but most in a more 
or less subordinate role as servants and counsellors of princes and kings. The 
bonds of community brought Nuremberg and these nobles closer together, at 
times narrowing the social divides between the two, but also generating friction.
However, a defining feature of the 1440s was the weakness of these communities, 
particularly those which had the potential to unite townspeople and nobles. 
Frederick III, the new Habsburg emperor, had less use for Nuremberg in a 
geopolitical sense, and at the start of his reign he had fewer opportunities than 
his Luxemburg and Wittelsbach predecessors to intervene in the Empire beyond 
his dynastic lands. The last document to be issued by a Franconian Landfriede 
had appeared in 1416.865 The Hohenzollern burgraves and margraves had all but 
withdrawn from the city, occasional festivities not withstanding, and now the 
aggressive policies of Margrave Albrecht Achilles were driving wedges between 
himself and many of his neighbours, including Nuremberg. The Briefbücher 
testify to the council’s alarm at the perceived lawlessness and disorder in the 
865. Pfeiffer, Landfriedensorganisation, p. 27.
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Empire at the time. But the old communities were beyond recall, and those 
which remained available were of dubious value. Despite the many commercial 
and personal links between different cities, Nuremberg had long been sceptical 
towards the Swabian League of towns (and associated princes), preferring to 
rely on and to guard its close relationship with the monarchy. But Frederick 
III remained distant, and Nuremberg eventually joined the Swabian League in 
December 1444, only shortly before a group of princes meeting at Mergentheim 
(the archbishop of Mainz, Counts Palatine Otto and Stephan, Margraves Albrecht 
and Johann of Brandenburg and Margrave Jakob of Baden) established an alliance 
which included a clause committing them to defend their territories against the 
towns.866 Nuremberg’s next most natural ally was Albrecht Achilles’ main enemy, 
the bishop of Würzburg, who allied with the towns in July 1446.867 But these new 
political structures were hardly a framework for lasting peace, and were in fact a 
preparation for war.
Meanwhile, the defunct communities of the Luxemburg years had left a dangerous 
residue of unresolved disputes between Nuremberg and various nobles, which 
had been suppressed whilst these communities still functioned but could now 
come to the surface. The entry into the Swabian League also involved Nuremberg 
in numerous conflicts with nobles, as the League’s relationships with some of its 
own noble neighbours had been especially poor in the years leading up to 1444. 
Yet Nuremberg also continued to cooperate with many of the nobles with whom 
it had interacted out of necessity during times when imperial bonds had been 
stronger, and the many nobles who served the interests of princely polities near 
to Nuremberg were essential partners for the transaction of all sorts of legal and 
political business. In one way or another, communities which went far beyond 
the immediate relations of townspeople and nobles continued to shape these 
relationships, and we can trace the origins of particular consequences for town-
noble relations in the deep-rooted structures of these communities.
866. Blezinger, Städtebund, pp. 116, 119.
867. Blezinger, Städtebund, p. 120.
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Imperial and Regional Communities
Unsurprisingly, a customary focus on some of the more spectacular and 
picturesque aspects of town-noble relations – including tournaments, the rural 
expansion of the towns, and ‘robbery’ – has led us to habitually underestimate 
or entirely ignore the importance of the daily churn of mundane political and 
diplomatic business between the two groups which forms the bulk of the 
correspondence in the Briefbücher. But an even more unquestioning focus on 
relations between townspeople and nobles as independent actors – encouraged 
by our fascination with the (from a modern perspective) curiously decentralized 
Empire – has caused us to further neglect the many relationships which arose 
between townspeople and nobles as a consequence of their obligations to other 
parties – chiefly to princes of one sort or another. It is difficult to tell where 
official functions and individual agency meet within these relationships, but they 
certainly shaped many of the networks within which townspeople and nobles 
had to negotiate their own more personal interactions.
The imperial community always came first for Nuremberg, and for a very small 
number of nobles it proved to be a lucrative connection thanks to portions of 
the city’s annual tax granted to them by kings and emperors. In the first half of 
the fifteenth century virtually all of the imperial tax revenues from the Swabian 
towns were pledged to nobles, especially to men such as Hans and Frischhans 
von Bodman who were associated with Sigismund’s plans for a peacekeeping 
alliance based around the League of St George’s Shield.868 Nuremberg received 
similar treatment, and from at least 1429 the city’s tax of 2,000 fl. per annum 
was paid to Count Ludwig of Oettingen. In that year Sigismund promised that 
following Ludwig’s death (which occurred in 1440) the tax would be used to 
repay 3,000 fl. to Leopold of Leuchtenberg.869 In 1445 part of the tax was redirected 
868. Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, pp. 189-201.
869. Wagner, Leuchtenberg 3, p. 80. For the value of the tax see Regesta Boica 13 p. 21 (12.11.1423). 
In 1433 Sigismund ordered Nuremberg to pay Ludwig (Regesta Boica 13 p. 271, 23.10.1433) 
and his servants collected the money (Sander, Haushaltung, p. 487).
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to pay 423 Gulden which Frederick III owed to Wilhelm von Stein.870 The same 
tax had earlier been the subject of a feud against Nuremberg between 1410 and 
1412 by the Rhinelander Reinhard of Hanau, whose claim was originally against 
King Rupert.871 In 1440 Nuremberg was also embroiled in a dispute over half of 
the imperial tax from the city’s Jews, which was claimed by both Heinrich and 
Konrad von Pappenheim and the royal chancellor Kaspar Schlick.872 The council 
had to ask Heinrich von Pappenheim to return money already paid out, though 
the matter was settled relatively quickly in favour of Heinrich and his brother 
Konrad by Frederick III.873 The potential for conflict inherent in these payments 
to nobles which Nuremberg had to make on behalf of the emperor was clear, 
though for the most part it was kept in check.
Princely territories meanwhile, with their localized and immediate authority, 
could function as a strong integrative force between nobles and the towns under 
their direct control when they treated rural and urban elites as part of the same 
class of leading subjects.874 Princely states (and particularly their developing 
representative institutions) could also enforce divisions by categorizing subjects 
as ‘burghers’ or ‘nobles’ for certain purposes.875 But Nuremberg in the fifteenth 
century was not directly exposed to these forces. The main structure with 
integrative potential was the burgravial Landgericht – in essence a court with a 
geographically limited competence, although its exact boundaries were not clear 
– on the bench of which two Nuremberg citizens were entitled to sit alongside 
nobles appointed by the Hohenzollern. This custom was described by Ludwig 
870. Joseph Chmel (ed.), Regesta chronologico-diplomatica Friderici III. Romanorum Imperatoris 
(Regis IV.) (Vienna, 1838), no. 1919.
871. Vogel, Fehderecht, p. 268.
872. For the Pappenheim brothers’ claim, see Regesta Imperii 11.2 no. 12037 (2.8.1437). For 
Schlick’s claim, see Regesta Imperii 12 nos. 1041 (29.6.1439), 1144 (7.9.1439).
873. BB 14 ff. 113r (28.1.1440), 132r-v (18.2.1440), 137r-v (26.2.1440). StAN Rep. 2a 968 (29.4.1440) (= 
Regesta Imperii 13.14 no. 5). Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 365, 606-607.
874. For example, Habsburg Austria in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Brunner, ’Zwei 
Studien’), and (to a lesser extent), Wittelsbach Bavaria in the late Middle Ages (Schneider, 
Niederadel, pp. 324-325; Martin Dallmeier, ’Die Rolle des “Adels” in der Stadt Regensburg’, 
in Gunnar Teske (ed.), Adel und Stadt. Vorträge auf dem Kolloquium der Vereinigten Westfälischen 
Adelsarchive e.V. vom 28.-29. Oktober 1993 in Münster (Münster, 1998), p. 103).
875. Schneider, Niederadel, pp. 311-312, 315-316, 328; Heilingsetzer, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 56; 
Vilfan, ’Stadt und Adel,’ p. 65.
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von Eyb at the end of the fifteenth century, with the proviso that the burghers 
must not be engaged in trade with weights and measures.876 The presence of 
burghers in the Landgericht is attested from at least 1265 onwards, and in 1313 it 
was fixed in a privilege with no stipulation as to the number or standing of the 
burghers who should be involved.877 The civic accounts from the 1430s record the 
payment of expenses to patricians and servitors who regularly sat at Landgericht 
sessions on Nuremberg’s behalf.878
Beyond the observance of these customary forms, it is unclear exactly how this 
relationship functioned during the 1440s. In this decade Nuremberg and other 
towns found themselves battling a wave of cases brought against them in the 
Landgericht, encouraged by Albrecht Achilles’ drive to expand its jurisdiction. A 
generous interpretation of a 1273 privilege from King Rudolf of Habsburg had 
long underpinned Hohenzollern efforts to establish their Landgericht as an appeal 
court for the whole Empire, dispensing royal justice in place of the emperor. These 
efforts were intensified by Achilles, causing significant problems for all Upper 
German towns. In 1458 the Swabian towns collectively paid a substantial sum, 
probably 12,000 Gulden, to be free of cases in the burgravial Landgericht whenever 
the towns themselves had not refused the plaintiffs justice.879 The two citizens 
which Nuremberg sent to the Landgericht had evidently been powerless to restrain 
the court’s aggressive practices; they were easily outvoted on the jurors’ bench, 
which itself had little autonomy vis-à-vis the court’s princely patron. It therefore 
seems unlikely that the Landgericht would have functioned as an integrative force 
between town and nobility in this period.
876. Hofmann, ’Nobiles Norimbergenses,’ pp. 67, 75. See also Dannenbauer, Entstehung, p. 85.
877. Dannenbauer, Entstehung, pp. 86-88. See also Leiser, ’Landgebiet,’ p. 241; Pfeiffer, Nürnberg, 
pp. 30-32.
878. Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 523-524.
879. Klaus von Andrian-Werburg, ’Markgraf Albrecht Achilles von Brandenburg-Ansbach 
und das Kaiserliche Landgericht Burggraftums Nürnberg’, Jahrbuch für fränkische 
Landesforschung, 60 (2000), pp. 64-65. See also Katrin Bourrée, ’Die Bedeutung des 
Kaiserlichen Landgerichts Nürnberg für die Herrschaftskonzeption Markgraf Albrechts 
Achilles. Landesherrschaftliches Instrument und reichsfürstlicher Legitimationsgenerator’, 
in Mario Müller (ed.), Kurfürst Albrecht Achilles (1414-1486). Kurfürst von Brandenburg, 
Burggraf von Nürnberg (Ansbach, 2014).
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Contact with nobles as officials and representatives of territorial princes was 
therefore chiefly an aspect of Nuremberg’s external relations. The various roles 
of nobles in princely service created almost a second landscape of noble lordship 
around the city, one which was in places all but indistinguishable from nobles’ 
semi-autonomous rural lordship – for instance, when nobles served as district 
governors and behaved in this office much as they did on their own patrimonies – 
and was in other ways quite distinct, as when nobles filled offices at the centre of a 
princely administration or even governed whole territories in a prince’s absence. 
In whatever capacity they served princes, nobles could faithfully represent their 
masters’ interests at the same time as enjoying considerable room for independent 
manoeuvre, and it is never easy to tell which aspect of their double nature was 
uppermost in any given interaction. But regardless of who a noble official was 
and how he behaved, Nuremberg had to cultivate a relationship with him, and 
this relationship would have consequences beyond the immediate context of the 
noble’s official function. To what extent did these relationships build a network 
of useful contacts for the city?
The Landgerichte around Nuremberg – generally controlled by princes and staffed 
by local nobles – were important meeting points of town, state and nobility. The 
most significant from Nuremberg’s perspective were, alongside the burgravial 
Landgericht of Nuremberg itself, the courts named for Hirschberg (an organ of the 
Bavarian Wittelsbachs centred on the Altmühl valley but extending its competence 
northwards towards Nuremberg); Bamberg; Würzburg (also known as the 
Franconian ducal Landgericht); and four separate courts in the modern Upper 
Palatinate controlled by different branches of the Wittelsbach dynasty: Amberg, 
Auerbach, Sulzbach and Burglengenfeld. Sittings of each court moved around 
a set of customary meeting places within its ambit. Aside from the aggressive 
margravial policy, the Landgericht jurisdictions were generally respected by the 
towns. Certainly Nuremberg disputed the competence of the noble Landrichter to 
try cases against its own burghers or servitors, even when the property in question 
fell within the Landgericht’s competence, but such cases are rarely recorded in the 
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correspondence from the 1440s.880 Nuremberg preferred to work with the courts 
and their judges, and the council made sure that it had the diplomatic tools and 
contacts to do so. Gifts were presented to newly appointed judges in the Hirschberg 
court,881 and the council sought to intervene in the business of the court in the 
interests of its citizens.882 A 1439 request by Karl Holzschuher for information from 
the Landrichter of Hirschberg Heinrich von Absberg about the date of the court’s 
next sitting and the likelihood of a case against Nuremberg being heard on that 
occasion suggests a good day-to-day working relationship with the court.883
During the 1440s political upheavals and dynastic changes temporarily placed 
nobles in charge of many of the territories which surrounded Nuremberg as 
regents and administrators. The bishopric of Würzburg was ruled by a committee 
of canons and regional nobles between April 1441 and August 1442 owing to 
conflict between Bishop Sigismund and his cathedral chapter (part of a wider 
clash between Saxony and Brandenburg-Ansbach);884 authority in the bishopric of 
Bamberg was exercised from 1440 to 1443 first by Count Wilhelm of Henneberg 
and then by cathedral canons due to the diocese’s enormous debts;885 the kingdom 
of Bohemia had various noble regents through the decade;886 two noble regents 
administered the territory of Pfalz-Neumarkt during the absence of its ruler as 
king of Denmark (1443–1448); and the Upper Palatine territory of Amberg was 
under the authority of a noble vice-regent (Vitztum), as a representative of the 
Count Palatine on the Rhine. Noble regents also deputized for Margrave Albrecht 
Achilles during his absence on campaign on the Upper Rhine during 1445.887 Nobles 
880. BB 15 ff. 111r-v (3.10.1441), 359r (12.12.1442). BB 17 ff. 86r (30.7.1444), 93v (9.8.1444).
881. Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 521-522.
882. e.g. BB 15 ff. 229v-300r (18.8.1442). BB 18 ff. 25v-26r (27.8.1446), 103 (10.11.1446), 115v-116r 
(6.12.1446), 287r (8.7.1447).
883. BB 13 f. 279v (27.1.1439).
884. Alfred Wendehorst, Das Bistum Würzburg Teil 2 – Die Bischofsreihe von 1254 bis 1455 (Berlin, 
1969), pp. 167-169.
885. Looshorn, Geschichte, iv, 150-152.
886. See Frederick G. Heymann, George of Bohemia. King of Heretics (Princeton, 1965), pp. 30-46.
887. e.g. BB 17 ff. 228v (4.3.1445), 238v (15.3.1445). See Schubert, ’Albrecht Achilles,’ pp. 137-138.
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also represented princes as their envoys and ambassadors to the town,888 or acted 
as guarantors for princes who had taken out loans from the city.889 In these roles, 
nobles transacted a range of business with Nuremberg within the normal range of 
relations between towns and princes, but which also lay within the scope of town-
noble relations: the settlement of disputes between dependents;890 cooperation 
against violence and robbery;891  and occasionally the staging of a tournament 
in the city.892 Sometimes nobles clearly were the mouthpieces of princes, and as 
princely officials they were always especially honoured in Nuremberg (see above, 
pp. 58-59), but nobles’ activity in the service of princes generally replicated their 
autonomous behaviour, with differing constraints and possibilities.
How did Nuremberg ensure that its interests were well represented with those 
nobles who exercised power on behalf of princes? There were of course diplomatic 
gifts, such as a whole series of silver or gilded beakers and cash sums presented 
to imperial dignitaries during the emperor’s visits in 1442 and 1444.893 In 1426 
Nuremberg wrote to Hans von Degenberg to wish him well in his new role as the 
administrator of Lower Bavaria, together with the hope that he would show his 
good will towards Nuremberg’s citizens.894 But in general this sort of diplomatic 
relationship-building remains hidden. The civic correspondence preserves instead 
many requests for help – help in court cases and other matters at princely courts, 
help following acts of robbery, help with the prosecution of prisoners – and, 
much more rarely, letters expressing thanks for assistance actually given.895 The 
exact quality of Nuremberg’s relationship with the noble(s) concerned is often 
888. e.g. BB 15 f. 31v (2.6.1441). BB 17 ff. 20r (12.5.1444), 28v-29r (20.5.1444). BB 18 f. 99r (5.11.1446). 
RB 1b f. 5v (18.7.1441).
889. In particular a very long-running matter with Georg von Bebenburg and Heinrich von 
Thüngfeld as guarantors for the bishop of Würzburg; many references between BB 14 f. 
117r (5.2.1440) and BB 18 ff. 415v-416r (27.12.1447).
890. e.g. BB 14 ff. 323r-v (27.2.1441), 326v-327r (6.3.1441), 329v-330r (11.3.1441). BB 17 ff. 238v 
(15.3.1445), 248v-249r (2.4.1445), 266v (27.4.1445).
891. e.g. BB 14 f. 108v (15.1.1440). BB 18 ff. 98r (3.11.1446), 110r (21.11.1446), 123r-124r (16.12.1446), 
131r-v (28.12.1446), 142v (14.1.1447), 153v-154r (1.2.1447), 167r-v (14.2.1447), 347v (19.9.1447).
892. RB 1b f. 5v (18.7.1441).
893. ChrdtSt, iii, 395-396, 399-400.
894. BB 7 f. 40r (1.3.1426).
895. e.g. BB 18 f. 358r (3.10.1447).
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hard to judge. Those who were especially close to the king were naturally regular 
recipients of requests for help from Nuremberg, but how close were the city’s ties 
with the Austrian families (Neidberg, Ungnade, Zebinger and others) who enjoyed 
the confidence of Frederick III? Early in 1448 the council wrote to a whole series 
of Habsburg office holders in Carinthia about an exiled burgher: some of these 
men were probably known to Nuremberg, others probably not, and Nuremberg’s 
expectation that they would use their influence in the city’s interest must have 
varied accordingly.896 Nobles in princely service could be addressed ex officio as 
well as in a personal capacity, and there are few signs that Nuremberg maintained 
a very strong network of personal contacts with more than a handful of prominent 
nobles. We will look more closely at this select group shortly, but first it will be 
helpful to survey some of the communities which help to create these relationships.
The most effective relationship-building communities were communities of 
common purpose. Yet all of these communities also required political and military 
action which inevitably generated tension, even when the targets of this action were 
defined as being well and truly outside of the community. The wars of Sigismund’s 
reign against the Hussites (1420–1436) created just such a community. There are 
even some signs that Nuremberg, being relatively close to the Bohemian border, 
coordinated military action amongst princes and nobles against the Hussites.897 
Some of Nuremberg’s most valuable partners during the 1440s had been fellow 
members of the imperial party in opposition to the threat from Bohemia. Heinrich 
von Plauen was the central figure in this network: as a German-speaking noble 
with both a relatively independent lordship in the Vogtland region (north of 
Franconia) and extensive estates in Bohemia, he was perfectly placed to mediate 
between ‘German’ and ‘Czech’ anti-Hussite forces. As well as exchanging news 
and information, Nuremberg supplied Plauen with saltpeter and an artillery 
master during the fighting,898 though the council also complained that he was 
896. BB 18 ff. 430v-431r (13.1.1448).
897. See BB 8 f. 226r (1.2.1430).
898. BB 5 ff. 232v-233r (15.6.1422). BB 7 f. 17r (23.11.1425).
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calling on them for assistance ahead of others.899 The relationship established 
through this cooperation appears to have paid off for Nuremberg in the long run, 
however, as Plauen became a valuable intermediary in negotiations with hostile 
Bohemian lords such as Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg and Aleš of Sternberg (see 
pp. 290-294) and for the protection of trade passing through the Vogtland (see 
pp. 135-136 above). Another leader of the anti-Hussite coalition in the vicinity of 
Nuremberg was Count Palatine Johann of Pfalz-Neumarkt, and it is possible that 
the common anti-Hussite cause helped Nuremberg to establish or consolidate 
good relationships amongst Johann’s noble affinity. Wilhelm and Wigeleis von 
Wolfstein were captains of Nuremberg’s forces in the field against the Hussites, 
whilst their relative Friedrich von Wolfstein fought for Count Palatine Johann in 
his victory against the Hussites at Hiltersried in 1433.900
Conflicts arising from the Hussite Wars were equally present during the 1440s. 
The movement of troops through an area was always liable to bring tensions: 
in 1421 Hans von Egloffstein, district governor of Auerbach, complained about 
the passage of Nuremberg’s forces, and Nuremberg itself requested that Hans 
von Hirschhorn ensure that forces being dispatched to aid the Count Palatine 
against a French invasion of the Rhineland in 1444 did not damage the property 
of Nuremberg citizens in passing.901 Similar issues led to a series of disputes 
with Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg, one of the leading figures in the Bohemian 
catholic party, who made multiple complaints that Nuremberg’s forces on 
campaign against the Hussites had damaged his property and requisitioned the 
property of his dependents without compensation.902 Nuremberg protested that 
they had shown only friendship and goodwill towards Schwanberg during the 
Hussite Wars – the council had indeed intervened on Schwanberg’s behalf with 
the margrave of Brandenburg, annulled a 50 Gulden debt at Emperor Sigismund’s 
899. BB 7 f. 17r (23.11.1425).
900. ChrdtSt, i, 370. Simon Federhofer, Herrschaftsbildung im Raum Neumarkt vom 12. bis 17. 
Jahrhundert (Neumarkt in der Oberpfalz, 1999), p. 160.
901. Egloffstein, Chronik, p. 128. BB 17 f. 112v (5.10.1444).
902. BB 10 ff. 33v (26.8.1432), 38 (30.8.1432).
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request, and supplied Schwanberg with saltpeter and sulphur when he was ‘in 
daily fear’ of a Hussite attack.903 The dispute was eventually settled in August 1439 
by Heinrich von Plauen,904 but Schwanberg was to launch a far more serious feud 
against Nuremberg in 1441, in which the experience of this dispute during the 
1430s may have played a role (see p. 292). Certainly the city’s cooperation against 
the Hussites with this particular noble produced no lasting positive relationship.
Townspeople and rural nobles often worked together towards defensive or 
peacekeeping ends closer to home, albeit mostly under princely or imperial 
leadership. The classic model for this sort of activity was the regional peace association 
or Landfriede, which was often headed by local nobles (for instance, Ehrenfried von 
Seckendorff in Franconia in 1415).905 But peacekeeping activity inevitably involved 
conflict with certain nobles alongside cooperation with others, and whilst the last 
active Franconian Landfriede finished its work in 1416 (see p. 215), the consequences 
of Landfriede expeditions which had captured and destroyed castles rumbled on 
for decades afterwards. Nuremberg tried to mediate in a dispute between Ulrich 
von Laaber and the city of Frankfurt over the destruction of a castle, half of which 
had been owned by Laaber’s maternal grandfather, during what Frankfurt claimed 
was a Landfriede operation.906 The constructive relationships established during 
periods of Landfriede activity were probably less lasting than the conflicts which 
were simultaneously engendered, and the Landfriede itself fell out of use as a form of 
political association during the first half of the fifteenth century.
After questioning the value of a Rhenish Landfriede in 1415,907 Sigismund of 
Luxemburg attempted to set his imperial peacekeeping policy on a different footing. 
We have already encountered his plan to secure both the peace and Luxemburg 
903. BB 8 f. 74r (3.10.1428). BB 10 ff. 38 (30.8.1432), 267v (19.11.1433): saltpeter and sulphur 
supplied ‘von sorg wegen belegerung die ewch die Beheim teglich tun wellen’. BB 11 f. 108 
(5.10.1434).
904. StAN Rep. 2a 881 (28.8.1439).
905. e.g. BB 4 f. 95r (3.7.1415).
906. BB 18 ff. 368v-369v (18.10.1447). For an overview of Frankfurt’s interaction with various 
Landfriede, see Orth, Fehden, p. 142-153.
907. Orth, Fehden, p. 164.
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interests in southern Germany through an alliance of the Swabian League of towns 
and the noble Society of St George’s Shield (pp. 88-89, 144). The Society, many of 
whose members were also members of Sigismund’s closest circles of advisors,908 
was clearly the driving force behind the drawn-out negotiations with the League 
(1426–1434). The nobles appear to have seen a chance to enhance their power and 
influence by taking a central role in imperial policy, whereas the towns (particularly 
the smaller towns) saw a threat to their ability to receive new burghers and to 
look after their own security interests.909 The Society of St George’s Shield in the 
Hegau region (north of Lake Constance), which was often the most proactive of 
the Society’s regional associations, was still making unsuccessful approaches to the 
Swabian League in 1442, nearly five years after Sigismund’s death and without any 
new encouragement from his successors.910 But some towns were keen on the idea: 
Ulm, as de facto leader of the Swabian League, recommended a deal with the Society 
as late as 1442, and Nuremberg seriously considered an alliance with the Society in 
a separate set of negotiations between 1436 and 1438.911 This matter came to a head 
in a series of meetings in Nuremberg in October and November 1438. The Society 
was represented there by Haupt von Pappenheim and by Walter von Hürnheim, 
captain of the Society’s league on the lower Danube, but there was also a third party 
in the talks: Margrave Friedrich of Brandenburg was a member of the Society, but 
had his own particular demands regarding the alliance with Nuremberg (he was 
represented by his master of the court, Wilhelm von Rechberg).912
The negotiations reached an advanced stage, and Pappenheim and Hürnheim 
made effusive statements of their willingness to reach an agreement. In private, they 
repeatedly blamed the margrave’s position for the difficulties, which eventually 
proved intractable.913 But there may also have been other factors in play: we have 
already noted a deep difference in approach between Nuremberg and Haupt von 
908. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, p. 42.
909. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 60-203, especially pp. 201-203.
910. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, pp. 95-96.
911. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 216-247.
912. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 238-247.
913. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 243-246.
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Pappenheim on the question of highway robbery (p. 144), but another problem was 
the over-reliance on Pappenheim as a mediator between the two parties. The Society 
openly admitted that Pappenheim’s various absences on imperial business during 
1437 and 1438 were delaying negotiations; Nuremberg expressed a willingness to 
try to make progress without him, but simultaneously asked their envoys at Vienna 
about the likelihood of his imminent return from an embassy to the new king, 
Albert of Habsburg.914 Pappenheim’s death, which probably happened late in 1438, 
was almost certainly a major factor in the apparently immediate discontinuation 
of the negotiations. As a genuine confidant and close associate of Sigismund since 
1414, Pappenheim had been a significant partner for Nuremberg in the imperial 
community of the Luxemburg years for some time before the council presented 
him (in December 1435) with a gilded beaker in recognition of his ’great efforts 
on behalf of the city’ during the Roßhaupter feud (for more on this feud see p. 
240).915 Haupt’s main residence at Pappenheim in the Altmühl valley was less than 
60 km south of Nuremberg, and he had further possessions north of the city in the 
Thuringian forest, meaning that Nuremberg was a decidedly central place from 
Haupt’s perspective; he also drew income from the town’s Jewish taxes (his claim 
passed to his sons Heinrich and Konrad, as we saw above, p. 218). Nuremberg’s 
close relationship with the Pappenheim family continued into the 1440s.
Other prominent figures from Sigismund’s era, such as the imperial chamberlain 
Konrad von Weinsberg, continued to play a role in the new Habsburg-led 
Empire. Weinsberg unsuccessfully asked for Nuremberg’s help during the French 
invasion crisis of 1444 (see above, p. 65).916 But this external threat to the (German-
speaking) Empire did not create anything like the community which had formed 
in response to the Hussites. This was largely because the Dauphin’s invasion was 
so much shorter in duration, but also because political conditions were no longer 
914. Mau, Rittergesellschaften, pp. 225, 230-231.
915. Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 620-621. For Pappenheim’s career see Hans Schwackenhofer, 
Die Reichserbmarschälle, Grafen und Herren von und zu Pappenheim: zur Geschichte eines 
Reichsministerialengeschlechtes (Treuchtlingen, 2002), pp. 132-139.
916. BB 17 ff. 149v-150r (13.11.1444).
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conducive to the formation of a genuinely integrated and integrative alliance 
against the French. There was no clear leadership from the new king, Frederick 
III, who had originally called for the Dauphin’s aid against the Swiss,917 and his 
Austrian counsellors were not tied into Upper German networks of nobles and 
towns as many of Sigismund’s leading supporters had been. The imperial diet 
in Nuremberg (see pp. 64-65) which tried to coordinate the Empire’s response 
also brought tensions between the towns and certain princes into sharper focus 
(see pp. 241-250 below), and probably played a significant role in Nuremberg’s 
decision to join the Swabian League in December 1444.
Nuremberg had previously cooperated with the League in some matters 
and maintained its distance in others. Now that it was formally allied with 
towns up to 250 km away, Nuremberg’s relationship with many nobles across 
Upper Germany inevitably shifted. In the first quarter of the fifteenth century 
there is some evidence of Nuremberg acting as an arbiter in disputes between 
Franconian towns and nobles,918 but in the 1440s its role was almost exclusively 
that of a mediator, intervening with other towns on behalf of nobles resident 
in Nuremberg’s extended hinterland.919 Nuremberg did try to arbitrate a long-
running dispute between Georg von Bebenburg and Schwäbisch Hall (see p. 
181), but the bishop of Würzburg soon stepped into this role in Nuremberg’s 
place.920 By this point Nuremberg was a member of the Swabian League, along 
with Schwäbisch Hall, and the town actually asked Nuremberg to assist its 
delegation at the hearing with Bebenburg over which Nuremberg was due to 
preside. Naturally, the council pointed out that this would be inappropriate, and 
the incident is an example of the kind of clash of interests that could undermine 
Nuremberg’s value to nobles as an independent mediator with other towns, 
especially following the council’s decision to join the Swabian League.
917. Hardy, ’Expedition,’ p. 359.
918. e.g. BB 5 f. 88v. BB 7 f. 237v (12.12.1427).
919. For instance, with Nördlingen on behalf of Erhard von Murach (BB 17 ff. 129r (21.10.1444), 
208v-209r (8.2.1445), 253v-254v (10.4.1445), 256v (14.4.1445), 257v (15.4.1445)) and Wilhelm 
von Wolfstein (BB 18 ff. 342r-v (15.9.1447), 351v (25.9.1447)).
920. BB 18 ff. 26v-28r (30.8.1446), 43v-44v (14.9.1446), 62r-v (28.9.1446), 74r-v (10.10.1446).
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Joining the League also entailed exposure to its existing conflicts with rural 
nobles. Nuremberg’s protests that the terms of their membership freed them from 
all involvement in matters which had arisen prior to their admission did nothing 
to stop certain nobles who were hostile to the Swabian League from declaring 
feuds against Nuremberg on the pretext that the city was helping their enemies. 
Georg Auer’s feud with the League dated back to at least May 1443,921 and from 
the summer of 1446 onwards he was also a dangerous opponent of Nuremberg, 
carrying out three significant highway robberies.922 Eberhard von Urbach had 
been an enemy of the Swabian League ever since 1441, when the towns had 
besieged and destroyed the castle of Maienfels.923 He did not declare his feud 
against Nuremberg until January 1448, and quickly agreed to a truce through 
the mediation of the bishop of Würzburg.924 Clearly neither Urbach nor Auer 
felt a need to declare an automatic enmity against Nuremberg when it joined the 
League, and what caused them to open their feuds when they did is unclear. But 
alongside the intrinsic threat of these feuds, they were dangerous because of their 
connections to wider disturbances in Swabia. Eberhard von Urbach in particular 
was closely linked to a group of nobles characterized by their hostility to the 
Swabian League, so that the towns themselves called these nobles the ’towns’ 
enemies’ (Städtefeinde). These nobles were not active in the immediate vicinity 
of Nuremberg, though they did carry out several robberies which impacted on 
Nuremberg citizens prior to December 1444.925 But their potent anti-town rhetoric 
posed a threat to Nuremberg, as we will see shortly. In the meantime, however, we 
must take a closer look at some of the constructive relationships that developed 
within the political communities of which Nuremberg was a member.
921. Blezinger, Städtebund, p. 156.
922. Nos. 57, 65 and 68 on pp. 164, 166-167.
923. Blezinger, Städtebund, p. 75.
924. BB 18 f. 471v (21.2.1448).
925. Nos. 10, 21, 32, 34, 48 on pp. 156, 158, 160, 163.
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Peacemaking and Patronage
Communities created networks which structured many aspects of Nuremberg’s 
relationship with the rural nobility, but the real value of these networks was realized 
when townspeople and nobles could win the support of their community partners 
in processes of dispute resolution. Conflicts were usually resolved through ad hoc 
arbitration processes within regional communities.926 This state of affairs is often 
described as an unfortunate consequence of the the late medieval Empire’s lack of a 
strong central authority with a widely recognized and easily accessible legal system, 
but there are good grounds to believe that the prevalence of arbitration panels was 
at least in equal measure the result of an active preference for regional, communal 
and customary solutions to conflicts. Certainly the bias of such solutions towards the 
interests of those with local power and influence probably ensured that political culture 
more broadly only reinforced the habit of recourse to these forms of peacemaking.
There were many different forms of arbitration, but in one common model a panel 
consisted of three local dignitaries. These were not necessarily three independent arbiters: 
two were expressly partial, with each party appointing one of its own supporters to ‘assist’ 
the chair of the panel (commonly known as the Obmann) in making his casting vote. The 
identity of the Obmann was ultimately a matter to be agreed upon by the disputants, and 
each party would naturally try to gain an arbiter favourable to themselves. They could 
also attend the hearing accompanied by any number of supporters, or be represented by 
various kinds of attorneys: professional lawyers, servitors and retainers, or experienced 
and well-connected noblemen and city councillors. Through its communal and ad hoc 
nature the hearing was seamlessly integrated with other processes by which the parties 
sought to influence the final outcome, including feuds. These processes also required 
supporters, and preferably the patronage of important men or corporations. Thus 
peacemaking and patronage formed two parallel or even barely differentiated sets of 
relationships, and it was essential for all political actors to cultivate not only their patron 
and client relationships, but also relationships with potential arbiters.
926. For these processes in general see Obenaus, Recht und Verfassung.
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Defendants were obliged to offer appropriate arbiters to their accusers, and a mixture 
of structural and power-political factors determined which and what sort of arbiters 
were deemed appropriate. For instance, Nuremberg (as an imperial city) was obliged 
to offer the king or emperor, but had also won itself the privilege of offering the town 
councils of Windsheim, Weißenburg and Rothenburg. As these towns (especially 
Windsheim and Weißenburg) were generally closely aligned with Nuremberg, this 
gave the town a significant advantage. Nobles might find this offer unfair, whilst the 
emperor would often be too distant to give an expeditious judgement.927 Depending 
on the circumstances of each case, Nuremberg might therefore offer other towns, 
princes or regional nobles as possible arbiters. The permutations were in theory 
endless, but in practice they fell into patterns around the intersections of different 
communities and interest groups. Nobles and towns with diverse connections and 
multiple allegiances were useful arbiters, but more dependable allies were valuable 
too. Arbitration was also just one of the more structured forms of peacemaking and 
patronage: townspeople and nobles intervened in different circumstances on one 
another’s behalf in a variety of ways, including interaction with institutionalized 
legal procedures and their own inherent elements of communal justice such as juries 
and the local ties of nobles who served as judges.
In this system where social and political capital were constantly being created 
and cashed in, what did Nuremberg and its noble partners have to offer one 
another? Nuremberg was an important patronage partner for nobles, but owing 
to the particular forms which this patronage assumed it did not always strongly 
reinforce other aspects of the city’s relationships with these nobles. The council 
was sometimes asked to support a noble at a hearing or court session, though this 
was rarely a straightforward matter. Nuremberg could end up supporting both 
sides, as at several hearings in 1440 and 1441 between Count Johann of Oettingen 
and Heinrich von Pappenheim: given the importance of the counts of Oettingen 
to Nuremberg’s trade at the Nördlingen fairs (see pp. 133-134) and the importance 
927. e.g. BB 11 ff. 207v-208r (23.2.1435). BB 17 f. 63r (6.7.1444): ‘Wie ein ygclich Bidermann wol 
erkennen mug, daz eüch sollicher außtrag vor seiner kunigclichen Maiestat gar ungelegen sey’.
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of the Pappenheim family within Nuremberg’s imperial community, it is easy to 
see why the council decided that it could not refuse either party its backing.928 
But more commonly nobles asked the council not for its direct support, but for 
permission for one of its servitors or jurists to attend a hearing. The noted lawyer 
Gregor Heimburg (c.1400–1472) was in particular demand amongst leading nobles 
such as Konrad von Weinsberg and the counts of Henneberg.929 But nobles also 
sought the assistance of Nuremberg’s noble servitors: for instance, Paul and Fritz 
von Streitberg  successfully asked for the support of Mathes von Mangersreuth 
at a hearing in Bamberg.930 Both the Streitberg and Mangersreuth families were 
part of the same Upper Franconian regional nobility, and Paul and Fritz probably 
desired Mathes’ support as their neighbour rather than as a representative of 
Nuremberg. His obligations to the town as a servitor were simply an obstacle to 
be overcome. Nuremberg’s support was in even less demand outside of formal 
hearings and court sessions: the city was naturally asked by nobles to intercede 
with princes, especially kings and emperors,931 but was hardly ever asked by 
nobles to intervene with other nobles.
Nuremberg more frequently asked for the support of nobles in its own legal 
cases. Some of these nobles were those, such as Haupt von Pappenheim, with 
whom Nuremberg enjoyed a particularly close relationship.932 Walter von 
Hürnheim, Pappenheim’s partner in Nuremberg’s negotiations with the Society 
of St George’s Shield, was also asked by Nuremberg in 1440 to assist their case 
against their feud opponent Rudolf von Bopfingen (resident within Hürnheim’s 
area of greatest influence south west of Nördlingen).933 Others had weaker links 
to Nuremberg in general, but were asked to play a role in particular cases, for 
instance Hintze Pflugk during Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg’s feud. Pflugk’s 
928. BB 14 ff. 134r-v (19.2.1440), 157r-v (3.4.1440). StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 75r.
929. BB 16 f. 265r (1.4.1444). BB 17 ff. 48r (15.6.1444), 209r (8.2.1445), 220v-221r (21.2.1445).
930. BB 17 f. 247v (31.3.1445).
931. e.g. StAN Rep. 15a 102 (1.10.1443). BB 16 f. 149r-v. StAN Rep. 2c 29 f. 4r (11.9.1444). BB 17 f. 
125r-v (14.10.1444).
932. BB 6 f. 133r (3.1.1445). BB 7 ff. 73v-74r (25.6.1426).
933. BB 14 f. 263r (31.10.1440).
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geographical position on the Bavarian–Bohemian border made him a natural 
mediator in this instance.934 A good proportion of the nobles who were asked to 
assist Nuremberg also held important positions in princely administrations (such 
as successive vice-regents of Amberg, Walter von Hürnheim and Wilhelm von 
Rechberg), and Nuremberg habitually asked various princes to send one of their 
counsellors.935 In 1435 the council were slightly more specific when they asked 
Duke Ludwig of Bayern-Ingolstadt for support from Heinrich von Gumppenberg 
– or another of the duke’s counsellors.936 On balance, very few nobles appear 
as Nuremberg’s regular and particular supporters at arbitration hearings, and 
although the diversity of Nuremberg’s supporters is in some ways impressive, 
these relationships often seem surprisingly shallow.
Nuremberg asked nobles to intervene on its behalf with princes and other nobles 
far more frequently than the city was asked to support nobles. Is this an illusion 
created by the preservation of Nuremberg’s outgoing rather than its incoming 
correspondence? It seems unlikely, as nobles’ requests for support still had to be 
answered. The council certainly valued the assistance of nobles who occupied 
influential positions in princely territories and regional communities, and wrote 
to many of them individually and as groups of up to a dozen.937 It is not always 
possible to tell whether Nuremberg knew much more about the nobles it was 
addressing than their name, titles and the office which they held (see also above 
p. 223), though some nobles were frequent recipients of Nuremberg’s requests for 
help and probably had other diplomatic connections to the city as well. Notable 
examples are Georg von Bebenburg as a key figure at Würzburg during the unrest 
of Sigismund of Saxony’s episcopate (1440–1443) and the clique around King 
Frederick III formed by members of the Ungnad, Neidberg and Zebinger families.938
934. BB 16 f. 179v (13.12.1443). See also BB 16 f. 106r-v (13.8.1443).
935. e.g. BB 14 ff. 271v-272r (8.11.1440). Amberg vice-regents: BB 16 f. 175r (11.12.1443); BB 18 f. 
149v (26.1.1447).
936. BB 11 f. 262r (17.5.1435).
937. For an especially large group of noble addressees (all with connections to Johann of Pfalz-
Neumarkt) see BB 11 ff. 331v-332r (3.8.1435).
938. BB 14 f. 197r-v (6.7.1440). BB 15 f. 217r-v (21.3.1442). BB 18 ff. 217v (17.4.1447), 478r-v (24.2.1448).
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Nuremberg also called upon old connections from the era of Sigismund and the 
Hussite Wars. The council’s contacts within the Bohemian catholic party – including 
Czech-speaking nobles as well as Germans such as Heinrich von Plauen – were 
put to use during repeated attempts to resolve the feuds with Hynek Krušina of 
Schwanberg and Aleš of Sternberg.939 In Swabia, Nuremberg approached nobles 
whose families were prominent in the Society of St George’s Shield.940 From Saxony 
to Tyrol the council could rely on relationships with nobles and families who had 
once served alongside them in the Luxemburg cause: for instance, Hartung von 
Klux was thanked for his help with a Silesian noble’s debts to several Nuremberg 
citizens,941 and Michael von Wolkenstein and his brother Oswald (now better 
known for his poetry) assisted Nuremberg’s envoys to the Count of Görz (Gorizia 
on the Italian-Slovene border), who had arrested some citizens of Nuremberg 
on the road to Venice.942 Klux (d. 1445) was a soldier and diplomat in the service 
of Henry IV and Henry V of England, Sigismund and Frederick III,943 and was 
presented with wine by Nuremberg on eight occasions between 1439 and 1444 
(see p. 59). Oswald von Wolkenstein was another well-travelled ambassador for 
Sigismund who had stayed in Nuremberg during the imperial diet of 1431.944 These 
were certainly very useful men to know, but it is important to note that almost all 
of the nobles whose assistance Nuremberg sought in the 1440s were either princely 
officials or fellow members of particular communities at the imperial level; in other 
words, Nuremberg relied (for whatever reason) on high-level political structures 
far more than it did on networks within the nobility to form constructive links with 
rural nobles. Many of these connections were also the legacy of an old Luxemburg 
affinity which was now fading away, and there is little sign that Nuremberg was 
yet able to build new networks around the court of Frederick III with anything like 
the same intensity and breadth of those it had enjoyed during Sigismund’s reign.
939. See chapter seven, especially pp. 290-294.
940. BB 16 ff. 77v (13.6.1443), 104r-v (8.8.1443).
941. BB 14 f. 326v (4.3.1441).
942. BB 14 f. 351r (6.4.1441). BB 15 ff. 24r (25.5.1441?), 33r-v (8.6.1441), 130v (2.11.1441).
943. R.A. Griffiths, ’Klux, Sir Hartung von (d. 1445)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
(2008), accessed 24.10.2015: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/50137.
944. Regesta Imperii 11.2 no. 8388 (25.3.1431).
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Just as the council relied upon noble networks of patronage far more so than nobles 
called upon Nuremberg as a patron, the council also had only a very limited role 
as an arbiter for nobles who were not in the town’s service. This was only really an 
option in nobles’ disputes with princes or with other towns. Once Nuremberg and 
the bishop of Würzburg were both aligned with the Swabian League Nuremberg 
clearly began to play a limited role as a mediator. Hans von Wolfstein made 
demands via Nuremberg for repayment of debts from Würzburg and offered to 
allow Nuremberg to decide the level of compensation to be paid by the bishop,945 
whilst Nuremberg’s decision that the bishop of Würzburg should pay Hans von 
Modschiedel 100 Gulden compensation is the only instance from the 1440s in 
which Nuremberg is known to have actually arbitrated a case for a noble.946 Other 
attempts at arbitration fell through: for example, the dispute between Georg von 
Bebenburg and Schwäbisch Hall (see p. 181 above). This did not, however, reduce 
Nuremberg’s need for noble arbiters to settle its own cases in certain circumstances. 
There were some obvious candidates, by now very familiar to us. Heinrich von 
Plauen was called upon as an arbiter multiple times in Nuremberg’s disputes with 
Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg and Aleš of Sternberg.947 The council was also very 
successful during the 1440s in ensuring that any cases delegated by the king on a 
royal commission were entrusted to Heinrich von Pappenheim (when they could 
not obtain their own chief magistrate as their judge).948
When cases were delegated by princes to their noble retainers Nuremberg may 
have had less room to influence the decision. But the nobles chosen for these 
roles were at least drawn from the same pool of leading officials with whom 
Nuremberg was in constant contact.949 Sometimes Nuremberg of its own volition 
looked to arbiters beyond its usual narrow circle of patrons when this greater 
flexibility offered a chance of reaching a successful agreement. The arbiter could 
945. BB 18 f. 93r-v (29.10.1446).
946. BB 18 ff. 227r-228r (26.4.1447).
947. See for example the records of a hearing before Plauen at Eger (1.5.1445) in StAN Rep. 2c 27.
948. Pappenheim: Regesta Imperii 13.14 nos. 183 (8.7.1443), 288 (10.10.1444), 399-400 (29.3.1448). 
On the chief magistrate (Reichsschultheiß) see chapter six.
949. e.g. BB 18 ff. 326v-327r (23.8.1447: Martin Förtsch).
236
be qualified as a relative of Nuremberg’s opponent, such as Hans von Seckendorff 
– burgravial Landrichter at the time – in Nuremberg’s dispute with Georg and 
Hilpolt von Seckendorff over the Kornberg quarries (see pp. 116-117).950 Disputes 
which were geographically more remote from Nuremberg might require a local 
solution: for instance, the council called upon Heinrich von Gera to settle some 
of the compensation claims which arose from the campaign against Hans and 
Fritz von Waldenfels (see p. 296),951 having already courted him as a possible ally 
against the Waldenfels brothers.952 Former servitors, together with their families 
and connections also had a role as arbiters for Nuremberg citizens.953 A process of 
compromise in the interests of expediency can be seen quite clearly in the feud with 
Rudolf von Bopfingen (1440), in which Nuremberg’s preferred arbiter was Walter 
von Hürnheim, a contact from the negotiations with the Society of St. George’s 
Shield less than two years previously. Bopfingen initially accepted Hürnheim as 
well,954 but this plan fell through.955 Konrad von Lentersheim then appears to have 
successfully ended the feud.956 Lentersheim was not one of Nuremberg’s usual 
peacemaking partners, but he was qualified for the role on at least two counts: he 
was married to Helena von Pappenheim, and his second cousin Sigmund was one 
of the leading retainers of the Hohenzollern margraves at Ansbach.957
On its own terms, Nuremberg’s diplomacy in the search for arbiters was very 
successful. The city or its citizens hardly ever had to accept an unfavourable 
noble arbiter, and potentially less sympathetic nobles only played a role when it 
seemed likely that they would bring about a positive outcome. But this policy also 
had the side-effect of further entrenching Nuremberg’s reliance on partnerships 
with a relatively small number of nobles, and thereby potentially increased the 
950. Geiger, ’Steinbrüche,’ p. 150.
951. BB 17 ff. 68r-v (15.7.1444), 94r (9.8.1444).
952. BB 16 f. 254r-v (22.3.1444). BB 17 f. 4r-v (15.4.1444).
953. e.g. Lutz von Westernach, BB 16 f. 58r (9.5.1443).
954. BB 14 f. 105r-v (7.1.1440).
955. BB 14 ff. 149r-150r (9.3.1440), 187r-188r (11.6.1440), 239v-240v (17.9.1440).
956. BB 14 ff. 248v-249r (28.9.1440), 251r (10.10.1440), 263r-v (31.10.1440), 271v-272r (8.11.1440), 283r 
(3.12.1440).
957. Otto Rohn, ’Die Herren von Lentersheim im Mittelalter’, Alt-Gunzenhausen, 37 (1977), pp. 42-45.
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chances that a nobleman would find a particular offer of justice inappropriate, or 
indeed insulting. Eberhard von Dottenheim reacted with sarcasm when he wrote 
to Count Johann of Werthem about Nuremberg’s offer of the emperor, the imperial 
towns or the imperial master of the court Count Ludwig of Oettingen: ‘And I am 
surprised that they do not also offer to come before the lord of Hohenlohe, he 
is also not well disposed towards me’.958 This was part of the gamesmanship 
which preceded any arbitration, but the unwritten rules of this game required a 
degree of flexibility and willingness to compromise. Nuremberg’s normally rigid 
insistence on keeping its arbitration within a small clique of nobles with strong 
connections to the monarchy may have infuriated some nobles, as well as making 
solutions to some conflicts harder to find.
An even greater rigidity can be seen in the way in which both towns and nobles 
sought to seal off their independent jurisdictions from one another. The principle 
which lay behind this was expressed by Nuremberg’s secretary Hans Dumm 
before an assembly of the Bohemian lords in January 1443:
Now, as I hope your noble graces are well aware, it is the law in all 
Christendom that whoever has a case or claims against another, he [the 
plaintiff]	 should	 follow	 his	 opponent	 to	 the	 jurisdiction	 in	which	 his	
opponent resides, or come before the judge who is appointed and set 
over him.959
The council made constant use of this doctrine to forestall any attempt by nobles 
to bring a case against Nuremberg in courts other than those of the Empire. It 
was also applied to cases against citizens, which the council insisted on hearing 
as their proper judge. It was quite normal for towns (and other lords) to be utterly 
unbending on this point: Tom Scott describes Freiburg im Breisgau’s ‘grim 
pursuit’ of a case against the village court at Köndringen (under nobleman Anton 
958. StAN Rep. 2c 23 f. 9v (23.3.1435): ‘Und mich hat wunder, daz sie fur den von Hohenloh nit 
auch pieten, der ist mir auch nicht gar holt’.
959. StAN Rep. 2c 19, loose sheet: ‘Nu hoffe Ich ewr Edle gnade verstee ÿe wol, das es in 
aller Cristenheit Recht seÿ wer zu dem andern zevordern oder zusprechen hab, daz der 
demselben nach ziehen und faren sol, in das Gericht, do er ÿnne gesessen ist, oder fur den 
Richter, der Im dann geben und gesetzt ist worden’. For a similar statement, see BB 17 f. 63r 
(6.7.1444).
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von Landeck) which had given judgement over a citizen of Freiburg who was 
himself actually willing to settle the matter at Köndringen.960 Given this potential 
for conflict it is remarkable how infrequently Nuremberg actually sought to 
block cases against its burghers in courts controlled by nobles (in contrast to 
those administered by nobles for princes, such as the burgravial Landgericht). 
Intriguingly, two of the four clear-cut cases from the 1440s involved the jurisdiction 
of members of the Schenk von Limpurg family in the Main valley region, and 
another related to a court north of Schweinfurt under Hermann von Seinsheim-
Schwarzenberg, whose father Erkinger had been cited by Nuremberg before 
Emperor Sigismund in 1435/36 for calling burghers to his court at Scheinfeld.961 
It is difficult to know what to make of this small concentration of cases in one 
region (and two families), coupled with the lack of evidence for similar cases 
elsewhere. Certainly it reinforces the impression that Nuremberg’s right to try 
its own burghers was rarely challenged by nobles. The council worked hard to 
ensure that this was the case through a mixture of rigorous opposition to any cases 
which nobles did allow to proceed and conspicuously even-handed application 
of the underlying principle, for instance by firmly ordering its own burghers to 
bring their cases against nobles’ dependents in the relevant nobles’ courts.962
This relatively successful removal of Nuremberg’s citizens from the jurisdiction 
of neighbouring nobles was of course just a part of the intensely fragmented 
jurisdictional landscape which played its part in the frequent use of communal 
arbitration to settle disputes. This fragmentation also generated a great deal 
of correspondence between individual lordships, as they were forced firstly to 
cooperate in order to apprehend and prosecute malefactors and secondly to 
represent the interests of their dependents who sought justice from the dependents 
of other lords. Both Nuremberg and its many noble correspondents asked one 
another to provide justice against both their prisoners and (far more commonly) 
960. Scott, Freiburg, pp. 107-109.
961. Regesta Boica 13 pp. 350-351 (9.8.1435). BB 15 ff. 149v-150r (9.12.1441), 182v-183r (30.1.1442).
962. e.g. BB 15 f. 313r-v (18.9.1442).
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their subjects on a very regular basis. Both had varying degrees of personal 
interest in representing the interests of their dependents. Thomas von Rosenberg 
virtually entered into a feud with the city over a claim by a female peasant of 
his for the return of a horse which had belonged to her husband, who had been 
executed in Nuremberg (see pp. 289-290 below). Other cases were less dramatic, 
but this does not mean that we should label them as merely routine. Nobles were 
theoretically obliged to support their dependents, but in practice they must have 
had considerable discretion as to whether, how and when they raised a particular 
case with the Nuremberg council, and their decision would always have a bearing 
on their wider relationship with the city. Does the great weight of correspondence 
in this area represent good communication likely to bring solutions to conflicts, or 
does it indicate distance between nobles and townspeople, with the two reduced 
to exchanging endless letters with little hope of resolving matters? Something of 
both extremes is undoubtedly present, but overall it is difficult to reach a conclusion 
without equivalent evidence from another city or time period for comparison.
But nobles did not just support their own dependents vis-à-vis the civic authorities. 
They also involved themselves in the disputes of third parties, including burghers 
with grievances against fellow citizens or their own town councils.963 These are the 
most difficult of all patronage relationships to fully understand. Burghers had a clear 
reason to seek powerful backers outside of the town, but why did nobles take sides 
in the quarrels of others? Historians have often been suspicious that late medieval 
noble ‘degeneracy’ was at work: Markus Bittmann describes the ‘unscrupulous’ 
Count of Lupfen, who allied with a burgher of Konstanz, Konrad Stickel, against 
the town, then turned on Stickel and forced him to pay 500 fl. once the original feud 
had been settled.964 Thomas Marolf saw Hans von Rechberg’s involvement in the 
same feud as motivated by money.965 Yet given the improbability that feuding itself 
was a profitable enterprise for most nobles (see pp. 285-287), it is hard to imagine 
963. The phenomenon is also noted, with some examples, in Görner, Raubritter, pp. 176-177 and 
Orth, Fehden, p. 29.
964. Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, pp. 103-104.
965. Quoted in Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, pp. 110-111.
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that there were rich pickings to be had from proxy feuds – with perhaps the odd 
exception, such as Götz von Berlichingen’s feud against Cologne over a Straßburg 
burgher’s shooting prize, which netted Götz 1,000 Gulden.966
Most patronage feuds looked very different to this, and were fought much closer to 
home. In many cases the distinction between the noble and his burgher client was 
probably not nearly as clear-cut as we might instinctively suppose. One of the most 
notorious ‘feud clients’ of his age was Werner Roßhaupter, a citizen of Lauingen, who 
engaged a string of nobles to pursue his feud against Nuremberg in the 1430s. He 
first approached his relatives, the Ehinger family of Ulm, and then received support 
from the noble Riedheim clan, who owned property at both Ulm and Lauingen and 
were also connected to the Ehinger.967 Nobles could certainly use the feuds of others 
to further their own political objectives as well. Niklas Konzen has recently suggested 
that Hans von Rechberg used proxy feuds to bring himself to the attention of the 
Habsburgs during their wars with the Swiss Confederacy.968 Rechberg was one of a 
number of Swabian nobles who, in Konzen’s view, instrumentalized feuds to gain 
social and political capital. Another of these nobles was Georg von Geroldseck, who 
became a patron of Werner Roßhaupter’s feud.969
Unfortunately these considerations do not immediately help us to better understand 
the motives of at least twenty-five nobles who supported citizens of Nuremberg 
in their disputes with fellow citizens or with the city council during the 1440s. 
Some were members of local families (e.g. Wildenstein, Künsberg, Egloffstein) 
with a variety of connections to Nuremberg, though none known to date with the 
individuals concerned. But how did Counts Ruprecht and Philip of Virneburg, 
from the Eifel hills west of the Rhine, became patrons of Lorenz Pirckheimer against 
his mother Anna?970 These cases suggest a range of otherwise hidden connections 
966. Götz von Berlichingen, Mein Fehd und Handlungen, ed. Helgard Ulmschneider (Sigmaringen, 
1981), pp. 19-23.
967. Sporhan-Krempel, ’Roßhaupter-Fehde,’ pp. 16-17.
968. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, p. 109.
969. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, p. 212. Sporhan-Krempel, ’Roßhaupter-Fehde,’ p. 33.
970. BB 14 f. 325r-v (3.3.1441). BB 15 f. 110r-v (2.10.1441).
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between burghers and nobles which would have worked to some extent against 
the tendency of the city council to rely on a small number of close noble associates 
and on networks created by imperial and territorial communities rather than 
gaining direct access to networks within the nobility’s own communities. Further 
connections independent of the higher-level political communities will doubtless 
emerge with further research, but it may be telling that our first indications of these 
relationships arise through instances of conflict between town and nobility.
Nuremberg maintained close relationships with a small number of nobles, and in 
all political relationships the balance of patronage was heavily weighted towards 
the support given by nobles to the town. This particular inequality does not 
imply an imbalance in relationships between townspeople and nobles as a whole, 
as Nuremberg’s economic weight and centrality always made it worthwhile 
for certain nobles to engage closely with the town, even if they did not seek its 
political support. But it did mean that political and communal networks were 
weaker than they might otherwise have been.
Princes vs. Towns
There can be no doubt that certain princes and towns were genuine rivals for power 
in parts of southern Germany. Towns often experienced this conflict as a chronic 
fear of subjugation by a particularly threatening prince. This fear was intensified 
in 1440 when the small imperial town of Weinsberg was captured by a group 
of nobles and subsequently sold to the Count Palatine, coupled with perceived 
aggression towards Donauwörth by the duke of Bayern-Ingolstadt.971 In reality, 
no prince had up to this point managed to do more than harass the larger cities 
and pick off weaker towns such as Weinsberg, but there was a deep-seated logic 
behind the towns’ concerns. Princely territories were seriously compromised by 
their lack of authority over neighbouring and wealthy towns which exerted great 
economic and social power within the territory, and the differing needs of princely 
971. On Weinsberg: Blezinger, Städtebund, pp. 63-64. On Donauwörth: Blezinger, Städtebund, pp. 
46, 65. See also Graf, ’Feindbild und Vorbild,’ p. 127.
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polities and city states meant that the two were unlikely to find much common 
ground in political debates at the imperial level.972 It is important that we recognize 
the specifically princely interests which created such frequent tensions between 
themselves and the towns, and do not automatically project these interests onto 
the rural nobility as well. Princes and nobles had much in common, but also much 
which separated them, not least their theoretically complementary social roles as 
rulers and loyal subjects. A community of interest between the two was never 
automatic, and had to be established by conscious effort where it was desired.
One prince who adopted a particularly aggressive stance towards the towns, 
and towards Nuremberg in particular, was the Hohenzollern Margrave Albrecht 
‘Achilles’ of Brandenburg-Ansbach, who succeeded his father Friedrich in 
1440 via a fraternal division of the family’s lands into the margraviates of 
Brandenburg, Ansbach and Kulmbach. The motives behind Achilles’ agitation 
against Nuremberg have often been reduced to what Ernst Schubert called his 
‘consciousness of nobility’ (Adelsbewußtsein), which saw the towns only as a threat 
to the class of which he was so proud to be a member.973 This may have been 
part of the story, but Albrecht’s self-presentation as a champion of the nobility 
was also a calculated strategy to win influence and supporters.974 There is no 
doubt that Achilles was a charismatic leader whose personality and passion were 
and remain compelling, but we cannot ignore the structural factors that drew 
him towards a collision with Nuremberg. Albrecht’s father’s political world 
had stretched from the Baltic to the Danube: in this context, the sale in 1427 of 
the remaining burgravial rights in Nuremberg and the majority of those in the 
surrounding imperial forests to the city council had its logic. Albrecht, however, 
was confined to Franconia and needed to maximize his limited resources there. 
972. Klaus Graf describes the war of 1449/50 as a ‘fundamental contest over the power of the 
towns in the political order of the Empire’ (Graf, ’Feindbild und Vorbild,’ p. 124). See also 
Karina Kellermann, Abschied vom ‘historischen Volkslied’: Studien zu Funktion, Ästhetik und 
Publizität der Gattung historisch-politische Ereignisdichtung (Tübingen, 2000), p. 105.
973. Schubert, ’Albrecht Achilles,’ p. 135.
974. See Hillay Zmora, ’Das Verhältnis Markgraf Albrecht Achilles’ zum fränkischen Adel’, in 
Mario Müller (ed.), Kurfürst Albrecht Achilles (1414-1486), Kurfürst von Brandenburg, Burggraf 
von Nürnberg (Ansbach, 2014), pp. 238-240.
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It is not clear whether or not he sought to reverse or amend the Hohenzollern 
withdrawal from Nuremberg – though some partisans of the city in 1449/50 
accused him of ambitions to subjugate it975 – but certainly the city and his dynasty 
had both a very long and a very present history.
Meanwhile, Achilles’ main rivals were actually his princely neighbours, chiefly (at 
least at the start of his reign) the bishop of Würzburg. There was no clear border 
between the territories of Ansbach and Würzburg, turning a huge swathe of 
Franconia into a ‘border area’ within which bishop and margrave competed for the 
allegiance of the local nobility.976 The principality which Achilles had inherited had 
been the heart of Hohenzollern lordship under his father, but on its own it was highly 
exposed. Thus Albrecht’s aggression could have been what he understood to be his 
best form of defence. He has also been credited with attempts to create a unified 
Franconian territory, which would have required the subordination of Nuremberg.977 
But we do not need to assume the existence of such far-reaching plans in order 
to explain his political behaviour in political terms, as opposed to the assumption 
that both margrave and rural nobility were ideological enemies of Nuremberg. The 
lengths to which Achilles went to establish this triangular relationship (margrave 
and nobility vs. Nuremberg) suggest that it was far from inevitable.
Achilles’ polemicists presented the townspeople as arrogant and presumptuous 
‘peasants behind walls’:
They count no-one their equal
And call themselves the Roman Empire
But they are nothing but peasants;
They stand with ‘honour’ behind their gates
While the princes step forward
To lead the land and its people.978
975. Rochus von Liliencron (ed.), Die historischen Volkslieder der Deutschen vom 13. bis 16. 
Jahrhundert, 5 vols. (Leipzig, 1865), i, 424: ‘Der marggraf macht daß ich von im muß singen: 
/ er meint er woll die herrn von Nürnberg zwingen, / er wolls im zinshaft machen’.
976. Zmora, ’Verhältnis,’ pp. 237-238.
977. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, p. 114.
978. Liliencron, Volkslieder, i, 417: ‘Si bdunkt es sei nit ir geleich / und nennen sich das römisch 
reich, / nun sind si doch nur pauren: / si stand mit ern hinder der tür, / so die fürsten gand 
herfür / die land und leut beschauren’.
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Another lyric, by Michel Beheim, compares the townspeople to a donkey which 
finds a lion’s skin and tries it out for size:
Oh, my heartache,
My sorrow and misery,
Will soon be past.
I must strive for nobility.979
The donkey’s dreams are then crushed by its master, Margrave Albrecht, who 
will ensure that the ‘peasants in the towns’ never have dominion over the 
princes. But it is not just the princes who are under threat from the towns. Our 
first (anonymous) publicist opens with an image of the towns ‘oppressing’ the 
nobility (adel):
[The devil] has given the towns the arrogance
With which they oppose the nobility
And completely drive it out (vertreiben).980
We have already encountered this image of townspeople ‘driving out’ or 
oppressing the nobility, against which ‘doctor’ Albrecht of Brandenburg wrote a 
‘useful prescription’ (see above, p. 118). The ‘doctor’ to the nobility appears again 
in this ballad, prohibiting the ‘peasants’ the rich food to which they have become 
accustomed, and allowing them only barley gruel.981 Achilles is in fact nothing 
less than the saviour of all nobles:
Margrave Albrecht, the noble prince,
Who has always striven for honour,
He wishes to save the nobility.982
This particular song of the towns’ oppression of the nobility and Margrave 
Albrecht’s steadfast support for nobles can (through references within the text) 
979. Katja Scheel, ’Die Städtekriege in der politischen Lyrik des späten Mittelalters’, Leuvense 
Bijdragen, 85 (1996), p. 325:  ‘meins herczen swer, / ach trauren und elend / hat furbaz mer 
ain end. / nach adel wil ich ringen’.
980. Liliencron, Volkslieder, i, 417: ‘Den steten hat er [der bös] hochvart geben, / wie si dem adel 
widerstreben / und den genzlich vertreiben’.
981. Liliencron, Volkslieder, i, 418: ‘der marggraf ist ain arzat weis, / verpeut in alle kostlich speis 
/	und	erlaubt	in	můs	und	gersten’.
982. Liliencron, Volkslieder, i, 418: ‘Marggraf Albrecht, der edel fürst / den ir nach eren hat 
gedürst, / der will den adel retten’.
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be clearly situated in the context of the war in late 1449 or early 1450.983 But this 
rhetoric of ‘oppression’ was not just wartime propaganda. Achilles had made 
it a central plank of his political programme ever since he concluded one of his 
first major alliances with the archbishop of Mainz and the administrator of the 
bishopric of Würzburg in November 1443. This was expressly directed not against 
highway robbery and general peacebreakers, the usual targets of such leagues 
of princes, but against the towns and their ‘oppression’ of the princes and the 
nobility.984 However, the alliance itself did not last for the signatories’ lifetimes, as 
intended.985 The customary tensions between Ansbach and Würzburg reasserted 
themselves, and by the summer of 1445 the bishop (Gottfried von Limpurg) was 
aligned with Nuremberg and the other imperial cities.986 Now that his two main 
opponents – Würzburg and Nuremberg – had come together (or had been driven 
together), Achilles only intensified his efforts to label the towns as oppressors of 
the nobility.
This effort was aided by the simultaneous conflict between the Habsburg King 
Frederick III and the Swiss Confederation. In September 1444 the envoys of 
Straßburg at the imperial diet in Nuremberg were deeply troubled by rumours 
that the princes were complaining that the towns intended to oppress the nobility 
by allying with the Swiss.987 The city of Basel had a similar fear, and asked the 
towns which were present at the diet to deny the charges on their behalf.988 The 
towns’ representatives (as reported by Hans Ehinger of Ulm) eventually broached 
the matter in their discussions with the princes in Nuremberg, denying that they 
were ‘Swiss’ and that they wanted to oppress (vertriben) the nobility. The bishop 
of Worms, speaking on behalf of the princes, replied that he had heard nothing 
of the sort said against the towns. But as the princes rose to leave, Margrave 
983. Liliencron, Volkslieder, i, 418.
984. Johann Christian Lünig (ed.), Das teutsche Reichs-Archiv (Leipzig, 1710), xvi, 65: 
‘Niederdrückung des Adels’. In the text the nobility (Adel) is clearly understood as separate 
from the princes.
985. Lünig, Reichs-Archiv, xvi, 66.
986. Wendehorst, Bistum Würzburg 2, p. 177.
987. RTA 17 no. 226f (2.9.1444).
988. RTA 17 no. 231.1 (3.9.1444). See also RTA 17 no. 218 (1.10.1444).
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Friedrich of Brandenburg, Albrecht’s elder brother, remarked that ‘one must have 
a lord’, and that nobles would be nothing without honourable burghers, and the 
burghers would be nothing without the nobility.989
These rumours which swirled around the Nuremberg diet in 1444 were not 
necessarily spread by Albrecht Achilles; they had other sources, as we will see 
shortly. But Achilles quite definitely took up and promoted the same themes after 
June 1446, when he formed an alliance against Würzburg with his brother Johann 
of Brandenburg-Kulmbach, Duke Wilhelm III of Saxony and Landgraves Johann 
and Ludwig of Hessen, to which the bishop retaliated by committing himself 
to a full alliance with the Swabian League. An imperial diet in September 1446, 
this time at Frankfurt, provided a focus for tensions. In a letter to Ulm dated 
6 September, the Nuremberg council expressed a fear that Duke Heinrich of 
Bayern-Landshut might be ill-disposed towards the towns due to rumours that 
they intended to oppress (drucken) the nobility.990 Just four days later Nuremberg 
wrote to Ulm with news of a letter written by Wilhelm of Saxony to the knighthood 
of Franconia accusing the bishop of Würzburg of making an alliance with the 
towns against the nobility and promising to help the nobles if they were thereby 
oppressed (gedrangt).991 Achilles himself then repeated these allegations at the 
diet in Frankfurt.992 Whilst the towns debated whether they should make their 
answer to the princes in writing or in person,993 it was clear that Achilles and 
Duke Wilhelm had hit their mark. The alliance of the towns and the bishop of 
Würzburg was in fact wide open to this particular attack thanks to both the 
widespread accusations that the towns were seeking to oppress the nobility and 
the long history of poor relations between successive bishops of Würzburg and 
the noble families traditionally in their allegiance.994
989. RTA 17 pp. 506-507 (22.9.1444).
990. BB 18 ff. 35v-36v (6.9.1446).
991. BB 18 ff. 39v-40v (10.9.1446).
992. BB 18 ff. 53v-54r (22.9.1446).
993. BB 18 ff. 69r-70r (6.10.1446).
994. Ulrichs, Lehnhof, pp. 153-164.
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The Nuremberg council interpreteted Achilles’ strategy as an attempt to ‘turn’ the 
nobility away from Würzburg, presumably towards himself.995 This is also how 
the vast majority of historians have read his behaviour, as part of his attempt to 
secure regional hegemony. Recently, Hillay Zmora has questioned this consensus 
by pointing out that rather than trying everything he possibly could to attract 
nobles from all over Franconia to his court, Achilles actually pursued a very 
conservative strategy with respect to the chief offices in his administration (master 
of the court, marshall and Hausvogt), which were filled by nobles from a limited 
number of families with long-standing links to the Ansbach regime.996 However, 
these offices closest to the margrave are the only posts for which we can reconstruct 
a reasonably complete sequence of office-holders. We might expect Achilles to 
have filled these positions with reliable men, and this does not mean that he did 
not try to recruit noble supporters in other ways. Zmora does not dispute that 
Achilles assiduously presented himself as a champion of the nobility, which may 
even have been a reaction to the lack of patronage which he had to offer nobles 
from outside his inner circle. In the absence of lucrative offices and influential 
appointments, did he have to make do with the phantom threat of ‘oppression’ 
by the towns as a motivating factor? When the war came in the summer of 1449 
he was able to play to this well-established theme with some subtlety, as a letter 
was drafted in his name exhorting the nobility to help him deal with the towns in 
a manner that would bring future use and honour to the ‘common nobility’ and 
expressing the hope that all nobles would do the right thing as nobles.997 There 
could be no doubt that these words referred to the interlinked ideas of ‘arrogance’ 
and ‘oppression’ through which Achilles had over several years attempted to pit 
the ideal of a united nobility against an image of the overmighty towns.
Achilles appears throughout the 1440s as the driving force behind both the alliance 
of princes ostensibly opposed to the towns and the particular anti-town rhetoric 
995. BB 18 ff. 39v-40v (10.9.1446).
996. Zmora, ’Verhältnis’.
997. ChrdtSt, ii, 371 n. 2.
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associated with this alliance. But he was not the originator of this rhetoric, as 
we can see from the prominence of the Swiss in the rumours at the diet in 1444. 
In the context of the struggle between the Habsburgs and the Swiss, the latter 
had always been demonized as ‘peasants’ who rebelled against their natural and 
rightful lords. The Habsburgs’ client nobles who fought and sometimes died for 
the dynasty, especially at the bloody battle of Sempach in 1386, seem to have 
largely bought into this narrative, so that the habit of denigrating the Swiss 
‘peasants’ reinforced the Habsburg cause and vice versa.998 The Swiss Confederacy 
also included imperial cities, and was sometimes allied with other towns on the 
Upper Rhine and in Swabia. The towns were also comparable with the Swiss 
confederates in that they were self-governing communes whose inhabitants were 
not generally considered to be noble, however aristocratic the lifestyles of their 
elites might have been.999 Consequently the rhetoric of Swiss ‘peasants’ vs. the 
nobility was capable of being extended to an opposition between towns and 
nobility, and one particular group of nobles in the late 1430s and 1440s made this 
case with particular vigour. Niklas Konzen has recently argued that these nobles 
– labelled by their enemies as the ‘enemies of the towns’, the Städtefeinde – were 
all threatened by the territorial expansion of princes in Swabia, especially by the 
Counts of Württemberg, and that they tried to defend themselves by banding 
together to go on the offensive. They could not attack Württemberg directly, nor 
could they access its network of patronage, so they tried to align themselves with 
the Habsburg interest. To do so, and to gain prominence and social capital more 
generally, they mounted spectacular feuds against towns which they legitimated 
with a narrative about defending the nobility against oppression by the towns. 
Their activities also spawned political songs which derided townspeople as 
‘peasants’, for instance a lyric about an ambush against merchants carried out by 
998. Steffen Krieb, ’Vom Totengedenken zum politischen Argument: Die Schlacht bei Sempach 
(1386) im Gedächtnis des Hauses Habsburg und des südwestdeutschen Adels im 15. 
Jahrhundert’, in Horst Carl et al. (eds.), Kriegsniederlagen: Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen 
(Berlin, 2004).
999. For the conflation of the Swiss and the towns in the threat of the self-governing commons, 
see Brady, Turning Swiss, p. 32. Also Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, p. 55.
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the Städtefeinde in 1440.1000 By definition, this group remained relatively isolated 
in Swabia, and indeed was often opposed to large groups of nobles who were 
more tightly organized in the Society of St George’s Shield, which had spent the 
1430s working towards an alliance with the Swabian League of towns.
The Städtefeinde group in Swabia were, however, indirectly linked to Albrecht 
Achilles. He too was aligned with the Habsburg cause, and Wilhelm von 
Rechberg, brother of Hans von Rechberg, one of the leading ‘anti-town’ nobles, 
was Albrecht’s master of the court. But Albrecht would not have needed personal 
contacts to become aware of the situation in Swabia, as the Städefeinde were 
causing considerable unrest across southern Germany, and were bringing their 
case before assemblies of princes just as Albrecht began his rule in Brandenburg-
Ansbach.1001 Achilles supported their campaign against the towns with favourable 
judgements in his burgravial Landgericht which helped to legitimate their feuds,1002 
and he employed one of the most prominent figures in the group, Eberhard von 
Urbach.1003 Urbach and other leading Städtefeinde were praised by publicists in 
1449 almost to the same extent as Achilles himself, and one of these propaganda 
lyrics was framed as an explicit appeal for a certain nobleman (Eberhard Rüde von 
Kollenberg) to throw his weight behind the princes against the towns.1004 Just as 
the original denigration of the Swiss ‘peasants’ had been useful to the Habsburg 
dynasty, so it could be put to work by Achilles in Franconia too, though in this 
instance the strategy ultimately targeted the prince-bishop of Würzburg as well 
as the ‘peasants’ in the towns. Albrecht certainly borrowed heavily from the anti-
town rhetoric of elements within the Swabian nobility, but it is not necessarily the 
case that he was taking up a theme which was already widespread and popular 
amongst the nobility, in Swabia let alone in Franconia.
1000. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, p. 231.
1001. RTA 15 pp. 377-379 (7.5.1440).
1002. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, pp. 114-115; Blezinger, Städtebund, pp. 43, 93.
1003. Zeilinger, Lebensformen im Krieg, pp. 161-164.
1004. See Kellermann, Abschied, pp. 125-131, 152-163.
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It is impossible to say how successful Achilles’ anti-town strategy was in mobilizing 
the nobility in his cause. Even the fact that his son and heir tried the same strategy 
in the years around 1500 does not mean that it had worked in the first instance.1005 
A huge number of nobles declared feuds against Nuremberg in 1449 in support 
of Achilles and other princes,1006 but this may say more about Achilles’ success in 
bringing other princes onto his side than the success of his recruitment amongst 
the nobility: with all the princes in Franconia (aside from the bishop of Würzburg) 
ranged against Nuremberg, which itself had only a very small noble clientele (see 
chapter six), many nobles in the region may have had little choice but to toe the 
line.1007 It is, however, abundantly clear that most of the statements which emerged 
during the 1440s purporting to be about a conflict between town and nobility were 
produced to further the interests of certain groups and individuals, many of them 
neither townspeople nor nobles. The statements cannot be taken at anything like 
face value.1008 However, many questions remain to be answered regarding both the 
extent to which these polemics developed existing ideas that were circulating more 
widely and the extent of their influence. We currently have few direct indicators 
for either of these issues, though we may be able to say something about them 
from a consideration of the wider picture of town-noble relations.
Conclusion: growing apart together?
Margrave Albrecht’s appeal to the nobility of Franconia made explicit use of 
the tensions between townspeople and nobles over the issue of rural security 
to substantiate the idea that the towns were seeking to ‘oppress’ the nobility. 
1005. Seyboth, ’“Raubritter” und Landesherrn,’ p. 122.
1006. Theoretically over 6,000 nobles declared feuds against Nuremberg (Zeilinger, Lebensformen 
im Krieg, p. 157).
1007. The sixteenth-century historian of the bishopric of Würzburg, Lorenz Fries (1489/91-1550), 
believed that the Würzburg nobility mostly supported Margrave Albrecht, but does not 
suggest why (Zeilinger, Lebensformen im Krieg, p. 157).
1008. Cf. Schubert, ’Albrecht Achilles,’ p. 140, where the lyric quoted above describing Achilles as 
the ‘saviour’ of the nobility is taken as evidence for nobles’ attitudes. Similarly Sonja Kerth, 
’Niuwe maere vom Krieg: Politische Ereignisdichtungen, herrschaftliche Propaganda, 
Reimchroniken und Newe Zeitungen’, in Horst Brunner et al. (eds.), Dulce bellum inexpertis. 
Bilder des Krieges in der deutschen Literatur des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts (2002), pp. 42-43 reads 
the propaganda of 1449/50 as a direct expression of town-noble antagonism.
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But any success that his propaganda might have achieved would also have 
exploited the fissures between townspeople and nobles which were opening a 
little wider just as Achilles began his ideological campaign. The social division 
between Nuremberg’s elite and the nobility of the city’s hinterland was a much 
more deeply-rooted phenomenon, but in the 1440s wider political communities 
were becoming increasingly less able to bridge this divide, allowing the tensions 
inherent in these same communities to come to the fore. The social separation 
between town and nobility was a threat to effective communication between 
the two, given the weaknesses of the written communication which had to be 
employed to cross between urban and rural spaces and the exacerbation of these 
issues by nobles’ distrust of Nuremberg’s bureaucracy. However, these problems 
could clearly be overcome under favourable political conditions. The princely 
territories of Franconia, Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate which were otherwise 
so important to Nuremberg could offer little in the way of integrative structures, 
but the distant emperor played an indirect role through the communities of 
common interest and action which he could mobilize. These communities were 
relatively strong during the reign of Sigismund, and Nuremberg relied heavily 
on partnerships with some of the Luxemburg emperor’s closest confidants and 
most effective allies. This system began to unravel after Sigismund’s death, and 
the communities which replaced it in Nuremberg’s external relations, such as the 
Swabian League, tended to increase tension at least as much as they furthered 
cooperation. This was fertile ground for those who had an interest in sowing 
division between townspeople and nobles. Research in this area still has many 
avenues to explore, but currently there is little evidence that some of the more 
extreme ideas – such as the ‘oppression’ of the nobility by the towns and the 
virulent denigration of townspeople as ‘peasants’ – had much hold on the nobility 
before they were promoted by certain nobles and princes, and indeed hardly 
any more evidence that they gained much traction in the short term. However, a 
study of their possible longer term influence is certainly called for.
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Fig 3: Parsberg castle (2015)
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6.
ALLIANCE AND SERVICE
Nuremberg did not rely solely on its common membership of communities 
alongside rural nobles and on the patronage of some of these community 
partners. The council also created its own community of clientage and protection 
amongst the rural nobility, and it did so largely by employing nobles as servitors 
of the town. These retainers performed a range of functions, and many were 
simultaneously Nuremberg’s allies and its employees. This was the area of closest 
cooperation between townspeople and nobles, with substantial implications for 
wider town-noble relations. However, the study of this subject has been stifled by 
generalized assumptions about the fundamental relationship between town and 
nobility. It has long been assumed that, given the apparently innate and eternal 
antipathy between the two, any alliances must have necessarily been marriages 
of the most egregious convenience. Entry into the paid service of a wealthy town 
was supposedly one way for a morally degenerate nobility in economic decline 
to make ends meet – at least for those with limited class-loyalty or particularly 
desperate financial circumstances. This assumption has been reflected in an almost 
total lack of interest in the social, political and cultural dimensions of alliances 
between towns and nobles. Even a historian such as Kurt Andermann, who 
disputes the theory of a deep economic crisis within the nobility, has concluded 
that taking service with a town was for nobles ‘of interest almost exclusively 
from an economic perspective’.1009
In the last hundred years there has only been one full-scale study of a 
German-speaking town’s network of noble allies (Hans Domsta on Cologne’s 
‘outburghers’), although the phenomenon has been noted and commented upon 
countless times by historians.1010 Nuremberg offers excellent source material for 
1009. Andermann, ’Einkommensverhältnissen,’ pp. 90-91.
1010. Domsta, Kölner Außenbürger.
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a foray into this under-developed field: the Briefbücher record many (though not 
necessarily all) communications with noble servitors during their absences from 
Nuremberg; the accounts record not only payments made to servitors, but also 
the expenses they incurred in the town’s service; and the terms of many servitors’ 
contracts were written out in a special register.1011 Thus we can examine the scale, 
composition and structure of Nuremberg’s noble clientele in the 1440s, and 
ask what this might mean for our understanding of town–noble relations more 
broadly: do these service relationships really represent a triumph of pragmatism 
over ideology? If nobles simply needed Nuremberg’s money, we might expect 
service relationships to be shallow, one-dimensional, and probably short-lived; if 
service relationships were deeper, more complex and longer-lasting, we will have 
to question the extent to which the discourses of antagonism found any resonance 
amongst the nobility. To what extent could these cooperative relationships repair 
or counterbalance ruptures in other areas of interaction, and to what extent could 
they create meaningful relationships in areas of estrangement and division?
Allies and Servitors
We have already seen that Nuremberg had a number of ‘allies’ or trusted partners 
within its imperial political community: men such as Haupt von Pappenheim and 
his sons, and Heinrich von Plauen the elder. But these figures were not bound to 
the town through any kind of formal and reciprocal agreement. The city possessed 
another class of partner who had entered into such an agreement with the council, 
and the majority of these contracts were not just empty words. They were the 
basis for some very substantive relationships, which shaped the lives of certain 
nobles and played a very considerable role in the collective life of the town. During 
the 1440s these relationships were framed almost entirely by the structure of the 
service contract, in which one party undertook to perform certain tasks for the other 
party in exchange for money or other rewards. Yet these relationships went so far 
beyond this straightforward transaction that the more significant amongst them 
1011. StAN Rep. 52b 269.
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were true political alliances, and the vast majority were substantial agreements for 
mutual aid and support, although between very unequal partners. The inherent 
tension between the narrowness of the formal service contract and the breadth of 
the actual relationships which this service contract implied, created or enabled is 
important to both the strength and the weakness of these relationships overall.
This situation was not remotely unique to Nuremberg. The city council used much 
the same repertoire of forms of service and alliance as did other German towns 
of this period, tailored and adjusted to Nuremberg’s particular circumstances. In 
practice this meant that Nuremberg retained, in any given year during peacetime, 
between around 60 and 100 mounted soldiers as its servitors, many (though not 
all) of whom were rural nobles.1012 The number of soldiers increased to around 500 
during the war of 1449/50.1013 All of these men were in theory capable of fighting 
in battle for Nuremberg, but some also served as part of the regular patrols of 
the countryside (see above, pp. 179-183) and most also undertook non-military 
duties, chiefly diplomatic and sometimes administrative or judicial tasks. All of 
the servitors took orders directly from the inner council, except in times of war 
when a leading servitor was appointed as a captain in the field. But although 
there was no chain of command, there was a rough hierarchy of prestige within 
the group of servitors, and this can help us to understand how and why their 
relationships with Nuremberg were structured as they were.
Nuremberg’s senior servitor was simultaneously the city’s imperial chief 
magistrate (Reichsschultheiß). Control of this office had been fought over between 
the town and the Hohenzollern burgraves for much of the fourteenth century, but 
it last changed hands in 1385 when the council installed the patrician Nicholas 
Muffel in the position.1014 From around 1390 a series of Franconian nobles 
(Friedrich von Laufenholz, Georg Kratz, Winrich von Treuchtlingen, Hans von 
Rosenberg, Hans von Sparneck) held the post in fairly quick succession, before in 
1012. Sander, Haushaltung, p. 151 gives figures of between 63 and 108 soldiers for the 1430s.
1013. Sander, Haushaltung, p. 152.
1014. Dannenbauer, Entstehung, p. 101.
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1419 the knight Wigeleis von Wolfstein first appears as Reichsschultheiß.1015 In this 
role he served as a captain of Nuremberg’s contingent on expeditions against the 
Hussites in 1421 and 1426.1016 He also opened his share of the castles of Sulzbürg 
and Pyrbaum to Nuremberg.1017 The office of chief magistrate itself, however, was 
entirely ceremonial and had no judicial function, as Wolfstein himself informed 
a fellow noble in 1440.1018 Wigeleis served in this role until January 1442, when 
he fell unconscious and later passed away in the Nuremberg city hall itself, from 
where four of the town’s other servitors accompanied his body to his family’s 
favoured monastery at Seligenporten (west of Neumarkt in der Oberpfalz).1019
He was succeeded by his brother-in-law Werner von Parsberg, who had already 
been in Nuremberg’s service since at least October 1430, when he too had fought 
for Nuremberg against the Hussites.1020 Parsberg also opened his castles (Lupburg 
and Adelburg) to Nuremberg,1021 and (given his close association with Wolfstein) 
was probably in effect Reichsschultheiß-designate for many years, during which 
he served Nuremberg with eight horses (i.e. himself and seven retainers).1022 He 
carried Nuremberg’s banner in the best-remembered battle of the war of 1449/50 
(the battle of Pillenreuther Weiher, 11 March 1450), and his funerary hatchment still 
hangs in the church of St Laurence in the city (see fig. 4, p. 284).1023 Both Parsberg 
and Wolfstein were members of leading families in what is now the southern Upper 
Palatinate: Wigeleis’ main castle at Sulzbürg was 39 km southeast of Nuremberg, 
sandwiched between the principalities of Eichstätt and Pfalz-Neumarkt; Werner’s 
residence at Lupburg was 59 km from Nuremberg in much the same direction 
(and just 25 km from Sulzbürg), also on the fringes of the Pfalz-Neumarkt lands. 
The locations of these two nobles on the borders of relatively weak princely states 
1015. Sander, Haushaltung, p. 155.
1016. BB 5 ff. 173v-174r (12.11.1421). BB 7 ff. 92r (16.8.1426), 120v (5.12.1426).
1017. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 32r.
1018. BB 14 ff. 233v-234r (8.9.1440).
1019. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 82v.
1020. BB 9 f. 59v (30.10.1430). StAN Rep. 54 9 f. 65r.
1021. Sander, Haushaltung, p. 451. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 49r-v; Rep. 54 12 f. 73v (3.10.1441).
1022. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 49r-v; Rep. 54 12 f. 73v (3.10.1441).
1023. ChrdtSt, ii, 484.
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helped to give them a degree of independence which was a crucial factor in their 
relationship with Nuremberg. But members of these families also occupied key 
positions within princely states: most notably, Werner’s brother Hans was vice-
regent in Pfalz-Neumarkt for King Christoph of Denmark (1444–1446; see also p. 
221), and another brother, Friedrich, was bishop of Regensburg (1437-1449).1024
Nuremberg employed some other leading nobles with less defined roles and fewer 
known duties. In February 1445 Konrad von Heideck entered into a substantial 
service contract with ten horses and his castle at Heideck for ten years.1025 There 
is little evidence of his activity in Nuremberg’s service before the war of 1449/50, 
but he had probably been retained in anticipation of war with Albrecht Achilles, 
as both he and Nuremberg were threatened by Achilles’ belligerent policies. At 
the same time, the alliance with Heideck was simply a continuation of a similar 
relationship which Nuremberg had had with Konrad’s father and grandfather; 
the family held a small but substantially independent lordship around 35 km 
south of Nuremberg.1026 Another noble servitor with a more exalted title but not 
necessarily a more extensive lordship was Landgrave Johann of Leuchtenberg, 
who contracted himself to serve Nuremberg in 1421, and again between 1439 and 
1444.1027 Johann experienced the loss of much of his patrimony over the course of 
his lifetime, but built a varied career for himself as a servitor to various Wittelsbach 
dukes of Bavaria as well as to Nuremberg.1028 A little lower in standing than these 
two troubled grandees we find further members of the Wolfstein and Parsberg 
families, along with Georg von Wildenstein, whom Nuremberg helped to redeem 
Hohenstein castle (see above, pp. 176-177). There were also a small number of 
other individual noble servitors from families of middling fortune, such as Hans 
von Seckendorff-Nold zu Unterlaimbach and Mathes von Mangersreuth.
1024. Karl Hausberger, ’Parsberg, Friedrich von (um 1385-1449). 1437-1449 Bischof von 
Regensberg’, in Erwin Gatz and Clemens Brodkorb (eds.), Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen 
Reiches, 1448 bis 1648. Ein biographisches Lexikon (Berlin, 1996).
1025. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 84r (20.2.1445).
1026. Deeg, Heideck, pp. 36, 38.
1027. StAN Rep. 54 6 f. 87r (12.3.1421); Rep. 52b 269 f. 128r (26.2.1439, 10.1.1442).
1028. Wagner, Leuchtenberg 3.
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The engine room within Nuremberg’s body of servitors was a group of both noble 
and non-noble retainers who served on standardized terms and were hired or re-
hired each year en masse.1029 In the municipal accounts a distinction is made within 
this group between the higher-ranking servitors (called stipendarii) and the Einrösser, 
or servitors with just one horse. These latter servitors were probably not nobles, 
and neither were all of the stipendarii, though many of them were. One or two 
hailed from reasonably prominent families, such as Michael von Ehenheim, Hans 
von Rechenberg and Konrad von Laufenholz. Others have backgrounds which are 
more difficult to reconstruct, but they were sometimes addressed or described by 
Nuremberg as noble (either with a standard noble form of address or with the title 
‘erber Diener’, literally ‘honourable servitor’). Servitors of this type active in the 
1440s included Hans von Lidbach, Hans von Talheim, Hans Erlbeck, Hans von 
Blindheim, Albrecht Tauchersdorfer and Ulrich von Augsburg. Servitors whose 
general standing in Nuremberg’s service and (where visible) outside of the city’s 
clientele indicates that they may have been considered noble include Nicholas 
Grieß, Hans Stetzmann, Hans Feldbrecht, Peter Motter and Konrad Fribertshofer. 
There was a small range of wealth within the stipendarii, for instance between Hans 
von Rechenberg, who was retained with four horses, and Hans Feldbrecht, with 
just two.1030 Different members of this group also had different roles, with some 
appearing more regularly than others on diplomatic missions or on rural patrols.
These men formed a standing force of permanent servitors who were always 
at Nuremberg’s disposal. But whenever any serious conflict threatened many 
more retainers had to be engaged. In some senses these were classic ‘mercenary’ 
appointments, but the forms by which these servitors were bound to the town 
did not significantly differ from those which applied to the ‘standing’ servitors, 
and some of the short-term servitors’ roles extended beyond fighting in battle. 
Nuremberg needed to recruit extra troops on three occasions during the 1440s: 
twice in 1444 for the Waldenfels feud and for the imperial expedition to oppose 
1029. e.g. StAN Rep. 2a 894 (12.11.1440).
1030. Rechenberg: StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 90r (16.1.1445). Feldbrecht: ibid f. 18v (14.3.1447).
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the Armagnacs on the Upper Rhine, and of course in 1449 for the showdown with 
Albrecht Achilles. Each of these challenges required a slightly different response. 
To combat Hans and Fritz von Waldenfels Nuremberg needed operating bases 
closer to the Waldenfels’ castles at Wartenfels and Lichtenberg (the latter over 110 
km north of Nuremberg). The council secured the services of three nobles with 
castles nearly half way between Nuremberg and Lichtenberg: Hans and Sittich 
Groß zu Trockau (at Trockau and Tüchersfeld) and Friedrich von Künsberg (at 
Schnabelwaid).1031 But Künsberg also opened his castle at Stadtsteinach – which 
was just 12 km from Wallenfels – to Nuremberg’s forces, and the council also 
concluded an agreement with Georg, Neidhart and Friedrich von Wildenstein 
concerning their castle at Naila, 6 km from Lichtenberg.1032
Later	in	1444	Nuremberg	negotiated	with	the	Bohemians	Jakoubek	of	Vřesovice	and	
Nicholas of Lobkowitz in anticipation of the expedition to the Rhine, but decided 
that their services would not be necessary.1033 The council did, however, ask Heinrich 
and Wilhelm von Paulsdorf and Georg von Murach (from the present-day Upper 
Palatinate) to join Nuremberg’s forces.1034 Other nobles offered their service in this 
context, but were declined (see below, pp. 274-277). The crisis of 1449 naturally 
required a more substantial response. Further servitors were engaged from the 
Danube valley between Ingolstadt and Regensburg (Heinrich Zenger zu Regenstauf 
with ten horses and Oswald Ottlinger with fifteen) and from the Upper Palatinate 
(Georg Lichtenecker with five horses), but the main reinforcements came from further 
afield: the Bohemian mercenary captains Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg (whose 
feud with Nuremberg had ended in 1448, see p. 294 below) and Racek Janovice 
of Riesenberg with 190 and 60 mounted men respectively, and Nuremberg’s two 
main commanders in the field, Heinrich Reuß von Plauen (with 24 horses) and Kunz 
1031. Groß: StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 117r (24.1.1444). Künsberg: StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 133v (10.2.1444).
1032. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 108v (2.3.1444).
1033. BB 17 ff. 114r-115r	(6.10.1444).	On	Vřesovice	see	Uwe	Tresp,	Söldner aus Böhmen: im Dienst 
deutscher Fürsten: Kriegsgeschäft und Heeresorganisation im 15. Jahrhundert (Paderborn, 2004), 
pp. 37-38.
1034. BB 17 ff. 146v-147r (7.11.1444).
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von Kaufungen.1035 Both these last named men were Saxons aligned with Duke 
Friedrich, and their employment by Nuremberg was doubtless aided by the fact that 
Friedrich’s brother and rival Wilhelm was allied with Albrecht Achilles.1036
There was one other way in which nobles could enter Nuremberg’s service. Service 
contracts were sometimes used in the settlement of disputes to bind the reconciled 
opponents to keep the new peace between them and sometimes also to compensate 
one of the parties: the town might receive a noble’s service (or promise of readiness 
to serve) for free, or might be obliged to pay for service with limited obligations.1037 
There are no known instances of this form of service from Nuremberg during the 
1440s, but this does not mean that it was not a possibility. A settlement between 
the town and Hilpolt von Fraunberg in 1412 stipulated that Hilpolt should be 
ready to serve Nuremberg for a month at any time in the next year,1038 and in 1434 
Georg von Fraunberg suggested that Nuremberg should resolve its dispute with 
Hans von Villenbach (see above, pp. 190-191) by offering to take on Villenbach as a 
servitor with three horses for six years.1039 In August 1464 Georg von Egloffstein and 
Albrecht Gottsmann entered into an arrangement similar to Hilpolt von Fraunberg’s 
of over fifty years before.1040 Although many of the obligations contained in these 
agreements may have been of little real value to either side,1041 the use of service 
relationships in this way suggests that contemporaries understood them both as a 
straightforward contract for work and renumeration – and thus a possible form of 
compensation – and as a substantial bond of loyalty between servitor and service-
giver, meaning that the contract could also be a symbolic form of reconciliation.
1035. Zenger: StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 166v (8.1.1449). Ottlinger: ibid f. 165v (3.1.1449). Lichtenecker: 
ibid f. 167r (8.1.1449). Schwanberg and Riesenberg: Zeilinger, Lebensformen im Krieg, pp. 64-
65. Plauen:  StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 168v (16.1.1449). Kaufungen: Zeilinger, Lebensformen im 
Krieg, p. 58.
1036. Liliencron, Volkslieder, i, 413-414.
1037. For examples from beyond Nuremberg, see Regesta Boica 13 p. 35 (3.5.1424); Ochs, 
’Ritteradel und Städte,’ pp. 108-109; Zeilinger, Lebensformen im Krieg, pp. 163-164; 
Andermann, ’Einkommensverhältnissen,’ p. 196; Domsta, Kölner Außenbürger, pp. 129-137.
1038. StAN Rep. 2c 16 f. 2r-v (3.3.1412).
1039. StAN Rep. 2c 22 f. 17v (10.12.1434).
1040. Egloffstein, Chronik, p. 150.
1041. See Orth, Fehden, p. 97.
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The service contract of the mid-fifteenth century also needs to be seen as part of 
a historical process and as one of several options available to towns when they 
wished to form mutually beneficial relationships with rural nobles. Many towns 
received nobles as full burghers or as a special form of ’outburgher’. This form 
of alliance is barely recorded at Nuremberg, though it was used during the First 
Towns’ War in 1386/87, when twenty-four Franconian nobles were admitted as 
outburghers, including Friedrich von Heideck.1042 A similar arrangement may also 
account for the fact that some members of the Wildenstein family were burghers of 
Nuremberg in the early part of the fifteenth century.1043 But noble outburghers are 
recorded at towns across Germany from the second half of the thirteenth century 
onwards,1044 with Cologne having by far the largest such network.1045 This set of 
alliances was intended as a counterbalance to the archbishops of Cologne and 
included some of the most important nobles of the region. The agreements included 
a pension paid by the town, and were life-long, often also hereditary.1046 From the 
1360s onwards, however, they became more flexible, and were often combined 
with paid service contracts.1047 Domsta (who studied these treaties in detail) relates 
this development to the growing power on the Lower Rhine of territorial princes 
other than the archbishops of Cologne, but it also correlates with a shift which can 
be observed elsewhere from ‘outburgher’ to ‘service’ forms of alliance. This took 
place at Göttingen in the 1360s and at Frankfurt in the second half of the fourteenth 
century.1048 But in other towns, nobles continued to be received as burghers via 
particular treaties and contracts: at Schlettstadt in Alsace well into the sixteenth 
century, and in considerable numbers at Nördlingen (as so-called Paktbürger) until 
around 1450.1049 On balance, it seems that Nuremberg’s mid-fifteenth century city 
fathers were following the standard practice of their day in engaging noble allies as 
1042. Leiser, ’Landgebiet,’ p. 246. Deeg, Heideck, p. 36.
1043. See, for example, BB 2 f. 66r (25.11.1408).
1044. Domsta, Kölner Außenbürger, p. 25. Also Rechter, ’Verhältnis zwischen Niederadel und 
Städten,’ p. 145; Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt, p. 346; Andermann, Gewalt, p. 192.
1045. Domsta, Kölner Außenbürger.
1046. Domsta, Kölner Außenbürger, p. 46.
1047. Domsta, Kölner Außenbürger, pp. 68-91, 97-100.
1048. Göttingen: Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt, pp. 341-342. Frankfurt: Orth, ’Stadtherrschaft,’ p. 150.
1049. Schlettstadt: Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ pp. 33-34. Nördlingen: Kießling, Stadt, pp. 75-83.
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servitors, but that this was also a conscious decision to establish these relationships 
in a more flexible format than some types of outburgher treaty. When we also recall 
the failed attempts made by nobles to establish alliances with towns on a much 
broader basis – most notably those of the Society of St George’s Shield, as we have 
already seen, but also (for example) repeated appeals by the Breisgau nobility in 
1460 and 1468 for an alliance with the Breisgau towns against the Swiss1050 – it is 
clear that most towns, whilst continually allying with and employing many nobles, 
were not always interested in closer or more wide-ranging forms of cooperation.
Duties and Lordship
What was the actual content of the service relationships which we have just 
outlined? The ways in which noble servitors interacted with Nuremberg were 
largely determined by the conditions imposed by their contracts and by the duties 
which they were obliged to perform. These in turn are our key to understanding 
how and to what extent the town valued its servitors, how they fitted into civic 
structures, and how they interacted on the town’s behalf with their fellow nobles.
‘Relations were at their least complicated when towns made use of nobles’ most 
deeply ingrained characteristic, their military capabilities.’1051 Peter Johanek’s 
assessment reflects a scholarly consensus that independent, politically active 
towns could not do without the military professionalism of nobles.1052 The amount 
of fighting which was done by burghers – Ulman Stromer, for example, names 
Nuremberg patricians who were killed or wounded in battle1053 – suggests that 
matters were not quite so straightforward, but it is clear that Nuremberg did value 
nobles as military retainers, both as mercenaries to bolster the city’s permanent 
forces and as leaders of these forces as a whole. Command on campaign and in 
battle was usually shared between one or more noble captains and a member 
1050. Scott, Freiburg, pp. 33-34.
1051. Johanek, ’Adel und Stadt,’ p. 30: ‘Am unkompliziertesten waren die Beziehungen dort, wo 
die Stadt die ureigensten Eigenschaften des Adels nutzte, seine militärische Fähigkeiten’.
1052. Mindermann, Adel in der Stadt, p. 340; Andermann, ’Einkommensverhältnissen,’ p. 188.
1053. ChrdtSt, i, 10, 68.
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of the inner council. The expedition against Hans and Fritz von Waldenfels, 
for example, was led by Werner von Parsberg, Mathes von Mangersreuth and 
Nicholas Grieß together with the councillor Erhard Schürstab, who conducted 
the correspondence with the council in Nuremberg (Mangersreuth and possibly 
Grieß had relevant local knowledge and connections).1054 The council naturally 
directed operations in the field as far as it felt necessary, but individual patricians 
were not automatically senior to noble servitors: in the war of 1449, Heinrich Reuß 
von Plauen was given overall command of Nuremberg’s forces with responsibility 
to Bürgermeister Erhard Schürstab, but with authority over patricians including 
Erasmus Schürstab, Hans Imhoff and Konrad Paumgartner.1055 Sometimes nobles 
had sole command on particular deployments. For example, Werner von Parsberg 
directed the siege of the Riedheim brothers (feud patrons of Werner Roßhaupter, 
see p. 240) at Kaltenburg in 1435 (see map 1), and led Nuremberg’s contingent to 
Straßburg for the imperial war against the Armagnacs late in 1444.1056 The lower-
ranking servitors (the stipendarii) also had responsibility for the regular patrols 
of the countryside around Nuremberg (see pp. 179-183 above), and for leading 
small groups of retainers on security duties within the town, for example during 
the imperial diet in 1444.1057 The council made extensive use of its noble servitors 
as military specialists, and placed a great deal of trust in some of them, though 
we should question whether they were ever indispensable.
The notion that military expertise was the ‘proper’ function of noble retainers 
is also relativized by the amount of time which they spent carrying out various 
diplomatic functions. Some of these were purely representative: at the imperial 
diet in 1444 it was ordered that a number of the noble ‘erber Diener’ should be 
present at the town hall every day to help carry wine for the princes meeting 
there.1058 Wigeleis von Wolfstein, along with other noble retainers, often 
1054. ChrdtSt, ii, 57-92.
1055. ChrdtSt, ii, 484.
1056. Sporhan-Krempel, ’Roßhaupter-Fehde,’ pp. 25-27. BB 17 ff. 141r (4.11.1444), 162v (26.11.1444).
1057. ChrdtSt, iii, 387.
1058. ChrdtSt, iii, 387.
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accompanied visiting dignitaries to and from the city gates (see also p. 58), and 
both Wolfstein and Werner von Parsberg were part of Nuremberg’s representation 
at the funeral of Margrave Friedrich I of Brandenburg in September 1440.1059 But 
noble servitors were also entrusted with negotiations on the town’s behalf, either 
alongside or in place of patrician councillors. Werner von Parsberg, for instance, 
accompanied Nicholas Muffel to Saxony in 1443 and 1444,1060 having himself 
led a delegation to meet three unnamed princes at Neunburg vorm Wald in the 
Upper Palatinate in 1433 (he was asked to keep his expenses to a minimum on 
the journey home).1061 Lower-ranking noble servitors undertook a huge number 
of embassies to fellow nobles and princes (as too did some of their non-noble 
or semi-noble fellow stipendarii). Servitors in this role were envoys of the town 
rather than true diplomats, but they still had considerable responsibility. When 
Sigmund von Seckendorff questioned Hans Erlbeck’s account of a discussion the 
council defended the reliability of their retainer (who had been in their service 
for over twenty years): ‘since we have employed the aforementioned Erlbeck in 
diverse significant matters and embassies to many princes and lords and have 
never found him to be anything other than upright and truthful’.1062
Nobles were no more of a necessity for the town as diplomats than as soldiers. 
For every diplomatic mission involving a noble servitor, many more were carried 
out solely by councillors or even staff from Nuremberg’s chancery. The urban elite 
had connections to princes and emperors surpassing those of their noble servitors, 
though the visible presence of these servitors (for instance, passing around wine at 
the imperial diet) did underline the town’s wealth and power. There may, however, 
have been occasions on which a nobleman found it easier to communicate with 
other nobles, as was the case for Georg von Fraunberg with Rudolf von Eben 
(see above, p. 213). Nobles also had direct access to regional networks below the 
1059. See, for example, Sander, Haushaltung, pp. 485-490. StAN Rep. 54 11 f. 73v.
1060. BB 16 ff. 167r (29.11.1443), 168v (2.12.1443), 205v (25.1.1444).
1061. BB 10 f. 230v (3.9.1433).
1062. BB 16 f. 133v (27.6.1443): ‘wann wir nu den megenanten Erlbecken in menigfeltigen 
treffenlichen sachen vnd potschefften zu manigem fursten vnd herren gepraucht vnd in 
auch ny anders. dann redlich aufrecht vnd warhaft erfunden haben’.
265
level of the princes which Nuremberg otherwise lacked. To what extent did the 
town use its servitors as a point of entry to these networks? Servitors’ connections 
were obviously exploited whenever possible: for instance, Werner von Parsberg 
made a natural intermediary with the cathedral chapter at Regensburg, where 
his brother Friedrich was bishop.1063 Wigeleis von Wolfstein and later Werner von 
Parsberg conducted business on Nuremberg’s behalf with their fellow nobles 
from the Upper Palatinate and northern Bavaria, some of whom were also their 
relatives. Mostly (so far as we are aware) this was done on Nuremberg’s direct 
orders. In 1446 Werner von Parsberg is mentioned as being present at the making 
of an agreement between Albrecht von Murach, as vice-regent of Pfalz-Neumarkt, 
and some robbers who had kidnapped Nuremberg citizens: if Parsberg was with 
Murach independent of his function at Nuremberg he may actually have been 
better placed to represent the town’s interests, though it is equally possible that 
he was acting here, as elsewhere, as Nuremberg’s ambassador.1064 He certainly 
represented Nuremberg at some hearings and court sessions in his home region,1065 
but this activity was very limited in comparison to Frankfurt’s custom of retaining 
nobles expressly in order to assist the town at hearings.1066
Nuremberg also utilized another aspect of nobles’ regional connections by 
gathering information through them. Werner von Parsberg provided (or was 
asked to provide) some reports of musters,1067 but Nuremberg’s chief informant 
was Hans von Seckendorff-Nold, as a unique point of access to the noble affinity 
around Margrave Albrecht Achilles.1068 In October 1447 Seckendorff-Nold was 
specifically asked for information on a muster by Achilles.1069 There is no evidence 
that the gathering of this information was in any way underhand (though in 
1063. BB 14 ff. 229r (27.8.1440), 238r-239r (16.9.1440), 333r-v (15.3.1441).
1064. BB 18 f. 123r-v (16.12.1446).
1065. An arbitration at Straubing: BB 15 f. 48r (19.6.1441). Landgericht Hirschberg session: BB 18 
f. 55v (23.9.1446).
1066. Orth, Fehden, pp. 16, 109.
1067. BB 17 f. 44r (12.6.1444). BB 18 f. 41r-v (12.9.1446).
1068. BB 17 ff. 47v (13.6.1444), 94v-95r (13.8.1444), 220r (20.2.1445). BB 18 f. 68r (3.10.1446).
1069. BB 18 f. 357r (3.10.1447).
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the early sixteenth century Nuremberg did employ at least one spy amongst the 
Franconian nobility1070), but neither was it necessarily conducive to building the 
kind of communal relations with the rural nobility which (as we saw in chapter 
five) Nuremberg otherwise lacked.
Within Nuremberg’s own political community the servitors had only a very 
narrowly circumscribed role. Although the leading servitor was technically also 
the chief magistrate (Reichsschultheiß), this was an entirely honorific title. When 
the nobleman Thomas von Rosenberg wrote to Wigeleis von Wolfstein about 
a letter he had received from him, Wolfstein replied that he had nothing to do 
with the document personally, as it was simply the custom of the imperial court 
in Nuremberg to name the Reichsschultheiß at the head of each letter.1071 Mostly 
lower-ranking servitors had a very limited role in Nuremberg’s judicial system, 
as they seem to have been systematically employed as witnesses to Urfehde (see 
p. 187) in the city’s court.1072 Nobles were also employed in high judicial offices at 
other towns,1073 most notably as the mayor (Bürgermeister) of Regensburg, where 
(in contrast to Nuremberg) the office probably did have some actual judicial 
function, at least initially: the practice of appointing a noble in this position was 
introduced in the 1330s to guarantee the neutrality of the mayor in relation to the 
various factions within the town.1074 The council at Frankfurt am Main also used 
noble servitors to administer much of the city’s rural territory,1075 but again there 
is only a shadow of this practice at Nuremberg, where Hans von Seckendorff-
Nold appears to have been placed in charge of some of Nuremberg’s dependent 
peasants by organizing the Hauptmannschaft system in certain areas (see pp. 120-
121 above).1076
1070. Morsel, noblesse, pp. 279-304.
1071. BB 14 ff. 233v-234r (8.9.1440).
1072. e.g. StAN Rep. 2a 937a (22.1.1443).
1073. e.g. imperial chief judge at Windsheim (Rechter, ’Beobachtungen,’ p. 300), advocate at 
Wismar (Andermann, Gewalt, p. 156).
1074. Dirmeier, ’Information,’ p. 100; Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 36.
1075. Schneidmüller, ’Territorialpolitik,’ pp. 124, 126.
1076. BB 17 ff. 85r-v (28.7.1444), 94v-95r (13.8.1444); BB 18 ff. 300v-301r (29.7.1447). See also BB 18 f. 
68r (3.10.1446).
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This relative lack of involvement by noble servitors in the political life of the 
town is related to the close control which the council exercised over its retainers. 
This control can be viewed through both the evidence for actual practice and 
normative texts (specifically two undated servitors’ ‘oaths’ published by Johann 
Christian Siebenkees in 1792, the language and content of which is consistent with 
the late fourteenth or fifteenth centuries).1077 Certain measures were necessary 
to maintain the usefulness of the servitors under contract: general promises 
of loyalty and obedience, an obligation upon the servitors to replace any lame 
horses,1078 and restrictions on the activities of servitors which could reduce or 
compromise their value to the town. For instance, Johann of Leuchtenberg was 
denied permission to serve Duke Ludwig VII of Bayern-Ingolstadt whilst also 
contracted to Nuremberg,1079 and all servitors who were based in Nuremberg 
were forbidden to ride more than two German miles from the town (or allow 
their horse to be taken further than this) without the permission of the serving 
Bürgermeister.1080 These examples show both a political and a practical interest 
on the part of the council in servitors’ availability and their obligations to third 
parties; the same mix of considerations was probably at work in the many cases 
in which servitors obtained permission to take part in hearings in support of 
other nobles.1081 But the town also bound its servitors to certain obligations 
concerning their behaviour beyond the immediate requirements of their service. 
All disputes with Nuremberg and its citizens were to be brought before the court 
in Nuremberg, including disputes relating to the service relationship after it had 
ended; a servitor making a debt case in the Landgericht should proceed according 
to the ‘advice’ (rat) of the council; and if a servitor entered into a feud which was 
detrimental to the town they could be dismissed, and any overpayment of their 
wages could be recovered.1082 Thus, out of the purely pragmatic desire to keep 
1077. Johann Christian Siebenkees (ed.), Materialien zur Nürnbergischen Geschichte, 4 vols. (1792), 
i, 87-95.
1078. Siebenkees, Materialien, pp. 90-91.
1079. BB 14 f. 290r-v (15.12.1440).
1080. Siebenkees, Materialien, pp. 89-90.
1081. e.g. BB 14 f. 192v (25.6.1440).
1082. Siebenkees, Materialien, pp. 88-91.
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disputes involving servitors to a minimum, the council extended its authority and 
interests beyond the service contract itself and into other aspects of its servitors’ 
lives.
In fact, the council did not just judge its own disputes with its servitors: it also 
arbitrated in many disputes between servitors and third parties. This process 
recognized and established Nuremberg as a lord over its noble servitors, with the 
competence to hold them to account for alleged misdeeds committed anywhere 
and against anyone. Some models of town-noble relations have little room for 
the idea of nobles subjecting themselves freely to the jurisdiction of ‘inferior’ 
townspeople, but there is no evidence that nobles resented or rejected this 
jurisdiction. The council could not necessarily force nobles to come before its 
court, but any nobles entering Nuremberg’s service would have known that the 
council would not look kindly on a refusal.1083 In practice, the number of servitors’ 
disputes which at some stage involved Nuremberg as a mediator or potential 
arbiter was far greater than the number which actually came before the council 
for settlement (though in other cases the council instructed or exhorted servitors 
to take particular actions to bring about a resolution).1084 This probably had more 
to do with plaintiffs’ unwillingness (for whatever reason) to have Nuremberg 
judge their case than servitors’ resistance. Servitors knew that accepting 
Nuremberg’s jurisdiction over them was part of the bargain. This entailed a 
certain amount of risk if they served the town for any length of time and did not 
have good connections within the council, which may have helped to ensure that 
the composition of Nuremberg’s clientele in terms of individuals and families 
remained relatively steady over long periods of time: a long-term commitment 
to Nuremberg’s service required a commensurate effort to build relationships in 
the city, perhaps over many years prior to the beginning of a service relationship. 
There is some evidence for this process, as we will see shortly (p. 279).
1083. For an example of a noble servitor agreeing to defend himself in a hearing before Nuremberg 
see BB 18 ff. 450v (9.2.1448), 459v (12.2.1448).
1084. There is no room here for a full list of such cases, but the evidence for them is found almost 
entirely in the Briefbücher.
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Noble servitors were also content to accept Nuremberg’s jurisdiction because, like 
all medieval lordship, it involved a full reciprocity and commitment to mutual aid 
between lord and retainer. There is no evidence of Nuremberg actually invoking 
its contractual right to dismiss a servitor in whose disputes the city did not wish 
to be involved.1085 On the contrary, the city actually supported some of its servitors 
through long, bitter and damaging disputes. In the most famous of these cases, 
Konrad von Heideck’s defiance of Albrecht Achilles’ aggression, Nuremberg 
avowed its intention to stand by its commitment to him; to do otherwise would be 
‘shameful and damaging’, as the council told Nicholas Muffel, their envoy to the 
Swabian League.1086 But this conflict would have been anticipated by Nuremberg, 
and the whole alliance between Heideck and Nuremberg had probably been 
conceived in expectation of it. The story was very different for Hynek Krušina of 
Schwanberg’s feud against Werner von Parsberg and Nuremberg. Despite their 
previous differences (which had been settled by Heinrich von Plauen in 1439 – 
see above pp. 224-225), it seems unlikely that Nuremberg would have expected 
Schwanberg’s feud declaration against Parsberg in June 1441 over the alleged 
execution of Schwanberg’s retainer in Parsberg’s jurisdiction at Lupburg, which 
(as Nuremberg protested) was a pledge from Duke Albrecht of Bayern-München 
and nothing to do with the city.1087 Nearly three months later Schwanberg’s 
declaration of feud against Nuremberg was found hidden in a pew in the 
Dominican Church at Nuremberg, and the ensuing conflict lasted until February 
1449.1088 In this feud it was Nuremberg and its citizens, rather than Parsberg, that 
suffered the most. Nuremberg had already helped Parsberg through a difficult 
situation in 1432, when he had been captured by Dukes Ernst and Wilhelm of 
Bayern-München.1089 In return, Nuremberg received twenty-five years of service 
from Parsberg.
1085. Friedrich von Künsberg was involved in several disputes and his service was terminated 
early (StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 133v), but prior to this Nuremberg had expressed approval of 
Künsberg’s handling of these matters (BB 17 f. 154r-v, 18.11.1444).
1086. BB 18 ff. 386v-387r (15.11.1447).
1087. BB 15 f. 46r-v (16.6.1441).
1088. StAN Rep. 2c 27 ff. 3v-4r. See also below pp. 309-310.
1089. BB 10 ff. 23r (7.8.1432), 97v (11.12.1432). Regesta Boica 13 p. 261 (14.6.1433).
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There were many other less spectacular cases in which Nuremberg supported its 
noble servitors. What was it about their service which made this risk and expense 
worthwhile? The costs, human and material, of disputes fought on behalf of servitors 
was an additional burden on top of the considerable outlay required to employ them 
in the first place (for more on these costs see pp. 272-273 below). The various benefits 
for the townspeople are clear enough: they provided military muscle, leadership 
and perhaps some technical expertise; they carried out numerous diplomatic and 
representative tasks; they connected the town to regional noble networks and gave 
the civic authorities control over a number of nobles who might otherwise pose a 
security risk (as nobles tended to do, even when they were not directly hostile to 
Nuremberg – see chapter four). But it is not always easy to see how the marginal 
benefits in each of these areas were great enough to justify the costs, given that the 
town was not militarily or diplomatically dependent on noble servitors and did not 
use them to their full potential as links between the town and regional communities. 
This potential was in any case limited as Nuremberg did not have well-established 
servitors in all of the surrounding regions. To understand this state of affairs we 
need to investigate the recruitment and selection of allies, which also reveals a great 
deal about nobles’ motivations for entering Nuremberg’s service.
Recruitment
There is very little evidence of active recruitment by Nuremberg, aside from a mission 
by	the	burgher	Peter	Ratzko	to	Jakoubek	of	Vřesovice	and	Nicholas	of	Lobkowitz	to	
negotiate assistance from these two Bohemian lords against the Armagnacs.1090 We 
do know, however, that a great many nobles offered to enter Nuremberg’s service, 
and that the majority of known applications were turned down. What made some 
nobles so keen to serve Nuremberg, and to accept the tasks, obligations and oversight 
by the council which we have surveyed? What could induce them to oppose those 
voices who deemed service obligations to townspeople to be degrading for nobles? 
In the 1440s the tournament ordinances which imposed social exclusion on nobles 
1090. BB 17 ff. 114r-115r (6.10.1444).
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with close links to towns had not yet been drafted (see above, pp. 14-15), but all 
nobles at this time must have encountered the vigorous propaganda of Margrave 
Albrecht Achilles and others which denounced the townspeople as ‘peasants’ (see 
above, pp. 241-250). The traditional answer to this question is that the general crisis 
faced by the late medieval nobility forced some of its members to seek a reliable 
income and protection against the growing power of the princes in the service 
of towns.1091 This suggests that an alliance with a town was a last resort for those 
nobles driven to it by poverty or political weakness. But this does not seem to fit 
the picture of Nuremberg’s service clientele outlined above, and the prominence 
within it of figures such as Werner von Parsberg, whose brothers had immensely 
successful careers in both the church and princely service. Parsberg and others had 
their particular reasons for allying with Nuremberg, as we will see shortly, but what 
benefits of service with Nuremberg were open to all nobles?
Many historians have seen money as the main if not the only influence which could 
seduce nobles from their obligation to class solidarity.1092 Nobles were supposedly 
forced by a ’structural crisis’ to accept the towns’ wages, which helped to redress 
the economic imbalance between the two.1093 But this theory has not been re-
examined in light of new evidence which points to the economic vitality of the 
late medieval nobility.1094 The question which we must ask is not so much whether 
nobles, impoverished or otherwise, were attracted into the service of towns in 
part by the pay on offer (undoubtedly they were), but whether this motivation 
eclipsed other possible advantages which might have been realized through more 
prolonged and intensive contact with the town, and whether towns needed to pay 
more than princes to attract noble servitors. Princely service held very clear social 
and political opportunities for those nobles who knew how to grasp them; did 
towns have to focus on the economic side of the relationship in order to compete?
1091. As an example of this standpoint: Max Mendheim, Das reichsstädtische, besonders Nürnberger, 
Söldnerwesen im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 1889), pp. 4-5.
1092. See Zeilinger, Lebensformen im Krieg, p. 160.
1093. ‘Structural crisis’: Schneidmüller, ’Territorialpolitik,’ p. 126. Redressing imbalance: Orth, 
Fehden, p. 107.
1094. See Andermann, ’Einkommensverhältnissen,’ pp. 90-91, and pp. 26-27 above.
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We would need a systematic overview of rates of pay offered by both princes and 
towns to fully address this issue, but all available indicators suggest that there 
was no significant difference. Nuremberg’s top official, the Reichsschultheiß, was 
paid 400 Gulden per year throughout the period in which Wigeleis von Wolfstein, 
Werner von Parsberg and Sigmund von Egloffstein held the office (1419–1479).1095 
The same 400 Gulden was the going rate for a prince’s master of the court in 
early sixteenth-century Franconia.1096 Nuremberg paid other nobles, notably 
Landgrave Johann of Leuchtenberg, at the same level for less onerous roles: this 
was obviously considered necessary to attract a noble of Leuchtenberg’s status 
and experience.1097 But even Leuchtenberg’s lucrative position with Nuremberg 
pales in comparison to some of the salaries from princes which Markus Bittmann 
has discovered in late fourteenth-century Swabia, such as the 1,000 fl. per 
annum which could be expected by a Habsburg Landvogt.1098 Nuremberg’s pay 
does not even compare very well with that of other towns, such as Cologne and 
Frankfurt.1099
Basic pay was not the only income which servitors enjoyed, and the council 
frequently made special payments to ‘honour’ servitors (especially when they first 
entered service)1100 and as a reward for particularly loyal or effective service.1101 
But the terms of service restricted other, more independent ways of making 
money. Servitors were allowed to keep the horse and equipment of any schädliche 
Leute (see p. 179) which they captured, but the most valuable prisoners (princes 
and nobles) had to be handed over to the town.1102 Any booty taken during a 
campaign had to be surrended as the army marched back into the city, and the 
1095. e.g. Wolfstein: Sander, Haushaltung, p. 450. Egloffstein: StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 189v (22.11.1455).
1096. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 39.
1097. e.g. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 80r (2.2.1442).
1098. Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, p. 60.
1099. Ochs, ’Ritteradel und Städte,’ p. 107; Orth, Fehden, p. 110.
1100. e.g. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 80r (2.2.1442).
1101. e.g. a special payment to Werner von Parsberg for the siege of Kaltenburg (StAN Rep. 54 
269 f. 48r-v).
1102. Siebenkees, Materialien, pp. 88, 91.
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proceeds were split equally amongst all those involved.1103 Servitors had to pay 
for their own equipment, food and accommodation during peacetime,1104 and 
the council stuck rigidly to its policy of not compensating servitors for damages 
incurred through their service to the town.1105 Service with Nuremberg was no 
opportunity for nobles to enrich themselves through fighting, and indeed carried 
certain risks. There were, however, benefits to the way in which servitors’ salaries 
were paid. For leading servitors in long-term contracts with Nuremberg, all or 
part of their pay was normally advanced to them as a loan.1106 This contrasted 
with the enormous debts for overdue service fees run by many princes. Often 
these debts were converted into the pledge of a potentially lucrative or status-
conferring lordship, so they were not necessarily detrimental to nobles in the long 
run.1107 Towns such as Nuremberg could not compete with payment of this sort, 
but their access to credit markets may have made them useful paymasters for 
nobles interested in ready cash. There were risks inherent in this practice if nobles 
left the town’s service whilst still in debt, and in 1440 Nuremberg faced a feud by 
a former servitor, Rudolf von Bopfingen, who disputed the final reckoning made 
when he left Nuremberg’s service at the conclusion of the feud with Werner 
Roßhaupter in 1437 (see also above, p. 240, and p. 289 below).1108
Any other benefits which might have accrued to nobles from their service with 
the town remain relatively shadowy. Noble servitors may have had enhanced 
access to the urban world of trade and commerce (which Thomas Zotz sees as a 
motivation for nobles who took up citizenship), but my material from Nuremberg 
contains barely any evidence of servitors entering into business relationships with 
burghers.1109 Servitors could undoubtedly be useful advocates in Nuremberg for 
1103. Mendheim, Söldnerwesen, p. 90.
1104. Fouquet, ’Finanzierung,’ pp. 62-63.
1105. e.g. BB 8 ff. 105v-106r (17.1.1429).
1106. See the many references throughout StAN Rep. 52b 269.
1107. Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, pp. 72, 75-76.
1108. BB 14 ff. 105r-v (7.1.1440), 124r-126r (17.2.1440).
1109. Servitor Hans von Lidbach did buy tithes at Zirndorf from Sebald Haller (Regesta Imperii 
13.19 no. 100, 15.1.1451). Zotz, ’Adel in der Stadt,’ p. 32.
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their dependents and clients.1110 Wigeleis von Wolfstein even used the judicial 
system in which he was nominally chief magistrate to prosecute Eberhard Tierer 
von Ebern for robbery (Eberhard was executed).1111 Hans von Seckendorff-Nold 
tried to get his own servitor Georg a position with Nuremberg, revealing the 
layers of patronage which helped to build Nuremberg’s clientele.1112 A closer 
focus on the processes by which this clientele was formed will reveal a great deal 
about why it was so attractive to some nobles.
The geographical distribution of Nuremberg’s servitors and applicants for service 
in the 1440s is a good place to start, as most of the factors which determined the 
composition of Nuremberg’s noble clientele had a spatial dimension. Map no. 3 
shows servitors and unsuccessful applicants according to their primary residence, 
where this is known, or otherwise their toponymic family name or the seat of the 
main office which they occupied at the relevant time. Thus Hans von Hirschhorn, 
who offered his service in June 1444, is shown at Neustadt an der Aisch, where he 
was serving as a local governor at the time.1113 He is an exception within one of the 
most obvious trends on the map, namely the lack of servitors from areas to the west 
of Nuremberg. Undoubtedly this had much to do with the antagonism between 
Nuremberg and Albrecht Achilles. Around the fringes of Achilles’ principality 
Nuremberg was able to engage two valuable allies, however: we have already 
noted the information which Hans von Seckendorff-Nold zu Unterlaimbach was 
able to provide, and Hans von Rechenberg’s value to Nuremberg is shown by the 
length of his employment (1445 until at least 1460).1114 His residence was close to 
the road between Nuremberg and Nördlingen (see pp. 133-134 above). Michael 
von Ehenheim (shown here at Enheim) is another outlier, though other members 
of his family had been in Nuremberg’s service before he entered in around 1435,1115 
and he also performed something of a specialist role as Nuremberg’s envoy to 
1110. e.g. RB 1b f. 2v (8.6.1441). BB 18 ff. 450v-451r (9.2.1448).
1111. StAN Rep. 54 11 f. 78v.
1112. BB 17 f. 85r-v (28.7.1444).
1113. BB 17 f. 35v (1.6.1444).
1114. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 90r (16.1.1445); StAN Rep. 2a 1361 (7.1.1460).
1115. See BB 6 f. 177r (2.6.1425). BB 8 ff. 105v-106r (17.1.1429).
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his native Main valley around Würzburg.1116 This made him Nuremberg’s main 
link with the small towns of Heidingsfeld and Mainbernheim, which had been 
pledged to Nuremberg by Sigismund in 1431.1117
Appointments and applications are clearly clustered around Nuremberg’s military 
campaigns in its hinterland. There is a small concentration along the Danube 
between Donauwörth and Ulm, near to where Nuremberg besieged the Riedheim 
brothers at Kaltenburg in 1435 (see above, p. 263). Rudolf von Bopfingen, whose 
castle at Eselsburg lay just 3 km from Kaltenburg, was engaged by Nuremberg 
for this campaign in particular, though he had acrimoniously left Nuremberg’s 
service by 1440.1118 Hans von Blindheim, who was still in Nuremberg’s service 
until at least 1445, was engaged a little earlier during the Roßhaupter feud, in 
1116. e.g. BB 14 ff. 251v-252r (10.10.1440), 228v (3.12.1440). StAN Rep. 54 11 ff. 42r, 76v.
1117. Regesta Imperii 11.2 no. 8684 (9.7.1431).
1118. Sporhan-Krempel, ’Roßhaupter-Fehde,’ p. 21. For Bopfingen’s role at Kaltenburg see BB 12 
f. 35v (20.9.1435).
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1434.1119 Other long-term stipendarii such as Ulrich von Augsburg, Hans Lidbach 
(Gansheim) and Nicholas Grieß also have connections to this area, though Grieß 
seems to have had links to the area north east of Nuremberg as well. This was 
to become another recruiting ground in the early months of 1444, as Nuremberg 
prepared to storm the castles of the Waldenfels brothers. We have already noted 
the employment of members of the Künsberg, Wildenstein and Groß families 
(shown at Schnabelwaid, Naila and Trockau respectively) against Hans and 
Fritz von Waldenfels. Offers of service were also received from Heinrich von 
Plauen,1120 a Rabensteiner at Pottenstein,1121 Hans von Aufseß at Freienfels,1122 
Thomas von Reitzenstein,1123 Hans ‘Knoch’ von Schaumberg at Nordeck,1124 and 
Heinrich Reuß von Plauen at Greiz,1125 whilst negotiations were underway with 
Heinrich von Gera at Lobenstein.1126 None of these relationships lasted long once 
the Waldenfels feud was at an end, however (aside from those with Plauen and 
Reuß von Plauen, which were well established beforehand).
Further to the east lay Bohemia, which was for Nuremberg, as for many German 
princes and towns at the time, a recruiting ground for mercenaries.1127 As we have 
seen,	the	council	negotiated	with	Jakoubek	of	Vřesovice	(Kyšperk)	and	Nicholas	of	
Lobkowitz. There were also talks with the Guttenstein family (initiated by Johann 
of Guttenstein) about an alliance against Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg and the 
Waldenfels brothers (see p. 294).1128 Schwanberg (based at Bor) was then hired in 
1449, along with Racek Janovice of Riesenberg. But Nuremberg’s main pool of 
potential mercenaries actually lay in German-speaking areas along the Bohemian 
border, particularly in the hills of the Bavarian Forest north of the Danube. This 
1119. Sander, Haushaltung, p. 453.
1120. ChrdtSt, ii, 88.
1121. ChrdtSt, ii, 85.
1122. ChrdtSt, ii, 85.
1123. ChrdtSt, ii, 85.
1124. ChrdtSt, ii, 85. BB 16 f. 187r (2.1.1444).
1125. ChrdtSt, ii, 90.
1126. BB 16 ff. 229r (4.3.1444), 254r-v (22.3.1444).
1127. See Tresp, Söldner.
1128. BB 16 f. 210v (5.2.1444).
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region had also been heavily militarized during the Hussite Wars. Furthermore, it 
had until 1425 formed part of the now dismembered duchy of Bayern-Straubing, 
and its nobles had a certain independence from their new princely lords (chiefly the 
Wittelsbach dukes based in Munich). Nobles from this region offered their service 
to Nuremberg in the latter months of 1444, hoping to join the campaign against the 
Armagnacs. Gewolf von Degenburg,1129 Erasmus Sattelbogen of Lichteneck,1130 and 
Jakob Auer of Brennberg1131 were all politely declined; only Heinrich and Wilhelm 
von Paulsdorf of Kürn were engaged.1132 There were further offers of service from 
this area in 1447, when (between May and October) Nuremberg felt threatened by 
a large force of mercenaries moving in and out of Bohemia in the service of Duke 
Wilhelm of Saxony: Heimram von Nußberg of Kollnberg (135 km from Nuremberg) 
and Erhard Zenger zum Lichtenwald were both declined.1133 Many of these men 
had previously raised troops against the Hussites. Erasmus von Sattelbogen, for 
instance, enlisted in Regensburg’s service in 1426 with twelve horses,1134 and served 
Bayern-München in 1429 and 1430 with thirty horses and two castles.1135
The political conditions were not much different further north along the Bohemian 
border in the eastern Upper Palatinate, and a number of offers of service came 
from this area during same Armagnac and Bohemian emergencies in 1444 and 
1447: Georg Trautenberger, district governor of Waldeck;1136 Ludwig von Murach 
of Fuchsberg (via Werner von Parsberg’s wife);1137 and Albrecht Notthafft of 
Wernberg.1138 But Nuremberg also maintained a more regular presence in this 
area with Landgrave Johann of Leuchtenberg and Mathes von Mangersreuth 
(Riglasreuth) periodically active in its service. Leuchtenberg, as we have noted, 
1129. BB 17 f. 129r (21.10.1444).
1130. BB 17 f. 149r (13.11.1444).
1131. BB 17 f. 152v (17.11.1444).
1132. BB 17 ff. 146v-147r (7.11.1444).
1133. BB 18 ff. 324v (21.8.1447), 385r-v (10.11.1447). On the Bohemian mercenaries see Tresp, 
Söldner, pp. 145-152.
1134. Regesta Boica 13 p. 76 (18.7.1426).
1135. Regesta Boica 13 pp. 166 (11.11.1429), 179 (11.6.1430).
1136. BB 17 ff. 105v-106r (16.9.1444).
1137. BB 17 f. 151v (16.11.1444).
1138. BB 18 f. 318v (12.8.1447).
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had both a prestigious title and a more prosaic career as a professional servitor; 
his value to Nuremberg may have been largely as a status symbol. But he also 
brought with him the minor noble Hans von Erlbeck, who had joined the pool 
of stipendarii by 1422. Members of Erlbeck’s family had been leading officials in 
the small Leuchtenberg administration.1139 Meanwhile Mangersreuth entered 
Nuremberg’s service in 1416,1140 again in 1430 when he controlled Hohenstein 
castle,1141 and for a third time ahead of the Waldenfels campaign in 1444.1142
Travelling around 60 km south west from Leuchtenberg through Amberg brings 
us to Nuremberg’s primary recruiting area. It can be described in modern terms 
as the southern Upper Palatinate, verging into Middle Franconia and the border 
between Upper and Lower Bavaria – but in the fifteenth century it was thought 
of as part of the Bavarian Nordgau. Nuremberg’s allies tended to sit in pockets 
of semi-independent lordship between and around the region’s fragmented 
and relatively weak princely states, such as the bishopric of Eichstätt and the 
Palatine Wittelsbach splinter territory of Pfalz-Neumarkt. Chief amongst these 
allies were of course the families of Heideck, Wolfstein and Parsberg. But we 
also find Georg von Murach zu Flügelsberg (on the river Altmühl) offering his 
service against the Armagnacs,1143 and a slightly expanded version of this region 
provided mercenaries in 1444 and 1449: the Paulsdorfer at Kürn, Oswald Ottlinger 
(Ettling), and Heinrich Zenger zu Regenstauf (see p. 259 above). In addition, 
some of Nuremberg’s stipendarii were associated with the major servitor families 
of Heideck, Wolfstein and Parsberg: for instance, both Konrad Fribertshofer and 
Hans Stetzmann appear in association with Konrad von Heideck,1144 and the 
former defended the castle at Heideck in 1449.1145
1139. For example, Konrad Erlbeck as governor of Leuchtenberg in 1400 (Regesta Boica 11 p. 174 
(10.4.1400)).
1140. Regesta Boica 12 p. 232 (31.8.1416).
1141. StAN Rep. 54 9 ff. 51, 62r (20.9.1430).
1142. StAN Rep. 52b 269 f. 130v (24.1.1444).
1143. BB 17 ff. 37r (5.6.1444), 146v-147r (7.11.1444), 129r (21.10.1444).
1144. StAN Rep. 18 262 (28.2.1442).
1145. Deeg, Heideck, p. 120.
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The Heideck alliance was Nuremberg’s oldest, and may always have had 
mutual defence against the Hohenzollern burgraves and later margraves at its 
heart. Both Wolfstein and Parsberg had been associated with Nuremberg since 
the early fifteenth century, before they entered into formal service contracts. In 
1409 and 1411 Nuremberg offered to help reach a settlement between Schweicker 
von Gundenfingen and Hans, Wilhelm and Wigeleis von Wolfstein, which 
suggests that the city had a noteworthy relationship with both parties.1146 In 
1421 Nuremberg denied that the Parsberger were their burghers in a reply to 
Dietrich Landschad (vice-regent at Aschaffenburg, 150 km from Nuremberg), 
and Landschad’s confusion may be telling.1147 At this time Werner von Parsberg 
and Wilhelm von Wolfstein were part of a long stand-off with Nuremberg as they 
and the other guarantors for Hilpolt von Fraunberg’s debt bond (imposed as a 
settlement for a feud) refused to pay on Fraunberg’s behalf.1148 But Parsberg and 
Wolfstein, alone among the five guarantors, did briefly fulfil their duty to keep a 
servant in a specified hostelry whilst the debt was outstanding, suggesting that 
they had some interest in maintaining a good relationship with Nuremberg.1149 
The two families were themselves closely connected, with Wigeleis von Wolfstein 
married to Werner von Parsberg’s sister Margarete. They also both faced a similar 
political situation which made an alliance with Nuremberg extremely promising.
Whereas the Heideck dynasty was perpetually threatened by the powerful 
Hohenzollern, the position of the Parsberg family and the branch of the Wolfstein 
clan at Sulzbürg in relation to neighbouring princes presented itself more as an 
opportunity. They both had the chance to escape their weak ties to nearby princes 
and establish independent lordships which acknowledged no lord except the 
emperor. We can see how this possibility played out in relation to an alliance with 
1146. BB 2 f. 103r (29.4.1409); BB 3 f. 148v (17.7.1411).
1147. BB 5 f. 114v (14.2.1421).
1148. Regesta Boica 12 p. 159 (3.3.1414).
1149. BB 4 ff. 88v (5.6.1415), 109r (3.9.1415).
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Nuremberg through the example of the lordship of Parsberg.1150 The Parsberg 
family had historically been ministeriales and then retainers of the Wittelsbach 
dukes of Bavaria, though they had always enjoyed an unusual degree of 
independence.1151 In the fifteenth century they possessed a charter from Dukes 
Stephan, Friedrich and Johann of Bavaria, dated 19 June 1390, which confirmed 
their capital jurisdiction, safe conduct, hunting and mining rights within the 
lordship of Parsberg.1152 This therefore gave the family virtual sovereignty in their 
small territory, though under Bavarian protection. The charter survives only in 
a copy from 1456, when it was verified by an abbot in Regensburg, though there 
is no particular reason to doubt its authenticity. Other charters in the family’s 
possession were, however, quite definitely forged, and these were used to claim 
that Parsberg was an imperial lordship.1153
In 1407 and 1414 the family had been enfeoffed by Kings Rupert and Sigismund 
with small incomes from tithes at the villages of Darshofen and Holzheim, with 
no mention of the lordship of Parsberg.1154 But at some point in the early fifteenth 
century (to judge from the script) a number of documents purporting to be 
charters of King Ludwig IV (the first Wittelsbach emperor) and his brother Rudolf 
were created. These granted the rights contained in the 1390 charter with the 
unusual addition of a precise number of years for which they had already been 
enjoyed by the Parsberg family (apparently since the year 933).1155 One of these 
forgeries expressly mentions the advocacy over the parish church at See, near 
1150. On the Parsberg family and their lordship, see Manfred Jehle, Parsberg, Pflegämter Hemau, 
Laaber, Beratzhausen (Ehrenfels), Lupburg, Velburg, Mannritterlehengut Lutzmannstein, Ämter 
Hohenfels, Helfenberg, Reichsherrschaften Breitenegg, Parsberg, Amt Hohenburg (Munich, 1981). 
Also Karl Menner, ’Die Parsberger zu Lupburg’, Burgblick (Alt-Lupburg), 2 (2003); Xaver 
Luderböck and Karl Menner, ’Die Parsberger zu Lupburg: Linie Christoph (I)’, Burgblick 
(Alt-Lupburg), 2 (2003); Xaver Luderböck, ’Die Parsberger zu Lupburg II. Linie Werner (1)’, 
Burgblick. Heimatkundliche Arbeiten des Förderverein Alt-Lupburg und Umgebung, 3 (2010).
1151. Manfred Jehle, Die Reichsunmittelbarkeit der Herrschaft Parsberg (Parsberg, 2009), pp. 5-8.
1152. StAAm Herrschaft Parsberg Urkunden 16.
1153. First recognized as forgeries by Helmut Bansa, Studien zur Kanzlei Kaiser Ludwigs des Bayern 
vom Tag der Wahl bis zur Rückkehr aus Italien (1314-1329) (Kallmünz, 1968), pp. 338-339.
1154. StAAm Reichsherrschaft Parsberg 74 no. 12 (31.12.1407, in a copy from 1743); StAAm 
Herrschaft Parsberg Urkunden 7 (29.9.1414).
1155. StadtAAm Urkunden 2049 (27.10.1318), 2050 (16.2.1334). StAAm Herrschaft Parsberg 
Urkunden 1 (16.5.1326). See also Bansa, Studien, p. 338 and StAAm Reichsherrschaft 
Parsberg 25 no. 6.
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Parsberg, which Ludwig had supposedly initially refused to confirm under the 
influence of his counsellors, before finding in favour of Dietrich von Parsberg. In 
1422 Hans von Parsberg (Werner’s brother) purchased this advocacy at See from 
Georg Zenger, suggesting that the forgeries were created after this date.1156 In 1459 
Hans obtained the first genuine imperial enfeoffment for the lordship of Parsberg 
from Frederick III, and this was confirmed by his son Maximilian in 1500.1157 The 
Parsberg family were never able to establish an undisputed claim to imperial 
status, but the direction of their policy in the first half of the fifteenth century is 
clear enough. The final objective was not realized until four years after Werner’s 
death, but his years of service with Nuremberg (1430–1455) fit with the pattern 
of a family which was trying to establish for itself a position independent of all 
regional princes. Whether the imperial status of Nuremberg and Werner’s role as 
imperial chief magistrate helped to establish the family’s ‘imperial’ credentials is 
another matter; even without these trappings, Werner had a powerful reason to 
seek the political support and financial benefits of a service relationship through 
a close association with Nuremberg in particular, as the city was the leading non-
princely employer in the region.
Conclusion: turning outwards, facing inwards?
Nuremberg’s chief servitors during the 1440s – Heideck, Wolfstein and Parsberg 
– allied with the town in pursuit of clear, long-term political strategies. They were 
thus willing to commit to substantial and sustained relationships with the city. 
Other nobles – Johann of Leuchtenberg, for instance – were probably interested 
in the service relationship solely as a source of income. At the opposite end of 
Nuremberg’s service hierarchy, the noble and semi-noble stipendarii would also 
have been primarily economically motivated, though they were required to work 
for their salaries. These men did not have the capital which was necessary to enter 
the riskier business of princely service, and Nuremberg offered some of those on 
the margins of nobility a chance of advancement. For instance, Nicholas Grieß was 
1156. StAAm Herrschaft Parsberg Urkunden 12.
1157. StAAm Herrschaft Parsberg Urkunden 18 (24.7.1459), 39 (10.5.1500).
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in Nuremberg’s service on a yearly contract in 1409, but in 1436 he was retained 
for three years with three horses (soon increased to four), and then in 1449 for two 
years with five horses.1158 There was also no shortage of applications for short-
term mercenary service, whether from nobles wishing to involve themselves in 
local skirmishes (such as the Waldenfels feud) or from professional mercenary 
recruiters in Bohemia and its border regions. The most intriguing servitors are 
the mid-ranking figures such as Hans von Seckendorff-Nold and Mathes von 
Mangersreuth. The specific mix of political and economic factors which led them 
to enter Nuremberg’s service is not yet clear. Nuremberg’s service was clearly 
attractive to nobles other than those who were economically and politically weak, 
but it must also be noted that the particular political motives which we have 
identified in the cases of Heideck, Wolfstein and Parsberg would not have applied 
to most nobles, who did not enjoy the same level of independence from princes.
What was the significance of this small group of nobles who were allied to 
Nuremberg? Hillay Zmora has argued that since towns were neither nobles’ 
feudal lords nor their main employers, ‘[t]here was little to draw nobles and 
cities together, and a lot to set them against each other’.1159 This statement 
is a better fit for Zmora’s Franconian evidence than for some other regions in 
Nuremberg’s hinterland. But it remains true that relatively few nobles benefitted 
from Nuremberg’s patronage through service relationships, and given that 
service with Nuremberg offered a mixture of purely economic and quite specific 
political advantages, it is probable that only a limited number of nobles would 
have had the opportunity or the motive to enter into more than a short-term 
relationship with the town. But the main factor which constrained the number 
of nobles in Nuremberg’s service was the city’s demand for servitors. The 
functions which noble servitors carried out are very well recorded, and the value 
of nobles as diplomats and soldiers must have justified the sometimes handsome 
remuneration of the relatively small number of nobles required for these tasks. 
1158. BB 2 f. 86r (16.2.1409). StAN Rep. 52b 269 ff. 109v (10.12.1436), 165v (3.1.1449).
1159. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 75.
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But Nuremberg was also faced with the additional risk and cost of its inevitable 
involvement in its servitors’ disputes with third parties. It is conceivable that 
the council considered this burden worth shouldering because it was precisely 
the servitors’ connections within the fractious world of the rural nobility that 
it most valued. But the lack of evidence for noble servitors being deliberately 
deployed in this sense suggests that their primary purpose was not to develop 
Nuremberg’s links with networks amongst the rural nobility (though some 
servitors, such as Michael von Ehenheim, undoubtedly played a role as a link 
to a particular locality). For the service clientele to have been effective in this 
respect Nuremberg would have had to employ many more men of the calibre of 
Werner von Parsberg, at considerable cost even if such nobles could be recruited. 
Other cities, particularly Cologne, did succeed in maintaining larger and more 
widespread networks of noble allies, and a full comparison of the structures of 
these networks with Nuremberg’s could be very instructive.
Perhaps Nuremberg’s noble servitors were chiefly an outgrowth of the city’s 
internal politics. The city council of Speyer banned the employment of burghers 
as servitors in 1376, with the comment that ‘great trouble, harm and redundancy’ 
had been caused by this practice.1160 Despite the fact that the chief magistrate 
had no real judicial role, it may still have eased tensions within the ruling elite 
to have certain key political functions performed by outsiders. It may also have 
obviated the need for Nuremberg to look outside of its own ruling elite for men 
to carry out these tasks, thus preserving the exclusivity of political power within 
the walls. If this conclusion could be further substantiated it would fit with our 
earlier finding that the council prioritized internal order over the development of 
its relations with the rural nobility in the way that it handled the noble presence 
in the town (chapter two). Nuremberg’s noble clientele therefore had intrinsic 
weaknesses as an integrative force spanning town and country, though it cannot 
be denied that it had this function to some extent. Furthermore, Nuremberg’s 
noble allies remain a potent warning against over-generalizing any theories of 
1160. Mendheim, Söldnerwesen, pp. 23-24: ‘groz ungemach schade und unnutz’.
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deep-seated antagonism between town and nobility, as cooperation between the 
two could clearly be much more than a fleeting congruence of interests or a last 
resort for nobles with no better options.
Fig. 4: Funerary hatchment for Werner von Parsberg, St Laurence’s church, 
Nuremberg (2014)
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7.
FEUD AND CONFLICT
Although aversion based on aristocratic class ideology could play an 
important	 role	 in	 feuds	 [by	 nobles	 against	 towns],	 differences	 were	
predominantly territorial and political. Noblemen’s ties to the princes 
meant that they too were unfavourably disposed toward big, independent 
cities… Imperial cities were also collective feudal lords… This was an 
unfailing recipe for disputes with the landed nobility. Consequently, 
intimidation of, and violence against, cities’ subjects took forms akin to 
feuds among the nobility
Hillay Zmora1161
Zmora’s assessment is a rare attempt to move the discussion of feuds between rural 
nobles and townspeople at least some way beyond ‘aristocratic class ideology’ 
and the ‘crisis of the nobility’. Variations on both of these concepts dominated the 
liberal-Romantic tradition, which made such feuds – which were supposedly at 
once deeply immoral and intensely ideological – the quintessence of late medieval 
feuding itself, as we saw in Gustav Fretyag’s Scenes from the German Past (above, 
pp. 20-21). In contrast, Zmora subsumes feuds between nobles and towns into a 
feuding culture epitomized by feuds amongst nobles themselves and between 
nobles and princes. But we have already seen (pp. 111-118) that few feuds arose 
from disputes between townspeople and nobles in the context of rural lordship, 
and that nobles were not necessarily aligned with princes in their ‘unfavourable 
disposition’ towards independent cities: some nobles used ties with cities such as 
Nuremberg to escape the authority of princes (pp. 279-281). What, therefore, are 
the specific dynamics of feuds between nobles and towns?
The study of feuding in general has progressed substantially over the last twenty or 
thirty years, and Hillay Zmora has made some of the most important contributions 
to this field. Building on the historiographical rejection of the ‘crisis of the nobility’, 
Zmora has comprehensively overhauled the traditional image of feuding nobles as 
1161. Zmora, State and nobility, pp. 107-108.
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‘desperados’ (Herbert Helbig)1162 by setting their feuding behaviour in the context of 
their wider political strategies. In his model (developed from Franconian evidence) 
many feuds were driven by competition between princes, on whose behalf nobles 
carried out ‘bespoke’ feuds.1163 Princes and their noble agents made use of existing 
disputes or created new ones in order to fight proxy wars and to provoke real wars 
in a high-risk, high-stakes political game which none of the individual players could 
leave without conceding total defeat. Feuding culture, according to Zmora, could 
only end when the nobility en masse decided to opt out of the system in order to 
preserve their independence from princes. In a second book-length treatment of the 
subject, Zmora gave more emphasis to the fundamental dynamics of feuding which 
enabled feuds to be instrumentalized, magnified and multiplied through power-
politics. He recognized that nobles were not individualistic adventurers – as they 
have often been portrayed, in contrast to the corporate towns – but individuals with 
many obligations to others: to creditors, to family members, to their progeny and the 
future of their dynasty. Their reputation, and with it their wider social and political 
fortunes, rested largely on their ability to meet these obligations. Thus when a noble’s 
debtors defaulted, for instance, he was obliged to be seen to be doing everything he 
possibly could to recover those debts in order to maintain the faith of his own creditors, 
even if the debts concerned had been contracted by an emperor.1164 Many apparently 
‘desperate’ feuds were the result of the strength of the reputational imperative.
Taken together, these two perspectives on feuding situate it as human action rather 
than the expression of abstract ideals: feuding in general (though not necessarily 
every individual feud) was neither hot-headed and impetuous nor calculated down 
to the lowest common denominator of material gain. It was driven by powerful 
desires and fears which defy the kind of moral categorizations which the sight of 
violence, the ultimate result of feuding, lures us into making. Regardless of the 
merits and demerits of individual, more detailed, theses about the evolution and 
1162. Helbig, ’Städte,’ p. 239.
1163. Zmora, State and nobility, p. 100. Compare with Bittmann, Kreditwirtschaft, p. 100, describing 
a feud in which a prince contractually received 50 per cent of any plunder.
1164. Hillay Zmora, The feud in early modern Germany (Cambridge, 2011).
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dynamics of feuding, this general conclusion is important to uphold. It allows us 
to make more nuanced judgements about some of the aspects of feuding which 
previously have either been ignored or over-emphasized. For instance, Niklas 
Konzen agrees that nobles did not gain financially by feuding, but notes that 
robbery could be an important way to build clienteles of lower status supporters, 
who could be rewarded with a share of the plunder.1165 One area which largely still 
awaits reassessment in this vein is the subject of nobles’ feuds against towns.
Background and Origins
On 18 January 1444 the council wrote to the city of Straßburg, complaining that 
Nuremberg’s merchants had been robbed by Hans and Fritz von Waldenfels, and 
that the Waldenfels brothers had later declared a feud despite having asserted (as 
Nuremberg had heard) that they were enemies of the ‘common imperial cities’ 
(gemeine Reichstet) and had not intended to attack Nuremberg itself.1166 In 1864, 
Friedrich von Weech wrote that this passage from Nuremberg’s letter expressed 
‘the bitter opposition between nobility and bourgeoisie’ in which so many of 
his contemporaries so firmly believed.1167 This belief encouraged von Weech to 
misread Nuremberg’s statement, which refers not to an enmity against all towns, 
but to a specific enmity between Fritz von Waldenfels and the Swabian League. The 
council’s letter follows Fritz von Waldenfels’ feud declaration, in which he claimed 
to have been in a feud with the ‘upper towns’ (i.e. the Swabian towns), rather than 
Nuremberg, at the time of the robbery.1168 The phrase ‘common imperial cities’ was 
used by Nuremberg as a shorthand for the Swabian League (which did, after all, 
encompass the majority of Upper German imperial cities for much of its history).1169
1165. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, p. 402.
1166. BB 16 f. 199r (18.1.1444): ‘und als wir verstunden desmals furgenomen haben, wie sie 
gemeiner Reichstet veynde weren vnd das nicht uns, sunder denselben gemeinen 
Reichstetten zu misfallen getan hetten’.
1167. ChrdtSt, ii, 57: ‘der feindliche Gegensatz zwischen Adel und Bürgerthum’.
1168. ChrdtSt, ii, 71 (16.11.1443): ‘niht anders weiß, dann daz sollich hab meiner veynd ist der 
obern stet geweßt’.
1169. e.g, BB 14 f. 60r-v (20.10.1439): ‘gemeinen Reichs stette die mit den von Ulme in eynung 
seyn’. StAN Rep. 2c 30a, unfoliated (1453?): ‘Gemainen Stetten der veraynung in Swaben’. 
On other occasions a variation of the phrase ‘common towns’ is used when the context 
shows that the Swabian League is meant.
288
Thus one nobleman’s feud against a town which appeared to be an expression of 
inveterate hostility between nobility and townspeople in general is really no such thing. If 
we survey the origins of nobles’ feuds against Nuremberg in the 1440s, we also find little 
evidence of an abstract ‘aristocratic class ideology’. We have in fact already encountered 
the ostensible causes of all of these disputes through our exploration of the various fields 
of interaction between townspeople and nobles. To understand how these interactions 
could lead to feuds, it will be useful to have an overview of the sustained conflicts 
between nobles and Nuremberg (whether formally declared feuds or otherwise) which 
were active between January 1440 and March 1448 (noble feuders in bold).
At the outset of the decade Nuremberg faced several feuds which had been underway 
for some time. Dietrich von Mörl, called ‘Beheim’, carried out several attacks in 
the Main valley area between 1432 and 1436, aided by Walter von Urbach and Eitel 
Vogt von Rieneck of Rothenfels.1170 Rieneck himself was aided by others, including 
Melchior von der Tann. He ignored a judgement by the bishop of Würzburg in 1437 
and captured two burghers in 1439.1171 In 1441 Nuremberg accused Dietrich Beheim 
and his son Hans of a further attack on cattle being driven to the Rhine (p. 157, no. 16). 
The affair continued with Nuremberg’s case before King Frederick III against both 
Beheim and Rieneck,1172 and the enmity was still public knowledge in 1446/47, when 
Nuremberg twice denied paying the nobleman Konrad von Bebenburg to arrest 
Beheim.1173 In the summer of 1441 the council were also concerned with the imperial 
ban pronounced against Ludwig von Hutten, who had feuded against Nuremberg 
from 1434 to at least 1437 over money owed by Emperor Sigismund to his father.1174 
In February 1440 Hans von Urbach announced that over a year previously he had 
captured a Nuremberg citizen (Hans Ursenthaler) on account of another Nuremberger, 
Rotenhan’s son, whom Urbach accused of cheating him of money.1175
1170. Vogel, Fehderecht, pp. 90-93, 283. BB 11 f. 64v (31.7.1434).
1171. Vogel, Fehderecht, pp. 90-108. StAN Rep. 2c 25 f. 1r (20.9.1437). BB 14 ff. 50r (2.10.1439), 
164v-165r (18.4.1440).
1172. Regesta Imperii 13.14 nos. 90 (10.3.1442), 189–190 (21.9.1443).
1173. BB 18 ff. 78v-79r (13.10.1446), 259v-260r (1.6.1447).
1174. Vogel, Fehderecht, p. 143. RB 1b ff. 6r, 11v.
1175. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 347. BB 14 f. 141r-v (29.2.1440).
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Also in February 1440 Rudolf von Bopfingen declared his feud. He had been 
employed by Nuremberg against the Riedheim brothers and Werner Roßhaupter 
at Kaltenburg in 1435 (see above, pp. 240, 263), but this relationship became 
troubled once the siege had ended. Bopfingen wanted to agree a bounty for 
Roßhaupter’s capture, but the council would only permit Bopfingen to hold 
Roßhaupter in his own prison,1176 and in October 1437 four of Bopfingen’s 
servitors were imprisoned in Nuremberg on charges including murder.1177 This 
followed Nuremberg’s settlement with Werner Roßhaupter in August 1437,1178 as 
a consequence of which the council later claimed that Bopfingen still owed money 
which they had advanced to him.1179 Both sides envisaged Walter von Hürnheim 
as an arbiter, but there were still tensions over the imprisoned servitors.1180 An 
exchange of letters was followed by the feud declaration, in which Bopfingen 
was supported by Count Ulrich von Oettingen, who later claimed that he only 
wished to help Bopfingen to justice.1181 The two parties could not agree on the 
terms of the arbitration by Hürnheim, and Nuremberg was concerned by the 
threat posed by Bopfingen.1182 But no attacks are known to have taken place, and 
between September and December 1440 Konrad von Lentersheim succeeded in 
mediating a settlement (see p. 236).1183
Two ultimately phoney feuds played themselves out from July 1440 onwards. 
The vester (see p. 43) Lorenz Wielacher asserted claims originally made by 
Konrad Sarawer, burgher of Cilli (Celje), against Fritz Hutten of Nuremberg. 
He declared his feud, but seems to have taken no further action.1184 On 10 July 
1176. BB 12 ff. 149v (13.3.1436), 164v (31.3.1436). Sporhan-Krempel, ’Roßhaupter-Fehde,’ p. 35.
1177. BB 13 f. 54v (3.10.1437). StAN Rep. 2a 864 (26.10.1437). See also Sander, Haushaltung, p. 459.
1178. Sporhan-Krempel, ’Roßhaupter-Fehde,’ p. 41.
1179. BB 14 ff. 105r-v (7.1.1440), 124r-126r (17.2.1440).
1180. BB 14 ff. 118v-119r (10.2.1440).
1181. BB 14 ff. 124r-126r (17.2.1440), 147v-148r (8.3.1440).
1182. BB 14 ff. 149r-150r (9.3.1440), 187r-188r (11.6.1440), 239v-240v (17.9.1440), 246v-247v (27.9.1440). 
StAN Rep. 54 11 f. 81v.
1183. BB 14 ff. 248v-249r (28.9.1440), 251r (10.10.1440), 263r-v (31.10.1440), 271v-272r (8.11.1440), 283r 
(3.12.1440).
1184. BB 14 ff. 198v-201r (11.7.1440), 266r-270r (5.11.1440), 301r-v (3.1.1441), 304v-305r (7.1.1441). BB 
15 ff. 72r-73r (31.7.1441), 154r (13.12.1441).
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1440 Nuremberg executed a Contz Sprenger as a schädlicher Mann, on charges of 
abducting Georg von Eltershofen from his castle near Schwäbisch Hall. (He also 
apparently confessed to knowledge of planned attacks on the imperial cities.)1185 
Thomas von Rosenberg soon claimed that Nuremberg had withheld a horse 
that should have passed to Sprenger’s widow (his dependent peasant), and a 
lengthy exchange of letters resulted in stalemate.1186 No feud was declared, but in 
March 1442 the council was concerned for merchants returning from Frankfurt 
because they had not received a reply from Rosenberg.1187 Nuremberg tried to 
involve Frederick III1188 and possibly Counts Palatine Ludwig and Otto,1189 but 
the final settlement (obliging Nuremberg to pay 99 fl. to Rosenberg) was made by 
Margrave Albrecht Achilles and Wilhelm von Rechberg.1190
Nuremberg now faced two much more serious but unconnected feuds from 
Bohemian nobles. We have already encountered Aleš of Sternberg’s long dispute 
(1431–1437) with the council over his claims against Margarete Pirgerin, who 
seems to have been acting as a kind of agent for Sternberg in Nuremberg (pp. 74-
75). Following Sternberg’s threats in September 1437,1191 Nuremberg apparently 
heard nothing more until March 1441, when two nobles from the Bohemian–
Saxon border area – Aleš of Schönburg and Heinrich of Weidau – declared feuds 
in support of Sternberg.1192 Nuremberg moved quickly to involve Heinrich von 
Plauen (who was married to Sternberg’s daughter Katharina) and Duke Friedrich 
of Saxony, and ordered Pirgerin herself to go to Sternberg within three weeks.1193 
Plauen took up the matter, but could not speak to Sternberg in person as he was 
1185. BB 14 f. 202r-v (11.7.1440)
1186. BB 14 ff. 206r (19.7.1440), 210r-v (26.7.1440), 226r-227r (23.8.1440), 234v-235r (7.9.1440), 233v-234r 
(8.9.1440), 242v-243r (19.9.1440), 313v-314v (6.2.1441). BB 15 ff. 179v-180r (26.1.1442), 188v-189r 
(15.2.1442), 206r (7.3.1442), 213r-v (16.3.1442).
1187. BB 15 f. 220r (22.3.1442).
1188. BB 15 ff. 216v-217v (21.3.1442).
1189. BB 15 f. 220v (22.3.1442).
1190. StAN Rep. 2a 908 (13.5.1442).
1191. StAN Rep. 2c 19 f. 6v (1.9.1437).
1192. Rep. 2c 19 f. 7v (24.3.1441). BB 14 ff. 347v-348r (3.4.1441).
1193. BB 14 f. 348v (3.4.1441). BB 15 ff. 11v-12r (6.5.1441). RB 1b f. 2r-v (10.6.1441).
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not at his castle of Hradek in western Bohemia (near Elbogen (Loket)).1194 The city 
clerk Hans Dumm was sent on the first of several diplomatic missions to Bohemia 
in August; he returned between November and February and attended a diet in 
Prague where he negotiated with the Bohemian grandees Hašek of Waldstein 
and Ulrich of Rosenberg.1195
Meanwhile, Nuremberg also involved Frederick III from November 1441.1196 
Following the failure of this intervention and the talks at Prague, Nuremberg 
had Count Palatine Johann of Pfalz-Neumarkt commissioned as imperial judge 
in the matter, but this was not acceptable to Sternberg: he simply declined to 
cooperate, on the grounds that he was a ‘weighty man’ (Ein swerer man).1197 But 
he also responded directly to Frederick III, asserting that Nuremberg’s ‘caprice’ 
had driven him to ‘war’ (kryege), and that he was answerable only to a king 
of Bohemia or the Bohemian lords (politically a highly charged statement, as 
Frederick was at the time guardian of Ladislaus Posthumus, seen by many as 
the heir to the Bohemian throne).1198 The Bohemian nobles Aleš of Seeberg and 
Hanuš of Kolovrat offered their mediation, but Nuremberg declined.1199 Hans 
Dumm then set out for the Bohemian diet of January 1443, where he again made 
Nuremberg’s case that they had offered justice before the king as was required of 
them.1200 Negotiations continued through 1443 via Heinrich von Plauen, Ulrich of 
Rosenberg,	Jakoubek	of	Vřesovice	and	Frederick	III.	Sternberg	composed	his	reply	
to Frederick in Czech, perhaps to force home his point about his independence 
1194. StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 11v (16.6.1441), 12r (29.6.1441), 13v-14v (6.8.1441).
1195. BB 15 ff. 60r-v (8.7.1441), 137r-v (16.11.1441), 158r-v (18.12.1441), 174r-v (18.1.1442). StAN Rep. 
2c 19 ff. 17r-18r (31.1.1442, 7.2.1442, 15.2.1442)
1196. StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 23v-24v (28.11.1441). See Miloslav Polívka, ’Friedrich III. und Nürnberg 
im Konflikt mit dem böhmischen Adel und seinem Recht. Nürnbergs Fehde mit Alesch 
von Sternberg’, in Paul-Joachim Heinig (ed.), Kaiser Friedrich III. (1440-1493) in seiner Zeit: 
Studien anlässlich des 500. Todestages am 19. August 1493/1993 (Cologne, 1993), pp. 271-274.
1197. Regesta Imperii 13.14 no. 87 (10.3.1442). StAN Rep. 2c 19 f. 28v (2.4.1442). See Polívka, 
’Friedrich III. und Nürnberg,’ pp. 274-275.
1198. StAN Rep. 2c 19 ff. 28v-29r (5.4.1442).
1199. BB 15 ff. 307v-308v (10.9.1442), 327v-328r (15.10.1442).
1200. BB 15 ff. 343v-344v (14.11.1442), 362v-363r (29.12.1442). StAN Rep. 2c 19 (unfoliated).
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from Frederick’s authority.1201 Nuremberg continued with the same strategy, 
however, and Hans Dumm was dispatched with further letters of introduction to 
Bohemian dignitaries in February 1445.1202
In the midst of all this diplomatic activity, Sternberg carried out one robbery, in 
October 1441 (no. 17 on pp. 157-158; see also pp. 136-137). In 1447 he (or those close 
to him) tried to exert more pressure on Nuremberg through a feud declared by his 
son Peter, with the support of Peter of Wallsberg and Balthazar of Milen.1203 Peter 
made further threats, but nothing more seems to have happened. The dispute 
was then partially laid to rest via the mediation of the Bohemian lords Burján of 
Guttenstein and Ulrich of Rosenberg at Frederick III’s court at Wiener Neustadt in 
1451, though Peter continued his feud until the following year – twenty-one years 
after the original disagreement between his father and Margarete Pirgerin.1204
We have already seen that Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg had a mixed relationship 
with Nuremberg during the Hussite Wars, and then declared a feud in 1441 
following the execution by Reichsschultheiß Werner von Parsberg of his servitor (p. 
269). The condemned man, Nicholas Ochs, was (according to Nuremberg) accused 
by the city of Regensburg of murder, highway robbery and theft from churches.1205 
Schwanberg protested Ochs’ innocence on the grounds that he had been pursuing a 
feud on Schwanberg’s behalf against ‘enemies’ who had attacked Schwanberg with 
arson and murder.1206 In a further letter, Schwanberg stated that Nuremberg was 
his enemy on this account, possibly referring to the previous disputes during the 
Hussite Wars, and he later accused Nuremberg of breaking the agreement between 
1201. BB 16 ff. 51r (29.4.1443), 95r-v (24.7.1443). StAN Rep. 2c 19 (unfoliated) (8.4.1443, 13.7.1443, 
12.11.1443, 15.11.1443, 28.11.1443). Regesta Imperii 13.14 no. 206 (after 25.10.1443). See 
Polívka, ’Friedrich III. und Nürnberg,’ p. 270.
1202. BB 17 f. 218v (19.2.1445).
1203. StAN Rep. 2c 19 f. 18v (17.3.1447). BB 18 ff. 194v-195r (23.3.1447), 197v-198v (24.3.1447), 370r-v 
(21.10.1447).
1204. Regesta Imperii 13.19 no. 94. StAN Rep. 2c 19 (unfoliated) (14.2.1451, 19.2.1451, 27.2.1451).
1205. StAN Rep. 2c 27 f. 1r-v.
1206. StAN Rep. 2c 27 f. 1v (12.6.1441): ‘Sunder ich sie geschickt han meinen veyhenden zu 
schaden die mich vnd die meinen gemort vnd geprant haben widder got ere vnd recht on 
alle schulde’.
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them.1207 Schwanberg declared his feud in a letter (dated 25 July 1441) which was 
found in a pew in the Dominican friary in Nuremberg,1208 and carried out robberies 
in 1441 and 1443 (nos. 14 and 35 on pp. 157, 161). In July 1443 Schwanberg accused 
Nuremberg of executing another of his retainers, Hans Frank, despite the state of 
feud between them (see above, p. 193).1209 The council also feared that Schwanberg 
would support the Waldenfels brothers in the early months of 1444 (see also below, 
pp. 310-311) and already in 1441 Nuremberg had strengthened the defensive line 
known as the Ordnung an der Schwabach (see p. 175) in expectation of an attack by 
Schwanberg.1210 In September 1446 the council heard rumours that Schwanberg had 
negotiated himself free passage through the area around Amberg, which would 
allow him to attack Nuremberg’s immediate surroundings.1211 Hynek’s activity was 
of particular concern because of his role as a mercenary recruiter: in 1447 he sent 520 
men to support Duke Wilhelm of Saxony, and we have already seen that in 1450 he 
promised 190 men to Nuremberg (p. 259).1212
Diplomatic efforts to resolve the confrontation were wide-ranging, and ran parallel 
to the negotiations concerning Aleš of Sternberg. Numerous nobles from Bohemia 
and	its	border	regions	were	involved	as	possible	mediators:	Zbyněk	of	Bečov	and	
Děpolt	of	Riesenburg;	Ulrich	of	Rosenberg;	Hintze	Pflugk,	on	the	Bavarian-Bohemian	
border;	Martin	 Förtsch	 in	Upper	 Franconia;	 Jakoubek	 of	Vřesovice;	Menhard	 of	
Hradec; and of course Heinrich von Plauen, Schwanberg’s father-in-law.1213 The 
1207. StAN Rep. 2c 27 ff. 2v (25.6.1441: ‘die selben schulde geschehen sind in offner vehd die ich 
mit uch gehabt habe darvmb das ir mich vnd die meynen gemort vnd gebrant hett, vnd 
ward von uch darzu gedrungen’), 3v.
1208. StAN Rep. 2c 27 ff. 3v-4r. BB 15 f. 102r (8.9.1441).
1209. BB 16 ff. 86v-87v (9.7.1441). See StAN Rep. 2c 27 ff. 20r-21v (25/29.6.1443).
1210. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 76v. See BB 15 f. 128v (31.10.1441).
1211. BB 18 f. 42r (12.9.1446).
1212. Tresp, Söldner, p. 145.
1213. BB 15 ff. 137r-v (16.11.1441), 210v-211r (14.3.1441), 228v-230r (17.4.1442), 241r-v (14.5.1442); 
BB 16 ff. 96r (23.7.1443), 106r-v (13.8.1443), 134v-135r (3.10.1443), 179v (13.12.1443), 238v-239v 
(11.3.1444); BB 18 ff. 308v-309v (5.8.1447). StAN Rep. 2c 19 27 ff. 5v-6r (8.11.1441), 11v-13r 
(18.11.1441, 11.2.1442), 14r-v (28.2.1442, 6.3.1442), 16v (29.3.1442, 2.4.1442), 19r-v (4.5.1442), 
unfoliated (8.4.1443, 25.10.1443). For Plauen’s relationship to Schwanberg, see StAN Rep. 
2c 27 f. 3v; Miloslav Polívka, ’The Self-Consciousness of the Czech Nobility Against the 
Background of Czech-German Relations at the End of the Hussite Period’, Historica, 32 
(1995), p. 93; Roman Freiherr von Procházka, Genealogisches Handbuch erloschener böhmischer 
Herrenstandsfamilien (Neustadt an der Aisch, 1973), p. 277.
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town of Pilsen, 43 km east of Schwanberg’s main castle at Bor, also played a role.1214 
Many of these exchanges involved efforts to bring the matter to a hearing before one 
of the landgraves of Leuchtenberg, and late in 1443 Landgrave Leopold did indeed 
preside over an unsuccessful arbitration.1215 Frederick III was also involved in much 
the same manner as with Aleš of Sternberg, including through a commission for 
Count Palatine Johann.1216 In 1444 members of the Guttenstein family (local rivals of 
Schwanberg in south-western Bohemia) proposed an alliance with Nuremberg,1217 
and new peace negotiations began when Hanuš of Kolovrat and Burján of 
Guttenstein established themselves as heads of the Landfriede in the Pilsen district 
(an office formerly exercised by Heinrich von Plauen (1425) and Hynek Krušina 
of Schwanberg himself (1426)). This led to a hearing at Eger on 1 May 1445 before 
Heinrich von Plauen, which also failed to achieve a settlement.1218 Further peace 
efforts continued sporadically, until in February 1449 Schwanberg called an end to 
his feud.1219	This	was	probably	connected	with	George	of	Poděbrady’s	seizure	of	
power in Prague (September 1448), which posed a serious threat to Schwanberg.
Throughout this period the exposure of Nuremberg’s merchants and rural 
dependents to ‘robbery’ by nobles led to further antagonism. The Silesian Gotsche 
Schoff of Greiffenstein (35 km south east of Görlitz) declared a feud in May 1442: 
Nuremberg had been in contact with him over a year before concerning the debts 
of his son Georg to various craftsmen in Nuremberg, but the immediate cause of 
the	feud	was	probably	the	claims	of	Kaspar	Jonsdorfer	of	Münsterberg	(Ziębice),	
whose property had been entrusted to Konrad Imhoff of Nuremberg and was 
caught up in the robbery by Konrad and Lienhard von Gumppenberg of 14 
1214. BB 15 ff. 129r-130r (31.10.1441), 136r-v (16.11.1441), 155r (11.12.1441). BB 17 ff. 134v-135r 
(27.10.1444). StAN Rep. 2c 27 ff. 5v-6r (8.11.1441), 7r-v (1/2.12.1441).
1215. BB 16 ff. 159r-v (19.11.1443), 166v (27.11.1443), 174r-v (10.12.1443), 175r (11.12.1443), 179v 
(13.12.1443), 183v (24.12.1443).
1216. StAN Rep. 2c 27 ff. 10v-11r (30.11.1441, 29.12.1441), 18r-v (31.3.1442, 8/9.4.1442). Regesta 
Imperii 13.14 nos. 76 (28.11.1441), 86 (10.3.1442). Polívka, ’Friedrich III. und Nürnberg,’ pp. 
273-274.
1217. BB 16 ff. 210v (5.2.1444), 254v-255r (23.3.1444); BB 17 ff. 11v-12r (27.4.1444), 26v (19.5.1444), 
30v-31v (23.5.1444). See also BB 18 f. 1r (15.7.1446). See Tresp, Söldner, pp. 213, 457.
1218. BB 17 ff. 184r-v (30.12.1444), 198r-200r (22.1.1445), 201v-211v (12.2.1445), 260v-261r (21.4.1445). 
StAN Rep. 2c 27 (unfoliated).
1219. StAN Rep. 2a 2077 (14.2.1449).
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December 1440 (pp. 155-156 no. 8). Further Silesian nobles also intervened with 
Nuremberg for Jonsdorfer, but nothing more came of Schoff’s feud.1220 The unrest 
caused by the debts of the bishopric of Bamberg was also felt: Hans, Bernhard 
and Georg von Schaumberg declared feud on Franz Rummel of Nuremberg 
because he held fiefs from the bishop,1221 and Nuremberg warned their merchants 
returning from Frankfurt of Sigmund von Seckendorff’s ‘ill-will’ (unwillen), though 
Sigmund himself claimed not to have targeted Nuremberg (see pp. 148, 169).1222 
The council also had their concerns about the activity of Gerlach von Eberstein, 
whose relatives Georg and Asmus had been reconciled with Nuremberg by the 
bishop of Würzburg following robberies (nos. 33 and 49 on pp. 160, 163), after 
being informed by Hans von Seckendorff-Nold that Gerlach may have taken 
horses from Nuremberg citizens and engaged four spies or informers.1223
None of these disputes came to much, but the Waldenfels feud shows what 
could result from complications following robberies.1224 Its ultimate origins are 
unclear, however. In April 1441 Konrad Paumgartner of Nuremberg relayed 
Margrave Johann of Brandenburg-Kulmbach’s report that Fritz von Waldenfels 
had been insulted and threatened in a tavern by councillors from Rothenburg and 
Windsheim, and had thereupon declared feud on both towns.1225 Very soon an 
attack on citizens of Windsheim had been reported in Nuremberg, which was 
effectively a protector of the small town of Windsheim.1226 It emerged that some 
of the Windsheimer had been taken captive, and Margrave Johann made several 
attempts to arrange a settlement;1227 but an Augsburg citizen was captured and 
a Nuremberger’s peasants were attacked.1228 Nothing further is heard until the 
1220. BB 14 ff. 255v (14.10.1440), 325v-326r (4.3.1441); BB 15 ff. 196v-201r (5.3.1442), 247r-v (13.5.1442), 
248r (28.5.1442).
1221. BB 15 f. 307v (7.9.1442).
1222. BB 16 f. 126r (12.9.1443).
1223. BB 17 ff. 94v-95r (13.8.1444).
1224. See in general ChrdtSt, ii, 57-92.
1225. Waldenfels, Waldenfels, p. 153.
1226. BB 14 f. 354v (12.4.1441); BB 15 f. 1 (21.4.1441).
1227. BB 15 ff. 62v-63r (10.7.1441), 68v-69r (20.7.1441), 74v-75r (4.8.1441), 90r (18.8.1441). RB 1b ff. 3v, 
14v. StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 67r. Waldenfels, Waldenfels, p. 153.
1228. BB 15 ff. 132v (3.11.1441), 135r (12.11.1441), 262r-v (18.6.1442). StAN Rep. 54 12 f. 78v.
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summer of 1443, when further attempts were made to resolve the feud between 
Fritz von Waldenfels and Windsheim via Margrave Albrecht.1229 Towards the end 
of the year Fritz and his brother Hans began a spectacular series of robberies (nos. 
38, 41, 43, 44 on pp. 161-162). Fritz declared his feud after the first attack, claiming 
that he had not targeted Nuremberg in particular, but that their reaction to his 
offer of compensation had shown that he was ‘insecure’ against them.1230 Fritz’s 
brother Hans and many other nobles from Upper Franconia and the Vogtland now 
joined his feud,1231 and attacks on Nuremberg’s dependents in Upper Franconia 
began.1232 But Nuremberg assembled their own force of local nobles (as we have 
seen, pp. 259, 276) and on 26 February 1444 the council dispatched 168 mounted 
men (including 28 from Rothenburg and Windsheim) together with artillery in 
order to, in their own words, ‘hit back at and punish’ the Waldenfels brothers.1233 
Their castle of Wartenfels was taken and destroyed, and they were besieged at 
Lichtenberg after the residents of the small town there had set fire to their own 
homes and withdrawn to the castle.1234 Bad weather hampered the bombardment, 
and Nuremberg’s force withdrew in early April after receiving ‘false’ warnings 
that reinforcements were approaching from Bohemia (see below, p. 311).1235
As the expedition was setting out, Nuremberg wrote to thirty-three princes, towns 
and nobles in Franconia, Thuringia, Saxony, Brandenburg and Bohemia with their 
side of the story. In this letter the council refuted some allegations supposedly 
made by the Waldenfels brothers: that Heinrich Imhoff had retained a document 
which had been entrusted to him by their father, Kaspar von Waldenfels, as 
Kaspar’s host (wirt; see p. 79 above); and that the council had confiscated 498 
Gulden of their money in the city. To this the council replied that the money was 
1229. BB 16 ff. 52r-v (30.4.1443), 55r (6.5.1443).
1230. ChrdtSt, ii, 71 (16.11.1441). BB 16 ff. 161v-163r (23.11.1443).
1231. BB 16 ff. 176r (11.12.1443), 178v (13.12.1443), 268v-269r (15.4.1444). BB 17 ff. 3r-v (15.4.1444), 
7v-8r (20.4.1444), 233r-v (8.3.1445). Waldenfels, Waldenfels, pp. 154-155. ChrdtSt, ii, 58, 78-81. 
Müllner, Annalen, ii, 366, 369-370.
1232. Waldenfels, Waldenfels, p. 155.
1233. BB 17 f. 4r-v (15.4.1444): ‘widerumb zebeschedigen und zestraffen’.
1234. ChrdtSt, ii, 64-68 for the progress of the expedition.
1235. BB 16 f. 265v (3.4.1444).
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a ransom for a citizen of Augsburg, and therefore they had not allowed it to be 
collected.1236 It seems that these demands against Nuremberg were added to the 
brothers’ list of grievances once the feud which arose from their attacks on other 
towns was underway, but the objective of their feuding activity in general is far 
from clear. In particular, more research is needed on the Waldenfels brothers’ 
relations with the chief princes of their region, Margrave Johann of Brandenburg-
Kulmbach, the bishop of Bamberg, and the dukes of Saxony.
Margrave Johann was the only figure who was ever seriously considered as 
an arbiter: after an initial failure in November 1443 he succeeded in reaching 
a settlement in June 1445. (The Waldenfels brothers were not be enemies of 
Nuremberg for five years, unless as helpers or allies of a prince.)1237 But the 
margrave did not necessarily have a good relationship with the brothers (he gave 
Nuremberg’s army free passage through his lands),1238 and in 1446 he seized his 
chance to incorporate their possessions into his territory. Late in 1445 Hans and 
Fritz von Waldenfels were both captured by the bishop of Bamberg; Duke Wilhelm 
of Saxony intervened for them, but it was Margraves Albrecht and Johann who 
made the peace (2 June 1446), under the terms of which all the brothers’ allods 
became fiefs of Margrave Johann. In return, Fritz was made district governor of 
Hohenberg for five years.1239 This was one of the most important local offices in 
the margraviate, and so in the short-term the arrangement worked to the brothers’ 
advantage. In 1448 they were able to acquire the castle and town of Ziegenrück as 
a pledge from the dukes of Saxony, showing that (by this point at least) they were 
not impoverished knights forced to rob for a living.1240
Yet the Waldenfels brothers apparently used their new political position to resume 
the feud with Nuremberg. A burgher called Hans Rotbusch was kidnapped in 
1236. BB 16 ff. 228a-228f (2.3.1444).
1237. BB 16 f. 176r-v (11.12.1443). StAN Rep. 2b 1796 (30.6.1445).
1238. BB 16 ff. 235v-236v, 237v (9/10.3.1444), 240r (11.3.1444).
1239. Waldenfels, Waldenfels, pp. 137, 158.
1240. Waldenfels, Waldenfels, pp. 138, 140.
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November 1446, and then in September 1447 Nuremberg’s servitor Peter Motter 
was captured.1241 Hans von Waldenfels apparently wrote to Margrave Johann 
saying that Rotbusch’s imprisonment was known to most of the Thuringian 
knighthood, and although Johann obtained the release of Motter further 
negotiations foundered on supposed miscommunication, demands for money 
from the Waldenfels brothers, and allegations that Nuremberg had offered the 
king money to have the brothers killed.1242 The final settlement in the feud did not 
arrive until 1454.1243 In the meantime the conflict had generated further disputes 
over compensation for third parties following the siege of Lichtenberg, including 
a fully-fledged feud by Georg von Waldenfels, a relative of Hans and Fritz in the 
service of Margrave Friedrich II of Brandenburg (see p. 146 and p. 315 below).
A further feud with clear connections to the Waldenfels conflict was that waged by 
Heinz Röder, a minor noble from the Vogtland. Nuremberg named Erhard Röder as 
a helper of the Waldenfels brothers,1244 and this may be the reason that Heinz asked 
whether he was suspected by Nuremberg in November 1444.1245 But it was not until 
October 1446 that he complained about Nuremberg’s ‘hidden words’ in their reply 
(see p. 209), having already captured burghers on pilgrimage (no. 58 on pp. 164-
165).1246 What had happened to trigger Röder’s attack and delayed response? It may 
have been connected to the outbreak of fighting between the brothers Dukes Wilhelm 
and Friedrich of Saxony over an inheritance partition they had tried to make in 1445. 
There was certainly a small cluster of feuds against Nuremberg by nobles on the 
fringes of the Saxon territory around this time: the vester Heinrich von Gräfendorf 
(no. 59 on p. 165); Count Heinrich of Hohnstein; and Count Ludwig of Gleichen; 
in this latter case, the council responded with their wish to remain neutral in the war 
1241. BB 18 ff. 109v (19.11.1446), 124v-126r (20.12.1446), 205v-206r (31.3.1447), 348r (20.9.1447), 390r 
(17.11.1447), 394r-v (22.11.1447).
1242. BB 18 ff. 185r (7.3.1447), 192v-194r (22.3.1447), 348r (20.9.1447), 404r (6.12.1447).
1243. ChrdtSt, ii, 62. See Waldenfels, Waldenfels, p. 167.
1244. ChrdtSt, ii, 80.
1245. BB 17 f. 148v (12.11.1444).
1246. BB 18 ff. 72v-74r (8.10.1446).
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in Saxony (see no. 60 on p. 165).1247 Was this war also the reason why Friedrich von 
Bieberstein, who had been so angered in 1443 and 1444 by Hans Nagel’s warnings 
against using his roads (see pp. 138-139 above), only asked Duke Friedrich of Saxony 
for permission to attack Nuremberg in Friedrich’s territory in September 1446, and 
only carried out a robbery early in 1448 (no. 69 on p. 167)?1248 In some cases the war 
provided an opportunity to attack, in others it created conflict where there had been 
none before. However, only Heinz Röder’s feud amounted to very much. He held 
several hostages – the captured pilgrims and Hans Rotbusch, whom he gained from 
the Waldenfels brothers (no. 63 on p. 166) – but otherwise the feud consisted of a 
lengthy attempt by Nuremberg to get Duke Friedrich of Saxony and in particular 
Heinrich von Plauen to settle the matter in the council’s best strategic interest.1249
Other noble feuds originating during the second half of the 1440s were a result 
of Nuremberg’s membership of the Swabian League. Eberhard von Urbach was 
a long-term opponent of the League, connected to the Städtefeinde group and 
in particular to the castle of Maienfels, which the League had captured in 1441 
(see also p. 229 above).1250 His relative Hans von Urbach had also feuded against 
Nuremberg before (see p. 288 above). But Eberhard did not pursue his conflict 
with Nuremberg too hard: after declaring his enmity in early 1448 he entered into 
a truce (along with Horneck von Hornberg) through the mediation of the bishop 
of Würzburg before the end of February.1251 A less prominent noble but a far more 
active opponent was Georg Auer,	who	was	supported	by	Přibík	of	Klenová.1252 
Auer carried out three robberies in Lower Bavaria during 1446 and 1447 (nos. 
57, 65 and 68 on pp. 164, 166-167) and Nuremberg’s letter to nineteen Lower 
Bavarian nobles and an open letter to all estates show how seriously the council 
1247. BB 18 ff. 72v-73r (8.10.1446), 87r-v (21.10.1446), 203r (30.3.1447), 215r-v (13.4.1447). Müllner, 
Annalen, ii, 382.
1248. StAN Rep. 2c 29, unfoliated (7.9.1446, 10.9.1446).
1249. BB 18 ff. 86r-v (21.10.1446), 89r-90v (24.10.1446), 94v-95r (31.10.1446), 109r-v (18.11.1446), 
124v-126r (20.12.1446), 156v-157r (7.2.1447), 167v-168r (15.2.1447), 200r (27.3.1447), 270v 
(14.6.1447), 396v-397r (27.11.1447).
1250. See Blezinger, Städtebund, pp. 155-158, 162.
1251. BB 18 ff. 439r-v (27.1.1448), 444v-445r (29.1.1448), 452v-453r (10.2.1448), 459r-v (13.2.1448), 471v 
(21.2.1448).
1252. BB 18 ff. 22r (20.8.1446), 400r-v (1.12.1447), 441r-442r (26.1.1447), 454r-455r (10.2.1448).
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took the threat,1253 as does the involvement of Frederick III and his counsellors.1254 
Auer was involved in quite a web of violence in south-eastern Upper Germany, 
having fought with Walter von Freyberg against the Society of St George’s Shield 
in 1442, and then robbed citizens of Memmingen and Gmünd in May 1443.1255 
In February 1444 a reconciliation between the Swabian League and Auer was at 
least discussed,1256 but the feud may have been particularly difficult to resolve 
because of the death of Wormund Rotauer, described by Auer as his ‘friend’, 
for which he may have blamed Nördlingen.1257 The immediate cause of Auer’s 
feud against Nuremberg seems to have been an attack by his servitor Lienhard 
Schertel on Jobst Spalter, councillor of Weißenburg, which led to Schertel’s arrest 
at Passau on the initiative of some Nuremberg citizens. The arrest and the feud 
declaration seem to have happened almost simultaneously, however, and Auer 
claimed to have demanded that Nuremberg withdraw from the Swabian League 
as soon as the city had joined.1258
The background to these feuds correlates with the areas of particular tension between 
town and nobility which we have already observed. Nuremberg’s entanglement 
in political communities is the leading cause of feuds against the city, whether 
through conflicts which spread via alliances and allegiances (Hutten vs. Sigismund; 
Schwanberg vs. Parsberg; Schaumberg vs. Bamberg; Urbach and Auer vs. Swabian 
League), friction resulting from activity on behalf of a community (Schwanberg re. 
damages in Bohemia; Sternberg’s original presence in Nuremberg at the imperial 
diet of 1431) or the consequence of conflicts between third parties (Gleichen; 
Gräfendorf? Hohnstein? Röder?). In earlier decades we also find feuds declared 
against Nuremberg in the course of conflicts with emperors and following Landfriede 
1253. BB 18 ff. 469r-473v (21.2.1448).
1254. BB 18 ff. 477v-478r (21.2.1448?). Regesta Imperii 13.14 nos. 453, 476; 13.19 nos. 160, 334 
(27.3.1453), 335 (28.3.1453). StAN Rep. 2c 30a, unfoliated.
1255. Obenaus, Recht und Verfassung, p. 44 n. 29. Blezinger, Städtebund, p. 156.
1256. Blezinger, Städtebund, p. 158.
1257. BB 18 ff. 347r (18.9.1447), 416r-v (27.12.1447).
1258. BB 18 ff. 22r (20.8.1446), 29r-v (31.8.1446), 31r-v (4.9.1446), 32r-34r (5.9.1446), 50r-51r (20.9.1446), 
442r-v (26.1.1448).
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operations.1259 The majority of feuds which came to involve Nuremberg were not 
originally waged against other towns, but those which were seem to originate in 
the second major cause of feuds against Nuremberg: robbery and rural insecurity. 
In his own self-presentation, not even Fritz von Waldenfels originally intended 
to attack Nuremberg; his feud against Windsheim made it almost inevitable that 
eventually he would, however. Given the unrest in the Saxon sphere of influence in 
1446 it is impossible to say whether Heinz Röder deliberately targeted pilgrims from 
Nuremberg. Again, there were many feuds before 1440 in which nobles demanded 
security following attacks and complained about Nuremberg’s patrols or other 
‘policing’ activity.1260 To this category we could add ‘secondary’ feuds which were 
caused by feuding itself (Georg von Waldenfels, Röder?).
Nuremberg’s close contact with nobles as their employer could inevitably generate 
tensions (Bopfingen). And there is a limited role for the town’s specific commercial 
functions as the cause of feuds. The dispute with Friedrich von Bieberstein concerned 
his roads and tolls, and there was a business dimension to both the Sternberg 
and Waldenfels feuds. The Waldenfels brothers apparently complained about 
their father’s relationship with Heinrich Imhoff, and wider business connections 
between the Waldenfels and Imhoff families are visible.1261 But it seems unlikely 
that these issues were the substantive cause of the feud, or that Aleš of Sternberg 
was interacting very closely with the commercial life of Nuremberg when his 
‘merchandise’ was lost there (see pp. 74-75). Hans von Urbach complained that he 
had been cheated of money, but his feud was also part of the network of Städtefeinde 
feuds in Swabia. Otherwise we find feuds which result from nobles’ patronage and 
lordship over third parties (Wielacher; Rosenberg; Schoff).
What about the causes of feuds which nobles did not necessarily state publicly? 
More research is needed on the political affiliations of all of these nobles to 
determine whether they might have been feuding against Nuremberg with a third 
1259. e.g. Vogel, Fehderecht, pp. 143, 238, 266, 268, 281.
1260. e.g. Vogel, Fehderecht, pp. 144-148, 217-218, 270. StAN Rep. 2c 23.
1261. Waldenfels, Waldenfels, p. 160.
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party in mind. Did the Waldenfels brothers, for example, use their apparently 
indiscriminate attacks on merchants from various towns to assert themselves in 
relation to either the bishop of Bamberg or Margrave Johann? Did Hynek Krušina 
of Schwanberg and Aleš of Sternberg use their feuds to assert Czech independence 
from the German-speaking Empire? Certainly none of these feuds appear to have 
been ‘bespoke’ feuds on behalf of princes who wished to attack Nuremberg by 
proxy (though plenty of these would begin in 1449). The influence of the Städtefeinde 
group with their particular anti-town rhetoric is clearly felt, but there is no evidence 
of this rhetoric spreading beyond these Swabian nobles. If nobles were declaring 
feuds as a cover for lucrative highway robbery it is hard to account for the sheer 
inactivity in most cases. Only the Waldenfels brothers and Georg Auer can be said 
to have pursued a campaign of robbery, and any financial gain for the former must 
have been nullified when Nuremberg destroyed their castles.
It is hard to draw firm conclusions from such a small sample of feuds, but the 
indications are that we may have to rethink our ideas about the specific dynamics 
of feuds between nobles and towns. They have traditionally been seen as either 
the most cynical of all feuds (waged purely for material gain) or, conversely, 
as conflicts driven by ideology. But our group of feuders had relatively clear 
demands or security needs which their feuds attempted to address. The most 
pronounced characteristic of noble feuds against Nuremberg is not greed or 
class-consciousness, but simple geography (see map 4). All of the feuders were 
based at a relatively safe distance from the city. (Even though Nuremberg 
attacked Waldenfels in force, the vulnerability of the city’s army so far from home 
eventually spared the brothers when the siege of Lichtenberg was lifted.) Feuds 
against trading towns could also be pursued from almost any distance, at least 
in areas frequented by merchants. This possibility was used by some nobles – we 
might count the Bohemians Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg and Aleš of Sternberg 
amongst them – to engage in speculative feuds which could drag on for many 
years in constant hope of landing a decisive blow and gaining noteworthy 
compensation, but without incurring any very serious personal risk.
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The Conduct of Feuds
Feuding was governed by many, mostly unwritten, rules, which have already 
been extensively studied.1262 We have already come across the most basic of these 
in relation to the inherent logic of feuding (see chapter four): the feud had to be 
openly declared before any hostile action was undertaken. In some form, this was 
ultimately necessary if the feud was to achieve its objective of creating pressure on 
the opponent to meet the feuder’s particular demands. This declaration was also 
all that distinguished feuding violence from criminal violence, and hence it was 
(in theory) essential not only to the legitimacy of the feud, but also to the honour 
of the feuder; ‘to preserve one’s honour’ was synonymous with declaring a feud. 
This rule was often asserted because it was often breached, but a feuder almost 
invariably declared himself and his claims at some point, if not in the proper 
form or at the proper time. (There were various different stipulations on how 
1262. See in particular: Vogel, Fehderecht; Orth, Fehden; Obenaus, Recht und Verfassung.
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much notice should be given ahead of a feud.) A harder rule to enforce, but one 
which certain authorities had more interest in establishing as standard practice, 
was the requirement that the feuder should try to make his case by peaceful 
legal means before resorting to legal self-help via a feud. But the most commonly 
observed feuding regulations were those which were entirely customary, and 
which restricted behaviour within the feud to certain forms of violence: robbery, 
arson, kidnap of dependents, but rarely an attack on the opponent’s actual person 
(though this could happen when violence got out of hand). This might have been 
understood as a matter of honour, but it was ultimately another reflection of the 
fundamental logic of feuding: the opponent had to be able to meet the feuder’s 
demands, and thus could not be harmed beyond his ability to do so.
These rules were clear enough in themselves, and universally recognized – but 
it was a common tactic to break the first two of them. It was obviously in the 
feuder’s interests to declare his feud after he had landed a telling blow on his 
opponent using the advantage of surprise. It was very often not in his interests 
to accept his opponent’s offers of justice and arbitration, which were the only 
realistic or accepted way of solving most disputes peacefully (see above, pp. 230-
233). This resulted in a fierce battle over legitimacy and honour within the feud 
itself, as well as in relation to the dispute which originally sparked the feud. 
But although the general necessity of a distinction between feuding and criminal 
violence was upheld by everyone, it was always possible to argue for exceptions 
in any particular case. This was because the feud was not about might making 
right: it was a means for the relatively powerless to gain justice against or despite 
the powerful, when these powerful men had either failed those they were meant 
to protect or had unjustly arrogated power which did not belong to them. Thus 
some feuds (particularly those by nobles against princes and towns) were also a 
form of regulated rebellion, which had a slightly different set of rules: the feuding 
‘underdog’ was supposed to use guile and stealth to overturn the injustice which 
had distorted raw power relations, and if necessary he was to break the letter of 
the rules in order to restore the spirit of justice.
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The rules of feuding were further undermined when they became detached from 
the logic of the feuding as legal self-help. There is no doubt that many feuds 
were not fought primarily to bring about a particular judicial outcome, but for 
various political, economic and social ends. Historians have increasingly argued 
for the predominance of political and social motives over the more immediately 
economic. But although this ‘misuse’ of feuding rendered its conventions hollow, 
it certainly did not shatter these conventions. Feuds which lacked substantive 
legitimacy had all the more need of formal recognition as feuds. There is therefore 
no inherent link between the formal ‘correctness’ of a feud and its fundamental 
legitimacy as an act of legal self-help. There are, however, elements of the more 
general conduct of a feud which might provide clues to its motivation: how, 
for example, does its progress relate to wider political movements? How, when 
and where did feuders choose to pursue their claims through actual violence? 
What sort of settlement were they willing to accept or eager to impose? In the 
context of feuds between nobles and towns, all of these questions also have 
implications for wider town-noble relations, as the formal and customary (and 
propagandistic) behaviour associated with feuding could mask a wide range of 
conflicts of very different intensity. We must therefore move beyond the issues of 
rules, conventions and legitimacy which have hitherto dominated the discussion 
about feuding, and consider the feud in the round as another form of relationship 
between townspeople and rural nobles.
Diplomacy and Propaganda
The feud itself was always just a tactic within a wider contest with inevitable 
political dimensions. Any potential feuder had to take into account the political 
situation when deciding how best to pursue his claim (assuming that the feud 
was not an entirely political act in the first place). We can see the influence 
of external political factors very clearly in the feuds by Aleš of Sternberg and 
Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg. Sternberg began his feud nearly a decade after 
we first hear of his dispute with Margarete Pirgerin, but not so long after the 
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political networks which bound him to Nuremberg (and which had ultimately 
caused the feud) had begun to unravel. This process began with the death of 
Sigismund of Luxemburg on 9 December 1437 and continued under Sigismund’s 
heir Albert of Habsburg, whose succession in Bohemia Sternberg opposed.1263 He 
was also cool towards Frederick III, as guardian of Albert’s son Ladislaus, and 
within his feud against Nuremberg he stridently asserted the independence of 
the Bohemian estates (see above p. 291). Whether or not the feud itself was part 
of this Bohemian self-assertion is unclear, but it was only made more likely (and 
perhaps altogether possible) by the dissolution of political structures in which 
Nuremberg and Sternberg were both active. External circumstances had an even 
more direct influence on Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg, whose feud had to be 
ended so that he could meet the threat posed by the rising power of George of 
Poděbrady	(see	p.	294).	It	goes	without	saying	that	feuds	were	not	free-standing	
relationships and were subject to external influences and pressures, but it is worth 
noting that since feuds were in theory independent of politics and concerned only 
with justice and the fundamentals of social order, their entanglement in wider 
power relationships only aggravated issues of legitimacy.
With the question of legitimacy the war of words began. This always made up the 
overwhelming majority of the feuding ‘action’, even allowing for any tendency 
for the records of arguments and counter-arguments to survive better than the 
reports of actual events, as these events were instantly taken up into the storm of 
mutual allegations and recriminations. Nuremberg’s first task when faced with 
any feud was to declare it to be illegitimate, as to concede that the noble feuder 
had a valid reason to seek redress from the city would be to concede defeat in the 
contest. But the council tended to attack supposed formal irregularities – especially 
late feud declarations and failure to seek a peaceful solution – rather than dispute 
the fundamentals of the case.1264 The underlying issue was at most dismissed 
1263. In June 1438 Albert named him first in a list of the leading Bohemian ‘heretics’ (Regesta 
Imperii 12, no. 210 (2.6.1438)).
1264. e.g. BB 16 ff. 228a-228f (2.3.1444, re. Waldenfels), where the time elapsed between robbery 
and feud declaration is specified as fifteen days.
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simply as ‘no proper cause’1265 or, where applicable, on straightforward legalistic 
grounds. (Eberhard von Urbach’s feud, for instance, was dismissed because his 
case against the Swabian League had originated before Nuremberg joined the 
League.)1266 These arguments allowed Nuremberg to declare not only that a feud 
was ‘false’ or ‘improper’, but even that there was no feud at all, merely ‘sheer 
injustice’.1267 Thus any attacks undertaken were nothing but (criminal) robbery.1268 
To avoid using the term ‘feud’, the council labelled events as a ‘dispute’ or 
‘enmity’, or – with more polemical intent – as ‘perfidy and misdeeds’.1269
This rhetoric naturally met with a strong response from many nobles, given 
that their honour and the basic legality of their actions were being called into 
question. In July 1443 Heinrich von Plauen’s secretary Jobst Ebran read to Aleš of 
Sternberg a letter from Nuremberg declaring his feud to be invalid, and reported 
the Bohemian’s response. ’When he heard how you [Nuremberg] wished thereby 
to touch his honour and reputation, he became extremely serious and deeply 
angry about the matter, and said to [Ebran] that he would demonstrate that he 
had warned you three times and had written to you year after year, and had 
let the matter stand for so long for the sake of greater propriety.’1270 As we have 
seen, the extreme length of time between Sternberg’s first letter of complaint and 
his feud declaration probably had more to do with the political situation than 
any desire to ensure ‘propriety’, but his argument does show how nobles could 
turn a potential problem for the legitimacy of their feud (a belated declaration) 
into a point in their favour. Sometimes nobles entered into a detailed rebuttal of 
particular allegations, especially when this allowed them to present Nuremberg 
1265. e.g. BB 15 f. 128v (31.10.1441, re. Schwanberg): ‘kein redlich ursache’.
1266. BB 18 ff. 444v-445r (29.1.1448).
1267. BB 14 f. 240r-v (17.9.1440, re. Bopfingen): ‘Denn als Ir maynt ein vehe gen uns furgenomen 
zuhaben das mugen noch wellen wir für kein vehe niht halten sunder fur ein lawter 
unrecht’.
1268. e.g. BB 16 f. 27v (8.3.1443, re. Eitel Vogt); BB 17 ff. 131v-132r (26.10.1444, re. Waldenfels).
1269. BB 16 f. 229v (5.3.1444, re. Waldenfels): ‘untrew und übeltat’.
1270. StAN Rep. 2c 19, unfoliated (13.7.1443): ‘Nu dar er hort, das Ir In dadurch sein Ere und 
glimppff beruren wölt und berürt da warde er ganncz vast errnstlichen und zornig Inder 
sachen und hatt gesprochen zcu In Er wolde beweißen daz er eüch zcu dreien malen 
abgesagt hett und eüch y ein Iar nach den anderen y ein briff gesannt hett, und hett y das 
lanng also lassen ansteen durch merer gelimppfs wegen’.
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in	a	bad	light.	Přibík	of	Klenová,	for	example,	explained	that	his	feud	declaration	
had not been delivered because two of his messengers had heard that Nuremberg 
had imprisoned Georg Auer’s messenger and had therefore turned back before 
they reached the city.1271 But a greater number of nobles sought to indirectly justify 
any formal inadequacies in their behaviour by asserting that Nuremberg had 
‘forced’ them into a feud by its actions.1272 They thereby presented themselves 
as persecuted underdogs, shifting the set of unspoken rules against which their 
behaviour should be judged.
This tussle over the legitimacy of feuds was a major part of the wider battle for 
public opinion. In one way or another, the feud and its causes would have to be 
subjected to the judgement of third parties if a conclusion was ever to be reached, 
but it was never entirely clear exactly who the eventual arbiters or judges might 
be, let alone who might decide to support or frustrate one of the opponents 
in the meantime. The feud was also a touchstone of both sides’ integrity and 
honour, and so a great deal was at stake even in relationships with otherwise 
disinterested bystanders. Therefore no chance was lost to put across a partial 
version of events. In August 1442 Michael von Seinsheim of Schwarzenberg 
asked for safe conduct for his daughter Anna, the wife of Peter of Sternberg (son 
of Aleš), on her journey out of Bohemia accompanied by Sternberg’s retainers. 
Nuremberg granted this request, after describing the entire course of events 
with Sternberg from the council’s perspective.1273 Nuremberg’s narrative barely 
changed according to the recipient, but the method of delivery varied, from 
opportunistic responses to full-scale propaganda campaigns using open letters 
which made a case to all who heard or saw them. Both Nuremberg and nobles 
composed such letters,1274 but it may only have been the town which had the 
resources to deliver them to an extensive list of recipients: for example, a letter 
about the Waldenfels feud to thirty-three princes, towns and nobles in Franconia, 
1271. BB 18 f. 454r (10.2.1448).
1272. e.g. BB 18 ff. 452v-453r (10.2.1448. re. Urbach): ‘genött und gedrengt’.
1273. BB 15 f. 302r-v (29.8.1442). See also BB 16 f. 82v (25.6.1443).
1274. e.g. BB 18 ff. 471v-473v (21.2.1448, re. Auer). Egloffstein, Chronik, p. 123.
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Thuringia, Saxony, Brandenburg and Bohemia, and a letter about Georg Auer 
to nineteen nobles in Lower Bavaria.1275 The council could also be more targeted 
in its efforts: for instance, a particular rebuttal of allegations by the Waldenfels 
brothers was sent to Heinrich von Gera, whose support in the feud Nuremberg 
had previously hoped to secure (see above, p. 276).1276 In this letter the council 
asserted that it was well known that they were ‘not the type of people’ to unjustly 
take from others.1277 Feuders naturally tried to exonerate and justify themselves, 
but the overwhelming majority of their rhetoric was negative and critical of their 
opponents. Allegations of illegal, dishonourable or underhand behaviour were 
standard, and often became stereotyped. Towns invariably used similar language 
to accuse nobles of declaring invalid feuds, whilst nobles regularly accused towns 
of planning secretive attacks. The Waldenfels brothers accused Nuremberg of 
plotting to have them killed or kidnapped,1278 whilst Hans von Rechberg accused 
the Swabian towns of poisoning his fellow noble Heinrich von Eisenburg.1279
The Spiral of Violence?
The danger of a constant cycle of tit-for-tat violence was not as great as might be 
assumed, as the feud was no vendetta in which every attack had to be avenged. 
Both parties had their objectives and their strategies for achieving them, and 
these could be relatively aggressive or relatively restrained depending on 
circumstances. But feuding strategies nevertheless tended to continually escalate 
the conflict as each side sought to bring more and more pressure to bear on the 
other. One means to exert pressure, potentially with minimal effort, was outright 
intimidation. The feud declaration itself was an important moment for this, and 
its effect could be heightened. Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg’s declaration for 
himself and sixty helpers was dated 25 July 1441, but was found (according to 
1275. BB 16 ff. 228a-228f (2.3.1444). BB 18 ff. 469r-471r (21.2.1448).
1276. BB 17 f. 80r-v (23.7.1444).
1277. ibid: ‘Es sey Wol lanndkundig, und offenbar, das Wir nicht solliche lewt sein, die ymands 
das sein Wider recht, oder unpillicherweise nemen’.
1278. See BB 16 f. 213r-v (7.2.1444); BB 18 f. 348r (20.9.1447).
1279. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, pp. 232-233.
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Nuremberg’s record of events) on 8 September hidden inside a pew in Nuremberg’s 
Dominican friary.1280 Georg Auer went a stage further and cut off the finger of 
Hans Döbritsch of Wöhrd (an extra-mural suburb of Nuremberg) and forced him 
to	 carry	Přibík	 of	Klenová’s	 feud	declaration	 to	Nuremberg.	 (Supposedly	 this	
had remained undelivered because Klenová’s messengers were afraid of arrest 
in Nuremberg, as we saw on p. 308.)1281 Auer then threatened to ‘take a hand 
and a foot as a pledge’, which foreshadows the notorious mutilation of Wilhelm 
Derrer by Konrad Schott in 1499 (see p. 203).1282 Of course, the downside of such 
threats as a feuding tactic was that they also provided material for the opponent’s 
campaign of propaganda and defamation.
With some exceptions, feuders generally stayed within the limits of ‘acceptable’ 
feuding behaviour so as not to alienate potential supporters, as a large number 
of ‘helpers’ in the feud was in many ways the best possible form of intimidation. 
(In theory, outrageous acts could also have served to bind together a group of 
feuders, but there is no clear evidence for this in the feuds against Nuremberg 
during the 1440s.) We have already noted the coalition of allies and servitors 
which Nuremberg assembled against Hans and Fritz von Waldenfels (pp. 
259, 276), and the many nobles who in turn supported the brothers (p. 296). 
Nuremberg tried to bring further individuals into the feud on its side by offering 
bounty money.1283 But the real danger in this case was the connection between 
the Waldenfels brothers and Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg, the exact nature of 
which is unclear. Nuremberg understood that three of Schwanberg’s servitors 
(Hans, Georg and Leutold von Doberlitz) were supporting the Waldenfelser, and 
the council was concerned about forces coming out of Bohemia as they besieged 
Lichtenberg.1284 The Bohemian noble Johann of Guttenstein, who was trying 
to interest Nuremberg in an alliance against Schwanberg, told the council that 
1280. StAN Rep. 2c 27 ff. 3v-4r.
1281. StAN Rep. 2c 30a f. 2r; BB 18 f. 388r-v (16.11.1447).
1282. BB 18 f. 443r (26.1.1448).
1283. Müllner, Annalen, ii, 370.
1284. ChrdtSt, ii, 78. BB 16 ff. 241v-242r (12.3.1444), 253r (21.3.1444).
311
they had nothing to fear whilst they attacked Schwanberg’s ‘servitors’ (i.e. the 
Waldenfels brothers).1285 But Nuremberg’s forces blamed their withdrawal from 
Lichtenberg on ‘false’ warnings from Bohemia and elsewhere.1286 The council then 
refused to include the Waldenfels matter in negotiations with Schwanberg at Eger 
on 1 May 1445,1287 and Margrave Johann’s settlement between Nuremberg and 
Waldenfels in June 1445 ordered the release of the prisoners which the Waldenfels 
brothers had transferred to Schwanberg.1288 But despite the obvious threat, all of 
this amounted to little in practical terms, certainly nothing comparable to the 
coalition of nobles who menaced the Swabian towns (see pp. 248-249 above). The 
danger that feuds might snowball with ever more ‘helpers’, and that originally 
separate feuds might join together with one another was a constant possibility, 
but it was less often realized.1289
Feuding activity which could escalate the conflict was not always violent. In any 
substantial feud there was a parallel war of espionage and information-gathering. 
The councillor Karl Holzschuher warned Erhard Schürstab (leading the campaign 
against Waldenfels) about two ‘spies’ (Kundschafter) of Hynek Krušina of 
Schwanberg,1290 whilst Nuremberg made notes on the characteristic appearance 
of the Waldenfels brothers and their men.1291 The city also captured the alleged 
Kundschafter Peter Tantmann, and told Fritz von Waldenfels that Tantmann had 
been living covertly in Nuremberg.1292 Acts of espionage (and the fear of them) 
obviously heightened tensions, but the constant suspicion of espionage also 
features in prosecutions of low-ranking feud helpers as supposed Kundschafter. 
Nuremberg pursued such cases at Saalfeld and Eisenach during the Waldenfels 
1285. BB 16 ff. 254v-255r (23.3.1444). See also BB 16 f. 210v (5.2.1444).
1286. BB 17 ff. 4r-v (15.4.1444), 11v-12r (27.4.1444).
1287. BB 17 ff. 260v-261r (21.4.1445).
1288. StAN Rep. 2b 1796 (30.6.1445).
1289. Nuremberg often asked third parties not to support feuders, e.g. BB 17 f. 90r (4.8.1444, re. 
Waldenfels).
1290. BB 16 f. 253r (21.3.1444).
1291. ChrdtSt, ii, 78.
1292. BB 16 f. 227v (27.2.1444).
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feud, and executed several Kundschafter in Nuremberg itself.1293 To what extent 
these men really were ‘spies’ will remain unknown, but clearly it was a convenient 
allegation to make against minor players in the feud. These executions were also 
the most extreme form of violence within any of the feuds, though of course the 
council were more concerned with the acts of ‘robbery’. These have been surveyed 
above (pp. 151-173), where we saw that the majority of robberies which affected 
Nuremberg were not part of feuds against the city. Neither did feuds always lead 
to robbery: around twenty feuds were opened during the 1440s, and ten involved 
a violent ambush at some stage. Even fewer feuders made more than two attacks, 
and some of the feuds which generated the most correspondence were the least 
active (for example, Aleš of Sternberg only attacked once). The only feuders who 
pursued their feuds with any intensity in terms of actual violence were Georg Auer 
and especially Hans and Fritz von Waldenfels, to whom Nuremberg responded 
with an even more devastating attack.
The campaign against the Waldenfels brothers was in its outward form very 
much a counter-feud, and was fought using the classic methods of feuding with 
the addition of Nuremberg’s firepower, which enabled it to lay siege to the castles 
at Wartenfels and Lichtenberg. How the brothers would have been treated had 
they been captured would probably have depended on the political situation, 
and in particular the attitude of Margrave Johann of Brandenburg-Kulmbach. 
But there was an important difference in the rhetoric around this campaign, 
beginning at the time of the withdrawal from the siege of Lichtenberg. In its post 
hoc justifications of the campaign, Nuremberg described its intent to ‘hit back 
at’ the Waldenfels brothers, and to ‘punish’ them.1294 The expedition itself was 
also described as a ‘punishment’.1295 In a letter to the towns in Brandenburg, 
Nuremberg implied that this ‘punishment’ was carried out according to the 
1293. BB 16 ff. 191r (7.1.1444), 251v (20.3.1444). Müllner, Annalen, ii, 369, 376. Other ‘helpers’ of 
the Waldenfels brothers were prosecuted at Leipzig, Coburg and Sonneberg: BB 16 ff. 205r-v 
(25.1.1444), 220v (15.2.1444), 233v (6.3.1444), 252r (20.3.1444); Müllner, Annalen, ii, 370.
1294. Phrase first used BB 17 f. 4r-v (15.4.1444): ‘sie umb sollich übeltat widerumb zebeschedigen 
und zestraffen’.
1295. BB 17 ff. 108v-109v (23.9.1444).
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ordained laws of the Empire.1296 Nuremberg had also claimed to be keeping 
the peace on behalf of the Empire when it executed Weimar von Muggenthal 
(see above pp. 183-184, 186). But the language of punishment in itself does not 
necessarily mean that the council envisaged a judicial punishment. It would 
also be consistent with revenge, to which the council’s rhetoric also expressly 
refers.1297 In addition, it seems likely that the council was talking up its success 
in the campaign following the embarrassing retreat from Lichtenberg. Whatever 
its background, however, the rhetorical colouring which Nuremberg gave to this 
particular violence blurred the boundary between the direct, personal animosity 
of a feud and the town’s hostility towards feuding violence in general. This was 
another variation on the well-worn strategy of denying a feud’s legitimacy, but 
in the context of Nuremberg’s controversial policing operations this particular 
language represented a substantial escalation of the conflict, perhaps prompted 
by the failure to take Lichtenberg.
Settlements and Consequences
In order to bring the conflict to a satisfactory resolution, feuders had to continually 
exert pressure on their opponents. In practice this usually meant constantly 
heightened rhetoric, with the result that a solution of any sort became less likely. 
One of the most intractable problems was Nuremberg’s repeated refusal to enter into 
truces on the grounds that this would legitimate the dispute as a genuine feud. As 
the council advised its representative Berthold Volckamer, who was in Dinkelsbühl 
leading negotiations during Rudolf von Bopfingen’s feud: ‘it would not be fitting for 
us to enter into a truce or arbitration through which this matter, in which we are so 
totally innocent, could become a feud (veyntschaft)’.1298 The same strategic position 
could also restrain violence: the council ordered its servitors not to declare feuds 
1296. BB 17 f. 180v (22.12.1444): ‘nach des heiligen Reichs geordenten gesetzten’.
1297. Konzen, Aller Welt Feind, p. 56 discusses Thomas Marolf’s judgement that the expedition of 
the Swabian League in the Hegau in 1441/42 was no ‘punishment for noble violence’, but 
instead a ‘a feud of pure revenge and destruction’ (‘blosse Rache- und Schadensfehde’).
1298. BB 14 ff. 131v-132r (18.2.1440): ‘so were unsers fugs niht stallung oder tag da mit dieser sache 
darynn uns so gantz unrecht beschiht zu einr veyntschaft komen möcht aufczunemen’. 
Similar: BB 14 ff. 148r-v (9.3.1440), 193r-194r (28.6.1440); BB 16 f. 95r-v (24.7.1443, re. Sternberg).
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of their own and turned down offers of alliance in order to avoid creating an ‘open 
feud’.1299 But once violence had taken place, a resolution could become harder to find. 
Nuremberg strongly advised Windsheim not to extend a peace between themselves 
and Fritz von Waldenfels whilst the latter was still holding their men prisoner.1300
Even earlier, failed, peace negotiations could hamper a new process with a greater 
chance of success if one side clung to an agreement which the other did not 
recognize, as happened between Nuremberg and Eberhard von Dottenheim in 1435. 
Nuremberg rejected the mediation of Eberhard’s lord, Count Johann of Wertheim, 
in favour of a previous settlement by the counsellors of the archbishop of Mainz 
and the Count Palatine which Dottenheim refused to acknowledge.1301 And even if 
negotiations could actually be countenanced by both parties, it could still be a long 
and difficult road to find suitable arbiters through the processes outlined in chapter 
five above (pp. 230-233). There was also the possibility that the airing of grievances 
at a hearing could simply make matters worse. The speech of nobles at these events 
is rarely recorded, but we do have a report of Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg’s 
apparent bitterness at an arbitration in Eger before Heinrich von Plauen. This took 
place after Hans Frank, whom Schwanberg claimed as his man, had been executed 
for breaking into churches. Hynek’s spokesman told the hearing that it was well 
known that Hynek had spared neither his body nor his chattels in the fight against 
the heretical Hussites, and if he was to be accused now, in his old age, of ordering 
theft from churches, he would rather be dead.1302 Regardless of whether this position 
was a genuine reflection of Hynek’s feeling or a deliberate strategy (and probably it 
was something of both), such extreme language was still an escalation of the conflict.
1299. BB 17 ff. 131v-132r (26.10.1444): ‘zu dheiner offen vehde nicht machen lassen, Sunder, So es 
got und auch die zeit geben Wurdet, dartzu tun Wollen, Als sich zu sollichen Rewplichen 
sachen gepürt’. BB 17 ff. 30v-31v (23.5.1444): ‘Also ist es wol kuntlich und offenbar, das uns 
der von Swanberg lauter unrecht tut, das wir auch also fur ein unrecht halten, darumb 
uns nicht fuglich ist sollichermaße eintzutetten und unser sache zu einer offen vehde 
zumachen’.
1300. BB 15 ff. 68v-69r (20.7.1441).
1301. StAN Rep. 2c 23 ff. 9r (2.4.1435), 44r (16.4.1435), 45r (9.4.1435).
1302. StAN Rep. 2c 27, unfoliated: ‘Es wer aber wissentlich das der von Swannberg wider die 
hussen, und ketzer, sein leib und gut nicht gespart, sunder großlich dargelegt hett. Solt nü 
erst, in sein allten tagen, ein sollich wort uf in wachssen er wer lieber tode’.
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Regional princes were best placed to resolve feuds. Nuremberg naturally sought 
to involve the king, but his intervention was rarely effective. Heinrich von Plauen 
was an excellent mediator between Nuremberg and Schwanberg and Sternberg, 
as he was closely related to both and apparently took every opportunity to put 
Nuremberg’s case to them, but still he could not bring a solution to either conflict. 
Where no side could force a solution agreeable to itself, one had to be imposed by 
a prince or a territorial community of nobles. Ultimately, the main means to ‘end’ 
a feud from Nuremberg’s perspective was simply to sit it out. Occasionally this 
strategy looked too risky, and a solution by naked force could be attempted, as in 
the Waldenfels feud. The council showed great tenacity in its refusal to compromise 
what it saw as its long-term interests for a short-term increase in security.
Feuds were not only difficult to end, they also created further feuds. Nuremberg 
praised Johann of Guttenstein for making war (against Hynek Krušina of 
Schwanberg) to bring future peace, but this was an empty hope even if it was at all 
genuine.1303 Certain forms of settlement were more problematic than others, and 
the practice of obliging an opponent to make out a debt bond for compensation 
seems to have led to predictable complications over many years (see, for example, 
Werner von Parsberg and Wigeleis von Wolfstein’s involvement with Hilpolt of 
Fraunberg’s bond, p. 279 above). The likelihood that claims for compensation from 
third parties would arise from any concerted aggression within a feud is clear 
from our investigation in chapter four, and these claims could themselves become 
grounds for new feuds. Georg von Waldenfels, for instance, was not particularly 
closely associated with his distant relatives Hans and Fritz, as he had based himself 
in the Mark Brandenburg as a leading servitor of Margrave Friedrich II.1304 But he 
still claimed Lichtenberg and Wartenfels as his paternal inheritance, and his feud 
was nonetheless a dangerous product of the Waldenfels conflict.1305
1303. BB 17 f. 31r (23.5.1444): ‘denn das ewer Edel durch ewern kriege sucht künftigen fride 
zumachen, Daran tut Ir seliglich und Wol’.
1304. See Waldenfels, Waldenfels.
1305. BB 17 ff. 19r-21r (12.5.1444), 35v-36r (5.6.1444), 62v-63v (6.7.1444), 126r-v (14.10.1444), 180r-182r 
(22.12.1444), 262r-263r (22.4.1445). ChrdtSt, ii, 67. Waldenfels, Waldenfels, pp. 157-158.
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However, despite all of these complications and difficulties, relationships between 
feud opponents could about turn very quickly. If nothing else, bellicose feuding 
nobles could make excellent military allies. Hynek Krušina of Schwanberg was a 
well-known mercenary captain in Bohemia who was also opposed to George of 
Poděbrady;	when	Nuremberg	needed	support	against	Albrecht	Achilles	and	his	
allies,	with	whom	Poděbrady	was	aligned,	they	turned	to	Hynek	and	his	recruiting	
’business’ partner Racek Janovice of Riesenberg.1306 It is impossible to say whether 
the council’s long experience of Schwanberg as a feud opponent made them more 
or less willing to enter this new relationship. Multiple such changes were possible: 
Bechtram Vilbel twice changed role from Frankfurt’s enemy to its servitor, though 
the final act in this relationship was his execution for robbery in 1420.1307 The 
theatrics of feuding need not imply an equivalent long-term bitterness, but they 
were no game either. They were tactics which feuders deployed whilst retaining a 
very clear view of the ultimate threat they sought to counter, which could be very 
serious indeed. For all that feuds were self-sustaining and tended to proliferate, 
we should not allow feuds in themselves to distract us from the underlying causes 
of feuding between townspeople and nobles.
Conclusion: feuders together and apart
Feuding was not just a cover for essentially criminal violence, and feuds between 
nobles and towns were not the same as feuds amongst nobles and princes with 
the addition of class-consciousness. They had quite specific dynamics: patronage 
feuds were relatively common, as many wealthy and well-connected burghers 
in dispute with their town or fellow burghers needed to ally with nobles who 
possessed rural castles in order to pursue a feud effectively; for imperial cities, their 
membership of the Empire as the broadest possible political community spread 
the potential for feuds over a wide geographical area; and townspeople’s and 
nobles’ differing rural security interests could always flare into feuds, especially 
as feuds were a normal part of nobles’ security strategy, and they responded to 
1306. See p. 259 above and Tresp, Söldner, p. 213 for Hynek and Racek’s relationship.
1307. Orth, Fehden, pp. 109-110.
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the threat posed by the towns’ policing operations accordingly. If nobles already 
felt themselves to be ‘insecure’ in relation to a town because of existing feuding 
behaviour it could make sense for them to escalate this insecurity to an open feud 
in order to gain a full and formal reconciliation which would ultimately make 
them less at risk. In this way many noble feuds were a response to Nuremberg’s 
rural policing, though they were not direct ‘revenge’ for the town’s summary 
justice, as Klaus Graf as argued.1308
Feuds resulting from disputes over rural lordship were surprisingly uncommon, 
especially in comparison to such feuds between nobles themselves. One reason 
for this may be that the rural property of Nuremberg and its citizens lay mostly 
within ’striking distance’ of the town. No noble within this c.100 km radius of 
Nuremberg could risk a serious feud with the city without substantial backing 
(probably that of a prince). Conversely, nobles at a greater distance could 
conduct feuds more effectively against towns than against distant nobles or 
princes because of the town’s exposed trading network. Elsbet Orth argued that 
nobles declared feuds against towns with less justification than they might feel 
necessary for a feud against fellow nobles because they did not see their honour 
to be at stake to the same extent in a feud against ‘inferior’ burghers, and some 
feuds by nobles against Nuremberg do indeed appear to be less than vital to the 
feuder’s wider interests.1309 For instance, the wealthy Aleš of Sternberg pursued 
compensation for supposed losses which he had suffered ten years earlier. But 
this could be a consequence of the interaction of motive and opportunity: the 
latter was conspicuously present for nobles far enough from Nuremberg, so the 
motive might be less prominent. And it was not just geographical distance which 
mattered: we have seen that most nobles were living at a certain social remove 
from the Nuremberg elite, and thus they could afford to feud against that elite 
without cutting into their own support network, as was potentially the case in 
feuds between noble neighbours.
1308. Graf, ’Feindbilder und Konflikte,’ p. 202.
1309. Orth, Fehden, p. 81.
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Given this opportunity, nobles could exploit feuds with towns to their political 
advantage under the right conditions. It seems likely that around 1500 these 
conditions were present in the form of Margrave Friedrich of Brandenburg-
Ansbach, who sponsored nobles’ feuds against Nuremberg as much to secure 
these nobles’ allegiance as to strike at the city.1310 In light of the vigorous anti-
town propaganda of Friedrich’s father Albrecht Achilles it is therefore surprising 
that we do not find such Hohenzollern-sponsored feuds in the 1440s, and this 
may be an indication of the relative lack of identification amongst the Franconian 
nobility with the agenda which Achilles was pressing. Feuds arose, not from 
what divided townspeople and nobles, but from what brought them into contact: 
political communities and alliances in particular. But this is not the whole story, 
as differing rural security interests both sparked feuds and became enflamed 
within them as Nuremberg declared all feuds against the city to be robbery. Once 
a direct confrontation had begun the differing models of security faded into the 
background behind the mutual hostility, and nobles might have expected to 
encounter allegations of illegitimate feuding from princely and noble opponents 
as well. But it is important that we keep sight of the late medieval discourse, from 
which modern historiography is diverging. Whilst we increasingly argue that 
feuding was not about robbery, we can see that opponents  of Werner Roßhaupter’s 
feud-patron Georg von Riedheim were claiming (or were likely to claim) that his 
feud was robbery when he stated that his capture of the Nuremberger Burkhard 
Müfflinger was done ‘not for the sake of ransom or robbery’, but to help 
Roßhaupter to justice against the city.1311
1310. Seyboth, ’“Raubritter” und Landesherrn,’ pp. 122-123.
1311. Sporhan-Krempel, ’Roßhaupter-Fehde,’ p. 22. See also p. 152 above.
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CONCLUSION
Studies of townspeople and rural nobles in late medieval Germany have up to 
now focused on their interaction and on their reactions to one another. Whether 
the emphasis has been on cooperation or conflict, on homogeneity or a clash of 
cultures, the relationship has been understood as one of active antagonism or 
constructive engagement. But in the case of Nuremberg we see that, alongside 
the multiple points of contact and the constant communication, there was a 
significant distance between burghers and nobles – even, and in some ways 
especially, between rural nobles and the urban elite. The two formed quite distinct 
groups at Nuremberg in the mid-fifteenth century, and this separation was further 
(and perhaps increasingly) heightened by factors outside of town-noble relations 
themselves. The council’s desire for complete control of the space within the city 
walls ensured that nobles’ regular visits to the town did not necessarily translate 
into closer relationships with its inhabitants, even though there was no deliberate 
attempt to exclude nobles. In the countryside, nobles accepted burghers as 
vassals and rural landowners, but rural lordship was inherently fragmented and 
fractious, and burghers were not well integrated into the political communities 
which bound rural nobles together. For access to these communities the town 
relied on the over-arching imperial community, but this was thinly spread and its 
centre of gravity was shifting away from Franconia after 1440. To a lesser extent 
Nuremberg connected with rural communities through its noble servitors, but 
they were not employed primarily for this purpose and consequently the city’s 
service clientele was never developed as a network of regional contacts. Even 
Nuremberg’s feud opponents were physically distant from the city.
The town was primarily concerned with its commerce and internal order, 
whilst nobles were concerned first and foremost with their relationships with 
neighbouring nobles and with princes. It is no coincidence that relations between 
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town and nobility have not always been an object of specialist historical study: 
they were not a priority for their protagonists, either. But just as historians of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries found the apparent dichotomy between 
town and nobility inescapable as a way of explaining their own society, late 
medieval townspeople and nobles were profoundly shaped by the relationships 
between them. These relationships were created by their common membership 
of a society founded on the symbiosis of town and country, on the political 
community created by the belief in a universal empire and a common German 
identity, and on the mutual need for cooperation and exchange created by the 
radical decentralization of these same polities. For these reasons, relationships 
between townspeople and rural nobles always mattered, but there were certain 
areas where they had particular significance. Chief amongst these was the question 
of rural violence and security. For as long as burghers pursued their commercial 
interests through long-distance trade and nobles pursued their socio-political 
interests through feuds, the two were bound to come into conflict. This created a 
cycle of mutual resentment and recrimination with serious consequences.
However, this same cycle of resentment held the means for its own containment, 
as townspeople and nobles clashed not just because of their conflicting interests, 
but also on the basis of a principle which they both shared: that some violence 
was legitimate and some illegitimate, and that the two could be relatively 
easily distinguished, however divergent subjective distinctions between them 
may have been in practice. Likewise, away from Nuremberg, we could say 
that the disputes between rural nobles and the Swabian towns over the towns’ 
paleburghers were an expression of the greater economic integration of town 
and country in Swabia, which also ultimately restrained antagonism between 
the town and the rural nobility. Therefore these points of conflict, as dramatic as 
they may sometimes have been, do not necessarily fully explain the discourse of 
antagonism between town and nobility; nor, quite clearly, were they produced 
by this discourse, though they may have been coloured and intensified by it. 
The discourse could feed on these direct antagonisms, but it was essentially a 
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product of circumstances beyond town-noble relations. There are signs that such 
external factors were at work in mid-fifteenth century Franconia through the 
actions of princes, above all Margrave Albrecht Achilles, who pursued their own 
agenda through ideas which had developed in the particular circumstances of 
the growth of the Swiss Confederation and had been elaborated by a particular 
group of nobles in Swabia. There is little sign that these ideas, which centred 
around the supposed ‘oppression’ of the nobility by the towns, had any following 
in Franconia either before or during Achilles’ propaganda campaign. But the pre-
existing social separation between Nuremberg and the rural nobility could have 
enabled their adoption as a model of town and nobility in relation to one another.
Further research should therefore investigate the fate of the ‘oppression’ of the 
nobility as a set of ideas beyond the Second Towns’ War of 1449–50. In particular, 
we might look at the generation of nobles who created the anti-town tournament 
ordinances of the early 1480s. To what extent were these men influenced by ideas 
which they or their fathers had first encountered thirty years before, during a 
tumultuous and potentially formative experience? Clearly we also need a longer-
term perspective on the social separation between Nuremberg and the nobility. 
This appears to have been gradually widening in the first half of the fifteenth 
century, and possibly during much of the fourteenth century and onwards 
through the later fifteenth century as well. It seems to be a precursor to an active 
discourse of antagonism between town and nobility, but was it also intensified 
by this discourse as time went on? What was the role of the conflict of interests 
around rural security in the long-term development of these ideas? This latter 
question now assumes particular importance, as our study has shown that this 
tension resulted from the interaction of burghers’ and nobles’ conflicting strategies 
for the advancement of their own interests, rather than from nobles’ ideological 
hostility towards the towns. Certain further aspects of the social separation and 
integration of townspeople and nobles also deserve specialized study, especially 
the issue of sociability between them. The urban ‘hosts’ of nobles, for example, are 
an expression of the nobility’s distance from the urban economy, but potentially 
322
also a form of close personal relationship between townspeople and rural nobles. 
A different methodology would be required to collect the scattered traces of these 
relationships, which have hitherto hardly been recognized.
This present study also offers many counterpoints to the theories of Klaus Graf 
and Joseph Morsel, which did so much to shape it at the outset. We do see some 
further evidence of bloc-formation such as Klaus Graf observed in Swabia, where 
the towns referred to their noble enemies collectively as the ‘towns’ enemies’ 
(Städtefeinde). The Nuremberg council seem to have internalized this perspective 
as well. In a letter to Ulm, they described the danger of the ’agitation between 
the nobility and the towns’ (bewegnuß zwischen dem Adel und den stetten),1312 and a 
Nuremberg citizen (Pancras Imhoff) advised a certain Kaspar Speiler that for his 
own sake he ‘should have more to do with the towns than with the nobles’.1313 
One of Nuremberg’s servants made unguarded comments at the court of Count 
Palatine Otto, saying that his grace was running a costly establishment, and 
that he should have ‘more to do with the towns’ to avoid such expense.1314 This 
suggests that any bloc-formation between town and nobility was not (at this 
stage) clearly differentiated from conflicts between the towns and princes, except 
for the ‘agitation’ in Swabia, where the council was also clear that only ‘some of 
the knighthood’ were opposed to the Swabian League.1315 It also seems that this 
and related identity-formation followed in the wake of growing social separation, 
rather than proceeding simultaneously as Morsel argues. There is little evidence 
of the differing ‘logics’ of town and nobility which Morsel posited, especially on 
the question of feuding and rural violence, despite the clear clash of interests in 
this area. Instead we see the importance of princely propaganda in stimulating 
developments within town-noble relations, which were not so much of a closed 
system as Morsel implies. In addition, we have to do more to account for those 
1312. BB 18 f. 13r-v (30.7.1446).
1313. BB 15 f. 27r-v (29.5.1441): ‘daz du dich mer zu den Stetten dann zu den Edelen lewten halten 
soltest’.
1314. BB 15 f. 245r (18.5.1442): ‘wie sein gnade kostenlich hawse hielte, und bedeucht in, seinen 
gnaden nutze zusein, daz er es mit den Stetten hielte, sollich groß koste zuvermeiden’.
1315. BB 15 f. 140r-v (22.11.1441): ‘etlichen von der Ritterschaft an dem andern teyle’.
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nobles whose interests ran against any process of antagonistic identity-formation, 
especially those such as Werner von Parsberg who formed constructive alliances 
with the towns. This body of opinion does seem to have been influential later in 
the fifteenth century, for instance in overturning the outright ban on nobles with 
close ties to towns taking part in tournaments which was briefly established at 
Heidelberg in 1481.
Nevertheless, we have found no evidence for other models of town-noble 
relations which were anywhere near as highly developed as the ‘oppression of 
the nobility’ narrative was, or was becoming. This supports the fundamental 
contention of those who see growing tensions between townspeople and rural 
nobles in the fifteenth century, and indeed the theory that the 1440s was a key 
decade in this respect, though much further testing of both hypotheses is still 
required. This work is justified by the importance of town-noble relations as a 
process in German history and in Germans’ evolving self-understanding, but 
also by the intrinsic interest of their late medieval incarnation. This relationship 
became so embittered in certain quarters that the Apology for the nobles of the 
Schweinfurt League compared the towns to the Jews, the greatest outsiders of 
medieval German society – despite the fact that townspeople and nobles were 
not separated by religion, ethnicity or any of the principle characteristics which 
we today associate with xenophobia. This antagonism, and its background in the 
social separation between Nuremberg’s citizens and the rural nobility, is therefore 
a valuable study in the formation of our identities and prejudices.
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